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THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY, 


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THE 


Principles  of  Strategy 


Illustrated  Mainly  from  American  Campaigns 


BY 

JOHN  BIGELOW,  Jr. 

CAPTAIN,  TENTH  CAVALRY,  U.  S.  ARMY 

AUTHOR  OF    "mars   LA    TOUR   AND   GRAVELOTTE" 


SECOND    EDITION,    REVISED    AND    ENLARGED 


IVITH  ILLUSTRATIONS  AND  MAPS 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT   COMPANY 

1894 


IiOHBfl 


J  „,  BBnalTA  BT..  oefBHO!  GIBDBU. 


A^  ;'■ 


Copyright,  1893, 

BY 

John  Bigelow,  Jr. 


Printed  by  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company,  Philadelphia. 


PREFACE. 


General  Sherman  lias  said,  "There  may  be  siicli  men 
as  born  generals,  but  I  have  never  encountered  them,  and 
I  doubt  the  wisdom  of  trusting  to  their  turning  up  in  an 
emergency."  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  generals  are 
partly  born  and  partly  made,  and  are  the  joint  product  of 
three  characteristics :  talent,  or  a  faculty  born  in  the  man ; 
science,  or  a  faculty  acquired  by  study ;  and  art,  or  a 
faculty  acquired  by  experience.  What  is  here  said  with 
respect  to  generals  may  be  said,  too,  with  respect  to  efficient 
officers  of  all  grades ;  and  there  is  not  a  grade  in  which  a 
knowledge  of  the  highest  branch  of  military  science  may 
not  prove  advantageous.  A  lieutenant  in  charge  of  a 
scouting  party  may  be  confronted  with  problems  which 
nothing  but  generalship  will  enable  him  to  solve. 

While  of  paramount  importance  in  the  army,  military 
study  is  hardly  less  imi^ortant  in  the  reserve,  or  the 
national  guard.  Nor  is  it  unimportant  outside  of  these 
military  classes.  It  is  the  citizens  rather  than  the  soldiers 
who  decide  the  great  question  of  peace  or  war,  and  deter- 
mine the  military  policy  of  a  nation.  Hence  a  certain 
amount  of  military  knowledge  is  useful,  not  to  say  neces- 
sary, in  every  walk  of  civil  life,  and  should  be  regarded  as 
an  essential  j^iart  of  a  liberal  education. 

The  literature  of  the  day  abounds  in  works  on  the  art 
and  science  of  war,  but  these  are  based,  for  the  greater 

5 


6  PREFACE. 

part,  upon  the  exj^erience  of  European  armies  in  European 
countries.  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  author  of  this  book  to 
discuss  the  subject  of  strategy  in  the  light  of  American 
Avarfare,  and  thus  furnish  instruction  for  Americans,  not 
only  in  the  theory  of  this  subject,  but  also  in  the  military 
history  and  geography  of  their  own  country. 

It  is  neither  practicable  nor  advisable  in  a  work  of  this 
kind  altogether  to  avoid  the  use  of  technical  terms.  The 
first  chapter  is  therefore  devoted  to  the  discussion  and 
definition  of  such  as  are  deemed  pertinent  to  the  subject 
of  strategy  in  general.  Those  of  a  comparatively  restricted 
application  are  defined  as  they  are  brought  into  use. 

Proceeding  from  the  general  strategic  terms  to  the 
strategic  implement,  the  author  describes  the  order  of 
march  of  a  moderate-sized  army,  first  in  a  plain  or  road- 
less country,  and  then  in  a  road  country,  and  explains 
what  is  meant  by  Striking  Distance.  Under  the  head  of 
The  Organization  and  Size  of  Armies,  he  discusses  the 
disposition  of  a  large  army  for  operating  under  such  con- 
ditions as  obtain  in  Continental  Europe.  He  next  de- 
scribes the  Strategic  Chess-Board;  and  treats  in  particular 
of  strategic  jDoints ;  obstacles,  natural  and  artificial ;  screens, 
and  the  use  of  screens  and  obstacles ;  and  communications 
and  transportation.  He  then  concludes  what  may  be 
called  the  ^preparatory  part  of  the  work  with  an  abstract 
or  geometrical  discussion  of  strategic  movements  which 
he  entitles  The  Essential  Elements  of  Strategy. 

Hereupon  the  subject  of  strategy  is  resolved  into  regu- 
lar, political,  and  tactical  strategy.  Under  the  head  of 
regular  strategy,  the  nature  of  lines  and  bases,  both  of 


PREFACE.  7 

supply  and  of  retreat,  and  the  modes  of  securing  them, 
are  first  considered.  Modes  of  operation  are  then  discussed 
under  the  two  heads  :  Operating  independently  of  a  Base, 
and  Operating  from  a  Base.  The  discussion  of  tactical 
strategy  comprises  a  consideration  of  the  factors  of  tactical 
power,  the  princij^le  of  strategic  concentration,  the  use  of 
interior  and  exterior  lines,  and  kindred  subjects,  the  selec- 
tion of  an  objective,  and  the  dissimilarity  of  action  between 
the  fractions  of  an  army  on  the  one  hand,  and  separate 
armies  on  the  other. 

Political  strategy  is  treated  under  the  two  heads :  The 
Government  as  a  Military  Objective  and  The  People  as  a 
3Iilita7y  Objective. 

The  work  then  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  Wa?-  and 
Strategy  in  General,  illustrated  by  the  campaigns  of  Shiloh 
and  Vicksburg. 

The  first  edition,  which  was  published  in  1891,  has  been 
carefully  revised.  The  discussion  of  The  Essential  Ele- 
ments of  Strategy  has  been  simplified  and  abridged,  and 
the  work,  as  a  whole,  enlarged  by  descriptions  of  the  cam- 
paign of  Shiloh,-  the  campaign  of  Chancellorsville,  Grant's 
overland  campaign,  and  other  matter.  The  number  of 
maps  and  plans  has  been  reduced,  without  detracting  from 
the  value  of  tlie  work,  and  with  the  effect  of  considerably 
diminishing  the  size  and  cost  of  the  volume. 

The  author  is  indebted  for  valuable  suggestions  to  Lieu- 
tenants J.  F.  Morrison  and  A.  D.  Niskern,  of  the  20th 
U.  S.  Infantry,  and  to  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Grierson,  of  the 
10th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

Fort  Assinniboine,  Montana. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

General  Definitions 17 

An  Army  on  the  March 21 

In  a  Plain  Country 21 

In  a  Eoad  Country 26 

Striking  Distance 37 

The  Organization  and  Size  op  Armies 39 

The  Strategic  Chess-Board 44 

Strategic  Points ^ 47 

Obstacles,  Natural  and  xirtificial 52 

Screens,  and  the  Use  of  Screens  and  Obstacles 65 

Communications  and  Transportation 71 

The  Essential  Elements  of  Strategy 81 

The  Eace 82 

The  Manoeuvre 84 

The  Eetreat  and  Pursuit 89 

-The  Atlanta  Campaign,  1864 92 

The  Different  Kinds  op  Strategy 105 

Strategy  in  the  American  Eevolution 105 

Eegular  Strategy  110 

General  Considerations 110 

Grant's  Overland  Campaign,  1864 124 

Operating  independently  of  a  Base 132 

The  Case  of  Supplies  being  carried  along 132 

The  Saratoga  Campaign,  1777 136 

The  Case  of  Supplies  being  taken  fx-om  the  Country.    .    .  140 
Supplies  being  both   carried  along  and   taken  from  the 

Country 143 

Sherman's  March  through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  1864  144 

Sheridan's  Devastation  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  1804  .  147 

The  Geronimo  Campaign,  1886 150 

Operating  from  a  Base 152 

Cutting  a  Line  of  Supply    .            152 

Counter- Offensive  Manoeuvring 153 

9 


10  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Illustrations  of  Counter-Ofpensive  Operation 159 

"Washington's  Counter-Offensive  at  Trenton,  1777  ....  159 

The  Campaign  of  Chancellorsville,  1863 161 

Operating  behind  and  about  the  Enemy's  Base 183 

The  Blockade  of  the  Confederate  States 184 

The  Cruise  of  the  Alabama 186 

Tactical  Strategy 189 

The  Factors  of  Tactical  Power 189 

Concentration 192 

Interior  and  Exterior  Lines 192 

The  Use  and  Yalue  of  Eoad  Junctions 193 

Strategic  Interposition 195 

Tactical  Strategy — Continued 200 

The  Selection  of  an  Object 200 

A  Fractional  Army  and  Separate  Armies.      Comparison 

of  Modes  of  Operation 201 

Tactics  as  a  Factor  in  Strategy 203 

Strategy  as  a  Factor  in  Tactics 205 

The  Second  Bull  Eun  Campaign,  1862 206 

The  Gettysburg  Campaign,  1863 209 

Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  1862 212 

Political  Strategy 224 

The  Government  as  a  Military  Objective 224 

The  People  as  a  Military  Objective 228 

British    Operations  in  Georgia,  the  Carolinas,  and  Vir- 
ginia, 1776-1781 234 

War  and  Strategy  in  General 259 

-The  Shiloh  Campaign,  1862 267 

-"The  Vicksburg  Campaign,  1863,  including  Grierson's  Eaid 

through  Mississippi 283 

Index 343 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED  BY 
THE  AUTHOR. 


Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  prepared  under  the  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  edited  by  the  Century 
Company. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War,  edited  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 

The  Navy  in  the  Civil  War,  Ibid. 

Johnston's  Narrative,  by  himself 

Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  by  himself. 

Memoirs  of  General  William  T.  Sherman,  by  himself 

Memoirs  of  General  P.  H.  Sheridan,  by  himself 

Military  History  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  Badeau. 

History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America,  Comte  de  Paris. 

History  of  the  American  Civil  War,  Draper. 

Memoirs  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  Long. 

Four  Years  with  General  Lee,  Taylor. 

Life  and  Campaigns  of  Lieutenant- General  T.  J.  {Stonewall)  Jack- 
son, Dabney. 

Jackson's  Valley  Campaign,  Allan. 

The  Campaigns  of  Stuarfs  Cavalry,  McClellan. 

History  of  the  Mexican  War,  Wilcox. 

History  of  the  Mexican  War,  Brooks. 

War  with  Mexico,  Eipley. 

Abraham  Lincoln,  A  History,  Hay  and  Nicolay. 

History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Yan  Horne. 

The   Rise  and  Pall  of  the   Confederate    Government,   Jefferson 
Davis. 

Defence  of  the  Sea-Coast  of  the  United  States,  Abbot. 

Report  on  the  Defences  of  Washington,  Barnard. 

Modern  Warfare,  MacDougall. 

Lessons  of  War,  Soady. 

Modern  War,  Derr^cagaix. 

11 


12     LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES   CONSULTED   BY  THE  AUTHOR. 

The  Soldier  s  Pocket-Book  for  Field  Service,  Wolseley. 

Science  of  War  and  Fortification,  O'Connor. 

On  War,  Clausewitz. 

Operations  of  War,  Hamley. 

Elements  of  Military  Art  and  Science,  Halleck. 

Summary  of  the  Art  of  War,  Schalk. 

Art  of  War,  Graham. 

Lectures  on  Staff  Duty,  Clarke. 

Strategy  and  Tactics,  Dufour. 

Elements  of  the  Art  and  Science  of  War,  Wheeler. 

The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff,  Yon  Schellendorf. 

Principes  de  la  Strategie,  Le  Prince  Charles. 

The  Spirit  of  the  Modern  System  of  War,  by  a  Prussian  General 
Officer  [Yon  Bulow]. 

Strategy,  Blume. 

Letters  on  Strategy,  Prince  Kraft  zu  Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen. 

Principes  de  la  Strategie,  Okounep. 

La  Strategie  Appliqiiee,  Fix. 

The  Lifluence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,  Mahan. 

Field  Service  in  War,  Lippitt. 

The  Art  of  War,  Jomini. 

A  Precis  of  Modern  Tactics,  Home. 

History  of  the  United  States,  Bancroft. 

Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Swinton. 

The  Twelve  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  Ibid. 

The  Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World,  Creasy. 

History  of  the  Campaigns  of  1780  and  1781  in  the  Southern  Prov- 
inces of  North  America,  Tarleton. 

Sketches  of  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Nathaniel  Greene,  John- 
son. 

History  of  the  English  People,  Green. 

The  Clinton- Cornwallis  Correspondence,  Stevens. 

The  Life  of  General  Lafayette,  Cutter. 

The  Life  of  Frederick  William  von  Steuben,  Kapp. 

The  Yorktoivn  Campaign,  Johnston. 

The  Hessians  in  the  Revolution,  Lowell. 

The  Battles  of  the  American  Revolution,  Carrington. 

The  Writings  of  George  Washington,  Ford. 

History  of  the  American  Revolution,  Fiske. 

The  Invasion  and  Capture  of  Washington,  "Williams. 

Report  on  the  Internal  Commerce  of  the  United  States,  1886,  Switz- 
ler. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES   CONSULTED  BY  THE  AUTHOR.     13 

Report  of  the  Board  of  Fortifications  or  other  Defences,  1886. 
Notes  on  the  Military  Geograjyhy  of  the  United  States,  Brown. 
History  of  the  Consulate  and  Empire,  Thiers. 
History  of  Napoleon,  Norvins. 

Correspondence  of  Napoleon  I.,  published  by  Napoleon  III. 
Military  Government  and  Martial  Law,  Birkiiimer. 
Exercir-Reglement  fur  die  Infanterie,  1888. 
Felddienst-Ordnung  (Eegulations  for  Field  Service),  1887. 
Aide-Memoire  de  V  Officier  d'Ftat-Major,  1887. 
Precis  de  la  Campagne  de  1805,  edited  by  Merzbach  and  Falk, 
Brussels. 

Ancient  Monarchies,  Rawlinson. 

The  Nation  in  Arms,  Yon  der  Goltz. 

The  Winning  of  the  West,  Roosevelt. 

The  Magazine  of  American  History,  and  other  periodicals. 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 

(See  end  of  volume.) 


1.  The  Atlanta  Campaign,  1864. 

2.  Disposition  of  Troops  in  Eear  of  Sherman's  Army,  1864. 

3.  Grant's  Overland  Campaign,  1864. 

4.  Sherman's  March  through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  1864. 

5.  Trenton,  1777. 

6.  The  ChancellorsviJle  Campaign,  1863. 

7.  The  Second  Bull  Eun  Campaign,  1862. 

8.  (No.  1  and  No.  2.)     The  Campaign  of  Gettysburg,  1863. 

9.  (No.  1  and  No,  2.)     The  Shenandoah  Yalley  and  Adjacent 

Countr}',   with  Positions  of  Troops  in  Jackson's  Valley 
Campaign,  1862. 

10.  Jackson's  March  to  the  Eear  of  Strasburg,  1862. 

11.  Campaigns  of  Saratoga  and  Yorktown,  1777  and  1781. 

12.  Seat  of  War  in  the  Southern  States,  1776-1781. 

13.  The  Campaign  of  Shiloh,  1862. 

14.  The  Theatre  of  War  in  the  West,  1863. 

15-21.  The  Environs  of  Vicksburg,  with  Positions  of  the  Troops 
in  the  Yicksburg  Campaign,  1803. 


15 


GENERAL  DEFINITIONS. 

WAR  is  commonly   defined  to  be  a  contest   between 
nations,  states,  or  j)arts  of  states,  carried  on  by  force. 
In  its  highest  form  it  is  a  fight  between  armies. 

An  array  is  made  up  of  simple  or  indivisible  elements 
of  military  j^ower,  such  as  the  infantryman  with  his  rifle, 
the  gun  detachment  with  its  gun,  the  cavalryman  with  his 
horse.  These  elements  are  formed  into  groups,  and  these 
groups  subordinated  to  certain  officers  charged  with  direct- 
ing them  and  providing  for  tliem  ;  these  are  again  collected 
into  larger  groups  under  other  officers,  and  so  on,  in  such 
a  way  that  the  whole  is  subject  to  the  direction  and  control 
of  one  will.  Briefly  defined,  then,  an  army  is  the  highest 
organic  form  of  military  power.  Why  not  say  fighting 
power  ?  Because  fighting  power  is  not  necessarily  military 
power.  In  all  but  military  combats  an  express  or  tacit 
agreement  or  the  necessities  of  the  case  prevent  the  com- 
batants from  using  the  best  means  to  their  end.  It  is  only 
the  soldier  who  fights  with  the  best  wea])on  that  human 
art  and  ingenuity  can  produce  or  procure  for  him,  whose 
fighting  power  is  of  the  highest  order.  Military  power 
may  be  defined  to  be  the  highest  order  of  fighting  power. 

Tactics  is  the  art  of  conducting  war  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy ;  strategy,  the  art  of  conchicting  it  beyond  his 
presence.  The  province  of  tactics  is  the  field  of  battle ; 
that  of  strategy,  the  theatre  of  war,  on  which,  to  the 
strategist,  the  field  of  battle  is  as  a  point. 

Specially  important  points  of  the  field   of  battle  are 


-¥ 


18 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


designated  as  tactical  points ;  those  of  the  theatre  of  war, 
as  strategic  points. 

Both  tactical  and  strategic  points  are  of  two  kinds : 
decisive  points  and  key-points.  A  decisive  point  is  a 
point  upon  w^hich  a  decisive  blow  may  be  made  to  fall ;  in 
other  w^ords,  where  an  attack  may  be  made  which  shall 
decide  a  battle,  or  a  battle  fought  which  shall  decide  a 
campaign.  A  key-point  is  a  point  by  which  access  is 
gained  to  a  decisive  point. 

Any  point,  the  attainment  of  which  is  the  object  of 
a  military  operation,  is  called  an  objective  point  or  objec- 
tive. It  is  obvious  that  a  tactical  objective  should  be  a 
tactical  point,  and  a  strategic  objective  a  strategic  point. 

Strategy  directs  the  mass  of  an  army  through  the  key- 
points  upon  the  decisive  points  of  the  theatre  of  war; 
tactics  directs  them  in  a  similar  manner  upon  the  decisive 
points  of  the  field  of  battle. 


Fig.  1. 


Strategy  and  tactics  may  therefore  conflict  with  each 
other.  In  Fig.  1,  let  A  B  represent  an  array  resting  its 
left  flank  upon  a  lake,  G,  and  C  D  its  line  of  retreat.  Pure 
strategy  would    dictate  that   the   offensive   army   should 


GENERAL   DEFINITIONS.  19 

attack  at  C,  or  at  some  point  between  C  and  B,  in  order 
to  seize  the  line  of  retreat  C  D,  but  tactics  would  forbid  it 
on  the  ground  of  the  superior  strength  of  that  part  of  the 
line,  and  would  direct  the  attack  against  the  unprotected 
flank  A. 

OFFENSIVE    AND    DEFENSIVE. 

In  the  ordinary  combat  one  side  awaits  the  action  of 
the  other,  and  fights  in  reaction  against  it.  The  one  that 
opens  the  combat  is  said  to  attack,  or  to  fight  on  the 
offensive;  the  other  is  said  to  defend  itself,  or  to  fight  on 
the  defensive. 

OFFENSIVE    AND    DEFENSIVE    FORM. 

Inasmuch  as  there  cannot  be  a  fight  unless  one  side  or 
the  other  attacks,  the  relative  defensive  strength  of  the 
two  opposing  combatants  cannot  practically  concern  them  ; 
but  as  there  may  be  one  in  which  both  sides  attack,  the 
parties  to  a  combat  may  have  to  measure  their  relative 
offensive  strength.  As  the  ordinary  fight,  however,  con- 
sists of  an  attack  on  the  one  side  and  a  defence  on  the 
other,  the  important  question  to  a  combatant  is  his  rela- 
tive offensive  strength  with  respect  to  the  defensive  strength 
of  the  enemy  and  the  converse. 

Mounted  cavalry  cannot  fight  except  by  attacking.  If 
it  await  the  enemy  in  position  it  is  sure  to  be  tumbled  over 
or  routed.  Here  the  offensive  is  incomparably  stronger 
than  the  defensive.  In  the  case  of  infantry  attacking 
infantry  the  advantage  is  on  the  side  of  the  defensive. 
Before  the  days  of  breech-loaders  a  soldier  not  only  could 
not  aim,  he  could  not  load  without  halting.  Although 
there  were  instances  of  this  disadvantage  being  remedied 
by  drills  devised  especially  for  that  purpose,  it  was  not 
until  the  breech-loader  came  into  use  that  the  offensive, 
generally  speaking,  had  an  equal  chance  as  to  loading  with 
the  defensive.     The  breech-loader,  howevej-,  left  the  rela- 


20  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

tive  aiming  j^ower  of  the  offensive  just  where  it  was  before, 
where  it  is  still,  and  where  it  is  likely  to  remain.  For  no 
amount  of  training  can  enable  a  soldier  to  control  his 
nerves  as  effectively  through  the  brief  pauses  in  an 
advance  as  he  can  during  a  continuous  halt ;  to  control 
them  as  effectively,  in  other  words,  on  the  offensive  as  he 
can  on  the  defensive. 

The  defensive  is  a  stronger  form  of  action  than  the  offen- 
sive, and  yet  the  pure  defensive  is  almost  invariably  beaten. 
The  explanation  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  a  combat  is 
not  a  mere  trial  of  strength  in  which  these  two  forms  are 
pitted  squarely  against  each  other,  but  a  contest  of  strength 
and  skill  combined,  in  which,  by  virtue  of  the  initiative, 
the  offensive  commonly  secures  an  advantage  over  the 
defensive.  The  initiative  consists  essentially  in  getting 
the  start  of  the  enemy, — that  is,  in  moving  or  concentrating 
before  he  does.  It  is  one  of  the  highest  marks  of  general- 
ship to  be  able  to  alternate  judiciously  between  the  offen- 
sive and  defensive  modes  of  action,  and  thus  practically  to 
unite  the  two  opposite  characteristics  of  initiative  and 
resistance. 

OFFEXSIVE-DEFENSIVE    AND    MIXED    DEFENSIVE. 

Any  army  may  seek  to  defend  itself  by  attacking,  or  it 
may  attack  solely  to  prevent  being  attacked.  Such  action 
— offensive  in  form  but  defensive  in  spirit — is  designated 
as  the  offensive-defensive.  While  the  offensive  form  of 
action  will  accomplish  the  defensive  end,  and  thus  satisfy 
the  defensive  spirit,  the  defensive  form  will  not  satisfy  the 
offensive  spirit.  When,  therefore,  the  offensive  assumes  a 
defensive  form  it  does  so  temporarily,  and  supplements  the 
defensive  action  by  an  offensive  one.  Such  mixed  action 
is  technically  called  the  mixed  defensive. 


II. 

AN  ARMY  ON  THE  MARCH. 

IN    A    PLAIN    COUNTRY. 

THE  formation  of  an  army  on  the  march  is  generally 
based  upon  a  satisfaction  of  the  following  require- 
ments : 

1.  Security  against  surprise. 

2.  Efficiency  of  command  and  administration. 

3.  Mutual  support  of  the  different  parts. 

4.  Celerity  of  movement. 

In  a  roadless  or  plain  country  the  protection  required  is 
about  the  same  in  every  direction.  Marching  in  a  perfectly 
open  plain  such  as  our  Western  prairies,  over  which  the 
eye  may  range  for  ten  or  twenty  miles,  a  force  of  the  size 
of  an  ordinary  scouting  party,  which  rarely  exceeds  a 
good-sized  company,  may  be  protected  against  surprise  by 
simply  detaching  a  few  men  in  different  directions  charged 
with  giving  the  matter  their  attention.  If  the  force  be 
considerably  larger,  especially  if  the  plain  be  rolling  or 
slightly  broken,  and  the  enemy  stealthy  and  cunning,  the 
covering  of  the  main  body  by  detachments  in  a  way 
effectually  to  guard  against  sudden  or  unexj)ected  attack 
would  employ  an  excessively  large  portion  of  the  com- 
mand and  greatly  fatigue  it.  An  army  so  situated  has  to 
march  in  order  of  battle,  or  so  nearly  so  that  it  can  com- 
plete its  formation  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  It  may 
be  asked  what  would  be  the  objection  to  having  the  whole 
force  thrown  out  as  if  for  the  secui'ity  of  the  remainder. 
AVhat  is  the  use  of  a  main  body?     The  need  of  a  main 


22  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

body  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  an  attack  on  the  march  as 
it  is  in  a  regular  battle.  It  constitutes  a  central  reserve 
for  the  cordon  of  detachments.  Without  it,  the  detach- 
ments being  overthrown  at  any  point,  the  baggage,  wounded, 
etc.,  the  non-combatant  force  generally,  would  be  at  the 
mercy  of  the  enemy. 

The  only  formation  in  which  an  army  can  march  and 
be  ready  to  resist  an  attack  from  any  direction  at  any 
moment  is  the  square.  To  w^ithstand  the  charges  of  a 
numerous  and  intrepid  cavalry,  Napoleon  in  his  Egyptian 
campaign  marched  his  army  so  that  it  could  readily  form 
squares  by  division.  The  troops  of  each  square  formed 
two  columns,  two  faces  of  the  square  in  each  column,  ready 
at  any  moment  to  halt  and  front.  His  army  consisted  of 
five  divisions,  each  division  of  two  brigades,  each  brigade 
of  two  demi-brigades,  or,  as  we  should  say,  two  regiments, 
each  regiment  of  three  battalions,  each  battalion  of  nine 
companies,  including   one  of  grenadiers,  who  were  elite 

or  picked  men.     A   division 
"^   thus  numbered  four  regiments, 

which  gave  one  for  each  face 


t\  ^Jl,^  ft 


of  the  square  (Fig.  2).     The 
grenadiers  of  each   battalion 

II  were  posted  at  the  corners  to 
I  flank  the  faces,  or  held  back 
in  reserve  to  re-enforce  threat- 
ened or  hard-pressed  points. 
The  ranks  were  doubled, 
making  each  face  six  ranks 
deep.  The  baggage  and  cavalry  were  in  the  centre,  the 
artillery  was  at  the  angles  and  in  the  intervals  between 
battalions. 

Such  large  squares  were  no  stronger  than  smaller,  say 
battalion  or  regimental,  squares  would  have  been,  and  took 
considerably  more  time  to  form,  but  their  size  was  necessary 


AN  ARMY  ON  THE  MARCH.  23 

to  enclose  with  some  margin  the  wagons,  cavalry,  etc. 
These  were  not  mere  rallying  formations  as  were  the 
famous  squares  at  Waterloo.  They  were  grand  or  strategic 
squares,  as  distinguished  from  ordinary  or  tactical  squares. 
When  a  position  was  to  be  carried,  the  front  or  outward 
halves  of  all  four  faces  detached  themselves,  peeled  off  as 
it  were,  and  formed  columns  of  attack ;  the  inner  halves 
remained  in  rear,  still  forming  the  square,  but  only  three 
ranks  deep,  ready  to  rally  the  columns  of  attack.  One 
division,  that  of  the  gallant  General  Desaix,  who  after- 
wards saved  the  day  and  lost  his  life  at  Marengo,  j^receded 
the  remainder  of  the  army  by  about  a  day's  march  as 
advance  guard.  What  little  mounted  cavalry  Napoleon 
had,  which  numbered  when  he  first  landed  but  300  men, 
was  attached  to  this  division.  Another  division  followed 
the  main  body  as  rear  guard. 

The  following  diagram  (Fig.  3)  shows  an  order  of 
march  adopted  by  the  British  in  the  Soudan  campaign 
for  a  force  of  two  brigades  accompanied  by  cavalry  and 
artillery.  One  brigade  marched  on  the  right  rear  of  the 
other  at  a  distance  varying  from  600  yards  to  900  yards  in 
an  oblique  line,  the  object  being  to  expose  the  enemy,  in 
the  event  of  his  charging  one  brigade,  to  a  raking  or  flank 
fire  from  the  other.  The  rear  battalions  and  the  half 
battalions  on  either  flank  of  either  brigade  marched  at 
wheeling  distances,  so  that  on  the  word  to  form  outward 
being  given  two  complete  squares  could  be  formed.  The 
main  body  of  the  cavalry  were  echeloned  on  the  left  rear 
of  the  second  brigade. 

The  peculiarly  timid  or  wily  tactics  of  certain  of  our 
Indian  tribes  precludes  their  attacking  in  the  open.  Thus 
in  any  country  in  which  troops  could  march  in  a  square 
they  would  be  pretty  sure  not  to  attack.  The  Utes, 
Apaches,  and  other  mountain  Indians  would,  in  a  i:>lain, 
simply  watch  a  body  of   troops  without  showing  them- 


24  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

selves,  in  order  to  precede  them  to  the  mountains  and 
ambush  them  in  a  canon  or  ravine.  The  7th  Cavalry, 
Custer's  old  regiment,  which  has  done  a  great  deal  of 
active  service  in  our  northern  Indian  country,  has  a 
normal  order  of  march  for  the  2:»lains,  which  is  a  sort  of 

Fig.  3. 


X 


V>|- 


"iJ= 


A  ifilltrt 


K  ar'nits 


.UL 


i    l<\''  tl5^ 


H-l- 


AitiUerij 


bo4 

compromise  betw^een  the  square  and  the  column  (Fig.  4). 
The  regiment,  consisting,  as  do  all  our  cavalry  regiments, 
of  twelve  troops,  is  divided  into  four  battalions  of  three 
troops  each.*  In  the  centre  of  the  formation  marches  a 
train  of  some  250  wagons,  four  abreast.  The  width  of 
this  column  is  about  thirty  yards.  It  is  immediately 
j^receded  by  a  company  of  infantry  and  a  platoon,  or  two 
pieces   of   artillery,    and    immediately    followed    by    two 

"^^  This  was  written  before  Troops  L  and  M  were  "  skeletonized" 
and  the  strength  of  our  cavalry  regiments  reduced  practically  to  ten 
troops. 


Advance 
Cuavd 


Alaui 
Bodi 


V 


AN  ARMY  ON  THE  MARCH. 
Fig.  4. 

One     Aaii'}     matcK. 


25 


cavo\i 


iTrcchs    as  iMC-ntcts 


0«t  CI  mon.l<i»c^\Vis     c\  tio'ift 


J\rliU\ 


\  C. 


Cav    •'■..'■      \  Troop     Ti'sllt 


Waaon  Ttavr\ 

about 
i5oo  ijd!  lonq. 


Injtf^  '    a  Eos 


cavalrvj 

'•:'.  Pocl^-Tto'i-v. 

cavjaln. 


1  t, 


Rear 

Quari 


Covr.   I     1    BalMun- 


26  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

companies  of  infantry.  One  battalion  marches  ahead  as 
advance  guard,  one  in  rear  as  rear  guard,  and  one  on  each 
flank.  One  troop  of  the  advance  guard  precedes  the 
other  two  by  any  distance  up  to  a  day's  march.  Its  object 
is  to  select  a  camp  and  determine  the  hue  of  march. 
The  two  other  troops  follow  its  trail,  unless  by  short  de- 
viations therefrom  they  can  secure  better  travelling  for  the 
main  body.  These  two  troops  serve  as  pioneers,  removing 
obstacles,  looking  up  fords,  cutting  away  steep  banks  and 
bluffs,  etc.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  an  Indian 
country  may  be  perfectly  devoid  of  roads,  paths,  trails, 
etc.  The  three  companies  of  each  flanking  battalion  so 
regulate  their  march  that  two  shall  be  moving  and  the 
other  resting,  the  men  of  the  latter  being  dismounted  and 
their  horses  unbridled  to  graze.  These  companies  march 
about  500  yards,  or  good  covering  distance,  from  the  train. 
Each  one  sends  out  as  flankers  a  non-commissioned  officer 
and  three  or  four  men.  The  pack  train  and  beef  herd 
march  between  the  train  and  the  flanking  companies, 

IN    A    ROAD    COUNTRY. 

Security  against  Surprise. 

If  advancing,  the  protection  required  is  greatest  in  front, 
somewhat  less  on  the  flanks,  and  least  in  rear.  If  retreat- 
ing, the  greatest  need  of  protection  is  in  rear,  the  least  in 
front.  The  protection  of  an  advancing  army  in  front  is 
performed  by  its  advance  guard  (Fig.  5).  The  defensive 
functions  of  an  advance  guard  are  : 

1.  To  screen  the  main  body  with  a  view  to  concealing 
or  disguising  its  strength,  composition,  formation,  and 
movements. 

2.  To  protect  the  main  body  from  attack  until  it  has 
had  time  to  form  and  complete  its  line  of  battle. 

Its  offensive  functions  : 


^.V  ARMY  ON  THE  MARCH.  27 

1.  To  observe  the  enemy  with  a  view  to  ascertaining 
with  respect  to  his  main  body  what  it  aims  to  conceal  with 
respect  to  its  own. 

2.  To  initiate  the  battle  and  sustain  it  until  the  arrival 
of  the  main  body. 

Like  every  other  detachment,  the  advance  guard  should 
be  no  stronger  than  seems  absolutely  necessary.  Since  the 
close  of  our  Civil  War,  however,  its  necessary  strength  has 
considerably  increased.  The  increased  effectiveness  of  fire- 
arms has  increased  the  advantage  of  the  defensive  over 
the  direct  offensive,  or  front  attack,  and  thus  increased  the 
importance  of  manoeuvring ;  and  increased  manoeuvring 
requires  increased  protection. 

The  strength  of  the  advance  guard  depends  in  each 
case  upon  its  composition,  the  nature  of  the  country,  its 
distance  from  the  main  body  and  from  the  enemy,  and  the 
plans  or  designs  of  the  opposhig  commanders.  Its  offen- 
sive functions  call,  generally  speaking,  for  a  stronger  force 
and  greater  distance  from  the  main  body  than  its  defensive. 
The  offensive  observation  of  the  enemy,  however,  is  ordi- 
narily performed  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  by  independent 
cavalry,  or  a  mixed  force,  thrown  out  a  day's  march,  more  or 
less,  in  advance  of  the  advance  guard,  and  which  regulates 
its  movements,  to  a  large  extent,  by  those  of  the  enemy. 

The  advance  guard  is  formed  of  at  least  three  parts. 
First  comes  a  squad,  usually  of  mounted  men,  under  an 
officer  or  non-commissioned  officer,  termed  the  point.  This 
is  followed  by  an  advance  detachment  called  the  support, 
and  this  by  the  main  body,  or  reserve.  The  manner  in 
which  these  different  parts  co-operate  for  the  security  of 
the  main  body  of  the  army  is  about  as  follows :  the  point, 
moving  on  as  broad  a  front  as  practicable,  looks  out  for 
the  first  signs  of  the  enemy,  and  as  far  as  its  small  force 
will  admit  examines  and  feels  him.  The  advance  detach- 
ment, meanwhile,  without  wholly  uncovering  the  reserve, 


28  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

supports  and  re-enforces  the  point.  When  the  point  and 
support  have  between  them  ascertained  the  nature,  strength, 
and  formation  of  the  enemy,  the  reserve  seizes  upon  certain 
commanding  points,  and  thus  marks  out  in  a  general  way 
a  line  and  plan  of  battle.  The  main  body  of  the  army 
then  comes  up  and  executes  that  plan  with  such  modifica- 
tions as  the  commanding  general  sees  fit  and  is  able  to 
carry  out. 

Following  the  main  body  comes  the  train,  or,  as  the  old 
Romans  expressively  called  it,  the  impedimenta.  It  may 
be  regarded  as  consisting  of  three  parts  (Fig.  5)  : 

1.  That  which  is  needed  on  the  march,  or  in  action,  or 
shortly  after  going  into  camp.  This  is  called  the  light 
baggage,  or  fighting  train. 

2.  That  which  is  needed  daily  in  camp,  but  not  until 
some  time  after  the  night  halt,  or  shortly  before  the  start 
in  the  morning.  This  is  called  the  heavy  baggage,  or 
regimental  train. 

3.  That  which  is  not  needed,  either  in  action  or  daily 
in  camp.  This  may  be  called  the  reserve,  or  general 
supply  train. 

These  different  j^arts  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  within 
convenient  reach  of  the  main  body,  without  hampering  it 
on  the  one  hand,  or  unnecessarily  exposing  themselves  on 
the  other.  The  fighting  train  follows  close  upon  the  main 
body,  say  a  hundred  or  a  few  hundred  yards  behind  it. 
The  regimental  train  follows  the  fighting  train  at  the  safe 
distance  of  a  mile  or  more.  The  general  supply  train 
marches  far  enough  in  rear  of  the  rest  of  the  column  to  be 
able  to  keep  out  of  its  way  should  the  latter  be  pressed  back 
in  retreat,  and  yet  not  so  far  but  that  it  can  join  the  main 
body,  if  necessary,  during  the  night,  say  from  half  a  day's 
to  a  day's  march  in  rear  of  the  main  body.  Where  there 
is  no  likelihood  of  an  engagement,  the  regimental  train,  or 
part  of  it,  may  precede  the  fighting  train.     The  diagram 


--d 


CJ5 


^iV  ^/^iWF   ON  THE  MARCH. 
Fig.  5. 
^  Poin\. 

I  Subporl. 

I\e3enje. 


29 


/>. 


Tiq^Vinc^Travn 


X 


X 


t3 


I 


T^tqimtT.^aV   Tra\n 


% 


a 
o 
o 


Travtx 


o 
o 
o 
oo 


N/ 


30  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

(Fig.  5)  represents  a  division  of  15,000  men  marching  on 
a  single  road. 

The  whole  column,  from  the  point  of  the  advance  guard 
to  the  rear  of  the  general  supply  train,  would  measure 
32,000  yards,  or  eighteen  miles.  Adding  to  this  one-third 
for  opening  out,  we  have  for  the  roadway  that  it  would 
take  uj)  on  the  march  twenty-four  miles. 

Should  the  flanks  of  a  marching  column  not  be  ade- 
quately covered  by  independent  cavalry,  or  neighboring 
columns,  or  natural  obstacles,  they  are  protected  by  detach- 
ments thrown  out  from  the  advance  guard,  and,  it  may  be, 
from  the  main  body  also.  These  side  detachments  are 
called  flankers. 

The  so-called  rear  guard  of  an  advancing  column  is 
little  more  in  reality  than  a  police  force  or  provost  guard. 
Its  principal  functions  are  taking  up  stragglers,  repacking 
wagons  that  have  upset,  and  occasionally  defending  the 
train  against  a  dash  of  cavalry  or  guerillas,  or  the  depre- 
dations of  armed  inhabitants.  In  the  French  army  it 
marches  in  rear  of  the  fighting  train  and  in  advance  of 
the  regimental  train.  In  the  Russian  army  it  marches  in 
rear  of  the  regimental  train  and  in  advance  of  the  general 
suj)ply  train.  In  the  British  army,  and  in  our  own,  it 
marches  regularly  in  rear  of  the  general  supply  train. 
The  Germans  have  no  rear  guard,  or,  perhaps  I  should 
say,  they  do  not  use  the  designation,  rear  guard,  except  in 
retreat. 

In  marching  away  from  the  enemy,  or  in  retreat,  the 
train  should  precede  the  troops ;  in  marching  across  his 
front,  they  should  keep  abreast  of  them  on  the  side  oppo- 
site the  enemy.  In  the  campaign  of  1812,  General  Hull 
embarked  his  baggage,  stores,  sick,  convalescent,  and  "  even 
the  instructions  of  his  Government  and  the  returns  of  his 
army"  on  board  a  packet,  and  despatched  them  for  Detroit, 
while  the  army,  with  the  same  destination,  resumed  its 


AN  ARMY   ON  THE  MARCH.  31 

march  by  land.  The  consequence  of  thus  sending  his 
baggage,  stores,  official  papers,  etc.,  without  a  guard,  and 
on  the  flank  nearest  the  enemy,  was  what  might  have  been 
expected.  In  attempting  to  pass  the  British  post  of  Mai- 
den, the  whole  detachment  was  captured  by  a  lieutenant 
and  six  men  in  a  small  open  boat. 

If  the  train  be  properly  screened  by  detachments  be- 
tween it  and  the  enemy,  it  will  be  secured  against  an 
attack  in  force.  Should  a  small  party  succeed  in  getting 
in  unperceived  among  the  wagons,  it  may  contrive  to 
divert  a  part,  if  not  the  whole  of  the  train  from  its 
command,  and  capture  it.  Where  this  is  not  practicable, 
an  opportunity  may  present  itself  of  destroying  at  least  a 
part  of  it  with  dynamite  or  some  other  powerful  and  port- 
able explosive.  Every  improvement  made  in  the  power 
or  portability  of  high  explosives  contributes  to  the  efficacy 
and  importance  of  raiding,  and  of  guerilla  and  partisan 
warfare. 

A  country  can  hardly  be  supposed  so  perfectly  open 
but  that  an  enemy  of  some  sort  may  operate  in  it  unseen. 
An  Apache  Indian  can  conceal  himself  in  the  grass  of  the 
prairie  a  few  yards  from  the  flank  of  a  marching  column, 
and  any  bushwhacker  can  find  concealment  along  an  ordi- 
nary road.  Perfect  security,  therefore,  requires  that  a 
certain  force  be  distributed  throughout  the  train  to  guard 
any  and  every  point  against  hidden  enemies.  With  this 
end  in  view  there  is  usually  at  least  one  soldier  in  each 
wagon. 

Efficiency  of  Command  and  Administration. 

By  efficiency  of  command  and  administration  is  under- 
stood the  subordination  of  the  movements  of  an  army  to 
the  will  of  the  commanding  general,  and  keeping  it  sup- 
plied. Efficiency  of  command  calls  for  a  close  or  concen- 
trated order  of  march  and  sure  and  rapid  communication 


32  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

between  head-quarters  and  the  several  corps  or  divisions, 
and,  above  all,  for  a  competent  and  energetic  staff  to  work 
out  promptly  and  accurately  the  details  of  every  projected 
movement.  Its  administration  may  be  better  subserved 
either  by  concentration  or  by  dispersion,  according  to  the 
particular  mode  of  procuring  or  furnishing  supplies  and 
the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

Mutual  Support  of  the  Different  Parts. 

Every  part  should  be  able  to  unite  with  any  other  before 
that  other  part  can  be  defeated. 

An  ordinary  column  of  route  has  a  density  of  about 
one  man  to  the  yard  of  roadway.  The  density  of  a  regu- 
lar defensive  line  of  battle  being  five  men  to  the  running 
yard,  such  a  line  suddenly  formed  to  a  flank  from  a  single 
column  would  have  to  contract  to  about  one-fifth  its  origi- 
nal length.  Taking  its  original  length  at  a  day's  march, 
its  contraction  would  amount  to  about  six  or  twelve  miles, 
according  as  it  took  place  towards  the  centre  or  towards  a 
flank. 

The  several  tactical  arras,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery, 
should  succeed  each  other  in  column  in  the  order  in  which 
they  are  needed  on  the  field  of  battle,  which  is  ordinarily 
as  follows :  first,  cavalry,  to  examine  the  ground  and  feel 
the  enemy  ;  second,  artillery,  to  open  the  action  ;  and  third, 
infantry,  to  carry  it  on  and  decide  it. 

The  combatant  portion  of  a  German  army  corps  num- 
bering 30,000  men  takes  up  14  miles  of  roadway  and  re- 
quires from  five  to  six  hours  to  form  on  its  head,  or  to 
deploy. 

"  It  frequently  happens,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  in  "  The 
Nation  in  Arms,"  "  that  after  a  certain  distance  has  been 
covered  on  the  march,  the  enemy  is  fallen  in  with,  and  it 
becomes  necessary  to  deploy.  If  the  distance  already  cov- 
ered was  nine  miles,  the  last  battalion  of  the  army  corps 


^A"  ARMY   ON  THE  MARCH.  33 

has  marched  twenty-three  miles  when  it  arrives  uj^on  the 
fiekl  of  battle.  An  enemy  who  is  in  the  early  morning 
more  than  fourteen  miles  distant,  and  who  does  not  ad- 
vance, cannot  well  be  attacked  the  same  day.  It  must 
then  suffice  to  march  with  the  front  up  to  this  position ; 
the  next  day  the  deploying  and  the  attack  take  place. 
The  attack  may  indeed  be  begun  when  only  a  part  of  the 
troops  have  deployed,  leaving  the  remaining  part  to  come 
up  during  the  action.  But  in  so  doing  the  united  employ- 
ment of  the  whole  mass  is  abandoned."  .  .  . 

Celerity  of  Movement. 

If  an  army  corps  of  30,000  men  be  massed,  say  in 
camp,  it  will  be  a  matter  of  a  day's  march  for  it  to  draw 
out  into  a  column  of  route  without  wagons,  and  of  another 
day's  march  for  it  to  form  again  in  mass  on  its  head. 
Thus  to  move  the  corps  in  this  way  its  own  length  requires 
two  days.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  that  such  large  bodies 
of  troops  make  a  ^^I'actice  of  camping  in  column  of  route. 
The  different  subdivisions  move  perhaps  a  mile  or  two  to 
either  side  of  the  road  to  secure  good  camps,  bivouacks,  or 
cantonments,  and  return  to  their  places  in  column  simul- 
taneously when  the  march  is  resumed. 

"A  well-disciplined  force  of  15,000  or  20,000  men, 
properly  commanded,  will  usually  be  able,  by  rapid  in- 
trenching, to  hold  its  ground  against  even  a  largely 
superior  force  for  two  or  three  hours,  and  if  in  a  strong- 
position,  for  half  a  day,  or  even  longer.  Columns  of 
this  strength  may  safely  march  on  parallel  roads  eight  or 
ten  miles  apart."* 

In  September,  1862,  General  McClellan  marched  his 
army  from  Washington  in  quest  of  the  enemy,  in  five 
parallel  columns.     If  he  had  marched  it  in  one,  its  length 

*  Lippitt. 
3 


34  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

with  its  trains  would  have  been  fifty  miles,  one  or  both  of 
its  flanks  would  have  been  left  uncovered,  and  an  attack 
on  its  head  would  inevitably  have  crushed  it  in  detail. 
Ordinarily,  therefore,  when  more  than  one  corps,  say  of 
20,000  or  30,000  men,  are  restricted  to  one  road,  one  of 
two  things  takes  place :  either  the  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  tactical  unity  are  as  far  as  possible  removed  by  march- 
ing all  of  the  train  that  can  be  dispensed  with  at  the  rear 
of  all  the  troops,  and  making  extra  exertion  to  keep  the 
column  closed  up ;  or  all  thought  of  support  from  the 
corps  in  rear  is  given  up,  at  least  for  a  period  of  about 
twenty-four  hours,  and  the  corps  follow  each  other  a  day's 
march  apart,  each  camping  or  bivouacking  in  the  place 
vacated  in  the  morning  by  the  corps  preceding  it.  This 
was  the  practice  of  the  Germans  in  1870. 

Where  the  army  is  small,  the  divisions  may  support  one 
another  better  and  be  better  controlled  and  administered 
on  one  road  than  on  several.  The  army  with  which 
General  Scott  advanced  from  Puebla  upon  the  city  of 
Mexico  numbered  less  than  11,000  men;  it  was  formed 
into  four  divisions,  besides  an  independent  cavalry  brigade, 
but  marched  on  one  road.  On  the  8tli  of  May,  1864, 
Sheridan  marched  to  the  James  River  in  a  single  column 
thirteen  miles  long ;  "  for,"  he  said,  "  I  preferred  this  to 
the  combinations  arising  from  separate  roads,  combinations 
rarely  working  as  expected,  and  generally  failing,  unless 
subordinate  officers  are  promj^t  and  fully  understand  the 
situation."  * 

The  interval  admissible  between  separate  columns  varies 
with  their  strength,  the  jDlans  or  designs  of  the  opposing 
commanders,  especially  as  to  their  being  offensive  or  defen- 
sive, and  the  nature  of  the  country,  especially  as  regards 
lateral  communications,  or  cross-roads.     To  regard  it  as 

*  Official  Eeport. 


AN  ARMY   ON  THE  MARCH.  35 

restricted  to  deploying  distance,  or  the  space  occupied  by 
the  several  columns  in  line  of  battle,  would  be  to  ignore 
altogether  the  containing  or  defensive  strength  of  the 
several  columns.  "  The  experience  of  recent  wars  tends 
to  show  that  the  junction  of  the  columns  takes  place  more 
often  in  than  before  the  battle.  The  circumstance  that 
this  can  be  done  without  danger  may  be  attributed  to  the 
increased  power  of  modern  weapons,  especially  behind 
cover,  enabling  the  troops  which  first  arrive  to  hold  their 
ground  longer,  even  against  a  superior  force."  '=' 

Two  divisions  marching  on  separate  roads  are  at  deploy- 
ing distance  so  long  as  the  distance  between  them  does  not 
exceed  twice  the  front  of  a  division,  for  within  that  interval 
they  can  form  a  continuous  line  by  dej^loying  on  the  heads 
of  column.  During  the  march  every  column  commander 
should  know : 

1.  The  object  in  view  ; 

2.  What  commanders  are  next  to  him  ; 

3.  Who  is  to  re-enforce  him  if  attacked  ; 

4.  On  what  point  he  is  to  fall  back,  if  driven  by  the 
enemy. 

The  column  commanders  should  not  only  report  without 
delay  the  ai3pearance  of  the  enemy  and  other  particular 
events,  but  should  also  report  dail}^  or  from  time  to  time, 
according  to  circumstances,  their  arrival  at  halting  places, 
and  when  the  halting  place  is  not  a  prescribed  one,  or  a 
known  point,  its  distance  from  some  knovvn  point  on  the 
road.  The  commanding  general  should  be  with  that 
column  which  is  expected  to  be  the  first  to  come  in  contact 
with  the  enemy,  in  order  that  on  meeting  him  no  time 
may  be  lost  in  making  the  proper  dispositions  for  battle. 
The  commanding  general  fixes  in  orders  the  time  of  depart- 
ure, destination,  line  of  march,  and  time  of  arrival   for 

*  Clarke.  <' Lectures  on  Staff  Duty." 


36  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

each  column.     This  may  be  done  daily  or  for  a  number 
of  days,  or  periods  of  days  at  a  time. 

There  should  be  a  separate  advance  guard  for  each 
column,  as  well  as  a  general  advance  guard  for  the  whole. 
The  latter  consists  ordinarily  of  a  corps  or  division,  pref- 
erably of  cavalry,  thrown  out  a  day's  march  or  more 
ahead,  which  covers  the  front  of  the  army  as  with  a  screen. 
The  line  of  columns  is  sometimes  followed  by  a  reserve 
corps  or  division  intended  for  the  re-enforcement  of  threat- 
ened or  hard-pressed  columns. 

The  system  or  assemblage  of  roads  on  which  an  army 
marches  constitutes  together  the  line  of  operations,  which 
may  be  designated  by  its  most  important  or  principal 
road.  This  consists  of  a  comparatively  smooth,  safe,  and 
direct  one,  used  by  the  general  supply  train  and  spare 
parts  of  the  regimental  trains,  etc.,  also  by  convoys, 
recruits,  convalescents,  etc.,  coming  from  the  rear.  Cer- 
tain military  writers  have  designated  this  road  as  the  axis 
or  dii^ectrix  of  operations,  for  the  evident  reason  that  it 
gives  the  general  direction  of  operations.  Each  column  is 
accompanied  by  whatever  is  indispensable  in  the  way  of 
baggage,  which  follows  in  its  rear  under  charge  of  a  guard 
(Fig.  6). 

If  rapidity  of  movement  be  the  sole  consideration,  as  it 
is  in  a  flight,  the  smaller  or,  in  other  words,  the  more 
numerous  the  columns  of  march  the  better.  If,  however, 
command  and  administration  be  considered,  as  they  are  in 
an  advance,  or  even  in  an  orderly  retreat,  there  is  a  maxi- 
mum determined  by  circumstances  beyond  which  the  num- 
ber of  columns  cannot  be  advantageously  increased.  Even 
in  a  perfectly  open  plain,  an  army  could  not  make  a  rapid 
march  in  any  approximation  to  a  deployed  line.  An 
attempt  to  do  so  would  either  destroy  the  formation  or 
render  its  movement,  if  anything,  more  sluggish  and 
difficult  than  that  of  a  single  column. 


AN  ARMY  ON  THE  MARCH. 


37 


STRIKING   DISTANCE. 

Tlie  distance  at  which  an  army  on  the  march  may  be 
compelled  by  the  enemy  to  luilt  and  form  line  of  battle  is 


Fig.  G. 


A 


B 


t    : 


T 


t:: 


R 
t  J 


t   ; 

Aooul.  one 
dous    marc) 


>\\)ou1  one 
daiis    march. 


-   u.  «  _,  >J' 


A,  advance  guard  ;  B,  main  bod}';  T,  grand  train  ;  t,  fighting  train  ;  K,  reserve. 

designated  as  striking  dista7ice.     It  depends  in  the  main 
upon  the  formation,  or  order  of  march,  of  the  opposing 


38  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

armies.  An  array  marching  under  the  apprehension  of 
being  attacked  in  flank,  or,  in  other  words,  making  a 
regular  flank  march,  is  formed  in  parallel  columns  admit- 
ting of  suddenly  forming  line  of  battle  by  simply  feeing 
the  enemy.  Striking  distance  in  such  a  case  is  the  length 
of  cannon  range,  or  about  three  miles. 

But  suppose  the  army  on  the  march  to  be  formed  in  a 
single  column.  Its  length,  including  the  trains,  may  be 
taken  at  about  one  and  a  half  day's  march,  or  about 
twenty-four  miles.  Taking  the  length  of  the  line  of  battle 
and  the  length  of  cannon  range  each  at  about  three  miles, 
we  may  for  this  case  estimate  striking  distance  roughly 
at  from  fourteen  to  twenty-four  miles,  according  as  the 
marching  column  is  threatened  near  the  centre  or  near 
the  head. 

Suppose  two  hostile  army  corps  to  be  camped  in  mass 
within  a  day's  march  of  each  other.  If  either  one  starts 
to  march  off  in  a  single  column,  it  exposes  itself  to  being 
overtaken  and  annoyed  in  its  rear.  The  two  corps  are 
within  striking  distance  of  each  other,  and  cannot  sepa- 
rate without  an  action.  * 


III. 

THE  ORGANIZATION  AND  SIZE  OF  ARMIES. 

UNDER  normal  conditions,  the  smallest  fraction  of  an 
army  with  which  a  general  or  army  commander  has 
to  deal  is  the  division.  It  is  the  smallest  unit  comprising 
the  three  tactical  arms,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  and 
adapted  by  its  numerical  strength,  as  well  as  by  its  com- 
position, to  marching  under  ordinary  circumstances  on  a 
road  by  itself.  It  may  number  from  5000  to  15,000  men. 
The  largest  unit  adapted  to  marching  on  a  single  road  is 
the  army  corps.  It  is  the  largest  which,  formed  in  a 
single  column  of  route,  can  be  deployed  in  a  single  day 
on  the  head  of  the  column.  In  most  of  the  armies  of 
Europe  it  numbers  about  30,000  combatants.  Where  the 
number  of  corps  is  too  great  to  be  handled  as  a  single 
army,  they  are  grouped  together  in  minor  armies.  The 
following  discussion  of  the  conditions  of  numbers  and 
oi'ganization  which  correspond  to  the  maximum  effective- 
ness of  a  minor  army  is  taken  from  Derrecagaix's  "Treatise 
on  Modern  War"  : 

"  These  conditions  may  be  determined  by  practical  data. 

"  Thus  as  a  rule  an  array  may  not  without  danger  ex- 
ceed a  certain  fixed  combat  front ; 

"  It  must  preserve  a  march  front  which  will  allow  it  to 
concentrate  in  seasonable  time ; 

"  It  should  occupy  a  space  of  territory  sufficient  to  sup- 
ply the  troops  with  food  for  at  least  twenty-four  hours. 

"  Each  of  these  considerations  leads  to  almost  identical 
conclusions. 

"  Combat  Fronts. — Let  us  first  consider  the  combat  front. 

39 


40 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


One  of  the  factors  determining  its  extent  is  the  distance 
which  can  be  reached  b}^  the  eye,  aided  by  a  good  field- 
glass,  or  from  five  to  five  and  a  half  miles. 

"  The  general-in-chief  being  supposed  in  the  centre  of 
the  field  in  an  open  country,  the  combat  front  would  equal 
from  ten  to  eleven  miles.  Now  experience  proves  that 
this  space  is  too  extended,  that  we  must  regard  it  as  a 
maximum,  and  that  it  may  not  be  exceeded  without  ex- 
posure to  disorders  and  miscalculations. 

"  An  army's  combat  front  should  moreover  be  such  that 
an  interchange  of  communications  between  the  army  com- 
mander and  a  corps  commander  would  not  require,  going 
and  coming,  more  than  an  hour  and  a  half  at  the  most — 
an  interval  corresponding  to  seven  miles. 

"  Thus  the  most  distant  corps  commanders  should  not 
station  themselves  farther  than  three  and  a  half  miles 
from  the  army  commander. 

"  Supposing  the  former  to  be  in  the  centre  of  their 
respective  corps,  we  see  that  the  combat  front  could  be 


Fig.  7. 


iKKW 


es 


-^ 


i^>llles 


CorlPS 


CoTbs 


Corf  s 
CommaTid«r 


Am 


Commander. 


extended  from  one  and  a  half  to  two  miles  beyond  them. 
In  this  manner  we  again  reach  a  maximum  front  of  from 
ten  to  eleven  miles  (Fig.  7). 

"  Now  if  we  suppose  a  corps  of  30,000  men  in  order  of 


THE   ORGANIZATION  AND   SIZE   OF  ARMIES.  41 

battle  with  a  density  of  five  men  to  the  running  yard,  the 
maximum  dictated  by  experience  with  arms  of  rapid  fire, 
we  arrive  at  a  front  of  6000  yards  for  this  body. 

"From  this  it  is  seen  that  on  a  front  of  ten  miles, 
17,600  yards,  we  can  deploy,  irrespectively  of  general 
reserves,  88,000  men,  or  say  three  corps  of  30,000  men,  a 
round  total  of  90,000  men. 

"  To  these  should  be  added  the  general  reserve  in  the 
proportion  to  those  engaged  of  two  to  three ;  or  for  three 
corps  in  line,  two  in  reserve.  Consequently,  for  a  front  of 
ten  miles,  the  army  would  contain  five  corps  of  30,000 
men  each,  or  150,000  men. 

"  3Iarch  Fronts. — The  estimate  of  the  extent  of  the 
march  front  leads  to  the  same  conclusions. 

"  An  army  in  motion  should  always  be  able  to  concen- 
trate within  a  single  day. 

"  Now  this  condition  will  be  fulfilled  if  the  length  of 
march  front  be  so  regulated  that  in  order  to  take  its  place 
in  line  an  army  corps  has  never  to  make  a  march  exceed- 
ing fifteen  miles.  The  baggage  and  other  impedimenta 
are  in  this  case  left  in  rear. 

"  Let  us  take  a  combat  front  of  ten  miles.  A  corps 
moving  from  an  extremity  of  the  march  front  into  position 
at  the  nearer  extremity  of  the  combat  front  will  be  able, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  travel  fifteen  miles.  We  thus  have  a 
maximum  march  front  of  forty  miles.  In  order  that  by  a 
march  of  fifteen  miles  a  corps  may  move  from  either  ex- 
tremity of  the  march  front  to  the  opposite  extremity  of  the 
combat  front,  the  march  front  must  not  exceed  twenty 
miles.  This  distance,  then,  is  the  minimum  march  front 
(Fig.  8). 

"  The  mean  between  these  two  extremes  is  thirty  miles. 

"  History  teaches  us  that  the  commanders  of  large  armies 
recognize  the  correctness  of  these  figures. 

"  Moreover  it  is  an  established   fact  that  in   order  to 


42  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

assure  the  subsistence  of  au  army  for  twenty-four  hours 
in  the  countries  of  Europe  in  a  fair  condition  of  cultiva- 
tion, there  must  be  one  mile  of  front  for  every  5000  men. 
For  a  front  of  thirty  miles  this  proportion  corresponds  to 
an  army  of  150,000  men. 

"  The  average  of  disposable  communications  will,  of 
course,  have  a  controlling  influence  upon  the  maximum 
number  of  troops  that  can  be  set  in  motion. 

Fig.  8. 


"  In  Europe  a  front  of  thirty  miles  will  contain  scarcely 
more  than  three  roads  approximately  parallel. 

"  Reckoning  a  corps  to  each  road,  or  90,000  men,  for 
the  first  line,  and  two  corps,  or  60,000  men,  for  a  second 
line,  or  reserve,  we  have  again  for  the  whole  army  a  force 
of  150,000  men." 

The  author,  in  this  discussion,  disregards  the  time 
necessary  for  the  flank  and  reserve  columns  to  form  up 
on  their  heads.  Unless  they  are  already  formed  up  when 
the  movement  of  assembling  commences,  it  would,  from 
his  own  data,  be  impossible  for  an  army  of  150,000  men, 
marching  on  a  front  of  thirty  miles,  properly  to  assemble 
for  battle  in  a  single  day. 

GROUPING   OF    ARMIES. 

Minor  armies  may  be  grouped  into  larger  armies,  to  be 
handled  as  units  by  the  general-in-chief  Thus  in  1864 
the  armies  of  the  Oliio,  of  the  Cumberland,  and  of  the 
Tennessee  constituted  a  single  separate  army  under  the 
command  of  General    Sherman.     But  Sherman's  whole 


THE   ORGANIZATION  AND   SIZE   OF  ARMIES.  43 

army  barely  aggregated  100,000  men.  Referring  to  our 
Civil  War,  Derrecagaix  says,  "  During  this  war  the 
Federals  avoided  the  use  of  large  armies,  preferring  the 
system  of  combining  armies  of  moderate  size,  which  offered 
to  them  the  advantage  of  relieving  the  commanders-in- 
chief  of  many  perplexing  details,  and  also  of  diminishing 
the  importance  of  the  powers  confided  to  each."  * 

The  rule  that  an  army  shall  possess  a  main  body,  two 
wings,  and  a  reserve  holds  good  also  for  a  group  of 
armies. 

First  Line. — Suppose  a  principal  army  of  150,000 
men,  two  lateral  armies  of  120,000  each,  and  a  reserve  of 
110,000.  The  total,  500,000,  is  about  the  number  which 
Germany  threw  upon  France  in  1870. 

Second  Line. — Security  in  rear  requires  that  at  least 
one-third  as  many  men  as  are  at  the  front,  say  160,000, 
be  established  upon  the  railroads  and  other  lines  of  com- 
munication. But  this  is  not  all.  The  front  of  operations 
of  this  grou])  of  armies  will  probably  come  into  collision 
with  at  least  two  fortresses  or  intrenched  camps,  each  strong 
enough  to  arrest  an  army  of  120,000  men.  The  observa- 
tion, or  investment,  of  these  places  calls  for  an  additional 
contingent  of  240,000  men,  and  makes  the  total  of  the 
second  line  400,000. 

In  general,  then,  a  total  force  of  900,000  men  should 
be  divided  into  two  groups  of  armies :  one  of  500,000  at 
the  front,  or  in  the  first  line,  and  one  of  400,000  at  the 
rear,  or  in  the  second  line. 

*  Derrecagaix's  "Modern  War,"  Foster's  translation. 


IV. 

THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD. 

rpHE  net-work  of  roads  and  other  lines  of  communication 
-■-  of  a  theatre  of  war  has  been  called  the  "strategic 
chess-board."  As  such  it  differs  essentially  from  the 
ordinary  chess-board  in  that  it  is  not  the  squares  that  are 
played  on,  but  the  lines  of  demarcation  between  them. 
A  somewhat  different  view  of  the  ordinary  theatre  of  war 
is  given  by  Hamley  in  his  "  Operations  of  War."  He 
says,  "  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  persuade  even  intelli- 
gent auditors  that  two  armies  are  not  like  two  fencers  in 
an  arena,  who  may  sliift  their  ground  to  all  points  of  the 
compass,  but  rather  resemble  two  swordsmen  on  a  narrow 
plank  which  overhangs  an  abyss,  where  each  has  to  think, 
not  only  of  giving  and  parrying  thrusts,  but  of  keeping 
his  footing  under  penalty  of  destruction."  The  situation 
on  the  "  narrow  plank"  would  seem  to  be  a  considerably 
more  difficult  one  than  that  on  the  "  strategic  chess-board." 
Each  has  its  counterimrt,  however,  as  a  characteristic 
reality.  On  the  strategic  chess-board  an  army  forced  off 
its  regular  line  of  communication  is  not  necessarily  ruined. 
It  may  save  itself  either  by  fighting  its  way  back  to  it,  or 
by  moving  to  the  next  one ;  for  though  an  army  cannot 
regularly  operate  on  the  squares,  it  may  stand  and  fight  on 
them,  or  march  short  distances  across  them ;  moreover,  it 
can  often  command  a  cross  line  by  which  to  reach  the  next 
parallel  one.  In  the  case  of  Hamley 's  illustration,  let  us 
suppose  that  instead  of  one  plank  there  are  half  a  dozen 
spanning  the  abyss  about  a  step  apart,  so  that,  if  the 
swordsman  loses  his  balance  on  one,  he  has  a  chance  of 

44 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  45 

recovering  it  on  another;  we  thus  assimilate  to  a  certain 
extent  the  situation  over  tlie  abyss  to  that  on  the  strategic 
chess-board. 

The  swordsman  on  a  single  plank  re2")resents  an  army 
on  a  single  road,  the  man  on  the  chess-board  represents 
an  army  on  a  system  of  roads.  An  army,  however,  can 
hardly  place  itself  in  such  a  position  that  being  forced  off 
a  road  is  instant  destruction.  The  danger  to  an  army  of 
losing  its  communications  depends  upon  their  importance 
to  it  as  the  channel  through  which  it  procures  its  suste- 
nance and  other  necessities.  The  swordsman  is  inde- 
pendent of  them  in  that  respect.  The  plank  is  to  him 
nothing  but  an  imperfect  platform,  and  his  anxiety  re- 
specting it  is  essentially  different  from  that  of  an  army 
for  a  road  in  its  rear.  An  operation  against  an  enemy's 
line  of  communication  is  not  ended  with  forcing  the  enemy 
from  it,  or  with  the  occupation  of  it  in  his  rear.  Such 
subsequent  steps  must  be  taken  as  will  prevent  him,  not 
only  from  recovering  or  reopening  it,  but  also  from  gain- 
ing possession  of  another.  It  was  the  disregard  of  this 
requirement  that  occasioned  General  Hooker's  discomfiture 
at  Chancellorsville.  By  a  brilliant  manoeuvre-march  he 
had  slipj)ed  away  un perceived  from  the  front  of  the  enemy, 
passed  around  his  flank,  and  planted  himself  in  his  rear, 
and  had  announced  to  his  army  that  the  enemy  must 
either  ingloriously  fly  or  give  him  battle  on  his  own 
ground  and  be  destroyed ;  but,  by  bold  and  skilful 
manoeuvring  and  fighting,  the  enemy  reopened  his  line 
of  retreat  and  made  Hooker's  army  look  to  its  own. 

For  the  formation  of  a  general  plan  in  a  country  known 
to  be  either  generally  practicable  or  generally  impracti- 
cable, maps  showing,  in  the  former  case,  only  obstacles, 
and  in  the  latter,  only  communications  are  all-sufiicient. 
But  when  it  comes  to  the  actual  conducting  of  a  campaign 
the  maps  cannot  be  too  detailed.     For  the  execution  of  a 


46  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

strategic  movement  depends  ofttimes  not  only  on  the 
availability  of  existing  roads  and  other  ready-made  lines 
of  communication,  but  also  on  the  practicability  of  march- 
ing across  country  or  of  constructing  additional  roads. 
In  our  war  with  Mexico  the  position  of  Cerro  Gordo  was 
turned  by  a  military  road  cut  by  General  Scott  over 
rough  ground  overgrown  with  bushes,  which  enabled  him 
to  seize  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  in  time  to  intercept 
and  capture  nearly  half  of  his  army ;  and  in  the  War  of 
the  Kebellion  hundreds  of  miles  of  marsh  and  swamp 
were  travelled  over  by  both  armies  on  corduroy  roads  con- 
structed by  the  troops.  In  that  war  the  construction 
corps  of  the  Union  army  built  or  rebuilt  no  less  than  641 
miles  of  railroad  and  26  miles  of  bridges. 

Good  roads  approximate  in  their  uniformity  of  kind 
and  condition  to  waterways,  tramways,  and  railways, 
which  only  the  heaviest  storms  make  any  impression 
upon.  Bad  roads,  on  the  other  hand,  are  of  infinite  kinds 
and  condition.  They  may  be  soft  and  heavy,  or  stony 
and  rocky,  or  cut  up  with  ruts,  or  slippery  with  ice.  A 
road  that  is  soft  and  heavy  one  day  may  be  hard  and 
uneven  the  next,  and  one  that  is  slijDpery  with  ice  one  day 
may  be  soft  and  running  with  water  the  next.  Tims  the 
use  of  bad  roads  not  only  23recludes  rapidity,  but  also 
seriously  interferes  with  concert  and  promptitude  of  move- 
ment. After  the  battle  of  Ligny,  in  the  Waterloo  cam- 
paign, the  bulk  of  the  French  army  on  the  field  was 
divided  into  two  commands,  each  of  about  32,000  men, 
one  to  pursue  the  Prussians  under  Bliicber,  the  other  to 
join  the  remainder  of  the  French  army  under  Ney  in  the 
vicinity  of  Quatre  Bras,  and  march  with  it  against  the 
English  under  Wellington.  Both  commands  left  the  field 
about  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  former  under 
Marshal  Grouchy,  the  latter  under  Napoleon.  Grouchy 
marched  until  ten  o'clock  at  night  to  reach  Gembloux, 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  47 

about  eight  miles  from  Ligny ;  whereas  Napoleon  as- 
sembled his  army  about  dark  in  front  of  the  Waterloo 
position,  over  sixteen  miles  from  Ligny.  The  contrast 
between  these  two  marches  is  partly  attributable,  no  doubt, 
to  the  diflference  between  the  two  commanders,  but  it  is  due 
at  least  in  equal  measure  to  the  fact  that,  while  Napoleon 
marched  on  great  jiaved  high-roads.  Grouchy  had  to 
march  on  country  cross-roads,  or  common  dirt  roads. 

STRATEGIC    POINTS. 

Strategic  points  have  already  been  divided  into  decisive 
points  and  key-points.  Decisive  i^oints  may  be  subdivided 
into  regular  strategic  points,  tactical  strategic  points,  and 
political  strategic  points. 

Regular  strategic  points  consist  of  great  centres  of 
wealth,  trade,  and  commerce ;  arsenals,  depots,  and  maga- 
zines ;  repositories,  in  other  words,  of  those  material  re- 
sources comprised  under  the  popular  designation  of  the 
sinews  of  war.  By  far  the  most  important  point  of  this 
kind  in  the  United  States  is  New  York.  Two-thirds  of 
the  import  duties  of  the  United  States  are  collected  on 
merchandise  entering  its  port,  and  the  duties  collected 
in  New  York  make  up  nearly  one-half  of  the  total  rev- 
enue of  the  government.  Another  important  regular 
strategic  point  is  Springfield,  Massachusetts,  the  national 
factory  of  small-arms. 

Tactical  strategic  points  consist  of  centres  of  armed 
strength,  or  places  occupied  by  considerable  bodies  of 
troops.  They  owe  their  importance  to  the  dispositions  of 
the  opposing  armies,  and  can  hardly  be  determined  or  fore- 
seen in  time  of  peace.  As  examples  in  the  United  States 
may  be  mentioned  Saratoga  in  the  Revolutionary  War, 
Gettysburg  and  Appomattox  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Political  strategic  points  consist  of  great  centres  of 
political    influence    and   authority,    of    art,    science,    and 


48  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

literature,  of  thought  and  opiniou  generally.  Foremost 
among  these  is  the  national  capital.  Next  come  subor- 
dinate capitals  or  chief  places,  such  as  our  State  capitals, 
and  with  them  all  j)opulous  towns  and  cities,  but  es2:>ecially 
those  of  a  business  or  commercial  character.  New  York 
is  thus  an  important  political  strategic  point.  Finally 
come  places  of  sacred  or  historic  association.  As  exam- 
ples of  the  latter  may  be  mentioned  Mecca,  the  birthplace 
of  Mohammed  and  famous  sanctuary  of  the  Mohamme- 
dans ;  Moscow,  the  ancient  capital,  and  still  the  place  of 
coronation  of  the  Czars,  the  holy,  or  white  mother,  city  in 
the  creed  of  the  Russian  people  ;  Mount  Vernon,  the  home 
and  burial-place  of  George  Washington. 

Key-2)oints  do  not  by  inherent  qualities  correspond  to 
particular  kinds  of  strategy.  They  are  points  of  vantage 
equally  important  to  every  kind.  Permanent  key-points, 
or  such  as  are  cognizable  in  time  of  peace,  are  known  as 
geographical  strategic  points.  Temporary  key-points,  or 
such  as  are  occasioned  by  the  dispositions  of  op2)osing 
armies  in  time  of  war,  are  known  as  strategic  points  of 
manoeuvre. 

Geographical  strategic  points  are  points  adapted  to  com- 
mand imjiortant  lines  of  communication  or  of  defence. 
They  comprise  important  harbors,  junctions  of  roads,  rivers 
and  railroads,  important  bridges  and  passes,  etc.  As  ex- 
amples in  the  United  States  may  be  mentioned  Gardiner's 
Bay  (Map  11),  at  the  eastern  end  of  Loug  Island,  which, 
according  to  high  miUtary  authority,  is  the  point  of  the 
vvliole  coast  and  frontier  line  best  adapted  to  serve  an 
invader  as  a  base  of  operations;  Albany,  at  the  junction 
of  the  Hudson  River  with  the  Erie  and  Champlain  Canals, 
and  with  important  railroads  running  north,  south,  east, 
and  west ;  Cairo,  at  the  junction  of  the  Ohio  and  Missis- 
sipi^i  Rivers.  Should  we  ever  become  involved  in  a  war 
with    England,   a   highly   important   point  of  this    kind 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  49 

would  be  Portia lul,  Maine,  because  it  is  the  terminus  of 
the  Grand  Trunk  Kailroad  of  Canada,  over  which  the 
winter  traffic  is  most  conveniently  carried. 

A  strategic  point  of  manoeuvre  is  a  point  whose  prox- 
imity to  a  certain  objective  promises  access  to  it  in  advance 
of,  or  simultaneously  with,  any  force  that  may  be  trying 
to  cover  it.     If  B   (Fig.  9)  no.  o. 

represent  a  force  chargetl 
with  covering  and  defend- 
ing the  point  O,  and  A  ^ 
represent  a  force  operating 
against  that  point,  every 
point  within  the  circum- 
ference of  a  circle  B  C,  de- 
scribed from  O  as  a  centre,  is  a  strategic  point  of  ma- 
noeuvre, for  from  any  such  point  A  can  reach  O  simul- 
taneously with  B. 

Regular  strategic  points  are  less  changeable  than  tacti- 
cal, but  more  so  than  political,  while  geographical  strategic 
points  are  still  less  liable  to  change  than  political,  being 
all  but  absolutely  fixed.  Arranged,  then,  in  order  of  their 
fixedness,  the  several  classes  of  strategic  points  would  suc- 
ceed one  another  as  follows  : 

1.  Geographical ; 

2.  Political; 

3.  Regular ; 

4.  Tactical ;  and  with  them 
Strategic  points  of  manoeuvre. 

A  point  that  is  strategically  important  in  one  respect 
may  be,  and  ordinarily  is  so,  in  more  than  one.  The  same 
point  may  therefore  belong  in  two  or  more  different  classes. 
So  similar  are  the  requirements  of  an  army  to  those  of  a 
civil  community,  and  the  conditions  of  military  to  those 
of  commercial  enterprise  and  success,  that  a  geographical 
strategic  point  is  ordinarily  the  site  of  a  considerable  town 


50  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

or  city,  and  therefore  a  regular  or  political  strategic  point; 
and,  conversely,  a  regular  or  political  strategic  point  is 
commonly  a  geographical  strategic  point.  Take  New  York 
City,  for  instance.  Apart  from  its  immense  resources  in 
money  and  supplies,  and  its  potent  influence  upon  the 
thought  and  feeling  of  the  country,  it  is  a  point  of  the 
highest  strategic  value,  by  reason  of  its  magnificent  harbor, 
its  admirable  land  and  water  communications,  and  its  loca- 
tion on  the  direct  line  of  invasion  between  Europe  and  the 
United  States.  For,  assuming  the  northern  end  of  Long 
Island  Sound  to  be  closed  by  our  forts,  there  is  no  other 
place  than  New  York  available  to  an  enemy  as  a  base  of 
operations  from  Gardiner's  Bay  on  the  north  to  Delaware 
Bay  on  the  south.  It  commands  the  natural  line  of  opera- 
tion for  pushing  from  the  Atlantic  through  the  United 
States  to  Canada.  Hence,  with  all  its  importance  as  a 
X  regular  and  political  strategic  point.  New  York  is  a  most 
important  geographical  strategic  point.  This  distinction 
would  still  pertain  to  it,  though  its  buildings  should  be  laid 
in  ashes,  its  trade  and  commerce  annihilated,  its  population 
dispersed,  and  all  its  accumulated  wealth  destroyed  or 
carried  away.  It  was  mainly  as  a  geographical  strategic 
point  that  New  York  was  held  by  the  British  during  the 
Bevolutionary  War.  Albany  is  not  only  a  geographical 
strategic  point,  but  also,  as  the  capital  of  the  Empire  State, 
a  political  strategic  point,  and  as  a  great  manufacturing 
centre  and  the  location  of  the  Watervliet  Arsenal,  a  regular 
strategic  point. 

The  importance  of  Kichmond  during  the  war  was  due 
not  alone  to  its  being  the  seat  of  government  of  the  Con- 
federacy; it  had  been  the  commercial  capital  of  the  South 
before  it  became  its  political  caj^ital,  and  throughout  the 
war  it  was  a  great  entrepot  for  the  produce  of  the  Southern 
States.  It  was  the  seat  of  great  tobacco-factories,  flour- 
mills,  and  military  workshops  of  various  kinds.     Its  gun- 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOARD.  51 

foundry  and  rolling-mills,  its  factory  for  field  artillery,  its 
military  laboratory,  and  its  workshop  for  ammunition  and 
equipments  made  it  by  far  the  most  important  ordnance 
depot  in  the  South.  Its  location  at  the  head  of  navigation 
of  the  James  River,  and  at  the  junction  of  five  lines  of 
railroad,  made  it  an  important  centre  of  communication, 
while  its  importance  in  these  several  respects,  together  with 
its  excellent  defensive  qualities,  both  natural  and  artificial, 
made  it  an  important  place  of  arms.  In  short,  the  strategic 
character  of  Richmond  was  most  complex,  being  regular, 
tactical,  political,  and  geographical. 

In  an  unsettled  country  military  posts  mark  the  sites  of 
future  towns  and  cities.  It  is  not  merely  the  protection 
they  afford  against  savages  that  draws  settlers  to  them ;  in 
fact,  the  settlements  commonly  precede  the  posts;  it  is  their 
actual  or  prospective  civil  advantages  as  centres  of  trade 
and  transportation.  Many,  if  not  most,  of  the  great  cities 
of  the  United  States  have  thus  grown  out  of,  or  alongside 
of,  camps  and  garrisons.  It  may  not  be  uninteresting  to 
the  reader  to  peruse  the  following  list  of  cities  with  mili- 
tary beginnings : 

New  York Fort  Amsterdam. 

Albanj^ Fort  Orange. 

Chicago Fort  Dearborn. 

St.  Louis Fort  St.  Louis. 

Cincinnati Fort  Washington. 

St.  Paul Fort  Snelling. 

Detroit Fort  Pontchartrain. 

Pittsburg Fort  Pitt. 

Savannah Fort  Frederica. 

New  Orleans Fort  St.  John. 

San  Francisco Presidio  San  Francisco. 

There  are  indeed  instances  of  points  of  great  geographical 
strategic  importance  which  have  not  become  the  sites  of 
corresi)ondingly  large  cities.      One  such  point  is   Cairo, 


52  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Illinois.  It  has  the  finest  harbor  of  any  stream  in  the 
United  States,  and  is  in  many  resjiects  the  most  remarkable 
water  centre  on  the  earth.  Its  geographical  importance 
was  understood  and  appreciated  by  the  earliest  pioneers 
who  visited  the  locality,  and  was  reaffirmed  from  the  mili- 
tary stand-point  early  in  the  Civil  War  by  able  generals, 
North  and  South. 

"  This  city,  which  was  originally  expected  to  become  the 
metropolis  of  the  West,  through  its  location  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Ohio  and  its  central  position  on  the  great  Mississippi, 
chiefly  failed  to  reach  that  distinction  by  reason  of  its 
unhealthy  site  and  surroundings."  * 

But  such  instances  as  this  are  exceptional,  and  do  not 
argue  against  the  usual  coincidence  of  geographical  with 
regular  and  political  strategic  points. 

OBSTACLES. 

An  obstacle  or  line  of  obstacles  adapted  to  defence  is 
called  a  defensive  line  or  line  of  defence.  Lying  within 
the  territory  of  Canada,  the  Lower  St.  Lawrence  (Map 
11)  is  a  line  of  defence  for  that  country  against  the  United 
States.  The  great  lines  of  defence  of  the  United  States  ran 
north  and  south.  They  are,  besides  the  coast  lines, — 1. 
The  Appalachian  system  of  mountain  ranges,  comprising 
the  White  Mountains,  the  Green  Mountains,  the  Adiron- 
dacks,  the  Blue  Bidge,  and  the  Alleghany  Mountains ;  2. 
The  Mississippi  River ;  and  3.  The  Cordilleras,  comprising 
the  Sierra  Nevada  and  Rocky  Mountains,  and  the  lesser 
ranges  known  as  the  Cascade  and  Bitter  Root  Mountains. 

The  rate  of  travel  upon  an  ordinary  road  is  so  far 
greater  than  that  across  an  ordinary  country,  that  as  a 
general  thing  an  army  operating  in  a  country  provided 
with  roads,  or  in  a  road  country,  cannot  leave  the  roads  to 

*  "  Internal  Commerce  of  the  United  States."  1888.  Part  II.  p.  501. 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  53 

execute  a  strategic  movemeiit  across  country  without  being 
outmarched  and  outmanoeuvred.  Hence,  in  operating  in 
civilized  countries,  the  spaces  on  either  side  of  the  roads, 
canals,  rivers,  railroads,  etc., — that  is,  the  strategic  squares, 
— are  ordinarily  regarded  as  im[)racticable,  and  considered 
more  or  less  in  the  nature  of  strategic  obstacles. 

Natural  Obstacles. 

Strategic  obstacles  may  be  divided  into  two  kinds,  natural 
and  artificial.  The  principal  types  of  natural  strategic 
obstacles,  arranged  approximately,  at  least,  in  the  order  of 
their  importance,  are, — 1.  Neutral  territories ;  2.  Oceans; 
3.  Deserts ;  4.  Mountains ;  5.  Forests ;  6.  Inland  seas  and 
lakes ;  7.  Swamps  and  marshes  ;  8.  Rivers. 

Neutral  Territory. 

The  boundary  of  a  state  may  be  an  imaginary  line,  or  a 
geographical  line,  such  as  a  mountain  or  river,  or  it  may 
consist  of  a  number  of  geographical  elements  connected  by 
imaginary  lines.  But  whatever  its  character,  an  army 
forced  up  against  it  is  bound  to  surrender,  either  to  the 
enemy  or  to  the  neutral  state.  For,  assuming  that  the 
state  in  question  is  a  bona  fide  neutral,  and  strong  enough 
to  preserve  its  character  as  such,  it  is  impossible  to  cross 
its  territory  or  to  draw  suj)plies  from  it. 

This  is  strictly  true  only  in  war  on  land.  An  armed 
vessel  driven  into  a  neutral  port  may  procure  therein 
subsistence  for  its  crew  and  officers  ;  and  the  enemy,  should 
he  run  into  the  same  port,  could  not  attack  it ;  nor  could 
he  follow  it  out  within  twenty-four  hours  after  its  departure. 
The  best  thing  the  enemy  can  do  is  to  take  station  outside, 
at  a  distance  of  three  marine  leagues  or  more  from  land, 
and  watch  and  wait  for  it.  Under  ordinary  conditions  the 
blockading  of  two  vessels  in  a  port  requires  the  stationing  of 
three  vessels  on  the  outside.    A  naval  force  in  neutral  water 


54  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

may  thus,  without  danger,  iieutraHze  for  a  time  a  superior 
force  on  the  ocean. 

The   Ocean  Barrier. 

The  effectiveness  of  the  ocean  as  a  strategic  obstacle  is 
due  principally  to  the  two  difficulties :  first,  of  transport- 
ing an  army  by  sea;  second,  of  landing  an  army  on  an 
enemy's  coast.  The  difficulty  of  transportation  consists 
chiefly  in  getting  the  necessary  transports,  and  in  protect- 
ing them  in  transit. 

The  tonnage  to  be  allowed  for  man  and  horse  varies  in 
the  main  with  the  length  of  the  voyage.  Thus  it  is  esti- 
mated that  for  a  voyage  of  a  few  hours  a  man  requires  one 
ton,  a  horse  two  and  a  half  tons ;  for  a  voyage  under  a 
week,  a  man  two  tons,  a  horse  six  tons ;  for  a  voyage  to 
any  part  of  the  world,  a  man  two  and  a  half  tons,  a  horse 
seven  tons.  In  these  calculations  are  included  arms,  ammu- 
nition, stores,  wheeled  vehicles  for  the  fighting  and  regi- 
mental trains,  together  with  provisions  and  forage,  in  the 
case  of  a  week's  voyage  for  one  month,  and  in  the  case  of 
a  long  voyage  for  three  months.  For  a  long  voyage  a 
regiment  of  infantry  requires  two  large  steamers,  a  division 
of  10,000  men  at  least  30,  and  an  army  corps  of  33,000 
men  at  least  135  large  steamers.  "  If  we  examine  the 
navy  lists  of  foreign  powers,"  says  a  high  British  authority, 
"  and  the  returns  of  large  mercantile  steamers  present  in 
their  ports,  it  will  be  found,  even  under  the  most  favorable 
conditions,  that  with  the  exception  of  Great  Britain,  and 
perhaps  France,  no  nation  has,  at  any  given  moment, 
sufficient  tonnage  at  disposal  for  the  transport  across  the 
seas  of  50,000  men."  If  all  the  tonnage  of  Great  Britain 
were  available  to  her  she  should  be  able  to  ship  for  any 
part  of  the  world  an  army  of  over  half  a  million  men. 
But  scattered  as  her  shipping  is,  she  could  not  suddenly 
command  any  considerable  portion  of  it.  Nor  could  she 
ever  devote  the  whole  of  it  to  military  use,  for,  being  no 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOARD.  65 

longer  self-sustaining,  she  depends  upon  a  niercliunt  marine 
for  her  food  supplies. 

"  Excepting  for  our  ocean  commerce  and  for  our  sea- 
board cities,"  says  General  Sheridan,  in  his  report  for 
1884,  "  I  do  not  think  we  should  be  much  alarmed  about 
the  j3robability  of  wars  with  foreign  powers,  since  it  would 
require  more  than  a  million  and  a  half  of  men  to  make  a 
campaign  upon  land  against  us.  To  transport  from  beyond 
the  ocean  that  number  of  soldiers,  with  all  their  munitions 
of  war,  their  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  even  if  not 
molested  by  us  while  in  transit,  would  demand  a  large  part 
of  the  shipping  of  all  Europe." 

The  ability  to  protect  one's  transports  against  the  naval 
vessels  of  the  enemy  would  seem  to  be  an  indispensable 
condition  to  success  in  any  maritime  expedition ;  for  an 
army  is  as  helpless  on  the  water  as  a  gunboat  would  be  on 
dry  land,  and  a  single  armed  cruiser  is  capable  of  sinking 
a  whole  fleet  of  unprotected  transports.  Yet  descents  have 
been  successfully  executed  in  opposition  to  a  considerable 
naval  preponderance.  In  such  cases  the  weaker  naval 
power  rightly  trusted  to  the  enemy's  being  engaged  else- 
where, or,  apprehending  his  attack,  managed  to  escape 
detection  or  elude  pursuit. 

In  1796,  wlien  the  French  attempted  to  throw  an  army 
into  Ireland,  the  most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  the 
British  navy  to  intercept  the  French  fleet  in  its  passage. 
Notwithstanding  a  triple  floating  bulwark,  as  it  was  called, 
one  fleet  on  the  enemy's  coast,  a  second  close  on  their  own 
shore,  and  a  third  between  the  two,  the  French  fleet  of  44 
vessels,  carrying  a  land  force  of  25,000  men,  reached 
Ban  try  Bay  in  safety.  This  fleet  was  eight  days  on  the 
passage,  and  three  more  in  landing  the  troops.  Only  one 
vessel  was  intercepted  by  the  vast  naval  force  which 
England  had  assembled  for  that  express  object.* 

*  Hal  leek. 


56  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

The  fleet  which  in  1798  carried  Napoleon's  army  to 
Egyj^t,  and  which  consisted  altogether  of  300  sail,  slipped 
out  of  the  port  of  Toulon,  past  Nelson's  fleet  of  observa- 
tion, with  its  40,000  troops  on  board.  It  was  followed  by 
Nelson,  who,  thinking  correctly  that  it  was  bound  for 
Egypt,  shaped  his  course  direct  for  Alexandria.  The 
French  having  taken  a  circuitous  passage.  Nelson  arrived 
at  Alexandria  before  them,  and  not  finding  them  there, 
returned  to  Sicily,  missing  his  adversary  in  both  passages. 
In  the  mean  time  the  French  army  had  landed  and 
marched  into  the  interior. 

As  the  transports  are  favored  in  their  passage,  so  they 
are  in  their  landing,  by  the  fact  that  they  travel  no  definite 
line  and  leave  no  track  behind  them.  The  direction  of 
roads  and  railways  to  the  invader's  own  coast  line  may 
indicate  to  the  enemy  the  points  of  the  invader's  embarka- 
tion, but  they  aflbrd  no  indication  as  to  his  destination  or 
point  of  debarkation.  Where,  therefore,  there  is  a  consider- 
able extent  of  beach,  or  there  are  numerous  points  adapted 
to  the  landing  of  troops,  the  invader  may  steer  for  an 
unguarded  point  and  land  without  opposition.  "  A  fleet 
conveying  a  large  army  will,  in  such  a  case,  be  divided 
into  groups,  each  group  carrying  a  corps  complete.  In 
order  that  all  the  vessels  may  unload  simultaneously,  each 
group  or  corps  will  require  a  stretch  of  beach  some  five 
miles  in  length.  A  sufficient  number  of  boats  being  pro- 
vided, each  vessel  should  have  half  its  complement  ready 
to  cast  off  in  ten  minutes'  time.  Ten  minutes  more  is 
suflBcient  to  cover  some  1500  yards  of  water  between  the 
ships  and  the  shore,  and  the  work  of  actual  landing  is  an 
affair  of  seconds. 

"  Assuming  half  the  complement  of  each  vessel  to  num- 
ber 400  rifles,  and  that  there  are  twenty-five  vessels  carry- 
ing infantry  in  each  corps,  we  should  have  a  force  of 
10,000  men  thrown  on  shore  from  each  corps  in  about 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  57 

twenty-five  minutes,  and  these  would  be  supported  within 
an  hour  by  an  equal  number. 

"  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  vessels  all  unload- 
ing simuhaneously,  it  makes  no  difference  in  the  time  how 
many  of  them  there  are.  Six  hours  is  the  time  laid  down 
for  the  disembarkation  of  all  arms  in  Von  Schellendorf's 
*  Duties  of  the  General  Staff.'  "  * 

The  debarkation  of  Scott's  army,  destined  for  tlie  in- 
vasion of  Mexico,  took  place  on  the  9th  of  March,  1847, 
inside  of  the  little  island  of  Sacrificios,  some  three  miles 
south  of  Vera  Cruz.  Sixty-five  lighters,  each  capable  of 
holding  100  men,  were  hauled  to  the  gangways  of  the 
various  ships,  and  by  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  freighted 
with  4500  men,  were  drawn  up  abreast  in  a  single  line 
about  a  mile  in  length.  This  was  the  first  division  under 
General  Worth. 

At  the  signal  for  landing  it  gave  way  for  the  shore.  As 
the  boats  touched  ground  the  men  sprang  into  the  water, 
waist  deep,  and  dashed  up  the  beach.  The  boats  then 
returned  and  landed  the  second  division  under  General 
Patterson.  The  reserve  of  regulars  under  General  Twiggs 
followed,  and  by  ten  o'clock  the  men-of-war  and  transports 
were  relieved  of  the  remaining  troops.  Nearly  12,000 
men  were  thus  disembarked  without  confusion,  disturb- 
ance, or  accident. 

The  landing  of  the  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  pro- 
visions, ammunition,  etc.,  consumed  several  days.  The 
Mexicans  did  not  seriously  oppose  the  landing,  either  of 
the  troops  or  of  the  stores. 

The  guarding  of  a  coast  at  every  point  requires  an  ex- 
tensive system  of  lookouts  and  signals,  and  a  numerous 
force  of  coast-guards  trained  in  their  use.  The  difficulty 
of  meeting  these  requirements  is  the  chief  reliance  and 
justification  of  naval  descents. 

*  Cai.tain  .Maude,  E.E. 


58  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Ordinarily,  however,  an  army  debarking  beyond  the 
seas  must  place  itself  at  once  where  it  can  get  provisions, 
put  its  transports  out  of  danger,  and  maintain  communi- 
cation through  them  with  its  own  country.  This  necessity 
narrows  down  the  portion  of  the  coast  to  be  guarded,  at 
least  against  invasion  or  sustained  operations.  A  large 
army  would  hardly  land,  for  instance,  on  the  shores  of  the 
United  States  farther  than  one  or  two  easy  marches  from 
a  seaport  city ;  but  a  French  or  German  army  might 
land  anywhere  on  the  300  miles  of  beach  of  the  English 
coast  and  subsist  ofP  the  country,  or  supplies  brought 
with  it.  In  a  few  days  the  invading  army  should  reach 
London,  where  the  campaign  would  undoubtedly  be 
decided. 

Deserts. 

The  effectiveness  of  a  desert  as  an  obstacle  is  due  to  the 
scarcity  of  provisions  of  all  sorts,  especially  of  water,  to- 
gether with  the  extreme  heat  and  dryness  of  the  climate. 
A  country  ordinarily  fertile  cannot  by  any  amount  of 
devastation  be  made  literally  a  desert,  or  the  equivalent  of 
one  as  a  strategic  obstacle.  Though  the  crops  and  dwell- 
ings may  be  destroyed  and  the  population  exterminated, 
the  wells  and  springs,  to  say  nothing  of  brooks  and  rivers, 
cannot  be  dried  up,  and  even  if  they  were,  the  desert  cli- 
mate could  not  be  brought  about.  With  the  aid  of  an 
efficient  and  well-appointed  commissariat  an  army  in  a 
desert  may  carry  Avith  it,  or  draw  from  its  base,  all  that  it 
requires  of  solid  food,  clothing,  ammunition,  etc.,  but  it 
can  hardly  thus  supply  itself  with  water. 

A  soldier  requires  in  a  tropical  climate  for  drinking  and 
cooking,  to  say  nothing  of  washing,  about  a  gallon,  or  10 
pounds  of  water  a  day.  A  horse  drinks  about  12  gallons, 
or  120  pounds.  Now  a  soldier's  ration,  with  a  correspond- 
ing portion  of  the  mess  outfit,  may  be  taken  to  weigh  3 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOAR  J).  59 

pounds,  a  horse's  daily  allowance  of  grain  is  12  pounds, 
and  of  hay  14  pounds.  Hence  the  water  required  for  an 
army  would  increase  the  weight  of  provisions  to  be  trans- 
ported with  i'esi')ect  to  the  perso/niel  more  than  threefold, 
and  with  res2:)ect  to  the  animals  from  five-  to  tenfold, 
according  to  the  amount  of  hay  carried.  To  be  sure,  where 
railroads  are  available,  water  might  be  regularly  forwarded 
to  an  army  in  tank  cars.  But  railroads  are  uncommon 
in  deserts. 

The  strategic  jDoints  of  a  desert  are  its  watering-  or 
drinking-places,  and  its  principal  lines  of  communication 
are  ordinarily  commanded  by  the  possession  of  a  single 
spring,  or  well,  on  each  one. 

The  stratagem  of  filling  up  springs  and  wells,  or  cover- 
ing them  over  for  the  purpose  of  depriving  an  enemy  of 
water,  rarely  succeeds,  for  the  reason  that  there  are  or- 
dinarily numerous  signs  around  any  permanent  water  in  a 
dry  country  by  which  it  can  be  located,  and  men  famish- 
ing for  water  can  ordinarily  remove  any  obstruction  that 
other  men  may  have  placed  in  the  way  of  it.  Where, 
however,  all  the  water  is  in  deep  wells,  filling  these  up  may 
serve  the  purpose  of  retarding  a  pursuit,  as  the  pursuers 
must  devote  several  hours,  perhaps  days,  to  reopening 
them.  In  the  British  campaign  in  the  Soudan,  Sir 
Redvers  Buller  covered  his  retreat  across  the  Bayuda 
Desert  by  filling  up  the  Avells  at  Abu  Klea. 

The  poisoning  of  springs  and  watercourses  is  contrary 
to  the  military  interests  of  both  contending  armies  and, 
generally  speaking,  to  the  orders  of  their  respective  gov- 
ernments. 

A  fair  idea  of  the  difficulties  that  an  army  would  en- 
counter in  crossing  a  desert  may  be  formed  from  a  perusal 
of  the  reports  of  our  army  officers  of  their  ex2)eriences 
in  command  of  troops  on  our  Western  plains,  especially  in 
Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  Arizona. 


60  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Mountains. 

Mountains  offer,  as  a  rule,  a  larger  number  of  passages 
than  deserts,  and  are  therefore  harder  to  guard.  Unless 
watched  and  defended  by  the  mountaineers  themselves, 
who  know  every  path  and  by-path,  and  who,  it  may  be 
added,  are  as  a  class  pre-eminently  patriotic,  even  a  high 
and  difficult  mountain  may  prove  a  very  ineffectual  bul- 
wark. The  Alps  were  twice  crossed  by  an  invading  army, 
and  Napoleon  has  said  that  an  army  can  pass  wherever  a 
man  can  set  hig  foot. 

Mountains  offer  few  resources  for  the  maintenance  of 
armies,  and  at  certain  heights  they  are  impracticable  during 
several  months  of  the  year. 

"  Among  mountains  the  sphere  of  reconnoissance  is 
limited ;  little  or  no  cavalry  can  be  used,  and,  conse- 
quently, it  is  difficult  to  observe  the  enemy. 

"  Mountains,  in  general,  offer  to  weak  detachments  the 
advantage  of  strong  defensive  positions,  which  generally 
cannot  be  attacked  upon  the  flanks  nor  turned  without 
great  loss  of  time. 

"  Finally,  in  a  mountainous  section  the  belligerents  can 
bring  only  a  limited  number  of  effectives  into  action.  It 
does  not,  then,  in  wars  of  great  magnitude,  offer  a  favorable 
field  for  decisive  operations.'"^' 

Forests. 

Dense  forests  are  a  form  of  obstacle  little,  if  at  all,  in- 
ferior to  mountains.  While,  generally  speaking,  the  lines 
of  j^assage  through  a  forest  are  more  numerous  and  prac- 
ticable than  those  over  a  mountain,  they  are  better  known 
or  more  easily  ascertained,  and  therefore  more  easily 
watched  and  guarded. 

*  Blume,  "Strategy." 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  Gl 

Inland  Seas  and  Lakes. 

In  their  chanicter  as  obstacles  inland  seas  and  lakes 
differ  from  oceans  mainly  in  the  following  respects:  1. 
That  the  means  of  transportation  across  them  is  not  so 
hard  to  procure  or  to  improvise ;  2.  That  they  commonly 
admit  of  being  turned.  The  latter  feature  makes  it  prac- 
ticable to  combine  in  the  use  of  them  an  operation  by  land 
with  one  by  water. 

Lying  between  Canada  and  the  United  States,  the  Upper 
St.  Lawrence  and  the  Great  Lakes  offer  a  line  of  defence 
to  either  country  (Map  11).  To  the  country  command- 
ing the  water,  as  well  as  its  own  shore,  it  offers  a  double 
line,  and  to  the  one  commanding  the  water  and  both  shores, 
assuming  the  farther  shore  to  be  fortified  towards  the  in- 
terior, a  triple  line.  Having  command  of  the  water,  the 
effecting  of  a  lodgement  on  the  opposite  shore  is  consider- 
ably facilitated  by  directing  the  operation  upon  a  point 
which  a  land  force  can  reach  or  approach  on  its  own  ele- 
ment. Hence  for  defensive  security  the  straits,  rivers,  and 
other  narrow  communications  from  lake  to  lake  should  be 
fortified  at  each  end,  with  regard  to  the  crossing  at  these 
points,  independently  of  their  command  of  the  interlake 
transit.  The  author  refers  here  only  to  exceptionally 
large  lakes,  such  as  those  of  Switzerland  and  the  United 
States.  Small  lakes  are  not  worthy  of  strategic  considera- 
tion, except  where  a  considerable  number  of  them  are 
grouped  together,  cutting  the  country  up  into  labyrinths 
and  defiles. 

Swamj)s  and  Mai'sJies. 

Swam})S  and  marshes  obstruct  military  operations  not 
only  by  their  hinderance  of  locomotion,  but  also  by  their 
unhealthy  exhalations  and  dearth  of  provisions.  They 
are  crossed  on  bridges,  or  on  plank  or  corduroy  roads. 
The  latter  were  largely  used  in  the  well-wooded  swamp 


62  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

country  of  the  South  during  our  Civil  War.  They  are 
ordinarily  made  as  follows :  logs  of  about  12  inches  in 
diameter  are  first  laid  lengthwise  in  rows,  from  4  to  6  feet 
apart.  On  these  are  laid  crosswise,  and  close  together, 
young  trees  from  3  to  4  inches  in  diameter  and  of  a 
length  of  the  width  of  the  road.  On  the  outer  edges  of 
the  road,  trees  about  6  inches  in  diameter  are  spiked  or 
pinned  to  keep  the  trees  of  the  road-bed  in  position.  If 
the  ground  is  very  swampy,  several  layers  of  logs  may  be 
put  down  before  the  roadway  itself  is  laid.  In  order  that 
the  carriage  may  roll  smoothly,  the  interstices  between  the 
cross-pieces  are  filled  up  with  smaller  cross-pieces  or  the 
carriage  way  is  covered  with  earth  (Fig.  10). 

Fig.  10. 


Rivers. 
Kivers  afibrd  more  points  of  passage  than  other  obstacles. 
A  river  with  a  moderate  current  may  be  forded  by  infantry 
when  its  depth  does  not  exceed  three  feet,  and  by  cavalry 
and  carriages  when  its  depth  is  about  four  feet.  When  a 
river  is  more  than  four  feet  in  depth,  or  when  its  bottom  is 
of  mud  or  quicksand,  recourse  must  be  had  to  ferrying  by 
means  of  boats,  rafts,  etc.,  or  to  military  bridges.  A  wooden 
pontoon  boat,  such  as  is  used  in  the  construction  of  floating 
bridges,  will  carry  from  forty  to  fifty  men  120  yards  a 
minute.  About  one  minute  is  required  for  the  detachment 
to  enter  and  leave  the  boat.  Where  a  sufficient  number  of 
boats  cannot  be  collected,  lumber,  casks,  the  sides  of  frame 
houses,  and  other  suitable  materials  are  procured  and  rafts 
constructed  from  them.  According  to  the  nature  of  their 
supports,  military  bridges  are  either  fixed  or  floating.  The 
most  important  among  the  former  is  the  trestle  bridge,  and 
among  the  latter  the  pontoon  bridge. 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOARD.  63 

Trestle  bridges  may  be  constructed  in  rivers  whose  depth 
does  not  exceed  nine  feet,  and  whose  velocity  is  not  more 
than  six  feet  per  minute.  Tliey  are  employed  with  advan- 
tage in  rivers  of  moderate  depth,  with  hard  even  bottoms. 
The  trestle  bridge  over  the  Potomac  Kiver,  constructed  by 
the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Kappahannock  (McDowell's 
command),  is  the  most  remarkable  specimen  of  bold  mili- 
tary engineering  of  modern  times.  It  was  four  stories 
(eighty  feet)  high,  four  hundred  feet  long,  withstood  several 
freshets  and  severe  storms  without  injury,  and  carried 
daily  from  ten  to  twenty  heavy  railroad  trains  both  ways. 
It  was  built  in  1862,  in  nine  working  days,  out  of  rough- 
hewn  timber  cut  near  by.* 

A  pontoon  bridge  is  a  bridge  of  boats,  the  materials  of 
which  are  carried  with  an  army  in  its  train.  In  building 
it,  the  pontoons  are  brought  successively  out  from  the  bank 
into  their  places  in  the  bridge  and  connected  each  with  the 
preceding  one  by  balks  for  the  support  of  the  roadway. 
The  bridge  is  held  in  place  and  steadied  by  anchors  cast 
up  and  down  stream. 

A  pontoon  bridge  may  be  laid,  the  material  being  at 
hand  and  the  men  ready  to  commence  work,  at  the  rate  of 
from  two  to  three  yards  a  minute,  or,  on  an  average,  150 
yards  an  hour.  In  the  month  of  February,  1862,  a  pon- 
toon bridge,  composed  of  about  sixty  boats,  was  thrown 
across  the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry.  The  river  was  then 
a  j)erfect  torrent,  the  water  being  fifteen  feet  above  the 
summer  level,  and  filled  with  drift-wood  and  floating  ice. 
The  greatest  difficulty  was  experienced  in  pulling  the 
pontoons  into  position,  and  it  was  necessary  to  make  use 
of  ship  anchors  and  chain  cables  to  hold  them  in  place. 
Notwithstanding  these  unfavorable  circumstances,  the 
bridge  was  completed  in  about  eight  hours,  and  the  corjDS 

*  CuUum. 


64  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

commanded  by  General  Banks,  with  all  its  trains  and 
artillery,  passed  over  it  without  accident  or  delay. 

Where  floating  bridges  are  to  be  used,  it  is  a  matter  of 
some  importance  whether  or  not  the  stream  to  be  crossed 
is  affected  by  the  tide.  In  the  early  part  of  our  war  it 
was  thought  necessary  in  laying  a  pontoon  bridge  across  a 
tidal  stream  to  build  out  to  low-water  mark  with  trestles, 
so  that  as  the  water  rose  and  fell  all  tlie  pontoons  should 
always  be  afloat. 

Experience,  however,  showed  this  to  be  unnecessary. 
The  bridge  is  now  commenced  at  high-water  mark,  build- 
ing with  pontoons  only.  As  the  water  subsides  the  pon- 
toons nearest  shore  ground  successively,  forming  a  gentle 
ramp  or  slope  from  the  abutment  to  the  floating  portion  of 
the  bridge,  instead  of  making  the  descent  in  twenty  feet  as 
formerly.  This  method,  of  course,  applies  only  to  strong 
wooden  or  metallic  pontoons  and  to  soft  river-bottoms. 

Ice  as  a  means  of  communication  should  be  used  with 
great  circumspection.  A  change  of  temperature  may  not 
only  suddenly  destroy  this  natural  bridge,  but  render  the 
river  impassable  by  any  method  for  a  considerable  time,  in 
consequence  of  the  floating  cakes.  The  thickness  of  the 
ice  should  be  as  follows :  for  infantry  in  single  file  on  a 
line  of  planks  and  two  yards  apart,  two  inches;  for  cavalry, 
four  inches ;  for  field  artillery,  from  four  to  seven  inches, 
according  to  weight  of  pieces.  Ice  ten  to  twelve  inches 
thick  will  bear  the  heaviest  loads. 

Artificial  Obstacles. 

Under  the  head  of  artificial  obstacles  come  inundations 
and  fortifications.  The  subject  of  inundations  may  be 
considered  as  covered  by  our  discussion  of  inland  seas  and 
lakes,  and  swamps  and  marshes.  The  kinds  of  fortification 
which  principally  concern  the  strategist  may  be  classified 
as  follows : 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  65 

1.  Forts. 

2.  Fortresses. 

3.  Intrenched  camps. 

4.  Bridge-heads. 

A  fort  is  a  work  that  commands  a  position  only  by  the 
power  of  its  guns,  and  the  capacity  of  which  is  limited  to 
the  requirements  of  its  necessary  garrison.  Such  a  work 
is  adapted  to  blocking  a  pass  or  closing  a  river  or  harbor. 

A  fortress  has  a  sphere  of  action  exterior  to  that  of  its 
guns.  A  portion  at  least  of  its  garrison  may  sally  out  and 
engage  or  annoy  the  enemy  in  the  field.  Such  a  work  may 
obstruct  an  enemy's  progress  by  threatening  his  line  of 
retreat  or  of  supply,  and  so  an  invader  dare  not  leave  one 
in  his  rear  without  j^roviding  for  its  investment.  This 
will  ordinarily  take  from  two  to  three  times  as  many  men 
as  the  garrison  of  the  work.  A  fortress  garrisoned  by 
50,000  men  will  thus  arrest  a  force  of  from  100,000  to 
150,000.  A  fortress  connnonly  encloses  a  depot,  magazine, 
city,  or  other  important  strategic  point. 

An  intrenched  camp  is  a  work  adapted  to  the  quartering 
and  protection  of  an  entire  army.     Its  principal  uses  are  : 

1.  As  a  rendezvous  and  place  of  instruction  for  raw 
levies. 

2.  As  a  place  of  refuge  for  an  army  after  defeat. 

A  bridge-head  is,  as  the  name  implies,  a  work  protect- 
ing an  end  of  a  bridge.  A  double  bridge-head  is  one 
protecting  both  ends.  The  latter  may  enable  an  army  to 
operate  on  either  side  of  a  stream  at  will  without  fear  of 
beino;  attacked  in  rear.  Practicallv,  the  same  advantage 
may  be  afforded  by  a  fort  commanding  a  pass  through  a 
mountain. 

SCREENS,  AND    THE    USE   OF   SCREENS   AND   OBSTACLES. 

The  principal    kinds  of   strategic   screens   are   woods, ' 
mountains,  mist,  and  darkness. 


66  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Woods  have  the  advantage  over  mountains  in  that  an 
army  marching  through  them  is  concealed  not  only  on 
both  sides,  but  also  overhead,  and  thus  secured  against 
observation  from  elevated  points,  such  as  mountain  tops, 
balloons,  signal-towers,  etc.  They  have  the  advantage 
over  mist  and  darkness  in  that  they  are  not  as  likely  as 
these  to  prevent  seeing  the  enemy  in  the  same  degree  as 
they  prevent  being  seen  by  him,  and  that  they  are  not  as 
subject  to  variation,  or  as  treacherous.  Hence  woods  may 
be  regarded  as  the  most  perfect  form  of  strategic  screen. 
Woods  and  mountains  may  be  distinguished  from  mist  and 
darkness  by  their  auxiliary  properties  as  obstacles  and 
defences,  and  by  their  important  properties  of  fixedness 
and  permanence.  The  advantage  of  mist  over  darkness 
is  the  comparative  facility  of  marching  in  it  without  that 
sacrifice  of  order  and  discipline  which  attends  a  night 
march.  On  the  score,  however,  of  uniformity  and  con- 
tinuance, mist  is  ordinarily  less  to  be  trusted  than  darkness. 

A  remarkable  illustration  of  the  utilization  of  mist  and 
darkness  as  a  strategic  screen  is  afforded  by  Washington's 
retreat  across  the  East  River  after  the  battle  of  Long 
Island.  An  array  of  9000  men  was  in  this  instance 
withdrawn  unmolested  from  the  front  of  a  victorious  army 
of  31,000,  camjDed  only  600  yards  from  it.  A  brilliant 
instance  of  the  use  of  darkness  alone  was  the  sur23rise  and 
capture  of  Stony  Point  by  General  Wayne. 

No  form  of  strategic  obstacle  is  so  effective  but  that  it 
requires  to  be  watched  and  guarded.  The  pure  or  passive 
defence  of  an  obstacle  consists  in  occupying  and  holding 
the  strong  tactical  position  it  affords.  This  mode  of  defence 
can  rarely  be  relied  upon  to  do  more  than  delay  the 
advance  of  an  enemy.  Positions  taken  up  for  the  passive 
defence  of  a  line  are  pretty  sure  to  be  turned  if  they  are 
not  forced.  Hence  the  better  mode  of  defence  is  the 
active  defence,  or  offensive-defensive,   which  consists   in 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  67 

taking  advantage  of  the  more  or  less  unwieldy  and  vul- 
nerable condition  into  which  an  enemy  crossing  an  obstacle 
is  thrown  by  bad  travelling,  subdivision  of  forces,  and 
narrowino;  of  front  or  len2;thenino:  of  columns.  The 
offensive-defensive  army  places  itself  at  some  central  point 
behind  the  obstacle,  preferably  at  a  junction  of  communi- 
cations leading  directly  to  it,  with  cor])s  of  observation 
thrown  out  to  w^atcli  and  report  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  and  retard  them  temporarily  (Fig.  11). 

Fig.  11. 


As  the  strength  and  purpose  of  the  enemy  develop 
themselves,  the  main  body  of  the  defensive  sallies  out  from 
its  central  position  and  throws  itself  upon  the  heads  of 
the  several  columns  as  they  emerge  from  the  obstacle,  or, 
screened  and  protected  by  the  obstacle,  it  moves  around  it 
upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  Obstacles  thus  have  their 
offensive  as  well  as  their  defensive  use.  "  The  true  uses  of 
obstacles,"  says  Hamley,  "  are  not  as  might  at  first  sight 
appear,  merely  to  increase  the  means  of  passive  resistance. 
Their  best  effects  will  be  to  give  their  possessor  increased 


68 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


power  of  manoeuvring  offensively,  and  of  taking  the 
enemy  at  a  disadvantage." 

The  breaks,  or  points  of  passage,  of  an  obstacle  may  to 
a  skilful  general  appear  as  their  chief  strength.  In  order 
to  turn  them  to  account,  in  an  offensive  defence,  they 
should  be  held  in  a  way  to  close  them  to  the  enemy,  and 
yet  to  allow  the  army  holding  them  to  sally  through  them. 

Let  B  (Fig.  12)  represent  an  army  posted  in  a  mountain 
pass.  The  army  A  cannot  move  towards  either  extremity 
of  the  range  without  exposing  its  communications.*  It 
is  thus  compelled  to  force  the  pass. 


Fig.  12. 


It  was  shown  during  our  war  that  in  the  offensive  or 
defensive  use  of  rivers  a  most  powerful  auxiliary  is  an 
iron-clad  gunboat.  Such  a  vessel  can  easily  prevent  the 
construction  of  bridges  at  every  point  reached  by  it  at 
intervals  less  than  the  time  necessary  for  the  construction 

*  Line  of  supply  or  line  of  retreat. 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  69 

of  a  bridge.  If  at  any  distant  point  a  bridge  should  be 
finished  and  an  army  started  across  it,  the  gunboat  might, 
at  a  signal  from  the  land  force,  come  up  and  with  a  few 
rounds  from  its  heavy  guns  demolish  the  bridge  under  the 
enemy's  feet ;  or  if  the  enemy  had  got  across,  destroy 
the  bridge  behind  him,  and  effectually  sever  his  communi- 
cations by  preventing  the  construction  of  new  bridges,  or 
by  sweeping  them  away  as  fast  as  they  are  built, 

"  At  no  time  after  the  panic  at  Bull  Run  could  the 
Confederates,  though  they  should  gain  possession  of  Arling- 
ton Heights,  have  crossed  the  Potomac  in  front  of  Wash- 
ington, for  our  gunboats  in  the  river  would  have  swept 
them  in  the  flank  and  destroyed  them  while  crossing. 
These  gunboats  thus  constituted  an  impregnable  defence 
of  our  national  capital  in  front  during  the  whole  war,  so 
that  the  enemy  could  seriously  threaten  it  only  in  rear,  and 
that  only  by  a  long  and  dangerous  line  of  operations."* 

The  offensive  passage  of  an  obstacle  may  be  effected  by 
one  of  three  methods : 

1.  By  force  alone ; 

2.  By  force  and  stratagem  combined ; 

3.  By  stratagem  alone. 

The  first,  or  that  of  force  alone,  is  generally  to  be  con- 
demned on  tactical  grounds,  but  it  should  be  said  in  its 
favor  that  it  has  an  advantage  over  the  other  methods  in 
its  simplicity.  Where  warranted,  therefore,  by  numbers, 
morale,  or  tactical  skill,  it  is  to  be  preferred.  Napoleon 
in  1809  crossed  the  Danube  with  an  army  of  150,000  men, 
in  the  face  of  an  Austrian  army  of  nearly  equal  strength, 
drawn  u})  on  the  opposite  side  for  the  express  purpose  of 
opposing  its  passage. 

Every  improvement  in  fire-arms  renders  such  an  op- 
eration as  this  more  difficult.     The  history  of  our  four 

*  Lippitt. 


70  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

years'  war  does  not  afford  a  single  instance  of  a  river  being 
forced. 

While  an  army  may  indeed,  as  a  very  exceptional  opera- 
tion, cross  a  river  in  the  face  of  a  vigorous  and  well-con- 
ducted defence,  it  can  never  do  so  until  it  commands  both 
banks.  In  the  campaign  of  Fredericksburg,  Barksdale's 
brigade  of  Mississippians,  under  the  heaviest  artillery  fire 
that  could  be  concentrated  upon  them,  prevented  the  lay- 
ing of  a  bridge  across  the  Rappahannock  until  a  number  of 
Union  regiments,  which  had  volunteered  for  the  service, 
pushed  their  way  across  the  river  in  boats  and  drove  them 
away. 

As  an  instance  of  a  mountain  being  forced  may  be  men- 
tioned the  passage  of  the  South  Mountain  by  McClellan  in 
1862.  Here  the  defensive  numbered  about  15,000;  the 
offensive,  about  24,000  men  in  action. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  second  method,  or  that  of  force 
and  stratagem  combined,  may  be  cited  the  passage  of  the 
Mississippi  by  General  Grant  in  1863.* 

The  third  method,  or  that  of  stratagem  alone,  is  illus- 
trated by  Hooker's  crossing  of  the  E-appahannock  in  the 
Chancellorsville  campaign.  As  a  general  rule,  an  army 
provided  with  a  good  bridge  train  can,  by  stratagem  alone, 
cross  any  river  that  is  only  passively  defended. 

"A  river,"  says  Napoleon,  "has  never  been  considered  as 
an  obstacle  whicli  could  cause  more  than  a  few  days'  delay ; 
and  its  passage  can  be  defended  only  by  placing  troops  in 
force  at  the  bridge-heads  upon  the  farther  bank,  ready  to  take 
the  offensive  as  soon  as  tlie  enemy  commences  his  crossing." f 

As  aids  to  offensive  manoeuvring,  screens  are  even  more 
important  than  obstacles.  In  fact,  to  be  of  any  offensive 
use,  an  obstacle  must  be  a  screen  in  itself  or  must  keep  the 
enemy  beyond  the  range  of  observation,  and  thus  subserve 

*  See  the  Vicksburg  campaign. 

f  Letter  to  Prince  Eugene,  March  15,  1813. 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  71 

the  purpose  of  a  screen.  It  has  already  been  stated  that 
mountains  and  forests  combine  in  themselves  the  properties 
of  both  screens  and  obstacles. 

Even  with  the  aid  of  the  most  difficult  obstacle,  such  a 
thing  as  an  absolutely  impassable  cordon  of  guards  and 
sentinels  running  the  length  of  a  strategic  line  is  a  prac- 
tical impossibility.  Hence  the  successful  use  of  a  strategic 
screen  depends  upon  the  enemy  not  suspecting  its  use,  and 
this  condition  depends  not  so  much  upon  pickets  and 
sentinels  as  upon  feints  and  false  reports,  and  a  certain 
audacity  of  execution  calculated,  if  observed,  to  throw  the 
enemy  off  his  guard. 

While  Jackson  was  marching  around  Pope  in  the  second 
Bull  Run  campaign*  (Map  7),  Longstreet,  with  the 
remainder  of  Lee's  army,  was  making  a  demonstration  in 
the  enemy's  front.  "  Jackson's  column  was  frequently 
observed  by  Pope's  scouts  and  outposts,  but  when  the 
Federal  generals  came  to  discuss  what  this  movement 
meant,  there  were  advocates  of  every  supposition  except 
the  right  one.  This  was  rejected  by  all  as  too  audacious 
to  be  credited." f 

COMMUNICATIONS    AND    TRANSPORTATION. 

The  seizing  of  a  relatively  rapid  line  of  transportation 
may  render  all  other  lines  which  would  otherwise  be 
available  to  the  enemy  practically  useless  to  him,  and 
thus  convert  a  dangerously  open  country  into  a  defensive 
obstacle.  The  principal  communications  of  a  theatre  of 
war  may  be  classed  under  three  heads, — roads,  water,  and 
rail.  On  a  good  road  a  good  walker  can  easily  do  four 
miles  an  hour,  but  this  far  exceeds  the  powers  of  a  sohlier 
moving  as  one  of  a  mass  of  men  loaded  down  with  knap- 
sack and  overcoat,  a  gun,  and  about  one  hundred  rounds 

*  See  the  second  Bull  liun  campaign. 
t  W.  Allan. 


72  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

of  ammunition.  Furthermore,  the  soldier  on  the  com- 
pletion of  his  march  does  not  find  a  comfortable  bed  and 
an  abundant  dinner ;  he  often  has  to  go  on  outpost  duty  at 
once,  and  perhaps  every  third  or  fourth  night  on  guard ; 
he  ordinarily  sleeps  on  the  ground,  and  has  a  spare  and 
ill-cooked  meal. 

Travelling  on  ordinary  roads,  an  army  or  a  mixed  force 
of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  with  its  baggage,  makes 
on  an  average  about  two  miles  an  hour,  and,  as  if  ob- 
serving the  eight-hour  law  of  civil  life,  averages  about 
sixteen  miles  a  day.  To  compare  this  rate  of  travelling 
with  that  by  water,  let  us  suppose  an  army  embarked  on 
rafts  and  scows,  with  neither  steam  nor  sail  to  tow  or  to 
propel  them.  The  rate  of  an  ordinary  river  current  is 
two  miles  an  hour,  the  same  as  that  of  an  army  on  a 
road.  But  while  an  array  can  tramp  it  on  an  avei-age  but 
eight  hours  out  of  twenty-four,  a  river  marches  every  hour, 
day  and  night.  In  the  time,  therefore,  that  an  army 
makes  a  march  of  sixteen  miles  on  a  road,  an  ordinary 
river  current  would  have  carried  it  forty-eight.  Thus  the 
embarkation  of  an  army  to  float  with  the  current  of  an 
ordinary  river  is  equivalent  to  making  it  literally  inde- 
fatigable on  the  march. 

Supposing  an  army  on  land  to  make  a  long  day's  march, 
or  twenty  miles  in  twenty-four  hours,  a  fast  river  current 
would  in  the  same  time  have  carried  it  seventy-two  miles, 
or  more  than  three  and  a  half  times  as  far.  A  foot  march  of 
over  twenty  miles  in  twenty-four  hours  is  a  forced  march. 
As  a  remarkable  instance  of  a  forced  march  may  be  men- 
tioned that  of  the  6th  Corps  to  the  battle-field  of  Gettys- 
burg, in  which  it  covered  thirty-five  miles  in  twenty  hours. 

When  it  comes  to  the  use  of  sail  and  steam,  the  kind  of 
craft  is  so  important  and  so  variable  a  factor  that  only 
the  roughest  estimate  can  be  made  of  the  rate  of  travel. 
A  fair  average  one  for  steam  transports  would  be  twelve 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOARD.  73 

miles  an  hour.  For  every  ordinary  day's  march  that  an 
army  makes  on  foot,  it  would  make  the  equivalent  of 
eighteen  such  marclies  (288  miles)  by  steamer. 

The  rate  of  travel  of  railroad  trains  conveying  troops 
may  be  taken  at  twenty  miles  an  hour.  Hence  in  a 
single  day  a  military  train  would  make  the  equivalent  of 
thirty  foot  marches  (480  miles).  In  this  comparison 
between  foot  marches  on  the  one  liand  and  water  and  rail 
marclies  on  the  other,  no  account  is  taken  of  the  time 
necessary  for  assembling  troops  at  the  place  of  embarka- 
tion, collecting  vessels  and  rolling  stock,  fitting  them  up, 
preparing  j^iers,  platforms,  etc.,  embarking  and  debarking, 
or,  finally,  of  the  time  intervals  between  the  several  con- 
veyances as  they  leave  the  initial  point.  Nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  any  account  taken  of  the  days  of  rest  and 
delays  from  break-downs,  bad  roads,  and  other  causes  con- 
nected with  foot  marching,  which  are  obviated  or  reduced 
to  comparative  unim})ortance  in  marches  by  rail. 

Where  the  number  of  troops  to  be  moved  bears  more 
than  a  certain  proportion  to  the  number  of  miles  to  be 
travelled,  no  time  is  gained  by  the  use  of  rail  or  water 
transportation.  Lord  Wolseley  estimates  for  English 
double-line  railways  600  sabres  and  bayonets,  with  their 
proportion  of  guns  and  materiel,  as  the  maximum  to  the 
mile  of  distance  to  be  made  that  can  be  advantageously 
moved  by  rail. 

A  German  army  corps  requires  ordinarily,  on  a  single 
line  of  railroad,  eleven  days,  and  on  a  double  line,  seven 
days,  to  entrain  itself  and  get  under  way  with  all  its 
materiel.  On  foot,  in  eleven  days  it  can  cover  nearly 
137  miles,  and  in  seven  days  91  miles.  Only  when  the 
distances  to  be  travelled  are  longer  than  these  can  the 
whole  army  corps  gain  in  time  by  the  use  of  a  railroad.* 

*  Von  del-  Goltz,  "  The  Nation  in  Arms." 


74  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Probably  the  greatest  feat  of  water  transportation  on 
record  is  the  transference,  in  1862,  of  General  McClellan's 
army  from  AYashington  to  its  base  on  the  peninsula.  On 
the  27th  of  February,  Mr.  Tucker,  of  the  War  Department, 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  undertaking,  and  commenced 
the  collection  of  the  necessary  transports.  On  the  17th 
of  March  the  troops  began  their  embarkation. 

"  On  the  5th  of  April  he  had  transported  to  Fort  Mon- 
roe from  Washington,  Perryville,  and  Alexandria,  a  dis- 
tance of  188  miles,  121,500  men,  14,592  animals,  1150 
wagons,  44  batteries,  74  ambulances,  besides  pontoon 
bridges,  telegraph  materials,  and  the  enormous  quantity  of 
equipage,  etc.,  required  for  an  army  of  such  magnitude. 
The  means  by  which  this  work  was  done  was  113  steamers, 
188  schooners,  88  barges."  * 

It  will  be  observed  that  it  took  exactly  the  length  of 
time  (twenty  days)  to  collect  the  transports  which  it  after- 
wards took  to  embark  the  troops  and  move  them. 

The  movement  of  General  Emory's  corps  from  Fort 
Monroe  to  Washington  in  1864  was  accomplished  in  two 
days,  or  one-tenth  the  time  it  took  to  move  McClellan's 
army  the  same  distance.  But  Emory's  corps  numbered 
only  13,000  men,  about  one-tenth  as  many  as  McClellan's 
army ;  it  moved,  moreover,  wholly  in  steamers,  and  when 
'  ordered  to  start  was  already  embarked,  having  just  arrived 
from  Louisiana. 

During  our  Civil  War  the  use  of  w^ater  and  rail  trans- 
portation attained  proportions  which,  considering  the  dis- 
tances moved  over,  were  unprecedented  and  have  never 
been  surpassed.  Prominent  among  those  movements  is 
that  of  the  23d  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Schofield, 
the  present  commanding  general  of  the  army. 

"  The  23d  Army  Corps,  after  fighting  at  Nashville  in 

*  Nicolay  and  Hay,  "  Abraham  Lincoln." 


THE  STRATEGIC   CHESS-BOARD.  75 

the  midst  of  ice  and  snow  in  December,  1864,  was,  on  the 
conclusion  of  the  campaign  in  the  West,  transferred  from 
the  valley  of  the  Tennessee  to  the  banks  of  the  Potomac, 
moving  by  river  and  rail  down  the  Tennessee,  up  the  Ohio, 
across  the  snow-covered  Alleghanies,  a  distance  of  1400 
miles,  and  in  the  short  space  of  eleven  days  was  encamped 
on  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  then  blocked  up  with  the 
ice  of  a  most  severe  winter.  Vessels  were  collected  to 
meet  this  corps,  the  obstacles  interposed  by  the  ice  were 
overcome,  and  early  in  February  the  troops  composing  it 
were  fighting  before  Wilmington,  on  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina."  * 

The  principal  factors  in  the  transportation  of  armies  by 
rail  are : 

1.  The  capacity  of  a  train. 

2.  The  time  necessary  for  loading. 

3.  The  time  interval  between  trains. 

4.  The  rate  of  running. 

5.  The  time  necessary  for  unloading. 

6.  The  number  of  railroads  available. 

A  consideration,  too,  of  some  strategic  importance  is  the 
extra  time  required  to  assemble  the  troops  at  the  railroad 
stations,  or  places  of  embarkation,  and,  upon  their  de- 
barkation, to  redistribute  them,  or  deploy  them  anew,  upon 
the  strategic  chess-board. 

In  regard  to  the  rate  at  which  large  bodies  of  troops 
can  be  moved  on  a  double-track  line  of  railroad,  General 
Haupt,  the  Superintendent  of  Railw^ays  in  our  campaigns 
in  Virginia,  expresses  himself  as  follows :  "  Allow  trains 
of  twenty  cars  to  start  at  intervals  of  fifteen  minutes,  each 
car  carrying  fifty  men,  96,000  men  could  be  moved  in 
twenty-four  hours  to  a  distance  of  250  miles.  The  num- 
ber moved  and  the  distance  travelled  per  day  are  simply 

*  Eeport  of  Secretary  of  War. 


76  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

questions  of  equipment  and  celerity  of  liandling.  Some 
colonels  could  get  a  regiment  into  the  cars  in  ten  minutes; 
others  would  waste  half  a  day  and  derange  the  whole 
line."  * 

This  estimate  of  General  Haupt's  does  not  include  the 
baggage,  or  the  horses  and  artillery.  The  practicable  rate 
of  movement  of  large  bodies  of  troops,  with  all  their 
impedimenta,  varies  considerably  in  different  countries 
and  according  to  different  authorities.  This  is  due  mainly 
to  a  difference  of  time  interval  between  trains,  which 
varies,  generally  speaking,  from  five  to  fifteen  minutes, 
and  of  rate  of  running,  which  varies  from  fifteen  to  thirty 
miles  an  hour. 

Referring  to  the  working  of  English  railroads,  Captain 
Maude,  of  the  Royal  Engineers,  says,  "  Where  a  uniform 
desjDatch  of  trains  lasting  for  twenty-four  or  thirty-six 
hours  is  to  be  expected,  the  time  interval  cannot  be  taken 
at  less  than  ten  minutes,  which  would  allow  144  trains 
being  sent  off  in  twenty-four  hours,  and  as  an  army  corps 
complete  in  all  its  fighting  units,  together  with  the  neces- 
sary reserve  required  in  view  of  a  general  action,  ammu- 
nition columns,  sanitary  detachments,  etc.,  requires  only 
150  trains,  the  whole  could  be  despatched  within  twenty- 
five  hours,  and  allowing  five  hours  for  a  journey  of  150 
miles,  it  could  be  delivered  at  a  point  at  that  distance  from 
its  head-quarters  within  thirty  hours,  always  assuming  a 
proper  provision  of  platforms,  etc.,  to  have  been  laid  down." 

While  ordinarily,  in  the  transportation  of  supplies, 
rapidity  is  not  so  important  a  factor  as  security,  emer- 
gencies may  arise,  such  as  break-downs,  or  a  change  of  plan 
or  of  objective,  in  which  the  rapid  transmission  of  supplies 
is  an  urgent  necessity. 

Rivers  and    railroads   will    regularly  deliver   a  larger 

*  Quoted  from  Lippitt's  "  Field  Service  in  War." 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD.  77 

quantity  of  supplies  at  a  given  point  than  can  be  delivered 
by  ordinary  roads.  They  thus  favor  the  concentration  of 
armies  and  their  sojourning  in  the  same  district.  Without 
railroads  the  siege  of  Paris,  it  is  said,  would  have  been  an 
impossibility. 

There  are  advantages,  however,  in  rivers  and  railroads 
over  ordinary  roads,  which  are  independent  of  speed, 
which  would  inure  to  the  army  controlling  and  using 
them,  though  steamships  and  locomotives  should  go  no 
faster  than  six-mule  teams.  Rivers  and  railroads,  as  com- 
pared to  ordinary  roads,  are  constantly  and  uniformly 
practicable,  and  rail  and  water  conveyances  are  far  more 
durable  than  wagons ;  in  other  words,  much  less  apt  to 
break  down.  Furthermore,  they  require  nothing  like  so 
large  a  proportion  of  their  capacity  for  the  transportation 
of  their  own  wants  or  necessities.  Independently,  there- 
fore, of  their  higher  rates  of  running,  rivers  and  railroads 
will  carry  an  invading  army  forward  not  only  faster  but 
farther  from  its  base  than  ordinary  roads ;  and  distant 
invasions  which  proved  to  be  impracticable  before  the  age 
of  steam,  are  now  deemed  perfectly  practicable.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  Napoleon  would  not  have  retreated  from  Mos- 
cow in  1812  had  he  had  railroad  communication  with 
France,  and  that  without  the  use  of  a  railroad  Sherman 
could  not  have  reached  Atlanta,  subsisting  his  army,  as  he 
did,  from  Louisville,  473  miles  away. 

At  an  early  stage  of  the  war  our  government  showed  its 
appreciation  of  the  military  importance  of  railroads. 

Congress,  by  act  of  January  31,  1862,  authorized  the 
President,  when  in  his  judgment  the  public  safety  required 
it,  to  take  possession  of  any  or  all  railroad  lines  in  the 
United  States ;  all  their  appendages  and  appurtenances, 
etc. ;  to  place  under  military  control  all  the  officers,  agents, 
employes,  belonging  to  such  lines,  so  that  they  shall  be 
considered   a  part  of  the  military   establishment  of  the 


78  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

United  States,  subject  to  all  the  restrictions  imposed  by 
the  rules  and  articles  of  war. 

While  railroads  are  more  vulnerable  than  ordinary- 
roads,  rivers  are  less  so.  It  takes  but  a  little  common 
labor  to  make  a  break  in  a  railroad,  but  to  obstruct  the 
navigation  of  a  river  is  an  operation  of  consideration, 
skill,  and  magnitude. 

The  capacity  of  one  of  our  large  rivers  for  transporta- 
tion is  limited  only  by  the  number  of  vessels  at  hand. 

An  ordinary  Ohio  river  steamer,  carrying  both  passen- 
gers and  freight,  has  a  capacity  of  about  500  tons.  To 
supply  an  army  of  40,000  men  and  18,000  animals  re- 
quires about  260  tons  daily.  Hence  one  such  steamer 
would  carry  supplies  for  such  an  army  for  nearly  two  days. 
The  capacity  of  an  ordinary  box  car  is  from  ten  to  fifteen 
tons  of  general  stores.  A  simple  calculation,  therefore, 
will  show  that  to  forward  the  load  of  one  large  river 
steamer  by  rail  would  require  from  thirty-three  to  fifty 
cars,  or  say,  two  trains  of  twenty  cars  each.  Hence,  as 
regards  both  security  and  capacity,  a  river  is  a  better  line 
of  supply  than  a  railroad. 

The  Comte  de  Paris,  the  ablest  historian,  thus  far,  of  our 
late  war,  says  that  whenever  the  Federals  were  supported 
by  a  river  their  progress  was  certain  and  their  conquests 
decisive ;  whilst  the  successes  they  obtained  by  following  a 
simple  line  of  railway  were  always  precarious,  new  dan- 
gers springing   up  in   their  rear  in   proportion   as  they 

advanced. 

The   Obstruction  of  Rivers. 

Points  adapted  to  the  obstruction  of  river  navigation  are 
such  as  favor  the  employment  of  artillery  and  of  booms, 
chains,  torpedoes,  sunken  vessels,  etc.  They  consist  of 
bends,  islands,  bluffs,  narrows,  and  shallows.  The  advan- 
tage of  bends  and  islands  is  the  length  of  range  which 
they  afibrd  along  the  water.     Bluffs  afford  shelter  as  well 


THE  STRATEGIC  CHESS-BOARD. 

Fig.  13. 


79 


ArKanSasRst. 

Fig.  14. 


MR!i»uH 


A\[esVPom\ 


80 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


as  a  plunging  fire.  A  sharp  bend,  or  loop,  enables  a  gar- 
rison to  bold  passing  vessels  a  long  time  under  fire.  Such 
were  the  positions  of  Arkansas  Post,  New  Madrid,  and 
Island  No.  10  (Figs.  13,  14).  In  the  position  of  West 
Point  on  the  Hudson  we  have  a  combination  of  a  bend,  a 
blufi*,  and  a  narrowing  of  the  stream  (Fig.  15). 

The  fortification  of  islands  and  bends  and  bluffs  was  a 
common  measure  of  defence  on  our  large  Western  rivers. 
To  a  fleet  having  to  run  past,  or  to  attack,  a  position,  it 
was  a  matter  of  considerable  moment  whether  it  was  to 
encounter  a  so-called  water  battery  or  a  hill  battery.  On 
a  level,  as  at  Fort  Henry,  the  chances  were  that  at  close 
quarters  it  would  win  by  silencing  the  enemy's  guns,  but 
pjy  ig  pitted    against  a  hill  battery,   as  at 

Vicksburg  and  Grand  Gulf,  it  did 
well  if  it  only  occupied  the  enemy 
and  held  its  own. 

Points  of  confluence  of  rivers  rarely 
afford  emplacements  from  which  the 
two  branches  can  be  commanded  by 
a  single  battery.  Suppose  Fig.  16 
to  represent  a  junction  of  ordinary 
roads.  A  battery  charged  with  its 
defence  would  place  itself  at  about 
the  exact  centre,  B.  Suj)pose  now 
that  the  figure  represents  a  confluence 
of  rivers.  In  order  to  command  both  branches  the  battery 
would  have  to  take  position  in  two  parts,  b  and  c,  on  oppo- 
site banks.  The  kind  of  position  on  a  river  which  most 
nearly  corresponds  to  a  road  junction  is  a  sharp  bend. 


V. 

THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS  OF  STRATEGY. 

THE  movements  of  armies  will  be  assumed  in  this  chap- 
ter to  take  place  along  straight  lines,  and  at  constant 
and  uniform  rates.  In  war  these  conditions  are  never 
fully  realized.  No  two  armies  have  exactly  the  same 
marching  power ;  no  road,  railroad,  or  other  line  of  com- 
munication is  absolutely  straight ;  no  two  such  lines  are 
exactly  as  practicable  the  one  as  the  other.  Changes  in 
the  weather,  works  of  improvement,  and  acts  of  destruc- 
tion may  effect  daily  and  hourly  variations  in  the  prac- 
ticability of  a  line  of  communication.  Now  in  war  the 
all-important  element  is  time,  and  it  will  often  happen 
that  the  length  of  a  march  is  measured  or  estimated  in 
duration  when  it  cannot  or  need  not  be  in  distance. 
Hence  the  deductions  of  a  purely  geometrical  discussion 
cannot  be  applied  until  corrected  for  the  practical  features 
of  the  case.  In  this  chapter  nothing  more  is  attemj^ted 
than  to  describe  in  their  theoretical  simplicity  certain 
characteristic  strategic  situations,  the  apprehension  of  which 
in  their  practical  complexity  is  the  function  of  what  is 
termed  a  strategic  coup  cToeil. 

Every  operation  of  strategy  consists  essentially  in  a 
movement  upon  an  objective  under  one  of  the  three 
following  conditions : 

1.  The  enemy  is  moving  upon  the  same  objective,  in 
which  case  we  have  a  race. 

2.  The  enemy  is  covering  the  objective,  in  which  case 
we  have  a  manoeuvre. 

3.  The  enemy  is  himself  the  objective,  in  which  case 

6  81 


82  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

we  have  a  simj^le  advance  or  pursuit,  according  as  the 
enemy  stands  his  ground  or  retires. 

THE    RACE. 

In  a  race  between  armies  there  is  no  advantage  of  which 
a  contestant  may  not  avail  himself  to  get  ahead.  Each 
army  will  endeavor,  in  the  first  place,  to  start  before  the 
other.  In  order  to  do  this  it  must  either  be  ready  before 
the  other,  or  it  must  deceive  the  other.  One  of  the  best 
means  that  an  army  can  have  of  being  generally  ready 
before  the  enemy  is  an  efiicient  staff  corps.  His  deception 
is  ordinarily  accomplished  by  such  stratagems  as  feints  or 
false  demonstrations,  executed  with  the  aid  of  screens  and 
obstacles,  and  false  reports.  Probably  the  most  common 
stratagem  for  stealing  a  march  is  the  time-honored  one  of 
which  one  reads  in  Plutarch's  "  Lives,"  in  the  lives  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great  and  Napoleon,  and  in  the  histories  of  our 
Civil  War  and  of  our  Indian  wars, — of  breaking  camp  at 
night,  leaving  the  camp  fires  burning.  This  simple  and 
commonly  successful  device  may,  however,  defeat  its  own 
object  if  fuel  be  heaped  upon  the  fires,  and  thus  a  sudden 
blaze  started  up  just  before  abandoning  the  camp.  To 
avoid  this  it  is  customary  to  leave  a  detachment  behind  to 
feed  the  fires. 

In  making  a  feint  or  demonstration  care  should  be 
taken  to  avoid  the  weakening  of  the  army  by  detach- 
ments or  unnecessarily  delaying  its  general  movements. 
While  Grant,  in  his  Vicksburg  campaign,  was  crossing 
his  army  at  Bruinsburg,  Sherman  was  making  a  dem- 
onstration at  Haines  BlufiP,  fifty-five  miles  from  there. 
Sherman's  corps  had  been  left  to  guard  communications, 
and  was  therefore  necessarily  lost  to  Grant  at  the  front 
(Map  15). 

The  amount  of  start  that  should  give  an  army  a  fair 
assurance  of  success  depends  upon  the  relative  marching 


THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS   OF  STRATEGY.  83 

power  of  its  op})onent.  Tlie  gain  of  one  day's  march  is 
sometimes  decisive,  but  in  order  that  it  shoukl  be  so  an 
army  must  be  able  to  preserve  it.  Such  an  advantage  is 
not  so  great  but  tliat  an  active  enemy  may  succeed  by 
extra  exertion  in  winning  it  back. 

If  the  two  armies  come  near  enough  together,  tlie  losing 
or  hindmost  one  will  endeavor  to  delay  the  other  by  draw- 
ing or  forcing  it  into  an  engagement.  Hence  in  a  strategic 
race  the  starting-points  are  ordinarily  separated  by  more 
than  striking  distance,  and  the  routes  or  courses  converge 
upon  the  common  objective.  In  order  that  either  army 
may  win  by  speed  alone,  it  must  keep  constantly  beyond 
striking  distance  from  its  competitor. 

The  slower  army  may  aim  at  arresting  the  enemy's 
march  by  striking  at  his  communications.      In  Fig.   17, 

Pig.  17. 


A  and  B  represent  the  competing  armies ;  A  O  and  B  O 
are  equal ;  and  the  angle  A  O  B  is  less  than  90°.  Draw 
A  a  perpendicular  to  B  O,  and  B  b  perpendicular  to  A  O, 
intersecting  at  c  ;  and  lay  off  O  a'  and  O  h'  equal  to  A  a, 
which  is  equal  to  B  h.  The  points  a'  and  h'  may  be  re- 
garded as  jorimary  objectives  of  A  and  B  respectively. 
No  gain  which,  for  instance,  the  army  A  may  make 
along  the  line  A  O  is  decisive  until  it  places  A  nearer  to 
O  than  B  is  to  A's  line  of  communications.  If  neither 
army  believes  it  can  reach  the  objective  without  the  loss  of 
its  communications,  each  army  will  strike  at  the  line  of 


84  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

communications  of  the  other,  and  a  battle  will  ensue  in 
the  neighborhood  of  c. 

If  the  angle  A  O  B  is  90°  or  greater,  the  distance  of 
either  army  to  the  line  of  communications  of  the  other 
will  be  greater  than  the  distance  to  the  common  objective, 
and  therefore  neither  army  will  seek  to  arrest  the  march 
of  the  other  by  striking  at  its  rear. 

THE    MANCEUVRE. 

Under  the  condition  that  one  army  covers  the  objective, 
the  primary  object  of  the  enemy's  operations  is  to  gain  a 
suitable  starting-point  from  which  to  race  with  the  defen- 
sive army.  Throughout  this  discussion  A  will  represent 
the  offensive,  B  the  defensive  army,  and  O  the  objective. 
Let  B  C  (Fig.  18)  represent  the  circumference  of  a  circle 
Fig.  18.  drawn   from  O  as  a  centre. 

Every   point,   except  B,   of 
such  circumference  is  a  stra- 
A  I  \   tegic  point  of  manoeuvre,  the 


possession  of  which  by  A 
will  realize  the  object  above 
mentioned.  For  conven- 
ience I  will  designate  this 
circumference  as  a  line  of  security,  and  the  circle  bounded 
by  it  as  the  area  of  command.  It  is  plain  that  A's  chance 
of  reaching  the  line  of  security  is  a  matter  of  stratagem. 
Having  reached  that  line,  it  pushes  on  at  its  highest  speed 
direct  for  O.  The  operation  of  circumventing  a  covering 
force  thus  resolves  itself  into  a  secret  or  stolen  march  and 
a  race. 

The  difficulty  which  A  will  experience  in  reaching  the 
line  of  security  will  depend  upon  the  thoroughness  with 
which  that  line  is  watched  and  guarded.  As  B  falls  back 
on  O  the  line  of  security  is  shortened,  and  the  difficulty 
of  watching  and  guarding  it  proportionately  diminished. 


THE  ESSENTIAL   ELEMENTS   OF  STRATEGY.  85 

Hence  the  nearer  the  covering  army  is  to  the  point  to  be 
covered,  the  harder,  generally  speaking,  is  the  task  of  the 
offensive. 

If  there  are  two  or  more  j^oints  to  be  covered  (O',  O",  O'", 
Fig.  19),  the  general  line  of  security  will  be  the  outline  of 
the  area  covered  by  their  sev- 
eral  areas  oi  command,  mdi- 
cated  in  the  figure  by  heavy  • 

lines.  The  space  circum- 
scribed by  the  general  line  of 
security  may  be  called  the 
general  area  of  command. 
Any  portion  of  the  general 
area  that  is  common  to  two 
or  more  minor  areas  of  com- 
mand commands  the  centres 
of  those  several  minor  areas.  That  portion  which  is  com- 
mon to  all  the  minor  areas  (indicated  in  the  figure  by 
shading)  may  be  designated  as  the  area  of  general  com- 
mand. Any  point  within  that  area  is  nearer  than  the 
defensive  army  to  every  point  to  be  covered. 

In  a  roadless  country  of  uniform  practicability,  such  as 
a  level  plain,  or  on  the  ocean,  the  possible  lines  of  opera- 
tion are  innumerable.  As  under  such  circumstances  the 
constant  observation  of  a  line  of  security  at  every  point  is 
hardly  possible,  the  covering  of  a  point  at  a  distance  from 
it  is  a  hazardous  operation. 

In  real  war  the  covering  army  will  ordinarily  take  up 
a  position  behind  some  natural  line  of  defence,  such  as  a 
mountain  or  unfordable  river.  But  the  principles  accord- 
ing to  which,  in  an  intersected  or  road  country,  a  point  is 
covered  by  barring  the  only  lines  of  approach  to  it,  or 
a  covering  force  is  turned  or  outstripped  on  neighbor- 
ing roads,  are  fundamentally  those  that  would  govern  the 
theoretical  or  imaginary  execution  of  such  an  operation  in 


86  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

a  perfect  plain.  The  operation  in  a  road  country  is  but 
the  practical  modification  of  the  imaginary  one,  and  may 
be  regarded  as  the  practicable  approximation  to  an  ideal. 

The  objective,  or  object  to  be  covered,  will  now  be  con- 
sidered as  a  line,  and  will  be  denoted  by  the  letters  X  Y. 
The  covering  force  will  first  be  considered  as  on  the  line. 

The  general  area  of  command  will  in  this  case  be  the 
joint  surface  of  the  areas  of  command  of  the  extremities 
(X'BY',  Fig.  20). 

Fig.  20. 


A' 


Suppose  (Fig.  20)  that  the  army  A  has  crossed  the  line 
of  security  B  Y'.  Bisect  the  line  A  B  and  from  its  middle 
point  draw  C  D  perpendicular  to  A  B.  The  army  A  can 
anticipate  B  at  any  point  between  D  and  Y,  and  the  army 
B  can  anticipate  A  at  any  point  between  B  and  D.  In 
other  words,  A  commands  the  objective  from  D  to  Y,  and 
B  commands  it  from  B  to  D. 

That  objective  point  which  is  nearest  to  being  equally 
distant  from  the  two  armies,  or  which  they  will  reach  most 
nearly  at  the  same  time,  I  would  designate  as  the  close  de- 
cisive point,  and  that  which  is  farthest  from  the  defensive 
army  as  compared  with  its  distance  from  the  offensive,  or 
which  the  offensive  army  can  reach  the  longest  time  before 
the  defensive  army,  I  would  designate  as  the  far  decisive 
point.    In  Fig.  20,  D  is  the  close  and  Y  the  far  decisive  point. 


THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS   OF  STRATEGY. 


87 


To  precipitate  the  decisive  engagement,  the  offensive 
army  inclines  towards  the  close  decisive  point ;  to  anticipate 
the  enemy  at  the  point  of  encounter,  it  inclines  towards  the 
far  decisive  point.  If  we  suppose  the  distance  B  Y  (Fig. 
21)  to  be  indefinite  or  practically  infinite  in  length,  the 
line  of  security  of  the  extremity  Y  will  practically  coin- 
cide with  the  perpendicular  V  V  passing  through  the 
army  B,  and  the  area  of  command  with  respect  to  BY 
will  be  the  wdiole  space  beyond  V  V  in  the  direction  of 
Y ;  that  is  to  say,  every  point  within  that  space  Avill  com- 
mand some  portion  of  B  Y.  Supposing  X  B  to  be  also 
indefinitely  extended,  W  becomes  the  line  of  security 
of  the  whole  line  X  Y,  and  the  whole  field  of  operations 
is  comprised  within  the  area  of  command. 

Fig.  21. 
V 


Hence  in  this  case  B  commands  the  line  X  Y  so  lono^ 
only  as  it  is  on  the  perpendicular  to  that  line  passing 
through  the  army  A. 

If  the  covering  army  be  off  the  line  to  be  covered  (Fig. 
22),  the  general  line  of  security  will  be,  as  before,  the  joint 
line  of  security  of  the  extremities,  shown  by  the  full  line 
in  the  figure.    The  area  common  to  the  areas  of  command 


88 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


of  the  extremities  (indicated  in  the  figure  by  shading)  is 
the  area  of  general  command ;  that  is,  every  point  of  such 
area,  and  no  point  outside  of  it,  covers  every  point  of  X  Y 
against  any  force  outside  of  the  general  line  of  security. 

For  every  point  A'  within  the  triangle  B  X  Y  (Fig.  22), 
the  far  decisive  point  is  the  point  Y'  where  the  line  B  A' 


FiQ.  22. 


prolonged  intersects  XY.  For  every  other  key-point, 
such  as  A",  the  far  decisive  point  is  the  extremity  of  the 
line  X  Y  on  the  same  side  of  B  as  the  key-point. 

If  the  line  to  be  guarded  be  indefinite  in  length  (Fig. 
23),  the  general  line  of  security  will  be  the  perpendicu- 
lar thereto  jmssing 
through  botli  the 
offensive  and  defen- 
sive armies. 

For  everv  point 
A'  between  the  line 
Y  X  Y  and  the  line 
MBN  parallel 
thereto,  the  far  decisive  point  will  be  the  point  where  the 
line  B  A  prolonged  intersects  the  line  X  Y.     For  every 


Fig.  23. 


nA 


M   - 


■-.A' 


THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS   OF  STRATEGY.  89 

other  key-point,  it  is  the  extremity  of  X  Y  on  the  same 
side  of  B  as  the  key-point. 

A  point  which  commands  a  given  line  commands  also 
the  lines  joining  it  with  the  extremities  of  such  line,  and 
consequently  the  triangle  bounded  by  the  three  lines. 

THE    EETKEAT    AND    PURSUIT. 

We  shall  now  consider  the  case  in  which  the  enemy  is 
himself  the  objective.  As  regards  an  advance  upon  a 
stationary  enemy,  it  need  only  be  remarked  that,  while 
yet  beyond  his  observation,  information  should  be  obtained 
as  to  his  tactical  disposition,  and  the  march  directed  with 
a  view  to  coming  upon  him  on  his  weak  side,  or  at  a  weak 
point  in  his  front.  The  problem  of  a  pursuit  varies 
according  to  the  mode  of  retreat.  So  far  as  it  aims  at 
distancing  its  pursuer,  the  retreating  army  will,  up  to  a 
certain  limit,  seek  to  increase  the  number  of  its  columns ; 
but  so  far  as  it  aims  at  repelling  the  enemy's  attacks,  or  at 
resuming  the  offensive,  it  will  try  to  keep  its  columns 
within  supporting  distance  of  one  another.  Where  the 
lines  of  communication  are  close  together,  an  army  of 
considerable  size  may  make  a  rapid  retreat  in  a  practi- 
cally concentrated  form.  But  in  an  ordinary  country  the 
communications  are  so  far  apart  that  a  choice  must  be 
made  between  a  slow  and  concentrated  retreat  on  the  one 
hand  and  a  rapid  and  divergent  retreat  on  the  other.  The 
success  of  the  former  depends  chiefly  on  tactical  skill, 
especially  on  the  part  of  the  rear  guard  ;  that  of  the  latter 
upon  marching  power  or  mobility. 

"  The  first  direction  taken  by  a  retreat  is,  as  a  rule,  a 
forced  one.  The  defeated  army  chooses  the  roads  upon 
which  it  can  more  easily  escape  from  the  enemy.  The 
first  necessity  is  collection  and  arrangement.  As  soon  as 
the  general  has  gained  control  over  the  backward-surging 


90  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

masses,  lie  will  guide  them  from  an  enforced  into  a  natural 
line  of  retreat.  This  leads  him  back  to  the  nearest  re-en- 
forcements, or  to  the  nearest  protection  afforded  by  a  redoubt 
or  a  fortress.  The  troops  must  be  halted  as  soon  as  possible  ; 
for  before  all  else  it  is  long  retreats  which  ruin  defeated 
armies.  A  short  one  is  seldom  accompanied  by  great 
losses ;  the  lapse  of  time,  the  exhaustion  and  despondency, 
the  inevitable  concomitants  of  continued  retreat,  give  into 
the  victor's  hands  guns,  prisoners,  and  baggage. 

"  In  the  case  of  the  vanquished,  therefore,  everything 
depends  upon  allowing  considerations  of  safety  to  drop  as 
soon  as  possible,  and  upon  the  following  up  of  general 
purposes.  A  successful  engagement,  be  it  only  of  subor- 
dinate importance,  will  soonest  bring  about  the  turning- 
point.  Only  a  success  of  arms  wipes  out  the  impression 
of  defeat.  The  defeated  combatant,  as  soon  as  he  again 
feels  himself  strong  enough,  must  seek  to  compass  such  a 
success.  It  depends  here  much  less  upon  the  battle  being 
combined  with  the  great  objects  of  the  war  than  upon  its 
being  a  victory  at  any  price.  It  is  now  justifiable  to  dis- 
regard for  once  the  generally  acknowledged  principles,  and, 
turning  away  from  the  enemy's  main  army,  to  address 
one's  self  to  a  subordinate  division,  merely  because  one 
hopes  to  defeat  it."  * 

A  rear  guard  covering  an  army  in  retreat  aims  not 
merely  at  repelling  attacks,  but  at  putting  such  distance 
between  the  armies  as  will  prevent  attack.  By  a  judicious 
selection  of  positions  for  making  a  stand,  it  may  compel 
the  enemy  to  deploy  a  much  superior  force,  or  to  execute 
extensive  flanking  or  turning  movements,  and  may  then 
manage  to  move  off  itself  while  the  enemy  is  deploying 
or  manoeuvring,  and  make  some  distance  before  the  pur- 
suit can  be  resumed.     The  pursuing  army  should,  if  pos- 

*  Von  der  Goltz,  "The  Nation  in  Arms." 


THE  ESSENTIAL  ELEMENTS   OF  STRATEGY.  91 

sible,  come  upon  the  successive  positions  of  defence  already 
formed  or  disposed,  so  as  to  outflank  or  turn  them.  This 
it  may  do  by  marching  in  three  bodies, — a  centre  and  two 
wings.  The  centre  pushes  or  occupies  the  enemy  in  front. 
The  wings  march  on  parallel  roads  and  aim  at  passes, 
bridges,  and  other  points  of  crossing  in  the  obstacles  inter- 
secting the  enemy's  line  of  retreat.  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  remark  that  this  form  of  pursuit  may  be  met  by  a 
similar  form  of  retreat,  and  that  its  advantageous  use  may 
require  a  considerable  preponderance  in  numbers  over  the 
retreating  army. 


VI. 

THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN,  1864. 

A  S  a  model  of  a  concentrated  retreat  and  of  the  kind  of 
-^  pursuit  just  considered,  the  operations  of  General 
Johnston  and  General  Sherman  between  Chattanooga  and 
Atlanta  are  worthy  of  careful  study. 

Johnston's  army  numbered  about  60,000  men.  His  ob- 
ject being  to  obstruct  Sherman  and  cover  Atlanta  to  the 
last  moment,  he  adopted  a  plan  of  carefully  intrenched 
lines,  one  succeeding  the  other,  as  he  might  be  compelled 
to  retire. 

"  He  practised  a  lynx-eyed  watchfulness  of  his  ad- 
versary, tempting  him  constantly  to  assault  his  intrench- 
ments,  holding  his  fortified  j^ositions  to  the  last  moment, 
but  choosing  that  last  moment  so  well  as  to  save  nearly 
every  gun  and  wagon  in  the  final  withdrawal,  and  always 
presenting  a  front  covered  by  such  defences  that  one  man 
in  the  line  was,  by  all  sound  military  rules,  equal  to  three 
or  four  in  the  attack."* 

Sherman's  army  was  composed  as  follows : 

Eight  wing  (McPherson) 35,000 

Left  wing  (Schofield)    ..........      15,000 

Centre  (Thomas) 50,000 

Total 100,000 

Sherman's  cavalry,  though  nominally  connected  with 
the  three  subordinate  armies,  was,  during  the  active  cam- 
paign, organized  into  four  divisions,  which  were  assigned 
to  duty  by  General  Sherman  as  circumstances  required. 

*  Cox,  "Atlanta." 
92 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  IS64.  93 

One  division  was  usually  upon  each  flank  and  one  cover- 
ing the  communications  at  the  rear,  whilst  the  fourth  was 
ready  for  expeditions  in  front  which  might  be  ordered. 
The  nearest  subordinjite  army  commander  usually  exer- 
cised authority  over  the  cavalry  co-operating  with  him. 

The  object  prescribed  to  General  Sherman  by  General 
Grant  was  "  to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  to  break  it 
up,  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as 
far  as  he  could,  inflicting  all  the  damage  possible  on  their 
war  resources."  The  theatre  of  war  is  generally  hilly  and 
wooded.  The  nature  and  condition  of  the  country  (for  it 
rained  weeks  at  a  time)  made  the  railway  especially  valu- 
able to  both  armies.  Sherman  had  his  centre  at  Rins:- 
gold,  his  left  between  Ked  Clay  and  Varnell's,  his  right 
at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills  (see  Map  1).  Johnston  had 
his  head-quarters  at  Dalton,  before  which  he  was  strongly 
intrenched  (I). 

Finding  the  position  of  Dalton  too  strong  to  be  assailed 
in  front,  Sherman  resolves  to  turn  it. 

7th-llth  May. — Leaving  part  of  his  centre  (Howard's 
corps)  intrenched  in  the  hills  opposite  Johnston,  to  guard 
the  line  to  Chattanooga  and  to  make  feints  against  the 
enemy's  front,  he  pushes  his  right  by  Villanow  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  supporting  it  by  the  rest  of  his  centre 
and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division,  in  all  between  50,000 
and  60,000  men.  The  left  wing  from  about  Varnell's 
covers  the  line  from  Dalton  to  that  point.  McCook's 
cavalry  division  watches  its  flank  to  the  east. 

At  two  in  the  afternoon  of  the  9th  the  right  wins:  is 
close  upon  Kesaca,  and  Sherman  is  full  of  hope  that  it 
will  place  itself  astride  of  the  railway  in  Johnston's  rear. 
But  its  commander,  deeming  the  position  of  Resaca  too 
strong  for  assault,  retires  to  a  strong  position  at  the 
southern  mouth  of  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  makes  sure  of 
keeping  that  way  open  for  the  army  (1). 


94  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

12th  3Iay. — Sherman's  whole  army,  except  Howard's 
corps  and  Stoneman's  cavalry,  covering  his  communica- 
tions, is  concentrated  in  the  position  of  the  right  wing,  at 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  looking  towards  Resaca.  Learning  of 
this  formidable  menace  against  his  communications,  John- 
ston makes  good  his  retreat  to  Resaca  during  the  night 

(II). 

13th-15th  May. — Howard  and  Stoneman  pass  through 
Dalton,  capturing  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners,  and 
push  on  beyond  it,  fighting  Johnston's  rear  guard.  Sher- 
man brings  his  trains  into  Snake  Creek  Gap,  Garrard's 
cavalry  picketing  the  roads  to  the  rear.  He  then  deploys 
his  army  against  the  Confederate  position  of  Resaca,  and 
while  pressing  the  enemy  in  front  and  on  his  right  flank, 
throws  a  division  of  infantry  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry 
division  across  the  Oostenaula  River  at  Lay's  Ferry. 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  advances  upon  Calhoun  (2).  John- 
ston withdraws  during  the  night  of  the  15th,  burning  the 
railroad  bridge  behind  him. 

IQth-l^th  May. — Sherman  crosses  the  Oostenaula  and 
Coosawattee,  and  advances  on  a  broad  front  out  of  the 
mountainous  into  an  open  rolling  country.  His  cavalry 
is  out  to  right  and  left,  under  instructions  to  reach  the 
enemy's  rear,  if  practicable.  General  Sherman  has  now 
a  double  objective  in  the  two  important  points  of  Rome 
and  Allatoona, — the  former  being  the  seat  of  valuable 
machine-shops  and  iron-works,  besides  containing  vast 
quantities  of  stores  and  cotton ;  the  latter,  a  strong  posi- 
tion south  of  Etowah  River,  covering  the  railway  in  John- 
ston's rear.  It  is  plain  that  having  once  crossed  the 
Etowah  River,  closely  pressed  as  he  is  by  Sherman's  more 
numerous  army,  Johnston  can  hardly  hope  to  hold  both 
Rome  and  Allatoona  without  dividing  his  army.  It  is 
accordingly  Sherman's  object  to  compel  Johnston  to  do 
one  of  three  things :  to  give  battle  in  the  open  country 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  I864.  95 

north  of  the  Etowah  River,  where  Sherman's  numerical 
superiority  will  tell  most  strongly  ;  to  divide  his  army 
and  thus  expose  it  to  being  defeated  in  detail ;  or  to  give 
up  without  resistance  either  Rome  or  Allatoona.  In  the 
improbable  event  of  Johnston's  attempting  to  hold  both 
places,  Sherman  purposes  to  break  his  line  at  Kingston  ; 
or  should  Johnston  concentrate  at  Kingston,  to  break  his 
railroads  right  and  left,  and  "  fight  him  square  in  front." 

Johnston,  as  he  retires  from  Resaca,  seeks  for  a  position 
that  will  enable  him  to  rest  both  wings  upon  commanding 
ground  which  cannot  readily  be  turned.  He  halts  on  the 
16th  a  mile  or  two  south  of  Calhoun,  but  that  position  not 
being  a  good  one,  he  retires  on  the  17th  to  Adairsville 
(III).  The  breadth  of  the  valley  is  again  found  too  great, 
and  by  this  time  the  Federal  army  is  pressing  him  in 
front  and  threatening  to  turn  his  flanks  (3).  Again  he 
orders  a  retreat.  Dividing  his  army,  he  marches  one- 
third  of  it  to  Kingston  and  two-thirds  to  Cassville,  man- 
aging to  leave  the  impression  that  his  j)rincipal  force  has 
gone  towards  Kingston.  He  means  to  give  battle  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Etowah,  his  plan  being  to  defeat  the 
Federal  left,  under  Schofield,  with  the  force  assembled  at 
Cassville. 

On  the  Federal  side,  Thomas,  wdth  two  corps  of  the 
centre,  is  kept  on  the  direct  road  to  Kingston,  while 
Hooker,  w^ith  the  other  corps,  and  Schofield,  with  the  left 
wing,  are  directed  upon  Cassville.  The  right  wing  marches 
by  circuitous  roads  to  the  west  of  Thomas,  upon  Kingston. 
Davis's  division  from  the  centre,  forming  the  extreme 
right,  marches  upon  Rome.  Thus,  as  Johnston  broadens 
his  trail,  Sherman  broadens  his  front,  and  on  the  18th 
the  two  armies  are  more  scattered  than  they  have  been 
since  the  campaign  opened. 

19ih  May. — Thomas,  with  his  two  corps  of  the  centre, 
takes  Kingston,  and  marches  thence  eastward,  driving  the 


96  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Confederate  rear  guard  into  Cassville.  Hooker,  with  the 
other  corps  of  the  centre,  advances,  skirmishing,  until  he 
forms  connection  with  Thomas's  left.  Schofield,  with  the 
left  wing,  marches  across  country,  driving  back  the  cavalry 
which  covered  the  enemy's  flank.  By  evening,  the  Fed- 
eral line  is  complete  and  advanced  close  to  the  enemy's 
works.  McPherson,  with  the  right  wing,  is  halted  at 
Kingston.  Davis's  division,  the  extreme  right,  is  at  Home 
(4).  Thus,  Johnston's  plan  of  battle  is  defeated  and  his 
position  liable  to  be  turned.  He  consequently  retires 
during  the  night  upon  the  strong  position  of  Allatoona 

The  miscarriage  of  his  plan  for  assuming  the  offensive 
was  due,  primarily  at  least,  to  inaction  on  the  part  of 
General  Hood,  who  was  charged  with  making  the  attack. 
Under  the  impression  that  Federal  columns  to  the  east  of 
him  had  turned  his  position.  Hood  refrained  from  attack- 
ing until  it  was  too  late  to  do  so  with  advantage. 

2M-25th  Hay. — After  three  days  of  rest  and  recupera- 
tion, Sherman  crosses  the  Etowah  and  proceeds  to  turn 
Allatoona,  his  columns  converging  upon  Dallas  (5).  He 
has  supplies  in  his  wagons  for  twenty  days.  Stoneman's 
cavalry  covers  the  left,  Garrard's  the  right,  and  McCook's 
clears  the  front  for  the  centre.  Johnston  moves  to  the 
position  of  New  Hope  Church  (VI). 

26th  3Iay-bth  June. — Sherman  confronts  the  Confed- 
erate position.  While  occupying  the  enemy  in  front,  he 
extends  his  line  eastward,  overlapping  the  Confederate 
right,  and  seizes  Allatoona  and  Ackworth.  Johnston 
retires  to  the  position  of  Pine  Mountain. 

6th-19th  June. — AVhile  Schofield  stands  fast  with  the 
left  wing,  the  centre  and  right  pass  by  his  rear  to  bis  left. 
The  former  right  wing  thus  becomes  the  left,  and  the 
former  left  wing  the  right.  Advancing  and  extending 
his  line  towards   the   left,  Sherman  again   overlaps  the 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  IS64.  97 

Confederate  right  (7).     Johnston  falls  back  to  the  posi- 
tion of  Kennesaw  Mountain  (VIII). 

27th  June. — While  Schofield  demonstrates  with  the 
right,  Sherman  attacks  the  Confederate  position  with  his 
left  and  centre  and  is  repulsed. 

IWi  June-Id  July. — The  centre  extends  its  line  a  little 
to  the  right ;  the  left  wing,  under  McPherson,  is  put  in 
motion  in  rear  of  it  towards  the  right.  The  right  wing, 
under  Schofield,  moves  down  the  Sandtown  Road  and 
establishes  itself  in  an  intrenched  line  well  to  the  south  of 
the  Confederate  position.  Stoneman's  cavalry  reaches  the 
Chattahoochee  River  near  Sandtown  (8).  Johnston  falls 
back  to  the  position  of  Smyrna  (IX). 

2)d-Ath  July.  —  Thomas,  with  the  centre,  advances 
through  Marietta  and  develops  the  position  of  Smyrna. 
McPherson  passes  beyond  Schofield  on  the  right,  and  pushes 
his  advance  down  the  Sandtown  Road  to  the  Chattahoochee, 
whilst  with  the  rest  of  his  command  he  unites  his  lines 
with  Thomas  on  his  left  (9).  Schofield  remains  behind  as 
reserve. 

Johnston  retires  into  the  works  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  river  (X). 

It  is  not  his  intention  passively  to  oppose  the  passage  of 
the  Chattahoochee,  which  would  involve  the  scattering  of 
his  army  along  its  bank.  He  proposes  to  meet  that  move- 
ment with  a  counter-offensive  from  the  south  side, — that  is, 
to  attack  Sherman's  army  during  the  crossing  or  before  it 
has  united  or  reformed  after  crossing.  By  holding  his  army 
well  in  hand  in  his  intrenched  camp  north  of  the  river, 
he  forces  Sherman  again  to  manoeuvre  him  out  of  position. 

bth-lth  July. — Stoneman's  cavalry  pushes  down  the 
river,  looking  for  fords  and  crossings.  Garrard's  occupies 
Roswell,  up  the  river.  McPherson  and  Thomas  invest  the 
Confederate  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  (10). 
Schofield,  as  reserve,  takes  position  at  Smyrna. 

7 


98  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

From  liis  head-quarters  at  Vinnings  Sherman  can  see 
the  distant  town  of  Atlanta  and  the  general  features  of 
the  country  for  some  miles  south  of  the  river. 

^th  July. — Schofield  seizes  the  crossing  at  the  mouth  of 
Soap  Creek  and  Garrard  at  Roswell.  Johnston  retires 
across  the  Chattahoochee,  burning  the  bridges. 

12th-ldth  July. — Sherman  crosses  the  Chattahoochee  by 
his  left  and,  advancing,  wheels  his  line  of  columns  to  the 
right.  Thomas,  on  the  pivot,  takes  the  road  to  Atlanta ; 
McPherson,  on  the  left,  moves  by  Roswell  upon  Decatur, 
with  Garrard's  cavalry  on  his  outer  flank ;  Schofield 
marches  in  the  centre,  also  uj^on  Decatur. 

General  Johnston  is  relieved  from  command  and  suc- 
ceeded by  General  Hood.  The  Confederate  army  takes 
position  between  Peach  Tree  Creek  and  Atlanta  (XI). 

20th-21st  July. — As  the  Federal  right  wing  crosses 
Peach  Tree  Creek,  a  wide  interval  exists  between  its  left 
and  the  centre  under  Schofield.  Thomas  accordingly 
orders  Howard,  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  towards  the 
left,  to  connect  with  Schofield.  The  execution  of  this 
order  does  not  close  the  interval  nor  greatly  diminish  it, 
but  changes  its  location  in  the  general  front  and  gives  the 
preponderance  of  strength  to  the  left  and  centre,  which 
may  now  be  jointly  considered  as  the  left  wing. 

Howard  thus  leaves  a  gap  of  two  miles  between  the 
right  and  left  wings.  Into  this  gap  Hood  suddenly 
throws  himself  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces  and  turns 
against  the  right  wing.  The  blow  is  well  concealed  and 
well  delivered,  but  is  nevertheless  repulsed.  The  Federal 
left  continues  the  wheel,  the  outer  flank,  under  McPher- 
son, advancing  along  the  Georgia  Railroad  to  between 
Decatur  and  Atlanta  (11).  Garrard's  cavalry  is  detached 
by  General  Sherman  to  destroy  the  railroad  to  the  east. 
McPherson  is  ordered  to  destroy  every  rail  and  tie  of  the 
railroad  from  Decatur  up  to  his  skirmish  line.     Leaving 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  I864.  99 

Hardee,  with  his  corps  of  four  divisions,  to  strike  another 
offensive  blow,  Hood  retires  with  the  bulk  of  his  army 
behind  the  lines  of  Atlanta. 

22c?  July. — Hardee,  by  a  night  march  of  fifteen  miles, 
gains  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Federal  left,  now  uncovered 
by  the  detachment  of  its  cavalry  ;  rolls  up  part  of  two 
corps,  kills  McPherson,  and  gets  into  Decatur,  where  part 
of  the  train  is  parked ;  but  he  is,  after  all,  checked  and 
repulsed.  Howard  succeeds  McPherson  in  command  of 
the  left  wing. 

23c?  July. — Rousseau,  with  a  small  division  of  cavalry, 
joins  Sherman's  army  from  a  raid  through  Alabama  and 
Georgia,  having  severed  the  Montgomery  Railroad,  and 
Garrard  returns  from  destroying  the  Georgia  Road. 

Hood  has  now  but  one  line  of  railroad  by  which  to 
procure  supplies,  that  from  Macon.  Sherman's  object 
is  to  deprive  him  of  the  use  of  that  last  line.  Had  Hood 
abandoned  the  city,  retreating  along  that  line,  Sherman's 
left  wing  would  have  pushed  right  on  southward  by  the 
east  side  of  Atlanta,  aiming  at  Rough  and  Ready  Station  ; 
but,  as  the  enemy  occupied  Atlanta,  the  question  of  supply 
determined  Sherman  to  move  around  by  the  north  to  the 
w^est  side  of  that  place,  and  reach  out  for  the  objective 
with  his  right  flank. 

2oth  July. — The  Federal  army  forms  an  intrenched 
line,  extending  north-westward  ly  from  south  of  the  Georgia 
Railroad  to  north-west  of  Atlanta.  The  cavalry  is  assem- 
bled in  two  strong  divisions,  one  under  McCook  on  the 
right  rear  at  Turner's  Ferry,  one  under  Stoneman  on 
the  left  rear  at  and  about  Decatur.  Sherman's  plan  is  to 
move  Howard  to  the  right  rapidly  and  boldly  against  the 
railroad  between  Atlanta  and  East  Point,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  send  all  the  cavalry  around  by  the  right  and  left 
to  make  a  lodgement  on  the  Macon  Road  about  Jonesboro. 

27th-31st  July. — Howard's  command  marches  to  the 


100  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

rear  of  Schofield  and  Thomas  around  to  the  west  side  of 
Atlanta;  Hood  attacks  it  at  Ezra  Ciiurch  and  is  repulsed. 

Simultaneously  with  Howard's  movement,  Sherman's 
cavalry  starts  out,  heading  for  Lovejoy's  Station,  below 
Jonesboro,  where  the  two  columns,  coming  down  by  the 
east  and  west  side  of  Atlanta,  are  to  unite. 

The  month  of  July  closes  with  the  Federal  line  strongly 
intrenched,  but  drawn  out  from  the  Georgia  Road  on  the 
left  to  the  Sandtown  Koad  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  ten 
miles.  Sherman  awaits  with  impatience  the  effect  of  his 
cavalry  movement. 

lst-24th  August. — From  reports  and  rumors  concern- 
ing his  cavalr}^  he  is  satisfied  that  it  will  not  make  a  suf- 
ficient lodgement  on  the  railroad  below  Atlanta,  and  that 
nothing  will  sufiice  but  for  him  to  reach  it  with  his  main 
army. 

Thomas  and  Schofield  move  by  the  rear  of  Howard  to 
his  right,  extending  the  line  south.  Schofield,  on  the 
right,  is  ordered  to  make  a  bold  attack  on  the  railroad 
about  East  Point. 

Subsequently  to  this,  becoming  strongly  impressed  with 
General  Kil2:)atrick's  ability  as  a  cavalry  leader,  Sherman 
concludes  to  suspend  the  general  movement  and  send  that 
officer,  with  a  small  division  of  cavalry,  to  break  up  the 
Macon  Road  about  Jonesboro.  He  hopes  thereby  not 
only  to  force  Hood  to  evacuate  Atlanta,  but  also  to  catch 
him  in  the  confusion  of  retreat.  Kilpatrick  gets  off"  dur- 
ing the  night  of  the  18th  and  returns  on  the  22d,  having 
made  the  complete  circuit  of  Atlanta.  He  reports  that  he 
has  destroyed  three  miles  of  the  railroad  about  Jonesboro, 
which  he  reckoned  it  would  take  ten  days  to  repair.  On 
the  23d,  however,  only  five  days  from  the  time  he  started, 
trains  are  seen  coming  in  from  Atlanta  from  the  south. 
Sherman  is  now  more  than  ever  convinced  that  cavalry 
cannot,  or  will  not,  work  hard  enough  to  disable  a  railroad 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  IS64.  101 

properly,  and  therefore  proceeds  to  the  execution  of  his 
original  plan  in  a  somewhat  modified  form.  Deeming 
Howard's  command  insufficient  for  a  decisive  movement, 
he  determines  to  leave  a  corps  well  intrenched  at  the  rail- 
road bridge  across  the  Chattahoochee,  and  to  cut  loose  with 
the  balance  of  his  army  to  make  a  circle  of  desolation 
around  Atlanta. 

25th-29th  August. — On  the  25th  he  commences  this 
movement,  taking  with  him  ten  days'  full  rations,  which 
are  to  be  issued  so  as  to  last  fifteen  days.  By  the  evening 
of  the  27tli  his  whole  army,  except  the  20th  Corps  of 
Howard's  command,  which  is  guarding  the  railroad  bridge 
across  the  Chattahoochee,  is  echeloned  along  the  road  from 
Sandtown  to  Atlanta, — Schofield,  on  the  left,  facing  East 
Point ;  the  mass  of  the  army  on  the  Sandtown  Koad, 
facing  south  (12).  On  the  28th  the  army  commences  a 
general  left  wheel,  j^ivoting  on  Schofield.  Howard,  on  the 
right,  describes  an  arc  of  twenty-five  miles'  radius,  aiming 
at  Jonesboro.  Thomas  takes  the  middle  course.  On  the 
evening  of  the  28tli  Howard  reaches  Fairburn,  and 
Thomas  Red  Oak  Station  on  the  Montgomery  Railroad. 
Schofield  stands  fast  until  the  army  trains  are  well  on 
their  way,  then,  withdrawing  a  little  from  his  isolated 
position,  puts  his  corps  in  line  a  mile  north-east  of  Mount 
Gilead.  The  29th  is  given  up  by  the  right  and  centre  to 
the  thorough  destruction  of  some  twelve  miles  of  railroad. 
Schofield  moves  into  connection  with  the  centre  at  Red 
Oak  Station. 

30^A  August. — Schofield  advances  from  Red  Oak  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  towards  East  Point  and  again  covers 
the  movement  of  the  army  trains.  He  is  fully  three  and 
a  half  miles  from  support,  but,  contrary  to  his  expecta- 
tions, is  not  attacked.  Hood  detaches  about  half  of  his 
army,  under  Hardee,  towards  Jonesboro  (XU)  to  attack 
Sherman's  right  flank. 


102  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Kesuming  the  wheel,  the  Federal  right  and  centre  place 
themselves  between  the  two  branches  of  the  railroad,  the 
riglit  within  two  miles  of  Jonesboro.  It  is  opposed  by 
Confederate  cavalry  covering  Hardee's  movement  to  that 
point  (13). 

31s^  August. — Hardee  attacks  Howard  and  is  repulsed. 
Schofield,  moving  to  his  right,  seizes  Rough  and  Ready 
Station.  Thomas  reaches  the  railroad  at  two  points  be- 
tween there  and  Jonesboro.  Thomas  and  Schofield  march 
for  Jonesboro,  tearing  up  the  track  as  they  advance. 

1st  Septembe7\ — Hood  abandons  Atlanta. 

In  General  Johnston's  judgment,  the  lines  of  works 
around  Atlanta  were  too  long  for  Sherman  to  invest  and 
too  strong  for  him  to  assault.  Had  Johnston  retired,  as 
Hood  did,  within  the  city,  he  could  have  remained  there 
and  defied  Sherman  to  starve  him  out.  Ample  supplies 
for  his  army  were  to  be  had  at  a  distance  of  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  city,  and  there  were  practically  three  lines 
of  railroad  (Georgia,  Montgomery,  and  Macon)  by  which 
to  bring  them  in.  He  could  hardly  have  been  prevented 
from  repairing  and  using  some  one  of  them.  For  how 
long  a  time  General  Johnston  might  have  averted  the 
doom  of  Atlanta  is  a  matter  of  interesting  conjecture. 

Rapid  and  Divergent  Retreat. 

The  second  mode  of  retreat  has  been  designated,  generi- 
cally,  as  rapid  and  divergent.  The  columns  of  a  defeated 
army  diverge  in  this  case  from  the  field  of  battle  to  gain 
their  main  lines  of  retreat,  but  these  main  lines  may  be 
parallel.  An  army  that  is  already  divided  has  no  occa- 
sion for  divergence,  and  may  make  a  rapid  retreat  along 
parallel,  or  even  along  convergent,  lines.  The  latter  will 
be  the  case  where  the  retreating  army  seeks  to  concentrate. 
A  small  force  may,  as  already  stated,  gain  nothing  in 
speed  by  subdivision  into  separate  columns. 


THE  ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN,  1864.  103 

The  perfection  of  light  or  rapid  retreating  is  illustrated 
in  the  operations  of  our  wild  Indians.  By  replacing  their 
worn-out  horses  with  fresh  ones  taken  from  ranches  along 
their  route,  they  are  enabled  to  travel,  for  days  together, 
almost  continuously  day  and  night.  Their  pursuers,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  ordinarily  restricted  in  their  opera- 
tions to  the  daytime,  by  reason,  first,  of  their  inability  to 
see  the  trail  at  night,  and,  secondly,  of  the  necessity  of 
sjiaring  their  horses ;  for  our  troops  campaigning  against 
Indians  are  not  authorized,  whatever  the  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  it,  to  impress  horses,  or  even  to  purchase  or  to 
hire  them.  If  the  Indians  have  a  start  of  more  than 
twenty-four  hours,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  overtake  them 
or  run  them  down  ;  but  if  the  trail  is  fresh,  or  less  than 
twenty-four  hours'  old,  there  is  a  fair  prospect  of  doing  so. 
For  our  sturdy,  long-legged,  troop  horses,  travelling  regu- 
larly from  sunrise  to  sunset,  may  average  longer  marches, 
especially  during  the  summer  days  of  the  prairie,  than  the 
scrubby  ponies  or  grass-fed  horses  of  the  Indians,  however 
hard  these  may  be  pushed.  But  fugitive  Indians,  when 
closely  pressed,  may  manage  by  dispersing  or  scattering, 
by  abandoning  their  horses  and  taking  to  hard,  rocky,  or 
difficult  ground,  by  marching  in  the  beds  of  streams,  by 
doubling  back,  and  by  other  such  devices  to  hide  their 
tracks  or  throw  their  pursuers  off  the  trail.  Thus  it  is 
that  chasing  Indians  ofttimes  proves  as  futile  as  running 
after  a  covey  of  quail.  Instead,  therefore,  of  pursuing 
them,  the  troops  may  endeavor  to  surprise  them.  To 
accomplish  this,  they  go  into  camp,  or  turn  back  as  if  to 
relinquish  the  pursuit,  and  detach  a  few  reliable  men, 
perhaps  friendly  Indian  scouts,  to  spy  out  or  locate  their 
camp.  The  hostiles  have,  meanwhile,  made  one  or  two 
long  marches,  and,  having  from  some  mountain-top  looked 
out  for  their  pursuers  and  not  seen  them,  or  heard  from 
their  scouts  that  the  pursuit  is  discontinued,  think  them- 


104  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

selves  comparatively  safe,  and  relax  their  ordinary  vigi- 
lance ;  for  an  Indian  does  not  like  guard  duty  any  more 
than  a  soldier  does.  The  troops  now  resume  the  pursuit 
by  forced  night  marches.  Having  reached  the  hostile 
camp,  they  silently  surround  it ;  and  in  the  morning,  as 
soon  as  it  is  light  enough  to  aim,  they  summon  their  wily 
enemy  to  surrender. 


VII. 

THE  DIFFERENT  KINDS  OF   STRATEGY. 

FOR  the  purpose  of  study,  strategy  may  be  resolved  into 
the  following  kinds : 

1.  Strategy  proper,  or  regular  strategy,  which  aims  at 
depriving  the  enemy  of  his  supplies. 

2.  Tactical  strategy,  which  aims  at  overmatching  him 
on  the  field  of  battle. 

3.  Political  strategy,  which  aims  at  embarrassing  his 
government. 

STRATEGY    IN    THE    AMERICAN    REVOLUTION. 

The  British  in  our  War  of  Independence  aimed  at 
separately  subjugating  the  Northern,  or  the  New  England 
and  the  Middle,  States  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Southern 
States  on  the  other.  The  summer  and  the  autumn  were 
the  seasons  of  activity  in  the  North,  the  winter  and 
spring  in  the  South.  The  British  general,  who  could 
move  his  troops  by  sea,  might  leave  either  department 
with  only  soldiers  enough  to  act  on  the  defensive,  when 
the  weather  limited  the  operations  that  could  be  conducted 
in  that  quarter,  and  maintain  a  superiority  in  the  other, 
where  a  superiority  was  more  important. 

The  problem  in  the  North  was  divided  according  to  a 
similar  plan  into  the  separate  subjugation  of  the  New 
England  States  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Middle  States 
on  the  other.  It  was  intended  first  of  all  to  conquer  and 
hold  the  State  of  New  York.  With  the  British  power 
thus  thrust  like  a  wedge  through  the  Confederacy,  it 
would  be  impossible  for  New  England  to  co-operate  with 

105 


106  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  other  States.  At  this  time  the  inhabited  part  of  the 
State  of  New  York  consisted  almost  entirely  of  the 
Mohawk  and  Hudson  Valleys  (Map  11).  All  the  rest  of 
the  State  was  a  wilderness,  dotted  here  and  there  with  a 
fortified  trading  post.  New  England  was  America's  chief 
source  of  supplies  and  of  recruits,  of  material  and  of 
moral  power.  It  was  the  stronghold  of  the  Revolution. 
To  isolate  it  would  be  a  grand  achievement,  not  only  of 
regular  and  tactical  strategy,  but  also  of  political  strategy. 

"  It  was  among  the  descendants  of  the  stern  Puritans 
that  the  spirit  of  Cromwell  and  Vane  breathed  in  all  its 
fervor ;  it  was  from  the  New  Englanders  that  the  first 
armed  opposition  to  the  British  crown  had  been  ofiered ; 
and  it  was  by  them  that  the  most  stubborn  determination 
to  fight  to  the  last  rather  than  waive  a  single  right  or 
privilege  had  been  disj^layed."  * 

In  the  execution  of  their  plan  the  British,  with  singular 
inconsistency,  undertook  with  divided  forces  to  divide  the 
forces  of  the  enemy,  thus  offering  to  the  enemy  the  very 
advantage  which  the  British  themselves  were  trying  to 
obtain.  A  strong  force,  under  General  Burgoyne,  was  to 
advance  from  Canada,  take  Ticonderoga,  which  com- 
manded the  Hudson  Valley,  and  push  down  the  line  of 
the  Hudson  to  Albany.  A  comparatively  small  force, 
under  St.  Leger,  was  to  ascend  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Lake 
Ontario,  land  at  Oswego,  and,  with  the  aid  of  Indians  and 
Tories,  to  reduce  Fort  Stanwix,  commanding  the  Mohawk 
Valley.  It  was  then  to  descend  the  Mohawk.  The  main 
British  army,  under  Howe,  was  to  advance  from  New 
York,  force  the  passes  of  the  Highlands  at  Peekskill,  and 
proceed  up  the  Hudson.  Both  Howe  and  St.  Leger  were 
to  unite  with  Burgoyne  at  Albany. 

St.  Leger  failed  to  take  Fort  Stanwix.     His  army  was 

*  "  The  Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World,"  Creasy. 


THE  DIFFERENT  KINDS   OF  STRATEGY.  107 

dispersed,  and  so  harassed  by  renegade  Indians  in  its 
flight  that  scarcely  a  remnant  of  it  remained  to  embark 
at  Oswego.  About  a  month  later,  Burgoyne  was  sur- 
rounded on  the  heights  of  Saratoga  and  his  whole  army 
compelled  to  surrender.  Lord  Howe,  meanwhile,  had 
sailed  away  with  his  army  from  New  York,  deeming  his 
co-operation  unnecessary  to  the  success  of  the  campaign.* 

Despite  the  failure  of  this  preliminary  plan,  the  British 
now  turned  their  attention  to  the  Southern  States,  where  a 
strong  royalist  party  still  existed.  There  they  again  gave 
the  Americans  just  such  an  opportunity  as  they  them- 
selves intended  to  seize.  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  the  successor 
to  Lord  Howe  as  commander-in-chief  in  America,  failed 
adequately  to  support  the  Southern  army  under  Corn- 
wallis,  in  consequence  of  which  tlie  latter  intrenched 
himself  in  the  lines  of  Yorktown.  A  sudden  march  of 
Washington  brought  him  from  the  Hudson  to  the  front  of 
this  position  at  a  moment  when  the  French  fleet  held  the 
sea,  and  the  British  army  was  driven  by  a  two  weeks'  bom- 
bardment to  a  surrender  as  humiliating  as  that  of  Saratoga. 

The  British  operations  in  our  War  of  1812  were  char- 
acterized, it  would  seem,  by  an  equally  injudicious  and 
unlucky  division  of  forces  and  disconnection  of  efibrt. 
The  real  stress  of  the  war  was  thrown  upon  two  expe- 
ditions, directed,  the  one  against  the  North,  the  other 
against  the  South.  A  force  of  9000  Peninsula  veterans, 
which  advanced  along  the  line  of  march  of  General  Bur- 
goyne to  the  attack  of  Plattsburg  on  Lake  Cham  plain, 
was  forced  to  fall  back  by  the  destruction  of  the  flotilla 
which  accompanied  it,  on  which  it  depended  for  supplies. 
Another  force,  after  making  a  successful  but  profitless  raid 
upon  Washington,  and  being  baffled  in  a  similar  attempt 
upon  Baltimore,  was  dii-ected  upon  New  Orleans,  where  it 

*  For  further  details  of  Burgoyne's  movement,  see  p.  136  et  seq. 


108  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

was  repulsed  by  General  Jackson,  with  the  loss  of  half  of 
its  number. 

In  both  the  Revolutionary  War  and  the  War  of  1812 
our  enemies  made  auxiliary  use  of  political  strategy. 
While  Burgoyne  was  advancing  upon  the  line  of  the 
Hudson,  Howe  sailed  up  the  Chesapeake  and  occupied 
Philadelphia,  the  temporary  capital  of  the  United  States 
and  the  seat  of  Congress  (Map  11).  The  War  of  the 
Kevolution,  moreover,  was  brought  home  to  the  Ameri- 
can people  by  the  cruel  treatment  of  prisoners  and 
those  atrocities  which  occasioned  the  thundering  of  Lord 
Chatham's  indignation  at  the  use  of  the  Indian  and  his 
scaljnng-knife  as  the  allies  of  England  against  her  chil- 
dren. In  the  War  of  1812  the  British  captured  Wash- 
ington and,  before  evacuating  the  city,  burned  its  public 
buildings  to  the  ground. 

With  armies  in  war,  as  with  individuals  in  single  com- 
bat, there  are  two  clearly  distinct,  if  not  essentially  dif- 
ferent, means  of  victory, — strength  and  skill.  While  in 
single  combat  strength  is  independent  of  skill,  in  war  it 
may  be  a  matter  of  skill.  An  army  that  takes  the  field 
with  150,000  men  against  another  of  100,000  starts  with 
an  advantage  as  to  strength.  The  enemy  may  succeed, 
however,  in  opposing  his  whole  100,000  to  a  corps  of  only 
50,000  of  the  stronger  army ;  the  preponderance  thus 
secured  at  a  jioint  of  the  theatre  of  war  would  be  a  matter 
of  strategic  skill ;  if,  on  the  field  of  battle,  the  mass  of 
these  50,000  is  directed  against  a  particular  point  of  the 
enemy's  line,  the  consequent  ^preponderance  is  a  matter  of 
tactical  skill. 

Ignoring  or  undervaluing  the  science  of  strategy, 
writers,  both  of  general  and  of  military  history,  not 
uncommonly  attach  a  disproportionate  importance  to  tac- 
tical, as  compared  to  strategic,  skill;  giving  for  their  mili- 
tary heroes  the  lowest,  rather  than  the  highest,  estimate  of 


THE  DIFFERENT  KINDS   OF  STRATEGY.  109 

their  force  on  the  fiekl  of  battle,  or  contenting  themselves 
with  depreciating  the  reader's  estimate  of  it  by  the  equiv- 
ocal statement  of  the  number  of  men  actually  engaged. 
More  or  less  of  the  tribute  thus  paid  to  bravery  and  tac- 
tical skill  is  stolen  from  strategy.  To  the  intelligent  mili- 
tary reader  there  is  no  extenuating  such  dishonesty.  The 
science  of  strategy  is  of  at  least  as  high  an  order  as  that 
of  tactics.  Its  fair  and  honest  treatment,  moreover,  never 
requires  the  ignoring  of  tactics,  for  strategy  can  never 
exclude  tactics  from  the  field  of  battle.  No  numbers  will 
compensate  for  the  total  lack  of  tactical  skill.  No  pre- 
ponderance so  great  but  that  it  may  be  shamefully  frittered 
away  or  skilfully  husbanded  and  applied. 

The  most  detailed  and  graphic  accounts  of  marches, 
manoeuvres,  and  evolutions  are  but  demonstrations  of  how 
and  where  the  victorious  army  managed  to  bring  into 
action  better  soldiers  or  more  of  them  than  the  enemy. 
When  such  accounts  do  not  show  one  of  these  ends  to 
have  been  attained,  the  fault  is  either  with  the  writer  or 
with  the  reader, — they  are  either  indifferently  written  or 
carelessly  read. 

It  is  with  a  view  to  bringing  better  men  than  the 
enemy's  upon  the  field  of  battle  that  the  general  practises 
regular  strategy.  He  aims  at  fighting  half-fed,  half- 
clothed,  half-armed  men  with  men  that  are  well  off  in 
each  of  these  respects.  It  is  with  a  view  to  overpowering 
the  enemy  before  meeting  him  that  he  practises  tactical 
strategy.  By  the  practice  of  political  strategy  he  aims  at 
undermining  the  political  supi^ort  of  the  opposing  army, 
or  at  effecting  its  recall  from  the  war.  These  different 
forms  of  strategy  are  not  necessarily  single  in  practice ; 
on  the  contrary,  they  are  usually  practised  in  combination. 
There  are  few  modern  campaigns  that  do  not  illustrate 
more  than  one  of  them,  and  it  is  not  uncommon  for  all  of 
them  to  be  combined  in  one  campaign. 


VIII. 

REGULAR  STRATEGY. 

GENERAL    CONSIDERATIONS. 

THE  chief  items  of  supply  to  an  army  in  the  field  are : 
men,  ammunition,  and  p7'ovisions.  Only  provisions 
can,  generally  speaking,  be  procured  from  the  country. 
Men  and  ammunition  must  be  taken  along  to  last  through 
the  campaign,  or  must  be  brought  up  from  the  rear. 

Assuming  that  all  its  actual  necessities  are  supplied  by 
the  theatre  of  operations  or  carried  along  in  its  train,  an 
army  has  more  or  less  use  for  a  channel  by  which  to  dis- 
encumber itself  of  disabled  men  and  animals,  of  broken- 
down  wagons  and  other  unserviceable  property,  and  also 
of  prisoners  and  trophies.  But  this  purpose,  compared  to 
that  of  procuring  supjDlies,  is  of  inconsiderable  impor- 
tance, and  an  army  that  can  supply  itself  without  a  base 
is  practically  independent  of  one. 

Before  undertaking  to  deprive  an  enemy  of  his  supplies, 
one  must  consider  how  he  procures  them.  This  will  or- 
dinarily be  by  one  or  more  of  the  three  following  methods  : 

1.  By  carrying  them  with  him. 

2.  By  taking  them  from  the  country  in  which  he  oj^erates. 

3.  By  drawing  them  from  a  distance. 

A  distant  point,  or  line,  or  tract  of  country  from  which 
an  army  draws  its  supjDlies  is  called  a  base  of  supplies. 
The  lines  by  which  an  army  communicates  with  its  base 
of  supphes  are  called  its  lines  of  supply.  A  base  of  sup- 
plies consists,  when  practicable,  of  a  line  of  fortified  depots. 

To  provide  against  disaster  in  case  its  regular  sup|)lies 

110 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  Ill 

should  happen  to  fail  it,  or  its  troops  should  be  routed,  an 
army,  no  matter  how  supplied,  will,  if  practicable,  adopt 
or  prepare  what  may  be  called  a  base  of  retreat,  connected 
with  the  army  by  lines  of  retreat.  Along  the  lines  of 
retreat  magazines  and  depots  are  established,  affording  the 
retreating  army  all  necessary  supplies.  A  base  of  retreat 
should  consist  of  a  natural  line  of  defence,  such  as  a  river 
or  mountain  suitably  fortified  at  its  weak  points,  or  of  a 
line  of  fortresses  or  intrenched  camps,  each  one  capable  of 
accommodating  the  mass  of  the  army.  Among  the  places 
of  this  description  existing  during  our  Civil  War  may  be 
mentioned  St.  Louis,  with  a  capacity  of  1 00,000  men ; 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga,  each  with  a  capacity  of  from 
50,000  to  60,000;  Knoxville,  with  a  capacity  of  from 
20,000  to  30,000.  The  greatest  of  such  places  was  Wash- 
ington, behind  the  outer  defences  of  which  all  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  might  have  pitched  their  tents.  The 
Array  of  the  Potomac,  when  demoralized  by  its  defeat  in 
the  second  Bull  Run  campaign,  fell  back  on  these  defences, 
where  it  rested  in  safety.  A  few  days  of  respite,  the 
arrival  of  re-enforcements,  and  a  change  of  commander 
enabled  it  to  take  the  field  again  offensively. 

In  brief,  then,  a  base  of  supplies  consists  of  a  line  of 
depots  admitting  of  defence,  and  a  base  of  retreat  consists 
of  a  line  of  defence  affording  supj^lies.  The  two  kinds  of 
base  thus  bear  a  decided  resemblance  to  each  other.  The 
essential  difference  between  them  is  in  their  working  or 
organization.  The  supplies  at  a  base  of  supply  are  regu- 
larly forwarded  therefrom  to  the  army,  those  along  a  line  or 
base  of  retreat  are  available  only  to  an  army  falling  back 
upon  them.  The  defences  of  a  base  of  retreat  are  adapted 
to  cover  and  protect  the  whole  army,  those  of  a  base  of 
supply,  pure  and  simple,  are  adapted  only  to  the  securing 
of  the  depots.  They  may  consist  of  small  forts,  field-works, 
block-houses,  etc.,  which  will  not  accommodate  masses  of 


112 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


men,  or  supply  them  with  water,  fuel,  and  other  neces- 
saries which  in  the  field  are  procured  from  the  country. 

A  base  of  operations  may  consist  of  a  base  of  supplies, 
or  of  a  base  of  retreat,  or  of  both  in  one.     An  army  may 


Fig.  24. 


V>'' 


oV 


^'>^ 


Base  tS^  SuBto\\cs. 


o 


0>  ^ 


Object; 


A  dvancina  .Annu. 


\ 


4 


\V 


\\ 


\ 


\ 


\ 


Base  oC  "HeVreat. 


operate,  moreover,  from  two  bases,  one  of  supply  and  one 
of  retreat,  each  separate  from  the  other.  It  may  thus 
have  three  distinct  lines  of  communication  to  look  to, — a 
line  of  supply,  a  line  of  retreat,  and  a  line  of  march,  or 
line  of  operation  proper  (Fig.  24).  Ordinarily,  the  base 
of  supply  and  base  of  retreat  are  one  and  the  same. 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  113 

In  an  offensive  war,  the  main  base  of  operations  is  at,  or 
a  little  in  rear  of,  the  frontier  line.  The  term  communi- 
cations is  often  used  in  a  restricted  sense  to  mean  those 
particular  lines  of  communication  which  connect  an  army 
with  its  base,  whether  of  supply  or  of  retreat. 

"  The  idea  of  a  line  of  communication  is  not  of  modern 
origin,  but  is  to  be  traced  back  to  the  era  of  the  invention 
of  gunpowder.  Prior  to  the  general  introduction  of  this 
propelHng  agent  for  war  purposes,  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
armies  lived  exclusively  at  the  expense  of  the  theatre  of 
war,  and  knew  no  lines  of  communication  ;  but  the  in- 
vention of  fire-arms  demanded  the  transport  of  warlike 
stores,  and  thence  arose  the  necessity  for  an  assured  com- 
munication with  the  mother  country. 

"  The  transition  about  the  same  period  from  armies  of 
knights  to  mercenary  troops  led  also  to  a  regular  organi- 
zation of  their  food  supplies.  These  hired  soldiers  were 
too  costly  to  the  state  to  leave  their  supply  to  the  mere 
chance  of  finding  food  in  the  theatre  of  war."'=' 

There  are  two  distinct  ways  of  cutting  an  enemy's  com- 
munications :  one  consists  in  breaking  them  up  or  encum- 
bering them  with  obstructions ;  the  other,  in  seizing  and 
holding  them,  or  in  contesting  their  use. 

Railroads,  for  instance,  may  be  torn  up,  bridges  de- 
stroyed, etc.  But  such  damages  admit  of  repair,  and  their 
effect  is  ordinarily  to  annoy  and  inconvenience  an  army 
rather  than  to  cripple  it.  Where,  however,  the  lines  are 
very  long,  or  the  force  detached  against  them  has  some- 
thing of  the  strength  of  an  army,  they  may  be  damaged 
with  decisive  effect. 

When  Sherman  closed  upon  Atlanta  after  the  battle  of 
Peach  Tree  Creek,  he  directed  his  movement  so  as  to 
bring  the  left  wing  astride  of  the  Georgia  Pailroad  for  the 

*  Clarke,  "Lectures  on  Staff  Duty." 


114  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

exj^ress  purpose  of  having  the  work  of  destroying  that 
road  thoroughly  done ;  and  to  make  assurance  doubly  sure 
he  also  sent  a  division  of  cavalry  to  Covington,  about 
thirty  miles  distant,  to  further  destroy  it.  That  road  was 
thus  rendered  useless  to  the  Confederates  during  the  re- 
mainder of  the  campaign,  and  consequently,  when  Sher- 
man, having  abandoned  it  completely,  moved  to  the  west 
and  south  of  Atlanta  and  destroyed  the  roads  in  that 
direction,  the  Confederates  evacuated  the  city. 

So  when  Hood,  after  evacuating  Atlanta,  took  his  whole 
army  on  a  raid  against  the  enemy's  line  of  railroad  com- 
munication, Sherman  found  it  more  than  he  could  do  to 
keep  that  line  open  and  maintain  the  offensive. 

So  far  as  a  line  is  menaced  by  raiding  jmrties,  it  is 
best  protected  by  detachments  stationed  along  it.  These 
occupy  block-houses  or  intrenchments  at  points  which, 
being  damaged  or  obstructed,  it  would  be  especially  diffi- 
cult to  repair  or  reopen ;  such  as  bridges,  high  embank- 
ments, deep  cuts  and  ravines,  etc.,  or  they  are  posted  at 
intervals  of  about  a  day's  march  apart. 

The  number  of  men  per  mile  required  for  thus  guard- 
ing a  line  of  communications  is  of  course  exceedingly 
variable,  depending,  as  it  does,  upon  the  tactical  features 
of  the  country  and  the  temper  of  the  inhabitants.  Ac- 
cordino;  to  the  estimate  of  the  Germans  for  the  conditions 
of  European  warfare,  the  number  will  average  about 
1000  men  for  every  stretch  of  fifteen  miles,  or  say  one  of 
our  regiments  for  every  length  of  a  day's  march.  At 
this  rate,  an  army  sixty  miles  from  its  base  requires  about 
4000  men  for  the  protection  of  each  line  of  communica- 
tion. Assuming  one  such  line  for  every  40,000  men,  we 
have  one-tenth  as  the  proportion  of  the  strength  of  the 
army  necessary  to  be  distributed  along  its  communications. 
Doubling  the  length  of  line  to  be  guarded,  or  making  it  120 
miles,  we  have  one-fifth ;  tripling  it,  we  have  about  one-third. 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  115 

General  Haupt,  previously  referred  to  as  Superintend- 
ent of  Railroads  in  the  campaigns  in  Virginia,  says  in  a 
letter  to  the  author, — 

"If  any  attempt  be  made  to  establish  a  rule  by  which 
to  determine  the  force  required  to  guard  an  intended  line 
of  railroad  communication  in  a  hostile  country,  the  ex- 
ceptions will  be  more  numerous  than  the  cases  to  which 
the  rule  will  be  applicable.  If  an  army  advances,  leaving 
any  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  in  the  rear,  it  will  be 
simply  impossible  to  secure  efficient  protection  to  com- 
munications; for,  however  numerous  may  be  the  force 
detailed  for  protection,  it  will  always  be  possible  for  an 
enemy  to  concentrate  a  superior  force  upon  a  given  point, 
and  effect  a  temporary  break.  The  reliance  in  such  cases 
must  be  in  the  rapidity  of  reconstruction.  ...  In  celerity 
of  reconstruction  we  were  far  in  advance  of  the  enemy.  .  .  . 

"The  greatest  trouble  was  caused  by  small  cavalry 
parties  and  by  guerillas,  who  were  constantly  placing 
obstructions  on  the  track,  switching  out  rails  as  trains 
approached,  by  wires  running  into  the  bushes,  and  burn- 
ing bridges.  We  lost  some  valuable  lives  in  this  way. 
Rebel  sympathizers,  who  appeared  as  peaceable  farmers 
by  day,  would  be  guerillas  at  night. 

"...  We  could  not  prevent  communications  from 
being  frequently  broken,  but  they  were  restored  with  such 
celerity  as  to  occasion  the  greatest  surprise  in  Europe, 
where  the  newspaper  accounts  were  regarded  as  fabulous." 

The  perfect  protection  of  a  system  of  communications 
devolves  upon  the  army  concerned,  as  a  whole,  no  less 
than  upon  detachments  in  its  rear.  The  most  efficient 
general  protection  will  be  a  vigorous  offensive  which  shall 
keep  the  enemy  on  the  defensive.  Where  this  is  imprac- 
ticable, the  army  must  see  that  it  constantly  possesses 
interior  lines  of  communication  with  its  base.  It  should, 
moreover,  select   its   lines  of  operation   with   a  view   to 


116  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

securing  the  protection  of  natural  obstacles.  A  valley 
with  few  i^asses  and  a  sufficiency  of  good  roads  is  an 
excellent  avenue  of  operation.  Such,  for  instance,  was 
the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah. 

As  an  army  moves  aw^ay  from  its  base  it  exiDeriences 
ever-increasing  difficulty  in  keeping  up  communication 
with  it,  and  a  point  is  finally  reached  beyond  which  it  can- 
not derive  any  advantage  or  support  from  it.  Before  passing 
this  point  it  must  establish  or  adopt  what  is  called  an  ad- 
vance base.  As  it  moves  beyond  this  advance  base  it  ex- 
periences the  same  difficulty  again,  and  it  again  solves  it  in  a 
similar  manner;  and  so  on,  as  long  as  it  continues  to  advance. 

When  the  army  moves  beyond  communication  with  a 
given  base,  the  latter  may  be  broken  up  and  re-established 
farther  to  the  front,  or  it  may  be  left  standing  as  an  inter- 
mediate or  contingent  base,  a  new  base  being  established 
beyond  it.  The  object  of  an  intermediate  base  is  to  sup- 
port the  army  in  case  of  a  retrograde  or  lateral  movement. 

The  practicable  length  of  a  line  of  retreat  is  limited 
only  by  the  extent  that  can  be  efficiently  guarded  or 
secured.  The  limit  of  length  for  a  line  of  supply  is  dif- 
ferently determined.  A  convoy  or  wagon  train  carrying 
supplies  consumes  an  appreciable  part  of  the  contents  of 
the  wagons  in  subsisting  the  driver,  draught  animals, 
escort,  and  perhaps  the  guards  along  the  road.  It  must 
retain  enough  supplies,  moreover,  when  it  unloads  at  the 
front,  to  carry  it  back  to  the  base.  One  six-mule  army 
wagon  will  carry  from  4000  to  5000  pounds,  or  1400  short 
rations  of  provisions  (bread,  coffee,  sugar,  salt,  and  soap), 
and  eight  days'  rations  of  short  forage  for  the  six  mules. 

The  distance  from  its  point  of  departure  at  which  it  can 
deliver  supplies  is  a  function  of  the  two  variable  factors : 

1.  The  amount  to  be  delivered  at  the  front. 

2.  The  rate  of  consumption  e^i  route. 

According  to  General  Sherman,  no  army  dependent  on 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  117 

wagons  can  operate  more  than  a  hundred  miles  from  its 
base,  because  the  teams  going  and  coming  consume  the 
contents  of  tlieir  wagons/'' 

Where  the  supplies  are  forwarded  by  rail  the  case  is 
different.  The  amount  of  its  own  freight  consumed  by  a 
railroad  train  is  inappreciable,  and  consequently  an  army 
sujDplied  by  rail  need  not,  as  it  advances  into  an  enemy's 
country,  move  its  base  up  after  it,  unless  it  be  to  facilitate 
the  working  and  protection  of  the  line,  or  on  account  of 
considerable  deliveries  that  have  to  be  made  en  route,  or, 
finally,  as  a  precaution  in  case  the  railroad  should  fail  it. 
Under  favorable  circumstances,  therefore,  an  array  may 
draw  supplies  by  rail  from  its  original  base  up  to  its 
farthest  objective,  and  thus  dispense  altogether  with 
advance  bases  of  supply  as  such.  In  the  last  war  between 
France  and  Germany,  the  German  depots  remained  in 
their  respective  provinces. 

In  a  general  sense,  a  base  of  supplies  in  a  railroad 
country  consists  of  the  whole  net-work  of  railroad  in  rear 
of  an  army.  In  its  ordinary  technical  sense,  however,  the 
term  is  understood  to  mean  the  line  of  depots  or  principal 
centres  of  supply  in  use  at  any  particular  time.  The 
railroad  station  where  the  supplies  for  an  army  are  de- 
trained, or  where  the  transportation  changes  from  rail  to 
wagon,  is  called  in  France  a  transition  station. 

Generally  speaking,  advance  depots  on  a  railroad  are 
needed  only  as  adjuncts  to  lines  of  defence,  for  the  forma- 
tion of  intermediate  or  contingent  bases  of  operation.  In 
case  the  main  base  is  cut  off,  these  intermediate  bases  are 
indispensable.  Transition  stations  are  not  necessarily 
depots,  though  for  obvious  reasons  depots  will  ordinarily 
be  located  at  such  points. 

In   the   Atlanta    campaign,   Sherman's   main    base   of 

*  "  The  Grand  Strategy  of  the  War  of  the  Kebellion,"   Century 
Magazine. 


118  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

operations  was  Louisville,  Kentucky  (see  Map  2).  The 
line  of  the  Ohio,  as  it  separated  loyal  from  disloyal  terri- 
tory, may  be  regarded  as  constituting  the  military  frontier. 
*'  Supplies  for  the  depot  at  Nashville  were  mainly  received 
by  rail  from  Louisville  (one  hundred  and  eighty-five 
miles),  but  whenever  the  stage  of  water  permitted,  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers  (the  latter  with  the  aid 
of  the  railroad  from  Johnson ville  to  Nashville,  seventy- 
eight  miles)  were  used  as  auxiliaries.  South  of  Nashville 
the  only  communication  was  by  railroad." ''' 

On  the  31st  of  August,  1864,  Sherman  had  at  the  front 
about  72,000  men  and  in  his  rear  about  68,000.t  His 
main  line — Louisville,  Nashville,  Stevenson,  Chattanooga, 
the  Chattahoochee  Bridge,  Red  Oak — was  about  480  miles 
long.  Referring  to  this  line  all  the  forces  in  his  rear,  we 
have  about  1827  men  per  etape,  or  length  of  fifteen  miles. 
Taking  only  the  forces  actually  on  that  line,  we  have 
about  1360  men  per  etajje.  Now  a  certain  proportion  of 
the  forces  oflP  the  main  line  were  doubtless  unnecessary  or 
unavailable  for  the  protection  of  communications.  Hence 
the  actual  force  per  etape  necessary  to  the  security  of 
Sherman's  line  of  communication  must  have  been  some- 
thing between  1827  and  1360  men.  It  may  be  roughly 
estimated  at  1500  men,  which  gives  100  men  per  mile.  It 
is  worthy  of  note  that  the  portion  of  the  line  north  of 
Chattanooga  was  held  by  about  533  men  per  etape,  while 
that  from  Chattanooga  to  Red  Oak,  both  places  being 
included,  required  a  force  per  etape  of  3500  men.  This 
difference  may  be  readily  accounted  for.  The  country 
north  of  Chattanooga  had  been  occupied  for  a  considerable 
time  by  Federal  armies,  and  its  population  had  been  more 

*  Major  Merrill,  Engineer  Corps. 

f  These  numbers  represent  combatants  only.  He  had  besides,  in 
his  rear,  an  army  of  civilian  employes  engaged  in  running  his  trains 
and  keeping  the  track  in  repair. 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  119 

or  less  "  reconstructed,"  to  say  nothing  of  the  appreciable 
extent  to  which  Union  sentiment  originally  prevailed  in 
it;  while  that  from  Chattanooga  south,  besides  being 
nearer  the  front,  was  newly  conquered,  and  its  population 
thoroughly  hostile.  The  map  shows  the  location  of  the 
principal  garrisons  along  the  road.  All  the  important 
bridges  were  protected  by  block-houses  garrisoned  by  from 
twenty  to  thirty  men,  and  capable  of  a  strong  defence 
against  cavalry  or  infantry.  At  nearly  all  the  regular 
railroad  stations  were  small  detachments  intrenched. 

Sherman's  transition  stations  were,  as  a  rule,  close  up  to 
his  line  of  battle,  or  in  his  camp,  so  that  his  wagons  had 
only  to  haul  supplies  from  the  centre  to  the  flanks  of  his 
army.  He  endeavored  to  have  always  on  hand  a  full 
supply  of  rations  for  twenty  days,  with  which  to  cut  loose 
from  the  railroad  if  he  chose. 

Between  Louisville  and  the  army  at  the  front,  the  three 
points,  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Allatoona,  were  forti- 
fied, garrisoned,  and  provisioned,  as  intermediate  or  con- 
tingent bases. 

Lines  of  operation  are  said  to  be  deep  when  they  extend 
far  beyond  the  base.  Besides  the  one  just  considered,  a 
notable  instance  is  that  of  Burgoyne's  line  in  the  Saratoga 
campaign.  As  an  extreme  tyjje  we  may  take  Napoleon's 
in  the  Moscow  campaign. 

While  an  army  cannot  have  too  many  available  lines  of 
communication,  it  should  be  dependent  on  as  few  as  pos- 
sible at  a  time.  In  Fig.  25,  let  B  O  represent  the  direc- 
trix or  principal  line  of  communication  of  the  army  B, 
and  B  O',  B  O",  accessory  or  reserve  lines.  If  the  oppos- 
ing army  A  cut  the  directrix  as  indicated  in  the  figure, 
the  army  B  abandons  the  line  B  O  and  adopts  B  O'.  If 
it  cut  the  directrix  from  the  oj^posite  direction,  the  army  B 
adopts  the  line  B  O". 

Suppose  that,  instead  of  drawing  all  its  supplies  by  a 


120  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

single  line,  an  army  draws  its  ammunition  by  one  line,  its 
provisions  by  another,  its  clothing  by  another,  etc.,  it 
would  have  to  guard  each  of  these  lines.  Should  the 
enemy  cut  any  one  of  them,  B  would  be  constrained  to 
rearrange  its  system  of  communications. 

Fig.  25. 


It  should  be  remarked  that  the  changing  of  a  directrix 
from  one  line  of  communication  to  another,  involving  as 
it  ordinarily  does  the  moving  of  magazines  or  the  estab- 
lishment of  fresh  ones,  is  an  operation  of  considerable 
difficulty.  It  can  hardly  succeed  unless  the  occasion  for 
it  is  anticipated  and  arrangements  are  made  for  it  before- 
hand ;  for  the  enemy  having  once  cut  the  directrix,  more 
or  less  of  the  necessary  transjjortation,  as  well  as  of  the 
supplies  themselves,  are  lost  with  it. 

As  a  precaution  against  the  interruption  of  its  com- 
munications, as  well  as  against  a  flank  attack,  an  army, 
while  turning  an  enemy's  position,  may  detach  a  corps  on 
the  side  of  its  inner  flank,  or  towards  the  enemy,  for 
defence  in  that  direction.  A  force  thus  employed  is 
designated  as  a  point  of  manoeuvre.  Such  was  the  func- 
tion of  Schofield's  corps  during  Sherman's  grand  wheel  to 
the  west  of  Atlanta  (see  pp.  100,  101,  and  102,  and  map 
of  the  Atlanta  campaign). 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  121 

The  changing  of  a  line  of  retreat  being  less  difficult 
than  the  changing  of  a  line  of  supply,  the  adoption  of  a 
new  line  of  communication  will  not  uncommonly  save  an 
army  from  capture  where  it  cannot  save  it  from  the  neces- 
sity of  retreating. 

An  army  that  is  entirely  cut  off  from  its  base,  either  of 
supply  or  of  retreat,  may  possibly  save  itself  by  moving 
into  communication  with  a  new  base.  This  involves  the 
subsisting  of  the  army  for  a  time  independently  of  a  base. 
As  instances  of  a  change  of  base  may  be  mentioned 
McClellan's  from  the  White  House  on  the  Pamunkey  to 
Harrison's  Landins;  on  the  James  River,  which  occasioned 
the  seven  days'  battles ;  and  Sherman's  from  Atlanta  to 
Savannah,  executed  by  his  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea. 

Fig.  26. 

m 

0 


0  A  B/^ 

^ •- ^ — 


y 

y 
y 
y 
y 


jp' 


/ 

Let  A  (Fig.  26)  be  an  army  operating  against  the  line 
of  communication,  B  O',  of  the  army  B.  The  angle — in 
this  case  180° — which  the  offensive  has  to  cross  in  the 
execution  of  such  a  turning  movement  may  be  designated 
as  the  turning  angle.  Suppose  that  the  base  O  and  the 
line  of  communication  B  O  be  swung  around  on  B  into 
the  position  B  O".  The  distance  which  the  army  A  has 
to  travel  to  reach  the  line  of  communication  of  the  army 
B  is  thus  increased.     Now  suppose  that  the  base  is  moved 


122 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


from  O"  to  O'",  the  length  of  line  which  the  army  B  has 
to  guard  is  increased  by  the  distance  0"0"'.  It  would 
appear  that  in  the  operation  of  cutting  a  single  line  of 
communication,  the  important  factors  to  be  considered  are 
the  turning  angle  and  the  length  of  the  line,  and  the 
operation  is  the  easier  the  smaller  the  turning  angle  and 
the  longer  the  line. 

Now  suppose  that  the  army  B  has,  besides  the  communi- 
cation which  it  is  actually  using,  or  directrix  of  operations, 
a  number  of  reserve  lines  (Fig.  25).  In  order  to  operate 
effectually  against  this  system,  the  offensive  must  seize  every 
single  line.  The  angle  included  between  the  two  outer  lines, 
or  lines  farthest  from  the  directrix,  is  designated  as  the  ob- 
jective angle.  It  is  evident  that  in  operating  agahist  a  sys- 
tem, or  number  of  communications,  the  iinportant  factors 
to  be  considered  are  three :  the  turning  angle,  the  objective 
angle,  and  the  length,  or  shortness,  of  the  lines. 

An  angular  base  is  a  sort  of  double  base,  either  face 
of  which  may  be  used  for  the  time  being.  Suppose  the 
army   B    (Figs.  27  and  28)    to  be  based  upon  the  line 


Fig.  27. 


Fig.  28. 


f- 

,B 

.^■*" 

Ai 

E  F  G.  Should  an  offensive  army,  A,  advance  in  the 
direction  of  A',  B  will  move  against  its  line  of  communi- 
cation A  A',  basing  itself  meanwhile  upon  the  face  F  G ; 
should  the  enemy  advance  in  the  direction  of  A",  B  will 
move  against  the  line  A  A",  basing  itself  upon  E  F. 


REGULAR   STRATEGY.  123 

As  a  rule,  a  position  on  a  river  should  be  turned  from 
below  rather  than  above ;  since  the  tributaries  and  principal 
water-sheds  above  the  position  will  be  so  many  barriers  to  the 
progress  of  the  offensive  army,  while  those  that  enter  the 
river  below  will  serve  as  protection  to  its  flanks.  Sherman's 
attempt  to  reach  Vicksburg  from  above  terminated  in  the 
bloody  repulse  of  Chickasaw  Bluff;  Grant's  movement  from 
below  was  favored  by  his  resting  his  inner  flank  on  the  Big- 
Black.*  Where  the  turning  movement  is  not  protected 
either  by  a  natural  obstacle  or  by  a  detached  corps,  it  may 
be  adequately  covered  by  a  screen,  or  favored  by  secrecy,  or 
false  demonstrations  and  reports.  Finally,  the  indecision 
or  inactivity  of  the  opposing  commander  may  sometimes  be 
reckoned  upon  as  a  factor  of  safety. 

A  point  on  the  pivot  flank  of  an  army  which  serves,  or 
may  serve,  it  as  a  temporary  base  of  supplies  or  of  retreat 
is  called  a  pivot  of  operations.  The  lines  of  communica- 
tion radiate  from  such  a  point  like  the  spokes  of  a  wheel. 
Washington  was  a  pivot  of  oi^erations  to  the  Union  armies 
in  Northern  Virginia  as  they  moved  from  east  to  west  and 
west  to  east. 

A  base  of  operations  may  follow  a  wheeling  or  turning 
movement  on  its  outer  flank,  or  a  direct  advance  on  either 
flank.  When,  in  1864,  the  Federal  army  crossed  the 
Rapidan  to  enter  upon  the  overland  campaign  against 
Bichmond  (see  Map  3),  its  advance  depots  at  Brandy 
Station  and  other  points  on  the  railroad  were  broken  up, 
and  all  extra  and  surplus  property,  with  the  depot  ofiicers 
and  employes,  were  sent  back  to  Alexandria.  From  there 
officers  took  position  and  opened  flying  depots  at  Acquia, 
Belle  Plain,  Fredericksburg,  Port  Royal,  White  House, 
and  City  Point,  as  the  army  fought  its  bloody  way  along 
and  came  within  communication  with  these  points. 

*  See  map  of  environs  of  Vicksburg,  on  which  Chickasaw  Bluff 
is  marked  Walnut  Hills. 


IX. 

GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN,  1864. 

THE  Federal  force  consists,  in  the  main,  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  together  with  the  9th  Corps.  The 
latter  is,  for  the  present,  only  attached  to  the  army,  but  in 
the  course  of  operations  is  incorporated  in  it.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  is  under  the  immediate  command  of 
General  Meade,  but  its  movements,  and  also  those  of  the 
9th  Corps,  are  directed  by  General  Grant,  who  accompanies 
Meade's  head-quarters  as  commander  of  all  the  land  forces 
of  the  United  States.  The  9th  Corps  is  under  the  immedi- 
ate command  of  General  Burnside. 

The  troops  have  fifty  rounds  of  ammunition  on  the 
person,  three  days'  full  rations  in  their  haversacks,  three 
days'  bread  and  small  rations  in  their  knapsacks,  and  three 
days'  beef  on  the  hoof  The  supply  trains  are  loaded  with 
ten  days'  forage  (grain)  and  ten  of  subsistence.  Only 
the  fighting  trains  accompany  the  troops.  The  regimental 
and  general  supply  trains  are  assembled  into  one  grand, 
or  main,  train,  to  move  under  the  direction  of  the  chief 
quartermaster.  The  successive  positions  of  this  train,  also 
of  the  Federal  depot  and  of  the  opposing  armies,  are  shown 
on  Map  3. 

The  strength  of  the  Federal  army,  including  the  9th 
Corps,  is  121,000  men.  Op23osed  to  it  is  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  commanded  by  General  Lee,  number- 
ing 62,000. 

The  Army  of  the  James,  under  General  Butler,  is  taking 
position  on  the  south  side  of  the  James  River,  under  orders 
to  advance  against  Richmond.     This  army  is  destined  to 

124 


GRAKrS  OVERLAND   CAMPAIGN,  IS64.  125 

be  neutralized  by  the  Confederate  forces  about  Richmond, 
commanded  by  General  Beauregard. 

Grant's  objective  is  Lee's  army.  His  idea  is  to  beat  it 
somewhere  north  of  Riclimond,  or,  if  he  fails  in  that,  to 
destroy  all  the  communications  of  Richmond  north  of  the 
James  River,  to  transfer  his  own  army  to  the  south  side, 
and,  uniting  with  the  Army  of  the  James,  to  besiege  Lee's 
army  in  Richmond ;  or,  should  Lee  retreat  southward,  to 
follow  him. 

The  Virginia  Central  Railroad  connects  Richmond 
with  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  the  granary  of  Virginia 
and  a  great  storehouse  of  forage  and  subsistence  for  Lee's 
army. 

The  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Railroad  extends  from 
Lynchburg  westward  to  the  Mississippi  River,  and  at 
Lynchburg  connects  with  Richmond  by  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  and  the  Virginia  Central  Railroads  through 
Gordonsville,  by  the  South  Side  and  the  Richmond  and 
Danville  Railroads  through  Burksville  Junction,  and  by 
the  James  and  Kanawha  River  Canal.  From  Knoxville 
westward  this  system  is  controlled  by  the  Federals,  but  the 
eastern  section  brings  from  Eastern  Tennessee  and  South- 
western Virginia  the  coal,  iron,  and  lead  used  in  the 
ordnance  works  of  Richmond,  and  the  salt  consumed  in 
households  and  issued  to  the  troops  and  used  in  curing 
their  meat.  The  James  River  is  not  navigable  above 
Richmond. 

The  Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad  is  in  part,  as 
already  shown,  an  element  of  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
system.  As  a  whole,  it  constitutes  the  central  or  main  line 
of  communication  between  Richmond  and  the  South.  It 
penetrates  an  extensive  region  of  supplies,  and  is  Lee's 
natural  line  of  retreat  from  Richmond. 

The  Petersburg  and  Weldon  Railroad  connects  Rich- 
mond with  the  leno;th  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard.    It  is  used 


126  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

to  transfer  troops  from  point  to  point  as  dictated  by  the 
dangers  of  the  moment,  and  to  convey  to  Richmond  the 
foreign  supplies  landed  at  Wilmington,  North  Carolina, 
the  one  remaining  seaport  of  the  Confederacy.  Stormy 
seas  and  a  peculiar  conformation  of  the  coast  prevent  the 
thorough  blockading  of  this  port.  The  Petersburg  and 
Weldon  Kailroad  is  thus  a  main  line  of  tactical  operation 
and  the  direct  line  of  communication  between  Richmond 
and  the  outside  world. 

Ath-lth  May. — To  avoid  the  intrenchments  that  cover 
Lee's  front.  Grant  crosses  the  Rapidan  by  his  left  and 
pushes  southward  through  the  Wilderness.  This  is  the 
dense  forest  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  nearly 
wrecked  in  the  camj^aign  of  Cliancellorsville.  Lee  makes 
no  effort  to  dispute  Grant's  crossing  of  the  river,  but  pre- 
pares to  strike  him  while  passing  through  these  dreary 
woods.  The  Federals,  however,  strike  first,  but  after  two 
days'  fighting  (5th  and  6th)  neither  army  has  the  advantage. 

The  Federal  depot  is  at  Fredericksburg. 

Sth-20th  May. — Grant  directs  his  army  upon  Sj^ottsyl- 
vania.  He  says  in  his  "  Memoirs,"  "  My  object  in  moving 
to  Spottsylvania  was  twofold :  first,  I  did  not  want  Lee  to 
get  back  to  Richmond  in  time  to  attempt  to  crush  Butler 
before  I  could  get  there ;  second,  I  wanted  to  get  between 
his  army  and  Richmond,  if  j^ossible ;  and,  if  not,  to  draw 
him  into  the  oj^en."  He  thus  meant  to  place  himself 
nearer  both  to  Butler  and  to  Richmond  than  Lee  was, 
thereby  covering  Butler  and  threatening  Richmond,  and 
hoped  to  strike  either  Richmond  unprotected  by  Lee  or 
Lee  unprotected  by  intrenchments.  A  special  advantage 
of  Spottsylvania  is  its  proximity  to  the  Richmond  and 
Fredericksburg  Railroad  and  to  the  stage  and  telegraph 
roads  between  these  towns.  Roads,  too,  radiate  from  it  in 
all  directions. 

On  the  9th,  Sheridan  with  the  cavalry  corps  cuts  loose 


GRANT'S   OVERLAND   CAMPAIGN,  I864.  127 

from  the  army  and,  passing  around  Lee's  right,  draws 
after  him  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  Stuart.  At 
Yellow  Tavern  he  meets  and  defeats  the  Confederate 
cavalry.  Proceeding  southward,  he  threatens  Richmond  ; 
and  leaving  Richmond  on  his  right,  he  pushes  on  to  the 
James  River,  where  he  turns  up  on  the  14tli  in  Butler's 
camp.  In  the  combat  at  Yellow  Tavern  the  Confederate 
cavalry  leader,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  is  mortally  wounded. 

Anticipating  Grant's  manoeuvre,  Lee  posts  himself  ahead 
of  Grant  at  Spottsylvania.  Grant  attacks  vigorously  on 
the  10th  and  12th,  but  is  each  time  repulsed. 

The  Federal  depot  is  still  at  Fredericksburg. 

21st-26th  May. — Believing  that  if  a  single  corps  were 
exposed  on  the  way  to  Richmond,  Lee  would  endeavor  to 
attack  it,  and  an  opportunity  would  thus  be  afforded  of 
attacking  Lee's  army  before  it  could  intrench,  Grant  de- 
taches a  corps  towards  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg 
Railroad.  Lee  learns  of  the  movement,  but  is  too  weak 
to  attack.  He  simply  moves  a  corps  on  a  parallel  road  in 
the  same  general  direction.  As  Grant  pushes  forward 
other  corps,  Lee  does  the  same.  The  result  is  that  when 
the  Federal  army  reaches  the  North  Anna,  May  23,  it 
finds  itself  confronted  by  the  Confederate  army  in  a  j^osi- 
tion  which  even  Grant  deems  unassailable.  Sheridan  re- 
joins the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  24tli,  having  left 
the  James  River  on  the  17th.  lie  has  destroyed  about 
20  miles  of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  telegraph 
wire,  4  trains  of  cars,  7  bridges,  and  1,500,000  rations 
and  other  stores  and  public  property  ;  has  taken  from  200 
to  300  prisoners,  and  recaptured  378  Union  jDrisoners 
on  their  way  to  Richmond.  He  reports,  "  The  country 
passed  through  by  my  command  is  entirely  destitute; 
there  is  nothing  for  men  or  animals.  All  the  country 
north  of  the  James  River  is  in  this  condition  from  very 
best  information." 


128  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

During  this  period  (May  21-26)  portions  of  three 
army  corps  were  employed  for  three  days  in  destroying 
the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  and  Virginia  Central 
Railroads  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  army. 

The  Federal  depot  is  at  Port  Royal. 

21  th  May-llth  June. — Again  the  Federal  army  tries 
to  place  itself  between  the  enemy  and  Richmond.  Re- 
crossing  the  North  Anna,  it  moves  down  the  north  side  of 
that  stream  and  the  Pamunkey,  and  pushes  across  the 
Pamunkey  ujDon  Cold  Harbor.  This  point  covers  the 
road  leading  back  to  the  White  House,  where  the  Federal 
depot  is  established,  and  also  the  roads  leading  below  the 
Richmond  defences  to  the  James  River.  The  railroad 
from  West  Point  has  been  destroyed  as  far  as  the  Cliicka- 
hominy.  Moving  by  an  interior  line,  the  Confederates 
are  the  first  upon  the  field.  On  the  3d  of  June  the 
Federals  again  attack,  and  again  they  are  repulsed.  The 
enemy  is  now  too  near  Richmond  to  admit  of  interposing 
between  him  and  that  place,  and  the  idea  of  beating  Lee's 
army  north  of  Richmond  has  to  be  abandoned.  Prepara- 
tions are  accordingly  made  to  besiege  it  in  Richmond. 
On  the  7th  of  June,  Sheridan,  with  two  divisions  of  cav- 
alry, is  detached  to  join  General  Hunter  coming  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  and  in  conjunction  with  Hunter  to 
operate  against  the  communications  of  Richmond.  Hun- 
ter is  compelled  to  turn  back  before  this  junction  is 
effected.  Sheridan  meets  and  defeats  the  Confederate 
cavalry  at  Trevilian  Station,  on  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad.  He  destroys  five  miles  of  the  railroad  and 
captures  about  500  prisoners. 

The  Federal  depot  is  at  White  House. 

12th  June-18th  July. — On  the  12th  of  June  Grant 
initiates  his  final  move.  On  the  14th  he  has  one  corps, 
on  the  loth  two,  and  by  midnight  on  the  16th  his  whole 
army,  except  Sheridan's  two  cavalry  divisions,  on  the  south 


GRANrS  OVERLAND    CAMPAIGN,  IS64.  129 

side  of  the  James  Kiver.  The  depot  at  AVliite  House  he 
left  open  for  Sheridan  to  use  and  then  break  up,  transfer- 
ring its  contents  overland  to  Grant's  new  base  at  City  Point. 

Keaching  White  House  on  the  21st,  Sheridan  breaks  up 
the  depot  on  the  22d,  and  starts  for  the  James  E-iver  with 
a  train  of  900  wagons  on  the  24th.  He  crosses  the  James 
Kiver  on  the  26th.  General  Wilson,  with  his  division  of 
Sheridan's  cavalry  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
James,  is  returning  hard  pressed  from  a  raid  south  of  the 
James  Kiver.  He  has  destroyed  thirty  miles  of  the 
South  Side  Kailroad  to  the  east,  and  thirty  miles  of  the 
Richmond  and  Danville  Railroad  to  the  south,  of  Burks- 
ville.  He  made  no  break  in  the  line  from  Lynchburg 
through  Burksville  to  Richmond.  All  the  damage  thus 
far  done  to  the  railroads  is  of  a  temj)orary  nature,  or  in- 
sufficient to  make  itself  seriously  felt.  On  the  2d  of  July 
Wilson  unites  with  Sheridan  within  the  Federal  lines. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  now  re-enforced  and  sup- 
ported by  the  Army  of  the  James,  which  numbers  over 
30,000  men.  Grant's  immediate  objective  is  Petersburg. 
This  point  is  of  great  importance  as  an  advanced  fortress 
covering  the  communications  of  Richmond.  Lee  with 
his  army  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Richmond,  under  the  im- 
pression that  Grant  is  aiming  directly  at  that  point.  The 
garrison  of  Petersburg,  which  numbered  on  the  14th  and 
15th  2500  men,  has  been  increased ;  but  on  the  16th  and 
17th  it  still  numbers  only  from  10,000  to  15,000  men. 
Through  a  combination  of  mishaps,  this  o^^portunity  of 
dashing  into  Petersburg  is  lost.  Lee  learns  on  the  17th 
of  Grant's  crossing  the  James,  and  on  the  18tli  his  army 
is  in  Petersburg.  The  Federals  close  in  on  the  place  and 
try  repeatedly,  but  in  vain,  to  take  it  by  assault. 

Since  it  crossed  the  Rapidan,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
has  Iqst  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  61,400  men,  about 
the  force  with  which  Lee  entered  the  campaign.     Lee's 


130  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

loss,  according  to  his  biographer,  Long,  has  not  been  more 
than  20,000  men. 

In  the  early  part  of  August,  Sheridan,  with  an  army  of 
30,000  infantry  and  10,000  cavalry,  is  detached  northward 
to  dispose  of  the  Confederate  General  Early,  who,  with  a 
force  of  about  15,000  men,  based  upon  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  is  raiding  across  the  Potomac  and  endangering  the 
Federal  capital.  In  the  campaign  which  ensues,  Early's 
force,  which  is  increased  to  21,000  men,  is  practically 
annihilated.  Sheridan  devastates  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
breaks  up  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  utterly  de- 
stroys the  James  and  Kanawha  Canal.  He  rejoins  the 
army  on  the  26th  of  March,  1865.  In  the  mean  time 
the  Federals  have  seized  the  line  of  the  Weldon  and 
Petersburg  Railroad,  and,  through  the  capture  of  Fort 
Fisher,  have  gained  possession  of  Wilmington,  and  thus 
closed  to  the  Confederates  their  last  gate-way  to  Europe. 

Lee's  only  lines  of  communication  are  now  the  two 
railroads  intersecting  at  Burksville, — the  Richmond  and 
Danville  and  the  South  Side.  AVith  the  object  of  ma- 
noeuvring Lee  out  of  his  position.  Grant  takes  these  lines 
as  his  primary  objective. 

On  the  29th  of  March  Sheridan  moves  out  against  them 
with  the  cavalry.  He  is  followed  by  two  infantry  corps 
as  support.     Grant  says  to  him  in  a  despatch, — 

" .  .  .If  you  find  it  practicable,  I  would  like  you  to 
cross  the  South  Side  Road  between  Petersburg  and  Burks- 
ville, and  destroy  it  to  some  extent.  I  would  not  advise 
much  detention,  however,  until  you  reach  the  Dan- 
ville Road,  which  I  would  like  you  to  strike  as  near  to 
the  Appomattox  as  possible.  Make  your  destruction  on 
that  road  as  complete  as  possible.  You  can  then  pass  on 
to  the  South  Side  Road,  west  of  Burksville,  and  destroy 
that  in  like  manner."  ... 

This  operation  of  Sheridan's  against  the  railroads  cul- 


GBANrS   OVERLAND   CAMPAIGN,  ISO/,.  131 

minates  on  tlie  1st  of  April,  1865,  in  the  victory  of  Five 
Forks,  which  is  immediately  followed  by  the  evacuation 
of  both  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  Lee  concentrates  his 
army  at  Amelia  Court-House.  His  intention  is  to  proceed 
in  the  direction  of  Danville  and  take  advantage  of  the 
good  lines  for  resistance  offered  by  the  Dan  and  Staunton 
Kivers;  but  the  activity  of  the  Federal  cavalry  and  the 
want  of  provisions  compel  him  to  adopt  a  different  course, 
and  the  retreat  is  continued  up  the  South  Side  Kailroad 
towards  Lynchburg.  The  Federal  cavalry  hangs  upon  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  his  column  and  strains  every  nerve  to 
get  ahead  of  it.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  Army 
of  the  James  j^ress  on  to  follow  up  any  advantage  that 
may  be  gained  by  the  cavalry.  The  result  is  that  on  the 
9th  of  April,  1865,  the  exhausted  remnant  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  is  intercepted  and  captured  at  Appo- 
mattox Court-House.  Had  the  Confederate  army  started 
a  few  days  earlier,  it  would  probably  have  got  away,  and 
might  have  prolonged  the  war  another  year ;  but  this  was 
prevented  by  the  Confederate  government,  which  was  de- 
termined up  to  the  last  moment  that  its  cause  should  live 
or  die  at  Richmond. 

These  operations  in  rear  of  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
are  known  as  the  campaign  of  Appomattox.  They  are 
especially  noteworthy  as  an  illustration  of  the  character- 
istic action  of  American  cavalry,  and  as  the  only  instance 
in  history  of  a  whole  army  being  run  down  and  taken 
prisoner  in  the  open  field. 

On  the  29th  of  March,  when  the  operations  commenced, 
the  Federal  army  numbered  in  effective  officers  and  men 
about  120,000,  the  Confederate  army  about  54,000,  The 
army  surrendered  by  General  Lee  numbered  about  28,000 
officers  and  men,  many  of  whom  were  without  arms.  This 
shows  a  Confederate  loss  of  over  26,000.  The  correspond- 
ing Federal  loss  was  about  10,000. 


X. 

OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A  BASE. 

THE   CASE   OF   SUPPLIES    BEING    CAERIED    ALONG. 

THE  supplies  that  an  army  carries  with  it  may  be  divided 
into  those  that  are  carried  by  the  troops  on  their  per- 
sons and  those  that  are  carried  in  trains.  When  McClel- 
lan's  army  crossed  the  Potomac  above  Harper's  Ferry 
in  1862,  each  man  carried  on  his  person  eight  days'  short 
rations  of  provisions  (bread,  coffee,  sugar,  salt,  and  soap), 
one  change  of  underclothing,  and  sixty  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion, besides  his  blanket  or  overcoat,  his  musket,  and  his 
accoutrements.  Of  his  eight  days'  rations,  five  were  stowed 
away  in  his  knapsack  and  three  in  his  haversack.  Of  his 
sixty  rounds  of  ammunition,  he  carried  forty  in  his  car- 
tridge-box and  twenty  in  the  pockets  of  his  clothing. 
His  total  load  was  forty-five  pounds.  The  supplies  thus 
carried  by  an  army  on  its  person,  so  to  speak,  the  enemy 
cannot  touch.  His  attempts  will,  therefore,  be  directed 
ao;ainst  the  train. 

The  train  of  an  army  carrying  all  its  supplies  with  it  is 
likely  to  be  much  larger  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
combatants  than  that  of  an  army  supplied  from  a  base; 
and  while,  for  that  reason,  the  harder  to  defend,  such  a 
train  is  much  the  more  important  to  preserve.  The  army 
dependent  on  it  will  be  especially  attentive  to  its  security. 

As  the  size  of  the  train,  and  consequently  the  difiiculty 
of  concealing  it,  as  well  as  of  defending  it,  increases  with 
the  number  of  rations  carried,  it  is  especially  important  to 
consider,  in  the  planning  of  a  self-sustaining  exjDcdition, 

132 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  133 

what  is  tlie  minimum  time  in  which  it  can  be  executed. 
The  marching  power  of  the  soldier  is  here  the  important 
factor. 

While  a  horseman  will  travel  faster  than  a  foot-soldier, 
the  train  of  a  body  of  horsemen  carrying  grain  wath  it,  to 
say  nothing  of  hay,  would  be  about  four  times  as  long  as 
the  train  of  an  equal  force  of  foot-soldiers ;  so  that  taking 
the  rate  of  operation  of  cavalry  to  be  to  that  of  infantry 
only  as  six  to  five,  the  train  of  a  body  of  cavalry  would  be 
to  that  of  an  equal  number  of  infantry  as  three  to  one. 
This  disproportion  may  perhaps  be  neutralized,  so  far  as 
security  is  concerned,  by  the  great  tactical  advantage  pos- 
sessed by  cavalry  in  their  fast  gaits,  which  gives  them  a 
superior  effectiveness  as  escorts. 

If  one  cannot  in  any  way  get  at  the  enemy's  train  to 
capture  or  destroy  it,  there  remains  to  be  tried  the  strat- 
agem of  prolonging  operations  beyond  the  period  for 
which  the  enemy  is  su2:>plied.  There  are,  generally  speak- 
ing, two  ways  in  w^iich  this  may  be  done.  The  one  con- 
sists in  cutting  the  enemy  from  his  base  of  retreat,  the 
other  in  retiring  before  him  and  luring  him  on  with  the 
prospect  of  a  decisive  engagement.  As  already  stated, 
a  line  of  communication  may  be  cut  either  by  damaging 
it  or  by  contesting  its  use.  The  former  method  will  be 
considered  further  on. 

In  taking  position  to  cut  a  line  of  retreat,  the  offensive 
has  a  choice  between  two  characteristic  forms  of  opposition, 
— the  direct  and  the  oblique.  The  direct  opposition  con- 
sists in  occupying  the  line  itself  and  squarely  barring  the 
enemy's  passage;  the  oblique,  in  taking  position  to  one 
side  of  it  and  thus  forcing  the  enemy  to  halt  and  face  to  a 
flank.  The  direct  opposition  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  29,  the 
oblique  in  Fig.  30 ;  in  both  of  which  O  is  the  base  of 
retreat  of  the  army  A,  and  O'  of  the  army  B. 

An  army  is  not  dependent  on  its  base  of  retreat  until  it 


134  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

has  exhausted  its  supplies  or  been  badly  beaten.  But 
when  it  depends  on  such  a  base,  it  must  return  to  it,  and 
consequently  cannot  operate  against  the  communications  of 
the  enemy.  It  follows  that  in  an  effectual  operation  against 
a  line  of  retreat,  the  defensive  army  is  dependent  on  such 
line  and  the  offensive  is  not. 

Fig.  29. 


— ^-i- ■  -  D  V ^ 

0  B  B'  O' 

Say  the  two  armies  A  and  B,  operating  from  bases  of 
retreat,  cut  each  other's  communications  as  illustrated  in 
Fig.  29  (A'  B') ,  each  facing  its  proper  base ;  they  are 
not  on  strategically  equal  terms.  B  is  dependent  on  its 
base.  It  is  therefore  compelled  to  attack,  and,  if  defeated, 
is  ruined.  A  may  wait  for  B  to  attack,  and,  if  defeated, 
has  only  failed  of  its  offensive  object.  So  in  case  the  two 
armies  face  each  other  across  their  lines  of  communication, 
as  indicated  in  Fig.  30,  A  may  ruin  B,  but  B  can  only 
thwart  A. 

Fig.  30. 

0     A  B    b^-^  0' 

In  Figs.  29  and  30,  the  army  B  is  in  retreat  and  the 
army  A  is  trying  to  intercept  it.  It  is  to  be  assumed  in 
these  cases  that  the  army  B,  having  met  with  a  serious 
reverse  or  run  short  of  supplies,  has  become  dependent 
upon  its  base  O',  and  that  the  army  A  is  still  independent 
of  a  base.  B  can  accomjolish  nothing  by  a  counter-move- 
ment against  A's  communications ;  and,  as  it  is  facing  its 
base,  it  need  have  no  concern  as  to  its  actual  rear. 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  135 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  army  A  has  taken  the  position 
A',  Fig.  30.  The  army  B  may  be  able  to  move  against 
its  flank,  indicated  by  the  line  B  a ;  but  it  is  presumable 
that  A  is  protected  by  the  ground  and  by  special  disposi- 
tions against  the  success  of  such  a  movement.  B  may 
consequently  undertake  to  deploy  in  front  of  A  and  make 
a  direct  attack  upon  it  (B  b)  ;  but  this  involves  the  tactical 
offensive  under  great  disadvantage.  B  may  prefer  an 
attempt  to  march  across  the  front  or  rear  of  A',  whichever 
is  the  more  favorable  to  secrecy  and  celerity.  The  more 
direct  and  ordinarily  the  safer  course  is  to  cross  the  front. 
Whether  or  not  it  will  utilize  the  road  B  O'  will  ordinarily 
depend  more  or  less  upon  the  distance  of  the  road  from 
A'.  But  the  terrain,  or  lay  of  the  land,  may  compel  it  to 
keep  on  or  near  the  road.  At  any  rate,  B  will  march  in 
as  compact  a  column  as  possible,  throwing  out  a  flanking 
force  towards  the  enemy.  The  latter  will  do  all  it  can  to 
break  through  this  force  and  attack  the  main  body,  or, 
failing  in  that,  to  cause  the  re-enforcement  of  the  flanking 
force  to  the  extent,  if  possible,  of  drawing  the  main  body 
into  action,  and  thus  bringing  on  a  general  engagement. 
But  even  if  a  battle  is  fought,  and  results,  as  it  supposably 
will,  in  a  tactical  victory  for  A,  the  strategic  advantage 
may  be  gained  by  B,  for  the  latter  may  make  good  its 
retreat  in  the  direction  of  O',  and  thus  attain  its  object  at 
the  cost  of  a  tactical  defeat.  On  the  other  hand,  A  may 
turn  the  flank  of  the  army  B  on  the  side  of  O',  and  thus 
compel  it  to  retire  in  the  direction  from  which  it  came; 
but  it  can  hardly  succeed  in  doing  so  without  making  its 
operation  practically  a  case  of  direct  opposition.  We  may 
conclude,  therefore,  that,  in  order  by  oblique  opposition  to 
arrest  an  army  that  is  trying  to  reach  its  base  of  retreat, 
two  conditions  must  be  fulfilled : 

1.  A  position  must  be  taken  up  beside  a  line  of  march 
which  the  retreating  army  is  compelled   to  follow,  and 


136  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

near  enough  to  that  line  to  compel  the  retreating  army 
to  deploy  for  battle. 

2.  The  retreating  army  must  be  defeated  and  forced  off* 
its  line  of  operation. 

The  fighting  to  be  done  in  the  oblique  opposition  is 
somewhat  harder  than  that  involved  in  the  direct.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  turning  movement  in  the  direct 
opposition  is  the  more  extensive.  Thus  the  difficulty  of 
the  fighting  in  the  one  is  about  offset  by  that  of  the  ma- 
nceuvrins:  in  the  other. 


'& 


THE  SARATOGA  CAMPAIGN,  1777. 

The  stratagem  of  luring  the  enemy  into  the  interior  of 
a  country  with  the  effect  of  depleting  his  numbers  and 
commissariat  is  well  illustrated  in  the  Saratoga  campaign 
(Map  11).*  The  object  of  Schuyler,  the  American  com- 
mander, was  to  delay  the  army  of  Burgoyne  by  every 
possible  device  and  steadily  avoid  a  pitched  battle.  The 
militia  and  farmers  of  New  England  and  New  York  were 
to  rally  and  fall  upon  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  British, 
harass  them,  cut  off  their  outlying  i')arties,  and  finally  hem 
them  in  and  capture  or  destroy  them. 

On  the  1st  of  June  Burgoyne  took  the  field  with  an 
army  of  about  8000  men.  On  the  5th  of  July  he  cap- 
tures Ticonderosra.  Leavins;  here  one-eio;htli  of  his  force 
as  a  garrison,  he  pushes  up  Lake  Champlain  and  destroys 
the  American  flotilla.  On  the  10th  of  July  he  arrives 
at  Skenesboro,  the  head  of  the  lake,  where  he  destroys 
a  considerable  quantity  of  baggage  and  stores.  His  own 
troubles  now  commence.  From  Skenesboro  to  Fort  Ed- 
ward, where  the  American  army  is  encamped,  is  twenty 
miles  as  the  crow  flies ;  but  Schuyler  has  been  industri- 

*  For  general  outline  of  this  campaign,  see  p.  105. 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY   OF  A   BASE.  137 

oiisly  at  work  with  the  axe  and  the  crow-bar.  The  roads, 
bad  enough  at  their  best,  are  obstructed  every  few  yards 
by  liuge  trunks  of  fallen  trees,  that  lie  with  their  boughs 
interwoven.  Wherever  the  little  streams  can  serve  as  aids 
to  the  march,  they  are  choked  with  stumps  and  stones ; 
wherever  they  serve  as  obstacles  which  need  to  be  crossed, 
the  bridges  are  broken  down.  The  country  is  such  a 
labyrinth  of  creeks  and  swamps  that  the  British  in  their 
march  have  to  rebuild  more  than  forty  bridges.  Under 
these  circumstances  their  advance  must  be  regarded  as  a 
marvel  of  celerity.  They  accomplish  a  mile  a  day,  and 
reach  Fort  Edward  on  the  30th  of  July. 

In  the  mean  time  Schuyler  has  crossed  the  Hudson  and 
fallen  back  to  Stillwater,  about  30  miles  above  Albany. 
The  militia  of  New  York  and  New  England  are  now 
beating  to  arms.  Burgoyne  supposed  that  it  would  be 
necessary  only  to  show  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army, 
for  the  peoi^le  to  rush  by  hundreds  to  offer  their  supjDort 
or  seek  his  protection.  He  finds  that  they  withdraw  from 
his  line  of  advance,  driving  their  cattle  before  them,  and 
seeking  shelter,  when  possible,  within  the  lines  of  the 
American  army.  In  his  reliance  upon  the  aid  of  New 
York  loyalists  he  is  utterly  disappointed ;  very  few  Tories 
join  him,  and  these  cannot  help  him.  When  the  yeo- 
manry collect,  it  is  only  to  vex  him  and  retard  his  prog- 
ress. He  is  in  want  of  horses  to  dras;  his  cannon  and 
carry  his  provisions,  and  his  army  is  suffering  from 
hunger.  With  a  view  to  supplying  his  wants,  he  detaches 
about  1000  troops  and  100  newly-arrived  Indians  to  seize 
Bennington,  the  depot  of  supplies  of  the  New  England 
militia.  At  the  battle  of  Bennington,  fought  August  16, 
this  detachment  is  practically  annihilated,  Burgoyne  is 
now  in  need  of  re-enforcements  as  well  as  of  supplies. 
On  the  19th  he  tries  to  force  the  main  American  position. 
This  occasions  the  battle  of  Freeman's  Farm,  which  costs 


138  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

liim  from  one-fifth  to  one-fourth  of  his  army,  and  results 
in  complete  failure. 

A  few  days  later  news  reaches  him  that  Ticonderoga  is 
besieged  and  his  last  source  of  supply  cut  off.  Even  on 
short  rations,  his  army  has  barely  three  weeks'  food.  The 
force  opposed  to  him  has  swollen  to  16,000  men,  and  is 
abundantly  supplied.  Hearing  nothing  from  the  army 
that  is  supposed  to  be  ascending  the  Hudson,  Burgoyne 
resolves  on  a  third  attempt  to  break  through  the  line  of 
the  American  army,  which  now  outnumbers  him  more 
than  three  to  one.  On  the  7th  of  October  the  second 
battle  of  Freeman's  Farm  results  in  a  complete  victory 
for  the  Americans.  The  British  retreat  upon  the  heights 
near  Saratoga,  where  they  are  intercepted  and  surrounded. 
In  this  position  they  are  compelled  to  be  constantly  under 
arms.  The  American  cannon  play  on  every  part  of  their 
camp,  and  rifle-balls  whistle  in  many  parts  of  tlieir  lines. 
On  the  17th  of  October,  being  too  debilitated  by  hunger 
and  fatigue  to  resist  an  attack,  and  their  supplies  being 
nearly  exhausted,  they  lay  down  their  arms  as  prisoners 
of  war. 

They  numbered  5790.  The  sick  and  wounded  left  in 
the  camp  when  the  British  retreated  to  Saratoga,  together 
with  the  British,  German,  and  Canadian  troops  who  were 
killed,  wounded,  or  taken  j^risoners,  and  those  who  deserted, 
numbered  together  about  4689. 

An  army  rarely  operates  nowadays  from  a  base  of 
retreat  solely  and  simply,  or  independently  of  a  base  of 
supj^lies.  This  mode  of  operation  is  characteristic  of 
naval  rather  than  of  land  warfare.  An  ocean  steamer 
must,  every  few  months, — say  from  three  to  six, — go  into 
port  to  be  coaled  and  docked, — that  is,  to  get  coal,  to  be 
repaired,  and  to  have  its  bottom  freed  of  barnacles  and 
sea-weed.  The  stations  at  which  this  is  done  are  essentially 
bases  of  retreat.     To  avoid  the  abandonment  of  an  opera- 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  139 

tion,  the  vessels  of  a  fleet  take  turns  going  and  coming  to 
and  from  the  base.  But  this  reduces  the  system  of  com- 
munication practically  to  that  of  a  regular  base  and  line 
of  supply.  It  is  when  we  consider  a  single  vessel  operating 
independently  that  we  see  illustrated  the  system  peculiar 
to  a  base  of  retreat. 

The  weight  that  a  man  can  carry  on  his  person,  or  on 
his  horse,  is  so  small  that  it  is  commonly  impracticable 
for  a  soldier,  especially  an  infjintryman,  to  keep  himself 
supplied  at  the  front  by  fetching  his  own  supplies  from  a 
base.  Unlike  a  fleet,  therefore,  an  army  cannot,  without 
transports,  maintain  efficient  communication  with  a  base 
of  supplies,  or  operate  from  a  base  of  retreat  as  from  a 
base  of  supplies. 

A  troop  of  cavalry  starting  out  from  one  of  our  Western 
posts,  in  pursuit  of  Indians,  takes  with  it  ordinarily  from 
ten  to  twenty  days'  rations  on  pack-mules.  With  these  it 
calculates  on  keeping  the  trail  from  five  to  ten  days.  It 
may,  however,  hold  out  longer,  and  return  on  short 
rations,  or  run  into  a  nearer  post  than  the  one  from  which 
it  started,  or  reach  a  telegraph  office  on  a  railroad,  where 
it  can  have  supplies  sent  to  it.  But  such  occasions  are 
exceptional.  Travelling  across  country  from  sunrise  to 
sunset,  day  after  day,  it  cannot,  at  any  rate  while  on  the 
trail,  keep  up  regular  communication  with  a  base. 

In  Indian  operations,  the  offensive  in  strategy  is  not 
readily  combined,  as  it  is  in  civilized  war,  with  the  defen- 
sive in  tactics.  The  extreme  lightness  or  mobility  of  the 
contending  forces,  together  with  the  general  openness  of 
the  country,  almost  precludes  the  operation  of  cutting  a 
line  or  system  of  communications,  and  Indians  have  not 
the  tactical  assurance,  so  to  speak,  to  force  a  body  of 
troops  to  attack  them.  Their  strategy  consists  ordinarily 
in  leading  their  pursuers  as  fatiguing  a  chase  as  possible, 
and  prolonging  it  beyond  their  power  of  endurance. 


140  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

THE  CASE  OF  SUPPLIES  BEING   TAKEN   FROM  THE  COUNTRY. 

By  subsisting  off  the  country,  an  army  may  succeed  in 
reducing  its  train  or  impedimenta  and  thus  gaining  in 
mobility.  On  the  other  hand,  it  makes  itself  de])endent 
upon  a  number  of  conditions  and  circumstances,  more  or 
less  varied  and  complex,  which  may  greatly  hamper  its 
movements.  The  supplying  of  an  army  from  the  theatre 
of  war  is  affected  by  the  facilities  for  utilizing  those 
resources  (especially  the  means  of  transportation),  by  the 
time  of  year  and  the  climate,  by  the  rapidity  of  the 
movements  of  the  army,  by  the  distance  or  proximity  of 
the  enemy,  and  by  the  temper  of  the  inhabitants.  Coun- 
tries which  are  mainly  agricultural  offer,  as  a  rule,  the 
greatest  advantages.  In  manufacturing  districts  it  is  more 
easy  to  find  money  than  supplies ;  while  in  a  cattle-breed- 
ing country,  bread-stuffs  will  not  probably  be  found  in 
excess  of  the  local  requirements,  but  meat,  forage,  and 
transport  will  be  insured. 

The  facilities  for  utilizing  the  resources  will  depend 
mainly  on  the  state  of  the  communications.  An  army 
may  suffer  from  want  in  the  richest  country,  if  the  means 
of  communication  be  in  an  unsatisfactory  condition.  How- 
ever vast  the  accumulated  stores  may  be,  they  are  of  no 
use  if  they  cannot  be  conveyed  to  places  where  they  may 
be  consumed.  The  chief  difficulty  encountered  by  the 
Confederates  in  supplying  their  armies  was  not  in  the 
production  of  supplies,  but  in  their  transportation  over 
decayed  and  worn-out  railroads. 

The  influence  of  the  time  of  the  year  and  the  climate 
upon  the  yield  of  supplies  and  upon  the  state  of  the 
communications  is  obvious. 

A  prolonged  sojourn  at  one  and  the  same  spot  exhausts 
the  local  resources.  The  number  of  troops  which  a  given 
country  will  supply  depends  upon  their  breadth  of  front 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  141 

and  rate  of  movement.  The  broader  tlie  front  the  easier 
the  supply,  and  vice  versa.  Hence  the  well-known  saying, 
"  Fight  concentrated,  march  separated."  As  already 
stated,  a  European  country  in  a  fair  degree  of  cultivation 
is  capable  of  sustaining  about  5000  men  to  the  mile  of 
front  for  a  period  of  twenty-four  hours. 

The  presence  of  the  enemy  compels  an  army  to  march 
concentrated,  and  thus  prevents  its  utilizing  the  resources 
of  the  country. 

Lastly,  if  the  inhabitants  are  favorably  disposed,  supply 
is  facilitated.  This  was  strikingly  shown  during  the  period 
of  the  formation  and  organization  of  our  little  army 
around  Boston  in  1775.  "  There  was  nothing  regularly 
established,  and  yet  many  thousands  of  men  were  abun- 
dantly supplied.  Touched  by  an  all-pervading  influence, 
each  householder  esteemed  himself  a  sort  of  commissary. 
There  were  no  public  magazines,  no  large  dealers  in  pro- 
visions ;  but  the  wants  of  the  army  rung  in  the  ears  of  the 
farmers,  and  from  every  cellar  and  barn-yard  and  field 
throughout  Worcester  and  Hampshire,  and  even  Berk- 
shire, such  articles  of  food  as  could  be  spared  were  devoted 
to  the  camp,  and  everybody's  wagons  were  used  to  forward 
them.  But  for  this  the  forces  must  have  dispersed.  How 
it  was  done  cannot  exactly  be  told ;  popular  enthusiasm 
keeps  little  record  of  its  sacrifices ;  only  it  was  done,  and 
though  great  waste  prevailed,  the  troops  of  Massachusetts, 
and  for  a  long  time  also  those  of  New  Hampshire,  were 
fed  by  the  unselfish  care  of  the  people,  without  so  much 
as  a  barrel  of  flour  from  the  Continental  Congress."  * 

If  the  inhabitants  are  passively  disposed,  the  task  of 
turning  the  local  resources  to  account  depends  upon  mod- 
eration and  tact  in  not  exasperating  them.  This  accounts 
for  the  following  article  of  war : 

*  Bancroft,  vol.  viii.  pp.  49,  50. 


142  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

"  Any  officer  or  soldier  who  does  violence  to  any  j)erson 
bringing  provisions  or  other  necessaries  to  the  camp,  gar- 
rison, or  quarters  of  the  forces  of  the  United  States  in 
foreign  parts,  shall  suffer  death,  or  such  other  punishment 
as  a  court-martial  may  direct." 

If  the  inhabitants  are  hostile  to  the  troops,  the  task  of 
supply  is  most  difficult.  This  is  particularly  so  when  the 
population  does  not  limit  itself  to  concealing,  carrying  off, 
or  destroying  its  own  resources,  but  engages  in  operations 
against  the  trains  of  the  invading  army.  In  this  case  it  is 
impossible  to  calculate  either  upon  local  resources  or  upon 
trans^^ortation.  On  the  other  hand,  an  army  in  an  enemy's 
country  need  not  spare  the  people  to  the  extent  that  it  may 
have  to  in  its  own,  and  may,  therefore,  compensate  itself 
to  a  certain  extent  by  extra  drafts  upon  them  for  what 
it  may  lose  through  depredations  upon  its  trains  and 
depots. 

In  the  thickly-settled  countries  of  Europe,  where  the 
roads  are  studded  with  towns  and  villages,  the  supplies 
available  in  a  theatre  of  war  are  commonly  procured  by 
requisition,  or  demands  made  upon  the  civil  authorities. 
In  a  sparsely-settled  country,  such  as  ours,  where  towns 
are  few  and  small  and  scantily  supplied,  and  provisions 
are  mainly  found  on  scattered  farms,  ranches,  and  planta- 
tions, an  army  must  supply  itself  by  direct  seizure,  or 
foraging.  Both  requisitioning  and  foraging  may  ordinarily 
be  advantageously  tempered  by  purchasing. 

Another  mode  of  subsisting  off  the  country,  which  is 
practicable  in  Europe  but  not  in  our  country,  is  that  of 
quartering  the  troops  on  the  inhabitants.  It  is  more  con- 
venient than  requisitioning,  and  is,  therefore,  especially  to 
be  preferred  in  the  execution  of  rapid  movements.  But  it 
is  too  obnoxious  to  Americans  to  be  practised  in  our  own 
country,  and  the  sparseness  of  the  population  makes  it 
generally  impracticable  on  this  continent. 


OPERATING  INDEFENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  143 

In  the  kind  of  strategy  which  we  are  now  considering, 
the  object  of  the  offensive  is  to  destroy  the  enemy's  maga- 
zines and  the  resources  of  the  country  generally. 

Each  army  will  aim  at  impoverishing  a  belt  of  country 
several  days'  march  in  width,  extending  across  the  enemy's 
front  and  as  far  as  possible  around  his  flanks ;  or,  if  this 
mode  of  operation  be  impracticable,  it  will  push  through 
the  enemy's  country  along  the  great  arteries  of  trade  and 
commerce,  or  along  the  successive  lines  of  least  resistance, 
destroying  suj^plies  to  right  and  left,  and  thus  gradually 
reducing  the  number  of  the  enemy's  available  lines  of 
operation  and  his  resources  in  general.  Such  work  may 
be  largely  intrusted  to  raiding  parties.* 

An  army  operating  against  the  resources  of  a  country 
must  guard  especially  against  two  dangers : 

1.  Of  having  to  march  itself  over  a  wasted  country. 

2.  Of  being  attacked  while  its  forces  are  scattered  and 
more  or  less  disorganized. 

SUPPLIES    BEING   BOTH   CARRIED   ALONG   AND  TAKEN    FROM 

THE    COUNTRY. 

In  order  to  avoid  the  risks  attending  the  exclusive 
use  of  either  of  the  two  modes  of  subsistence  already 
considered, — of  subsisting,  in  other  words,  from  an  accom- 
panying train  or  off  the  country, — the  two  modes  may  be 
employed  in  connection  the  one  with  the  other.  The 
supplies  in  the  train  are  then  regarded  as  a  reserve  to  be 
drawn  upon  when  the  country  fails. 

It  was  this  practice  which  in  ancient  times  enabled  the 
Persians,  the  Greeks,  and  the  Romans  to  move  their  im- 
mense armies,  without  a  base  or  line  of  supply,  across  the 
checkered  face  of  Europe  and  Asia  and  Africa.     Whilst 

*  For  an  account  of  a  raid,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that  of  Grier- 
son's  through  Mississippi. 


144  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

among  plenty,  tliey  loaded  up  their  transports  and  lived 
off  the  country.  In  a  sterile  or  desert  country,  they  drew 
on  the  supplies  carried  with  them. 

Thus  the  trains  of  an  ancient  army  were  a  sort  of 
movable  depot,  and  accordingly  they  guarded  them  with 
the  greatest  care.  For  the  same  reason  that  a  modern 
army  fortifies  its  base  of  operations  and  posts  guards,  and 
builds  intrenchments  and  block-houses  along  its  line  of 
communication,  the  ancients  made  it  a  regular  practice  to 
fortify  their  camps.  To  tide  over  long  periods  of  drought 
and  severe  winters,  they  accumulated  supplies  in  maga- 
zines, and  when  it  came  to  subsisting  upon  these,  they  had 
to  suspend  operations. 

When  Darius,  with  an  army  of  from  70,000  to  80,000 
men,  invaded  Scythia,  the  natives  had  received  intelligence 
of  his  approach,  and  had  resolved  not  to  risk  a  battle. 
They  retired  as  he  advanced,  and  endeavored  to  bring  his 
army  into  difiiculties  by  destroying  the  forage,  driving  off 
the  cattle,  and  filling  in  the  wells ;  but  the  commissariat 
of  the  Persians  was,  as  usual,  well  arranged,  and  proved 
equal  to  the  emergency.  Darius  returned  with  the  bulk 
of  his  army,  having  suffered  no  loss  but  that  of  a  few 
invalid  troops  whom  he  sacrificed. 

Sherman's  maech  through  Georgia  and  the 
carolinas,  1864. 

In  his  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea  (Map  4),  Sherman 
cut  a  swath  from  fifty  to  sixty  miles  broad  through  the 
unconquered  section  of  the  South,  from  west  to  east,  sub- 
sisting his  army  of  65,000  men  off  the  country.  He 
started  from  Atlanta  with  about  twenty  days'  supplies  in 
his  wagons,  which  were  regularly  refilled  as  fast  as  their 
contents  were  issued.  He  utterly  destroyed  over  two 
hundred  miles  of  rails,  and  consumed  stores  and  provisions 
that  were  needed  by  the  Confederate  armies,  besides  appro- 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY   OF  A   BASE.  I45 

priating  thousands  of  horses  and  mules.  Referring  to  this 
campaign,  he  says, — 

"  I  estimate  the  damage  done  to  the  State  of  Georgia  at 
$100,000,000,  at  least  $20,000,000  of  which  has  inured 
to  our  advantage,  and  the  remainder  is  simply  waste  and 
destruction." 

The  details  of  his  mode  of  operation  are  set  forth  in 
the  following  order,  j^ublished  to  his  army  about  a  week 
before  he  started : 

(Special  Field  Orders,  No.  120.) 

Head-quarters  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi:  in 

THE  Field,  Kingston,  Georgia, 

November  9,  1864. 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  military  operations,  this  army  is  divided 
into  two  wings,  viz.  : 

The  right  wing,  Major-General  O.  O.  Howard  commanding, 
composed  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps ;  the  left  wing, 
Major-General  H,  W.  Slocum  commanding,  composed  of  the  Four- 
teenth and  Twentieth  Corps. 

2.  The  habitual  order  of  march  will  be,  wherever  practicable, 
by  four  roads  as  nearly  parallel  as  possible,  and  converging  at 
points  hereafter  to  be  indicated  in  orders.  The  cavalry,  Brigadier- 
General  Xilpatrick  commanding,  will  receive  special  orders  from 
the  Commander-in-Chief. 

3.  There  will  be  no  general  train  of  supplies,  but  each  corps  will 
have  its  ammunition  train  and  provision  train,  distributed  habit- 
ually as  follows :  Behind  each  regiment  should  follow  one  wagon 
and  one  ambulance;  behind  each  brigade  should  follow  a  due  pro- 
portion of  ammunition  wagons  and  ambulances.  In  case  of  danger 
each  corps  commander  should  change  this  order  of  march,  by 
having  its  advance  and  rear  brigades  unencumbered  by  wheels. 
The  separate  columns  will  start  habitually  at  7  a.m.  and  make  about 
fifteen  miles  per  day,  unless  otherwise  fixed  in  orders. 

4.  The  army  will  forage  liberally  on  the  country  during  the 
march.  To  this  end,  each  brigade  commander  will  organize  a  good 
and  sufficient  foraging  party,  under  command  of  one  or  more  dis- 
creet officers,  who  will  gather,  near  the  route  travelled,  corn  or 
forage  of  any  kind,  meat  of  any  kind,  vegetables,  corn-meal,  or 
whatever  is  needed  by  the  command,  aiming  at  all  times  to  keep  in 

10 


146  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  wagons  at  least  ten  days'  provisions  for  his  command  and  three 
days'  forage.  Soldiers  must  not  enter  the  dwellings  of  the  inhabit- 
ants, or  commit  any  trespass ;  but  during  a  halt  or  camp  they  may 
be  permitted  to  gather  turnips,  potatoes,  and  other  vegetables,  and 
to  drive  in  stock  in  sight  of  their  camp.  To  regular  foraging  par- 
ties must  be  intrusted  the  gathering  of  provisions  and  forage,  at 
any  distance  from  the  road  travelled. 

5.  To  corps  commanders  alone  is  intrusted  the  power  to  destroy 
mills,  houses,  cotton-gins,  etc. ;  and  for  them  this  general  principle 
is  laid  down.  In  districts  and  neighborhoods  where  the  army  is 
unmolested,  no  destruction  of  such  property  should  be  permitted ; 
but  should  guerillas  or  bushwhackers  molest  our  march,  or  should 
the  inhabitants  burn  bridges,  obstruct  roads,  or  otherwise  manifest 
local  hostility,  then  army  commanders  should  order  and  enforce  a 
devastation  more  or  less  relentless,  according  to  the  measure  of  such 
hostility. 

6.  As  for  horses,  mules,  wagons,  etc.,  belonging  to  the  inhabit- 
ants, the  cavalry  and  artillery  may  appropriate  freely  and  without 
limit;  discriminating,  however,  between  the  rich,  who  are  usually 
hostile,  and  the  poor  and  industrious,  usuall}^  neutral  or  friendly. 
Foraging  parties  may  also  take  mules  or  hoi'ses,  to  replace  the 
jaded  animals  of  their  trains,  or  to  serve  as  pack-mules  for  the 
regiments  or  brigades.  In  all  foraging,  of  whatever  kind,  the  par- 
ties engaged  will  refrain  from  abusive  or  threatening  language,  and 
may,  where  the  officer  in  command  thinks  proper,  give  written 
certificates  of  the  facts,  but  no  rec'eipts ;  and  they  will  endeavor  to 
leave  with  each  family  a  reasonable  portion  for  their  mainten- 
ance. 

7.  Negroes  who  are  able-bodied  and  can  be  of  service  to  the 
several  columns  may  be  taken  along;  but  each  army  commander 
will  bear  in  mind  that  the  question  of  supplies  is  a  very  im- 
portant one,  and  that  his  first  duty  is  to  see  to  those  that  bear 
arms. 

8.  The  organization,  at  once,  of  a  good  pioneer  battalion  for 
each  army  corps,  composed,  if  possible,  of  negroes,  should  be  at- 
tended to.  This  battalion  should  follow  the  advance  guard,  repair 
roads,  and  double  them  if  possible,  so  that  the  columns  will  not  be 
delayed  after  reaching  bad  places.  Also  army  commanders  should 
practise  the  habit  of  giving  the  artillery  and  wagons  the  road, 
marching  their  troops  on  one  side,  and  instruct  their  troops  to 
assist  wagons  at  steep  hills  or  bad  crossings  of  streams. 

Captain  O.  M.  Poe,  Chief  Engineer,  will  assign  to  each  wing  of 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  147 

the  arnij'  a  pontoon  train,  fully  equipped  and  organized;  and  the 
commanders  thereof  will  see  to  their  being  properly  protected  at 
all  times. 

By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 
L.  M.  Dayton,  Aide-de-Camp. 

Taking  with  it  thirty  days'  supplies,  and  cutting  loose 
again  from  its  base,  Sherman's  army  marched  northward 
from  Savannah  to  Goldsboro,  destroying  the  resources  of 
the  country  on  its  way.  At  Goldsboro,  some  fifty-five  days 
after  leaving  Savannah,  it  came  into  communication  with 
its  new  base  at  Wilmington.  At  Kaleigb,  its  next  impor- 
tant objective,  Sherman  learned  of  the  surrender  of  Lee's 
army,  and  shortly  afterwards  received  the  surrender  of 
Johnston's,  the  last  considerable  army  of  the  Confederacy. 

Sheridan's  devastation  of  the  shenandoah  valley, 

1864. 

When  Sheridan,  in  the  fall  of  1864,  found  himself 
unable,  for  lack  of  transportation,  to  advance  beyond 
Harrisonburg,  he  retired  down  the  valley  of  the  Shen- 
andoah, destroying  its  resources,  so  that  an  army  going 
there  would  have  to  carry  its  suj^plies  with  it.  The  Con- 
federates were  so  short  of  transportation  that  this  prac- 
tically closed  the  valley  to  them.  Sheridan  says  in  his 
'*  Memoirs,"— 

"The  cavalry,  as  it  retired,  was  stretched  across  the 
country  from  the  Blue  Kidge  to  the  eastern  slope  of  the 
Alleghanies,  with  orders  to  drive  off  all  stock  and  destroy 
all  supplies  as  it  moved  northward.  The  infantry  pre- 
ceded the  cavalry,  passing  down  the  valley  pike,  and  as  we 
marched  alono-  the  manv  columns  of  smoke  from  burnino- 
stacks  and  mills  filled  with  grain  indicated  that  the  ad- 
jacent country  was  fast  losing  the  features  which  hitherto 
had  made  it  a  great  magazine  of  stores  for  the  Confeder- 
ates." 


148  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

In  a  despatch  written  at  the  time  to  General  Grant,  he 
reports, — 

"  I  have  destroyed  over  2000  barns  filled  with  wheat, 
hay,  and  farming  implements ;  over  70  mills  filled  with 
flour  and  wheat ;  have  driven  in  front  of  the  army  over 
four  herds  of  stock,  and  have  killed  and  issued  to  the 
troops  not  less  than  3000  sheep." 

General  Merritt  was  sent  into  the  Loudon  Valley  under 
instructions  to  clear  the  country  of  forage  and  subsistence, 
so  as  to  prevent  Mosby's  guerillas  from  being  harbored 
there.  Their  destruction  or  capture  was  well-nigh  impos- 
sible, on  account  of  their  intimate  knowledge  of  the  moun- 
tain region  and  their  practice  of  disbanding  in  times  of 
danger.  Merritt  swept  widely  over  each  side  of  his  general 
line  of  march  with  flankers,  who  burned  the  grain  and 
brought  in  large  herds  of  cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep,  which 
were  issued  to  the  troops. 

The  defensive  should  itself  destroy  those  resources  and 
communications  which  it  cannot  protect,  excepting  such  as 
the  enemy  cannot  use  to  advantage,  or  as  seem  destined  to 
be  recovered,  and  to  prove  in  the  long  run  of  greater 
advantage  to  the  defensive  than  to  the  offensive.  Where 
all  that  an  enemy  can  do  is  to  destroy,  there  is  nothing 
to  be  gained  by  anticij^ating  his  action.  On  this  account 
the  burning  of  the  navy-yard  at  Washington  by  our 
own  officials,  at  the  approach  of  the  British  in  1814, 
has  been  severely  censured.  It  was  understood  at  Wash- 
ington that  the  enemy  did  not  number  more  than  from 
4000  to  5000  men,  and  that  they  had  no  transportation, 
their  only  baggage  being  what  they  carried  on  their 
backs.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  such  a  force 
could  hold  the  city  long  enough  to  turn  a  navy-yard 
to  account. 

While  it  is  always  true  that  the  fewer  the  wants  of  an 
army  the  better,  it  is  especially  true  in  operating  indepen- 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY  OF  A   BASE.  149 

dently  of  a  base.  In  this  respect  savage  warriors  have  a 
great  advantage  over  regular  troops.  The  Apaches  can 
live  without  food  and  water  for  periods  that  would  kill 
the  hardiest  white  man.  "  Their  transportation  consists  of 
any  animals  they  can  steal,  and  they  subsist  by  prey- 
ing upon  herds  of  cattle  and  flocks  of  sheep  in  the  valleys, 
and  by  securing  their  natural  food  of  field-mice,  rabbits, 
seeds,  desert  fruit,  and  the  substance  of  mescal  and  tlie 
fruit  of  the  giant  cactus,  found  amid  the  highest  ranges."  * 
Thus,  a  country  affording  no  food  upon  wliich  soldiers  can 
subsist  may  provide  the  Indian  with  everything  necessary 
for  sustaining  life  indefinitely. 

While  a  body  of  troops  in  pursuit  of  Indians  cannot  be 
kej^t  regularly  supplied  from  a  base,  it  may  sometimes  be 
so  favored  or  supported  by  settlements,  camps  of  supply, 
and  reserve  troops,  distributed  over  its  field  of  opera- 
tions, that  it  can  carry  on  sustained  operations.  The 
strategy  of  the  troops  consists,  in  this  case,  in  keeping 
the  enemy  constantly  on  the  move,  and  thus  wearing 
him  out.  The  most  warlike  Indians  will  eventually  tire 
of  the  war-path.  What  decides  the  campaign,  however, 
is  not  so  much  their  physical  exhaustion  from  long 
marches  or  scanty  nourishment  as  their  mental  weari- 
ness from  constant  watching  and  devising  and  planning, 
and  their  final  despair  of  ever  thoroughly  resting,  or 
returning  to  wives,  children,  and  sweethearts,  unless  it  be 
as  prisoners. 

There  are,  then,  three  distinct  modes  of  operation  to  be 
practised  against  parties  of  hostile  Indians  :f 

1.  To  chase  them. 

2.  To  surprise  them. 

3.  To  wear  them  out. 


*  Report  of  Brigadier-General  Miles,  1886. 

f  See  Rapid  and  Divergent  Retreat,  pp.  102,  103,  104. 


150  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

THE   GERONIMO    CAMPAIGN,  1886. 

The  method  of  wearing  the  enemy  out  was  practised 
with  signal  success  by  General  Miles  in  his  campaign 
against  the  Apache  chief  Geronimo,  under  whose  leader- 
ship a  party  of  about  forty  Chiricahua  bucks*  was  com- 
mitting depredations,  now  in  Arizona  and  now  in  Mexico. 
The  field  of  operations  within  the  United  States  was 
divided  into  districts,  each  with  its  command  of  troops, 
charged  with  ascertaining  the  presence  of  any  hostile 
Indians  that  might  enter  it,  and  with  running  them  out. 
This  arrangement  insured  a  continuous  pursuit  by  fresh 
troops.  It  could  not  be  practised  south  of  the  interna- 
tional boundary  line,  as  our  treaty  with  Mexico  allowed 
our  troops  to  cross  only  when  following  a  fresh  trail.  For 
operations  across  the  line  a  force  was  organized  for  a  long 
pursuit,  and  placed  under  an  officer  specially  qualified  to 
conduct  such  an  operation.  Captain  W.  H.  Lawton,  4th 
Cavalry,  now  colonel  and  inspector-general.  His  com- 
mand was  composed  of  picked  cavalry  and  infantry, 
scouts,  guides,  etc.,  numbering,  all  told,  about  100  men, 
with  a  pack  train  capable  of  carrying  two  months'  provi- 
sions, with  the  necessary  ammunition  and  medical  supplies. 
When  his  supplies  gave  out,  he  replenished  them  at  an 
advanced  base  established  about  150  miles  south  of  the 
boundary  line,  which  was  as  far  down  in  Mexico  as 
wagons  could  be  taken.  He  also  sent  back  there  such 
men  as  were  worn  out  or  without  shoes.  His  command 
continued  almost  constantly  on  the  trail  from  the  time  it 
took  the  field  until  the  surrender  of  the  hostiles,  more 
than  four  months  later. 

The  successful  termination  of  this  campaign  was  largely 

*  Apaches  is  the  name  of  a  tribe ;  Chiricahua,  of  a  band,  or  sub- 
division, of  that  tribe.  Buck  is  a  term  aj^plied  generally  to  able- 
bodied  adult  male  Indians. 


OPERATING  INDEPENDENTLY   OF  A   BASE.  151 

due  to  a  novel  stratagem  practised  by  General  Miles  in 
the  enemy's  rear,  which  consisted  in  the  removal  of  the 
whole  remnant  of  the  Chiricahua  band — that  is,  all  the 
kindred  and  most  of  the  friends  of  the  hostiles — from  the 
reservation  in  Arizona  to  a  post  in  Florida  about  2000 
miles  away. 


XI. 

OPERATING  FROM  A  BASE. 

CUTTING    A    LINE   OF    SUPPLY. 

THE  operation  of  cutting  an  enemy  from  his  supplies, 
temporarily  at  least,  may  be  accomplished  by  a  de- 
tachment or  small  part  of  the  offensive  army.  The  offen- 
sive need  only  hold  the  lines  against  the  detachments, 
trains,  train  escorts,  etc.,  of  the  defensive  army,  or  else 
effectively  break  or  obstruct  the  lines  of  supply  as  such. 
Cutting  off  supplies,  then,  does  not  necessarily  cut  off 
retreat ;  but  it  compels  the  enemy  either  to  fall  back 
upon  his  base  of  supplies  or  base  of  retreat,  or  to  move 
into  communication  with  a  new  base  of  sujDply.  If  his 
regular  line  of  retreat  coincides,  as  it  ordinarily  will,  with 
his  line  of  supply,  and  that  line  is  in  our  possession,  the 
enemy  will  be  forced  to  assume  a  tactical  offensive.  This 
will  matter  more  or  less  to  the  enemy,  according  to  the 
degree  of  force  in  which  we  have  occupied  his  communica- 
tions. Should  his  line  of  retreat  not  coincide  with  his 
line  of  supply,  he  would  even  then  be  likely  to  attack  the 
force  on  his  line  of  supply  before  giving  up  that  line  for 
his  line  of  retreat. 

Moving  into  communication  with  a  new  base,  or  the 
operation  of  a  change  of  base,  is  not  in  itself  a  retreat ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  essentially  an  evasion  of  a  retreat. 
Circumstances,  however,  may  convert  the  operation  into 
one,  at  least  in  appearance.  McClellan's  change  of  base 
from  the  Pamunkey  to  the  James  is  not  uncommonly 
spoken  of  as  a  retreat,  while  that  of  Sherman  from 
Atlanta    to   Savannah    is    generally   regarded   as   a   tri- 

152 


OPEEATING  FROM  A   BASE.  153 

umphaut  march.  The  reason  is  that  McClellan  was  fol- 
lowed and  repeatedly  attacked  by  the  enemy,  while  Sher- 
man was  not  seriously  opposed  except  in  his  front. 

It  will  now  be  seen  that  there  are  four  separate  and 
distinct  objects  to  be  aimed  at  in  striking  at  an  enemy's 
communications,  namely : 

1.  To  curtail  his  supplies,  and  thus  weaken  him  by 
privation. 

2.  To  compel  him  to  abandon  a  p)osition  or  a  territory. 

3.  To  commit  him  to  the  offensive  in  tactics. 

4.  To  cut  liim  off  from  retreat  or  to  capture  him. 

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   MANCEUVRING. 

An  army  may  sometimes  best  protect  or  recover  its  own 
communications  by  attacking  those  of  the  enemy.  The 
army  A,  for  instance  (Fig.  31),  apprehending  that  its 
communications  will  be  attacked  by  the  army  B,  may 
thwart  such  attack  in  advance  by  moving  to  some  j)oint, 
A',  near  the  communications  of  the  army  B. 

Fig.  31. 


0 


aO' 


V 

$ #- ♦^ 


/ 

~~---, yA 

Had  B,  on  the  other  hand,  moved  in  time  against  the  line 
A  A',  it  might  have  placed  itself  nearer  to  that  line  than  A 
was  to  B  O',  and  thus  have  compelled  A  to  desist  from  its 
advance  upon  B  O'  under  jienalty  of  losing  its  own  line. 


154  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

The  army  B  may  strike  for  its  own  communications 
across  those  of  the  army  A,  and  thus  seek  to  combine  a 
turning  of  A  with  a  raid  upon  A's  communications.  In 
Figs.  29  and  30,  for  instance,  B  may  place  itself  between 
A'  and  O'  by  marching  upon  its  objective  across  the  line 
A  A',  inflicting  what  damage  it  can  upon  it.  Finally,  as 
in  the  case  of  two  armies  operating  from  a  base  of  retreat, 
the  army  B  may  clear  its  communications  by  attacking  A 
(Figs.  29  and  30),  or  it  may  turn  A  on  the  side  opposite 
A's  communications. 

The  army  A  will  seek  to  shorten  the  turning  movement 
by  availing  itself  of  the  cover  of  screens  and  obstacles ; 
but  it  may  have  to  extend  it  in  order  to  secure  such  cover. 
It  may  send  out  scouts  or  patrols  to  observe  the  enemy, 
but  should,  as  a  rule,  avoid  the  use  of  large  flank  detach- 
ments, as  they  are  likely  to  betray  the  movement  of  the 
main  body.  It  will  send  back  to  its  base,  or  some  nearer 
point  of  security,  all  its  unnecessary  or  surplus  stores  and 
transportation,  and  arrange  to  subsist  during  the  manoeuvre 
as  much  as  possible  off  the  country  and  its  trains ;  it  will 
aim,  in  other  words,  to  operate  for  the  time  being  inde- 
pendently of  a  base,  as  Sherman  did  in  his  turning  move- 
ments in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  Grant  in  his  march 
to  the  rear  of  Vicksburg. 

The  effect  of  cutting  a  line  of  communications  de^Dcnds 
more  or  less  upon  the  location  on  the  line  of  the  point  at 
which  it  is  cut.  Suppose  A  (Fig.  32)  to  cut  the  lines  of 
the  army  B  at  c',  c,  and  d'.  As  the  supplies  located 
between  B  and  these  several  points  are  still  available  to 
the  army  B,  it  is  evident  that  the  farther  off  these  points 
are  the  longer  it  will  be  before  B  will  feel  the  want  of 
supplies.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  farther  these  points 
are  from  B  the  farther  they  are  from  one  another,  and 
therefore  the  harder  it  is  for  the  army  A  to  retain  posses- 
sion  of  them.     It  may,  therefore,  be  generally  asserted 


OPERATING  FROM  A   BASE.  155 

that  the  closer  an  enemy's  line  of  communication  is  cut 
the  more  effective  will  the  operation  prove.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  closer  the  turning  movement  the  more 
likely  it  is  to  be  discovered  and  thwarted.     The  turning 

Fig.  32. 


army  must  be  guided  to  a  considerable  extent  by  the  cover 
which  the  country  may  afford  and  by  the  direction  of  the 
roads. 

Referring  to  the  interception  of  an  army,  Hamley 
says,— 

"  To  give  the  greatest  effect  to  such  an  operation,  the 
movement  should  be  directed  7iot  more  than  a  march  or 
two  in  rear  of  the  rearmost  point  ivhich  it  is  calculated  the 
enemy  can  reach  by  the  time  it  is  completed,  giving  him 
credit  for  obtaining  early  intelligence  and  of  retreating 
with  promptitude  when  his  resolution  is  formed,  but  also 
taking  into  account  the  motives  which  may  induce  him  to 
delay  to  form  that  resolution." 

The  lines  of  communication  may,  instead  of  radiating 
all  the  way  from  the  army  to  the  base,  as  indicated  in 
Fig.  32,  approach  one  another  at  some  intermediate 
point  and  radiate  again  towards  the  base.  The  army  A 
may  in  such  a  case  aim  to  seize  the  throat  or  neck  of  the 
system.     But  even  if  it  succeeds  in  this  it  should  not  rely 


166  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

upon  the  passive  defensive.  There  is  in  practice  more  or 
less  ground  for  apprehending  that  the  defence  commands 
a  line  which  is  not  known  to  the  offensive,  and  which  may- 
be utilized  by  the  defence  either  to  escape  or  to  assume 
the  offensive,  or  that  the  defence  may  procure  re-enforce- 
ments or  secure  the  co-operation  of  distant  detachments 
on  the  flanks  or  in  rear  of  the  offensive.  While,  there- 
fore, the  offensive  should  be  prepared  to  repel  an  attack, 
it  should  not  wait  for  one.  It  should  close  at  once  with 
the  defensive,  taking  such  a  route  and  such  a  formation 
as  will  enable  it  to  attack  with  advantage,  and,  if  possible, 
to  throw  the  enemy  back  upon  some  obstacle,  or  force  him 
into  a  place  where  he  may  be  invested. 

There  is  an  old  theory  that  the  offensive  in  strategy 
should  be  combined  with  the  defensive  in  tactics,  but  it  is 
rarely  carried  into  practice.  It  may  be  generally  asserted 
that  an  army  cannot  move  upon  any  commanding  strategic 
point  without  overcoming  some  resistance,  and  that,  once 
in  the  enemy's  rear,  it  must  move  against  him  and  attack 
him  under  penalty  of  being  overpowered  or  of  seeing 
the  value  of  its  position  nullified  by  the  enemy's  manoeu- 
vres. The  strategic  offensive  ordinarily  involves  the  tactical 
also. 

The  enemy  may,  indeed,  face  and  move  to  his  rear  and 
defend  himself  in  that  direction,  but  his  chosen  position 
is  taken  in  reverse,  his  plan  of  battle  frustrated.  While 
he  may  construct  new  works  and  form  a  new  plan,  they 
will  both  be  comparatively  hasty  productions,  more  or  less 
inferior  to  those  which  he  has  abandoned.  Some  of  his 
detachments,  too,  will  probably  be  cut  off  and  captured. 
To  these  circumstances  and  the  moral  effect  of  being  sur- 
prised it  is  not  ordinarily  necessary  to  add  the  onus  of  the 
tactical  offensive  to  put  the  defensive  army  at  a  decided 
disadvantage. 

The  operation  of  cutting  an  army  from  its  base  will 


OPERATING  FROM  A   BASE.  157 

hardly  succeed  unless  the  three  following  advantages  are 
realized  by  the  offensive  : 

1.  It  deceives  the  enemy  at  the  outset  as  to  the  direction 
of  the  advance. 

2.  It  considerably  outnumbers  the  enemy. 

3.  It  commands  a  line  of  communication  approximately 
perpendicular  to  the  enemy's. 

In  studying  any  successful  operation  against  an  army's 
communications,  one  should  particularly  note  the  degree  to 
which  these  conditions  are  realized,  and  how  they  are 
compensated  for  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  realized.  The 
principal  instances  of  such  operation  are  the  campaigns  of 
Ulm,  Marengo,  Vicksburg,  and  Metz. 

Once  its  communications  are  lost,  an  army  has  to  decide 
promptly  upon  one  of  two  courses : 

Fleeing  to  save  itself. 

Fighting  to  recover  its  communications. 

The  former  course  may  involve  some  fighting,  and,  owing 
to  the  strength  and  dispositions  of  the  enemy,  may  be 
altogether  impracticable;  but  if  the  intercepting  army 
be  considerably  scattered,  as  it  is  likely  to  be,  the  inter- 
cepted army  may  in  small  detachments  slip  between  its 
fragments,  or,  in  somewhat  larger  bodies,  force  the  inter- 
cepting cordon  in  different  places,  or  break  through  it  in 
a  mass  at  some  well-selected  point.  This  course,  while  it 
saves  the  army,  involves  the  abandonment  of  the  country. 
It  is  only  by  the  second  course — by  defeating  the  enemy 
in  a  general  engagement — that  the  defensive  can  both  save 
its  army  and  retain  possession  of  the  country. 

When  the  offensive  army  reaches  the  hostile  line  of 
communication,  it  secures  more  or  less  control  of  the 
enemy's  means  of  supj^ly  and  proceeds  to  convert  them 
to  its  own  use. 

Having  to  apprehend  a  movement  against  its  own 
communications,  the  turning  army  may,  w^itli  a  view  to 


158  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

exposing  these  as  little  as  possible,  adopt  the  flank  or  ob- 
lique opposition.  But  if  A  (Fig.  30)  posts  itself  close  to 
B's  line  of  communication,  and  facing  it,  while  B  is  still  a 
considerable  distance  off,  A  is  quite  likely  to  have  its  com- 
munications intercepted,  and,  if  defeated,  it  is  just  as  sure 
to  be  forced  off  its  communications ;  and  furthermore,  on 
account  of  the  exposure  of  its  flank,  it  is  more  likely  to 
be  defeated  than  it  would  be  in  case  of  direct  opposition 
(Fig.  29). 

To  be  sure,  an  army  that  plants  itself  on  the  flank  of 
the  communications  of  an  invading  army  compels  the 
invader  to  attack  it  under  penalty  of  losing  its  communi- 
cations. But  while  the  flank  opposition  is  thus  efiicacious 
as  a  means  of  arresting  an  invader  or  causing  an  army  to 
retreat,  it  is  not  to  be  relied  on  as  a  means  of  arresting  a 
retreating  army  or  causing  an  army  to  capitulate.  The 
flank  023position  answered  Meade's  purpose  at  Gettysburg ; 
it  would  not  have  answered  Grant's  at  Appomattox. 

A  peculiar  form  of  flank  opposition  is  presented  by  a 
fort  guarding  the  course  of  a  river  or  the  mouth  of  a 
harbor.  To  be  effective,  such  a  work  must  be  supple- 
mented by  a  fleet  or  by  some  other  form  of  direct  opposi- 
tion, such  as  chains,  torpedoes,  floating  batteries,  etc. 
These  obstructions  not  only  detain  passing  vessels  under 
fire,  but  also  insure  the  advantage  of  a  stationary  target. 


XII. 

ILLUSTEATIONS  OF   COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 
OPERATION. 

Washington's  counter-offensive  at  teenton,  1777. 

^ST  JANUAEY.— The  American  army  under  Wash- 
ington is  encamped  at  Trenton,  Bordentown,  and 
Crosswicks,  with  head-quarters  at  Trenton  (Maji  5).  It 
aggregates  5000  men.  Cornwallis  is  advancing  with 
7000  men  from  Brunswick  to  attack  it.  The  Delaware 
River  is  swollen  with  recent  rains  and  melting  snow  and 
obstructed  with  floating  ice,  and  is  consequently  impassa- 
ble in  the  face  of  the  advancing  enemy. 

2d  January. — Just  east  of  Trenton  runs  the  Assanj^ink 
Creek,  a  small  stream  with  abrupt  banks,  its  only  good 
crossing  being  a  little  above  its  mouth.  Washington  has 
assembled  his  army  on  the  east  bank  of  this  stream,  and 
the  British  have  encamped  on  the  west  side  near  Trenton. 
To  all  appearance  a  general  action  is  to  be  fought  on  the 
morrow,  with  all  the  chances  on  the  side  of  the  British, 
for  they  are  considerably  superior  to  the  Americans  in 
numbers,  and  still  more  so  in  discipline  and  experience. 
About  half  of  the  Americans  are  militia  who  have  never 
seen  a  battle  and  have  been  but  a  few  days  in  the  service. 
If  defeated,  moreover,  they  are  sure  to  be  driven  up 
against  the  impassable  Delaware. 

From  the  force  in  his  immediate  front  Washington 
rightly  conjectures  that  Cornwallis  cannot  have  left  many 
men  in  his  rear.  He  consequently  decides  to  move  by  a 
concealed  march  on  the  east  side  of  the  Assanpink  to 
Princeton,  strike  down  the  British  rear  guard,  and  then 

159 


160  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY. 

move  rapidly  on  Brunswick,  the  enemy's  advance  base, 
and  capture  or  destroy  the  magazines  there ;  or,  if  closely 
pressed,  to  seek  the  high  ground  on  the  way  to  Morris- 
town.  To  secure  his  baggage  and  prevent  it  from  encum- 
bering the  army,  he  orders  it  to  be  silently  removed  to 
Burlington,  and  at  midnight  commences  his  march.  That 
the  suspicion  of  the  enemy  may  not  be  awakened,  the 
camp  fires  are  kept  burning,  and  the  guards  ordered  to 
remain  at  the  bridge  and  the  fords  till  the  approach  of 
daylight,  when  they  are  to  follow.  Men  are  also  em- 
ployed during  the  night  digging  an  intrenchment  so  near 
the  enemy's  sentries  that  they  can  be  heard  at  their  work. 

Zd  January. — Washington  reaches  Princeton  a  little 
after  sunrise,  and  finds  there  three  British  regiments  of 
infantry  and  three  troojDS  of  cavalry.  One  of  the  regi- 
ments makes  its  way  towards  Trenton,  the  other  two  are 
cut  off  and  retreat  in  the  direction  of  Brunswick. 

AVhen  daylight  came  and  it  ^vas  discovered  in  the 
British  camp  that  the  Americans  were  gone,  Cornwallis 
easily  jDcnetrated  the  plans  of  Washington,  and  his  con- 
jecture was  confirmed  by  firing  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Princeton.  Alarmed  for  the  safety  of  Brunswick,  he 
immediately  retreated  by  forced  marches.  His  advance 
approached  the  Stony  Brook  Bridge  as  the  American  rear 
guard  w^as  completing  its  destruction.  He  was  delayed 
here  about  an  hour,  and  again  delayed  at  Kingston ;  for 
the  bridges  across  the  Millstone  Creek  on  the  different 
routes  to  Brunsw^ick  had  also  been  destroyed. 

Washington  pursued  the  intercepted  regiments  as  far 
as  Kingston.  Considering  the  exhausted  state  of  his  men, 
who  had  not  slept  for  thirty-six  hours,  and  the  near 
approach  of  Cornwallis,  together  with  the  arrival  of 
British  re-enforcements  at  Brunswick,  he  abandoned  his 
design  upon  that  place,  and  turning  at  Kingston  short  to 
the  left,  retreated  to  Pluckemin,  where  he  arrived  the 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE  OPERATION.  161 

same  evening.  Cornwallis  did  not  follow  the  Americans 
beyond  Kingston,  but  pushed  on  from  there  straight  to 
Brunswick. 

Having  remained  at  Pluckemin  long  enough  to  give 
his  troops  rest  and  refreshment,  Washington  advanced  to 
Morristown,  where  he  established  winter-quarters,  and 
whence,  in  conjunction  with  a  force  on  the  Hudson,  he 
threatened  Staten  and  Manhattan  Islands,  which,  together 
with  Long  Island,  constituted  the  main  base  of  the  British 
forces  in  America.     This  kept  the  enemy  on  the  defensive. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE,  1863. 

The  opposing  forces  are  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
commanded  by  General  Joseph  Hooker,  and  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  commanded  by  General  Bobert  E. 
Lee.     Their  organization  and  effective  strength  are  about 

as  follows : 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

5th  Corps  (Meade)       ^ 

11th  Corps  (Howard)     >  Eight  wing 42,000 

12th  Corps  (Sloeum)      j 

1st  Corps  (Re3"nold8)  ^ 

3d  Corps  (Sickles)       V  Left  wing      59,000 

6th  Corps  (Sedgwick)  j 

2d  Corps  (Couch) 15,500 

Provost  Guard  (Patrick) 2,000 

Artillery  Reserve  (Hunt) 1,500 

Cavalry  Corps  (Stoneman) 11,000       30,000 

Total 131,000 

Each  corps  consists  of  three  divisions. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

1st  Corps  (Anderson's  and  McLaws's  divisions) 16,600 

2d  Corps  (Jackson) 36,300 

Artillery  Eeserve  (Pendleton) 1,600 

Cavalry  Division  (Stuart) 5,500 

Total 60,000 

Jackson's  corps  consists  of  four  divisions. 

11 


162  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

The  Army  of  tlie  Potomac  is  posted  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  on  the 
Stafford  Heights,  a  position  considered  ahiiost  impreg- 
nable (Maps  3  and  6).  The  railroad  to  Acquia  and  the 
Potomac  River  constitute  its  main  line  of  communication. 
Its  advance  depot  is  at  Acquia ;  its  head-quarters  are  near 
Falmouth. 

Lee  occupies  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  The  prox- 
imity of  his  powerful  opponent  compels  him  to  maintain  a 
defensive  line  about  twenty-five  miles  in  length.  His  right 
is  at  Port  Royal,  his  left  at  United  States  Ford.  Beyond 
his  left  the  crossings  of  the  Rappahannock  are  watched 
by  his  cavalry.  His  main  line  of  communication  is  the 
Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  Railroad.  His 
advanced  dep6t  is  at  Guiney's  Station.  His  head-quarters 
are  about  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg. 

Plan  of  Operations. 

The  Federal  commander,  who  has  adopted  the  offensive, 
realizes  that  it  is  impossible  to  assail  the  enemy  in  front. 
The  mere  passage  of  the  river  presents  no  serious  difiiculty, 
for  Lee,  adhering  to  his  usual  policy,  invites  rather  than 
threatens  that  operation  ;  but  his  line  of  intrenchments, 
stretching  along  the  sides  and  crest  of  the  heights,  are  in 
plain  view,  and  the  hopelessness  of  attacking  it  is  a  con- 
viction in  the  mind  of  even  the  privates  in  the  ranks. 
The  enemy  can  then  be  assailed  only  by  turning  his 
position  either  below  or  above.  Against  turning  it  below 
is  the  fact  that  the  river  increases  so  rapidly  in  width  that 
to  cross  it  at  the  nearest  available  point  would  require 
1000  feet  of  bridging,  and  the  j^tontoon  trains  and  artillery 
must  march  twenty  miles  over  a  broken  and  wooded 
country  with  clayey  soil,  which  in  the  condition  of  the 
roads  at  this  time  is  impossible.  The  difiiculty  of  con- 
structing practicable  roads  in  this  quarter  is  great.     The 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  163 

side  streams  running  into  the  Rappahannock  and  tliose 
runnino-  into  the  Potomac  interlace  one  another  at  their 
sources,  so  as  to  destroy  the  continuity  of  the  main  di- 
viding ridge,  and  on  every  road  are  transverse  ravines 
with  steep  hills  and  oozing  springs,  which  the  wheels  of  a 
wagon  train  would  mix  with  clay  and  turn  to  streams  of 
mud.  The  march  of  an  army  under  such  conditions 
would  be  extremely  slow.  General  Lee's  spy  system  is  so 
efficient  that  the  movement  could  not  be  kept  from  him, 
and  his  intrenchments  might  be  extended  down  the  river 
to  keep  pace  with  it. 

Above  Fredericksburg  the  roads  are  dry  and  firm  and 
of  easy  grades.  This  fact,  together  with  the  comparative 
narrowness  of  the  rivers  up  stream,  determines  Hooker  to 
attempt  a  rapid  and  secret  movement  around  the  enemy's 
left  flank.  The  ground  in  this  direction  is  dotted  with 
patches  of  wood  and  thicket.  South  of  the  Rappahannock 
the  country  is  generally  wooded.  Its  chief  characteristic 
is  a  dense  tangled  forest  called  the  Wilderness. 

A  single  good  road  leading  from  Fredericksburg  west- 
ward divides  near  Tabernacle  Church  into  two  main  roads 
(Map  6).  These  merge  into  one  at  a  point  called  Chan- 
cellorsville,  in  the  Wilderness,  about  fifteen  miles  from 
Fredericksburg.  From  Chancellorsville  they  continue 
one  road  to  a  point  three  miles  distant  called  Dowdall's 
Tavern,  where  they  diverge  more  widely  than  before.  A 
road  of  inferior  quality  runs  from  Fredericksburg  along 
the  river  to  the  vicinity  of  United  States  Ford,  and  thence 
to  Chancellorsville. 

The  Confederate  line  of  security  is  the  Rappahannock 
River.  In  undertaking  to  cross  it,  the  Federals  must  aim, 
if  possible,  at  a  point  which  they  can  reach  without  being 
seen  and  force  without  being  checked. 

About  two  and  one-half  miles  above  Fredericksburg 
the  bluffs  on  each  side  of  the  Rappahannock  close  in  upon 


164  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  river.  They  rise  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet 
above  the  water.  Their  slopes  are  generally  well  wooded, 
very  steep,  and  deeply  cut  by  ravines.  Favorable  con- 
ditions for  approaching  the  river  from  either  side  first 
present  themselves  at  Banks'  Ford.  Here  a  foothold  on 
the  opposite  hills  gives  command  of  all  the  enemy's  line. 
A  place  of  such  importance  is  of  course  watched  with 
such  care  that  it  cannot  be  surprised.  Owing  to  the  bend 
in  the  river,  this  crossing  is  twice  as  far  from  the  Federal 
position  as  it  is  from  the  Confederate,  and,  moreover,  it  is 
not  now  fordable. 

The  next  point  that  offers  a  practicable  approach  is  United 
States  Ford.  Here,  also,  the  river  is  at  present  unfordable  ; 
the  approach,  moreover,  is  covered  by  long  lines  of  works, 
to  be  manned  whenever  necessary  by  troops  camped  near  by. 

Just  above  United  States  Ford  is  the  junction  of  the 
Rapidan  with  the  Bappahannock.  Any  attempt  to  turn 
the  enemy's  left  above  this  point  involves  the  passage  of 
both  streams,  each  of  which  is  from  two  hundred  to  three 
hundred  feet  in  width.  These  streams  present  numerous 
fords,  the  ^practicability  of  which  depends  upon  the  stage 
of  the  water. 

Hooker  fixes  upon  Kelley's  Ford,  thirty  miles  above 
Fredericksburg,  as  his  point  of  crossing,  and  upon  Chan- 
cellorsville  as  the  objective  of  his  flank  march  or  turning 
movement.  This  manoeuvre  may  determine  the  Con- 
federates to  attack  him  ;  if  not,  it  will  probably  enable 
him  to  attack  them  either  in  reverse  or  in  retreat;  at 
any  rate  in  the  open,  and  with  at  least  the  moral  advantage 
of  a  surprise.  But  it  is  not  improbable  that  before  the 
Federals  have  established  themselves  at  Chancellorsville 
the  Confederates  will  have  retired  from  their  position  at 
Fredericksburg  and  placed  themselves  beyond  striking 
distance.  To  provide  for  this  contingency,  the  cavalry 
corps  is  detached  to  pass  well  to  the  enemy's  rear  before 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE  OPERATION.  165 

the  movement  of  the  Federal  army  commences,  and, 
placing  itself  on  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat,  to  hold  him 
in  check  until  Hooker  can  come  up  with  the  army  and 
fall  on  his  rear.  Should  the  enemy  direct  his  retreat  so 
as  to  avoid  the  intercepting  cavalry,  the  Federals  are  to 
march  directly  upon  Richmond.  In  anticipation  of  a 
movement  on  Richmond,  Hooker  has  a  million  .and  a  half 
rations  placed  on  board  lighters,  with  gunboats  ready  to 
tow  tliem  down  the  Potomac  and  up  the  Pamunkey,  so 
that  his  advance  shall  not  be  impeded  by  want  of  supplies 
(Map  3). 

The  cavalry  corps  started  from  its  camp  near  Falmouth 
on  the  13th  of  April.  On  the  night  of  the  14th  a  severe 
rain  commenced,  which  made  the  Rappahannock  impas- 
sable until  the  28th,  during  which  time  the  command  re- 
mained near  Warrenton  Junction.  Its  movements  were 
reported  to  General  Lee,  who  believed  that  it  was  going 
to  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  As,  however,  it  continued 
near  Warrenton  Junction,  Lee  concluded  that  the  move- 
ment was  a  feint  intended  to  draw  his  army  to  the  Upper 
Rappahannock  in  order  that  Fredericksburg  might  be 
seized. 

The  Federal  cavalry  is  confronted  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  river  by  the  main  body  of  the  Confederate  cavalry, 
under  Stuart. 

Hooker  realizes  that,  if  undertaken  by  his  whole  army, 
his  flank  march  will  probably  be  discovered  and  forestalled. 
He  consequently  divides  his  army  into  two  nearly  equal 
parts, — the  wings  already  described, — and  determines  to 
make  the  right  wing  do  the  turning  while  the  left  occupies 
the  enemy  in  front.  To  confuse  the  enemy  as  much  as 
possible,  he  causes  demonstrations  to  be  made  at  both  ends 
of  his  line.  About  the  21st  of  April  small  infantry  forces 
showed  themselves  on  the  Upper  Rapimhannock,  at  Kel- 
ley's  Ford  and   Rappahannock  Bridge   (Map  6),  and  a 


166  ^'5'^  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

division  went  to  Port  Conway,  twenty-one  miles  below 
Fredericksburg,  where  it  made  a  pretence  of  crossing,  and 
at  night  built  fires  in  every  direction,  to  make  the  im- 
pression of  a  larger  force.  On  the  24th  another  expe- 
dition was  made  to  the  latter  place,  and  crossed  over  in 
boats.  These  demonstrations,  it  would  seem,  failed  to  con- 
fuse General  Lee ;  at  any  rate,  they  did  not  cause  any 
considerable  movement  of  his  troops. 

The  Mm^ch  to  Chmicelloi'sville. 

21th  April. — The  right  wing,  under  Slocum,  assembles 
at  Hartwood  Church,  under  orders  to  march  to  Kelley's 
Ford.  Hooker's  plan  is  not  known  to  any  one  except 
General  Couch,  the  second  in  rank.  The  whole  army  is 
provided  with  eight  days'  rations,  carried  on  the  person  of 
the  soldier,  except  the  fresh  beef  for  five  days,  which  is  to 
go  on  the  hoof.  Each  division  is  allowed  one  battery, 
two  ambulances,  and  a  pack  train  for  small  ammunition. 
Only  such  wagons  are  allowed  as  are  necessary  to  carry 
forage  for  the  animals.  The  balance  of  the  trains  is  to 
remain  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 

One  brigade  of  the  2d  Corps  is  marched  from  Falmouth 
to  Banks'  and  United  States  Fords. 

2%th  April. — Two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  march  to 
Banks'  Ford  and  set  to  work  to  construct  a  bridge  to 
United  States  Ford.  The  other  division,  whose  camp  is 
exposed  to  the  enemy's  view,  remains  in  position  at  Fal- 
mouth. Its  commander.  General  Gibbon,  is  ordered  to 
keep  up  the  picket  Hue  on  tlie  river. 

The  I'ight  wing  mai'ches  to  Kelley's  Ford.  The  river 
is  not  fordable,  but  by  ten  o'clock  at  night  a  bridge  of 
boats  is  completed,  and  the  11th  Corps,  which  has  the 
lead,  commences  crossing.  It  meets  with  but  slight 
opposition. 

The  cavalry  corps  breaks  up  its  camp  about  Warrenton 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION  167 

Junction  and  mjirclies  for  Kelley's  Ford,  under  orders  to 
cross  the  river  to-night  or  to-morrow  morning. 

Hooker,  whose  head-quarters  are  now  at  Morrisville, 
communicates  the  phm  of  campaign  to  his  corps  com- 
manders, inchiding  Stoneman,  commanding  the  cavalry. 

Tlie  left  wing,  under  Sedgwick,  moves  to  tlie  vicinity  of 
Franklin's  crossing.  It  camps  behind  the  heights  lining 
the  river,  without  fires,  and  concealed  from  the  observation 
of  the  enemy. 

By  9  o'clock  p.m.,  Stuart  receives  notice  at  Culpeper 
Court-House  (Map  3)  of  the  preparations  that  the  Fed- 
erals are  making  to  cross  at  Kelley's  Ford.  His  scouts 
have  already  discovered  and  reported  to  General  Lee  the 
movement  of  a  large  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  up 
the  river  from  Falmouth,  but  the  magnitude  of  the  force 
at  Kelley's  Ford  is  concealed  by  darkness,  and  Stuart  will 
not  leave  his  position  to  determine  it,  for  fear  of  exposing 
the  country  in  his  rear,  especially  the  railroads,  to  the 
depredations  of  the  Federal  cavalry.  So  far  as  he  can 
observe,  this  crossing  at  Kelley's  Ford  may  be  but  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  such  a  movement.  He  accordingly 
orders  the  enemy  to  be  enveloped  with  pickets  to  ob- 
serve the  direction  which  he  takes,  and  concentrates 
his  own  command  near  Brandy  Station  to  await  develop- 
ments. 

2dth  April. — The  two  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  com- 
plete the  road  to  United  States  Ford  and  march  to  that 
point.     They  work  all  night  to  get  up  their  bridge  train. 

The  right  wing  completes  its  crossing  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock at  Kelley's  Ford  and  pushes  on  in  two  columns 
to  the  Rapidan.  The  right  column  is  formed  of  the  11th 
and  12th  Corps  (the  12th  leading),  and  is  directed  upon 
German n a  Ford ;  the  left  column  (5th  Corps)  is  directed 
upon  Elley's  Ford.  The  river  is  found  to  be  barely  ford- 
able,    but,  appreciating   the   importance  of  celerity,  the 


168  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

troops  throw  themselves  cheerfully  into  the  current.  The 
passage  continues  at  night  by  the  light  of  fires  kindled  on 
the  banks. 

The  cavalry  corps  fords  the  Rappahannock  at  Kelley's 
Ford.  Here  it  is  divided  into  a  side  detachment  and  a 
main  body.  The  former,  under  Averell,  is  directed  upon 
Brandy  Station  ;  the  latter  marches,  under  Stoneman,  upon 
Stevensburg.  Averell  is  ordered  to  reach  Brandy  Station, 
if  possible,  by  night,  to  communicate  from  there  with  the 
main  body  at  Stevensburg,  and  to  proceed  to-morrow  to 
Culpeper  Court-House  and  Rapidan  Station  (Map  3).  He 
is  to  attack  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  the  railroads,  and  thus 
keep  the  former  occupied  while  Stoneman  proceeds  to 
operate  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  army.  Averell's  command 
comj^rises  3400  sabres,  Stoneman 's  about  4000.  Each  is 
accompanied  by  a  battery  of  artillery.  Averell  goes  into 
camp  not  far  from  Kelley's  Ford.  Stoneman  halts  for  the 
night  at  Madden. 

General  Pleasonton,  with  his  brigade,  detached  from 
the  cavalry  corps,  reports  to  General  Slocum  for  duty 
with  the  right  wing.  His  command  consists  of  three 
regiments  of  cavah'y  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  or  about 
1500  sabres  and  six  guns. 

The  left  wing  throws  two  divisions  across  the  river  at 
Franklin's  crossing  without  serious  opposition,  and,  having 
constructed  three  bridges,  awaits  orders. 

Early  in  the  forenoon  Stuart  telegraphs  to  Lee  that  the 
enemy  crossed  in  force  at  Kelley's  Ford  yesterday  evening. 
About  1  P.M.  he  is  apprised  by  his  pickets  that  a  large 
infantry  force  is  moving  towards  Madden.  Leaving  a 
regiment  at  Brandy  Station,  he  marches  the  remainder  of 
his  command  to  Madden,  where  he  takes  prisoners  from 
the  three  Federal  army  corps,  and  learns  that  they  are 
marching  directly  for  Germanna  Ford.  He  telegraphs  to 
that  effect  to  General  Lee.      In  reply,  he  is  directed  to 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  1G9 

swing  around  to  join  the  left  wing  of  Lee's  army,  making 
arrangements  beforehand  to  protect  the  public  property 
along  the  railroads.  He  accordingly  detaches  two  regi- 
ments, W.  H.  F.  Lee's  bi-igade,  by  way  of  Cidpeper  Court- 
House,  towards  Gordonsville  (Map  3),  and  with  the  re- 
mainder of  his  command,  consisting  of  Fitz  Lee's  brigade, 
pushes  across  the  Rapidan.  He  halts  only  for  a  few  hours 
after  marching  half  of  the  night.  One  regiment  goes  on 
without  stopping,  to  interpose  between  the  Federals  and 
Fredericksburg. 

In  the  course  of  the  forenoon  Lee  is  apprised  of  the 
bridging  of  the  Rappahannock  at  Franklin's  crossing,  as 
well  as  of  the  passage  of  that  river  by  Howard's  corps  at 
Kelley's  Ford.  He  contracts  his  main  position  by  moving 
Jackson's  corps  to  the  left  and  posting  it  with  its  right  at 
Hamilton's  crossing.  In  the  afternoon  he  learns  that  a 
heavy  column  of  the  enemy  is  moving  from  Kelley's  Ford 
towards  Germanna,  and  another  towards  Elley's  Ford. 
The  ch'cumstance  that,  after  crossing  the  Rapidan,  the 
routes  followed  by  these  columns  converge  towards  Chan- 
cellorsville  indicates  to  General  Lee  the  objective  of  the 
reported  movement.  By  6.30  p.m.  he  has  heard  that 
infantry  and  cavalry  have  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  Ger- 
manna and  Elley's  Fords,  but  cannot  learn  their  strength. 
He  is  satisfied  that  the  enemy  is  making  a  general  move- 
ment, but  is  still  in  the  dark  as  to  his  main  objective. 
For  aught  he  knows.  Hooker  may  be  aiming  primarily  at 
the  right  or  at  the  left  or  rear  of  Lee's  position,  or  away 
from  that  position  towards  Gordonsville.  He  orders  three 
brigades  of  Anderson's  division  to  be  assembled  at  Chan- 
cellorsville  and  posted  so  as  to  cover  the  roads  to  Fred- 
ericksburg. He  has  reported  to  the  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond that  Howard  is  making  for  Gordonsville,  and  that 
he  fears  that  Stoneman  will  do  the  same,  and  has  requested 
that  troo2:»s  be  forwarded  both  to  Fredericksburg  and  Gor- 


170  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

donsville.  General  McLaws,  commanding  at  Fredericks- 
burg, is  ordered  to  communicate  to  General  Jackson  and 
General  Anderson  all  movements  of  the  enemy  affecting 
them,  and  if  they  ask  for  re-enforcements  to  furnish  what 
he  can.  Lee  is  anxious  about  his  cavalry.  In  his  de- 
spatches to  Anderson  and  McLaws,  he  observes,  "We 
may  be  obliged  to  change  our  position  in  consequence  of 
the  enemy's  having  come  between  us  and  General  Stuart. 
Make  your  preparatory  arrangements  to-night  to  secure 
all  your  property." 

ZOth  April. — The  right  wing  completes  its  passage  of 
the  Rapidan  at  German na  and  Elley's  Fords  and  presses 
on  to  the  designated  point  of  concentration.  The  outer 
column  (lltli  and  12th  Corps)  is  somewhat  annoyed  by 
Stuart's  cavalry,  and  the  5th  Corps  has  some  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy's  pickets ;  but  by  4  p.m.  the  three  corps 
are  formed  up  in  line  extending  from  near  Dowdall's 
Tavern  on  the  right  to  beyond  Chancellorsville  on  the 
left.  By  10  P.M.  the  2d  Corps  has  marched  from  United 
States  Ford  and  gone  into  camp  near  Chancellorsville. 
Pleasonton's  cavalry  is  thrown  out  on  tlie  roads  to  Fred- 
ericksburg and  Spottsylvania. 

The  3d  Corps  is  detached  this  afternoon  from  the  left 
wing  and  ordered  to  join  the  right  by  way  of  United 
States  Ford.  It  marches  in  three  parallel  columns,  well 
concealed  from  the  enemy,  and  camps  about  midnight  at 
Hamet's,  five  miles  from  United  States  Ford.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  left  continues  inactive. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  Hooker  establishes  his 
head-quarters  at  Chancellorsville. 

The  main  body  of  the  cavalry,  under  Stoneman,  crosses 
the  Kapidan  at  Morton's  and  Raccoon  Fords.  It  camj^s 
about  midnight  not  far  from  the  river.  Stoneman  learns 
here  that  Stuart  crossed  about  five  miles  above  Raccoon 
Ford,  making  for  Fredericksburg. 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  171 

Averell's  command  marches  through  Culpeper  Court- 
House  to  Kapidan  Station,  where  it  arrives  about  7.30  p.m., 
and  finds  itself  confronted  by  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade. 

Stuart  halts  at  night  at  Todd's  Tavern.  One  of  his 
regiments  has  an  encounter  here  with  a  regiment  of 
Pleasonton's  cavalry  by  moonlight. 

The  concentration  of  troops  at  Chancellors ville,  together 
with  the  inactivity  of  the  force  at  Franklin's  crossing, 
satisfies  Lee  that  the  enemy's  main  effort  is  being  made 
upon  his  flank  and  rear.  Expecting  that  Hooker  will 
push  on  from  Chancellorsville  to  attack  him,  he  deter- 
mines to  leave  a  sufiicient  force  in  his  lines  to  hold  them, 
and  to  move  out  with  tlie  main  body  of  his  army  to  give 
battle  to  the  advancing  columns.  Pursuant  to  Lee's 
order  of  yesterday.  General  Anderson  was  established  with 
his  three  brigades  at  Chancellorsville  about  midnight  of 
the  29tli  and  30th.  Early  in  the  morning  he  retires  to 
the  vicinity  of  Tabernacle  Church  and  proceeds  to  in- 
trench himself. 

Hooker  does  not  intend  to  attack.  He  intends  to  put 
himself  in  position  and  await  the  attack  of  the  enemy, 
and  has  as  much  as  said  so  in  a  congratulatory  order  issued 
in  the  forenoon.     This  order  reads, — 

Head-quarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
Camp  near  Falmouth,  Va.,  April  30,  1863. 

General  Orders,  No.  47. 

It  is  with  heart-felt  satisfaction  the  commanding  general  an- 
nounces to  the  army  that  the  operations  of  the  last  three  days 
have  determined  that  our  enemy  must  either  ingloriously  fly  or 
come  out  from  behind  his  intrenchments  and  give  us  battle  on  our 
own  ground,  where  certain  destruction  awaits  him. 

The  operations  of  the  5th,  11th,  and  12th  Corps  have  been  a 
succession  of  splendid  achievements. 

By  order  of  Major-General  Hooker. 

S.  Williams, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


172  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Tabernacle  Church. 

1st  31ay. — Banks'  Ford  being  in  possession  of  the 
enemy,  the  Federal  line  of  communication  crosses  the  Rap- 
pahannock at  United  States  Ford.  The  distance  between 
the  right  and  left  wings  of  the  Federal  army  is  twenty 
miles.  Hooker's  first  object  is  to  shorten  this  distance  by 
taking  possession  of  Banks'  Ford.  His  second  is  to  get 
his  troops  out  of  the  forest  of  the  Wilderness  and  de- 
ployed on  open  ground,  where  his  artillery  will  be  able  to 
act  and  where  his  general  preponderance  will  tell.  His 
force  has  been  increased  by  the  arrival  of  the  3d  Corps 
from  Hamet's  about  9  a.m.  He  has  now  under  his  im- 
mediate command  five  corps  and  Pleason ton's  cavalry 
brigade.  Allowance  being  made  for  guards  left  behind, 
straggling,  etc.,  this  force  must  amount  to  about  70,000 
men. 

About  eleven  o'clock  the  bulk  of  it  moves  out  in  three 
columns,  preceded  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  to  take  up  a 
position  extending  from  Tabernacle  Church  to  Banks' 
Ford,  the  movement  to  be  completed  by  2  p.m.  His  head- 
quarters are  to  be  at  Tabernacle  Church,  At  the  very 
hour  when  this  movement  commences,  a  Confederate  force 
of  about  40,000  men,  commanded  by  General  Jackson, 
starts  out  from  Tabernacle  Church  for  Chancellorsville. 
The  two  forces  meet  and  engage  each  other  near  the  edge 
of  the  Wilderness.  Hooker,  who  has  available  for  action 
about  50,000  men,  fears  that  the  heads  of  his  columns  will 
be  overpowered  and  his  command  beaten  in  detail.  He 
consequently  orders  a  retreat  and  returns  to  Chancellors- 
ville. He  is  still  confronted  by  the  enemy,  who  has 
followed  him  up  closely. 

During  the  movements  of  this  day,  Stuart's  cavalry 
operates  with  Jackson's  command. 

The  left  wing  of  the   Federal  army  was  to  make  a 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE  OPERATION.  173 

demonstration  at  Franklin's  crossing  at  one  o'clock,  or  an 
hour  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  formation  of  Hooker's 
line  at  Tabernacle  Church ;  but  the  order  prescribing  it 
was  so  delayed  in  transmission  that  the  demonstration  was 
not  made  until  5.45.  By  this  time  the  right  wing  was 
back  at  Chancellorsville. 

Stoneman  detached  Gregg's  division  towards  Louisa 
Court-House,  on  the  Virginia  Central  Kailroad  (Map  3). 
At  midnight  it  is  still  on  the  march.  The  remainder  of 
Stoneman's  command,  consisting  of  Buford's  brigade, 
follows  in  the  same  general  direction  and  camps  on  the 
south  side  of  the  North  Anna. 

Averell  has  been  feebly  engaged  most  of  the  day  with 
W.  H.  F,  Lee  at  Rapidan  Station.  Lee  burns  the  bridge, 
but  holds  his  position  until  night,  when  he  withdraws 
towards  Gordonsville. 

DowdaWs  Tavern. 

After  the  events  in  the  Wilderness,  General  Kobert  E. 
Lee  confers  with  General  Jackson  as  to  the  course  to  be 
taken  on  the  morrow.  It  is  decided  to  endeavor  to  turn 
the  enemy's  right  flank  and  gain  his  rear,  leaving  a 
force  in  front  to  hold  him  in  check  and  conceal  the  move- 
ment. The  execution  of  this  plan  is  intrusted  to  Jackson 
with  his  three  divisions,  numbering  together  about  25,000 
men.  The  remainder  of  the  Confederate  main  body,  con- 
sisting of  Anderson's  and  McLaws's  commands,  and  num- 
bering about  15,000,  are  to  remain  in  the  enemy's  front. 
Stuart's  cavalry,  numbering  about  2500  men,  is  available  to 
cover  these  fractions  and  keep  up  communication  between 
them. 

2c?  May. — At  break  of  day  Jackson's  corps  is  in  motion. 
At  4  P.M.,  after  a  circuitous  march  of  fifteen  miles  under 
cover  of  the  dense  wood  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  it  reaches 
the  key-point  of  the  movement,  about  three  miles  due 


174  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

west  from  Chancellorsville.  Here  Jackson  goes  forward 
to  examine  tlie  position  of  the  enemy.  He  sees  the  en- 
campment of  the  11th  Corps  extending  in  an  east  and  west 
line,  and  observes  that  no  preparations  have  been  made  to 
receive  him.  He  proceeds  to  form  his  command  in  three 
lines,  a  division  in  each  line.  The  men  take  their  posi- 
tions in  silence,  orders  are  transmitted  in  a  low  voice,  the 
bugles  are  still,  the  soldiers  do  not  salute  their  gen- 
eral with  their  usual  cheers.  At  6  p.m.  everything  is 
ready. 

As  swiftly  as  the  dense  brushwood  will  permit,  the  first 
line  pushes  forward,  followed  by  the  second  and  third. 
The  men  have  their  clothing  almost  torn  from  their  bodies, 
but  still  the  lines  sweep  forward  in  tolerable  order  and 
with  great  enthusiasm.  Position  after  position  is  carried. 
The  movement  is  finally  arrested  by  darkness  and  a  line 
of  works  near  the  position  of  Chancellorsville.  About 
this  time  General  Jackson  is  mortally  wounded  by  one  of 
his  own  men. 

As  soon  as  the  sound  of  cannon  gave  notice  of  Jack- 
son's attack,  the  Confederate  right  wing  pressed  the  Fed- 
eral left  to  prevent  re-enforcements  being  sent  to  the  point 
assailed. 

Hooker  orders  the  1st  Corps  from  Franklin's  crossing 
to  Chancellorsville.  It  reaches  United  States  Ford  at  sun- 
set, but  has  great  difficulty  in  continuing  its  way  along  the 
crowded  roads,  and  at  midnight  is  still  three  hours'  march 
from  Chancellorsville.  This  movement  leaves  only  Sedg- 
wick's corj^s  at  Franklin's  crossing.  Sedgwick's  is,  how- 
ever, the  strongest  corps  in  the  army,  and  numbers  about 
22,000  men. 

Jackson's  flank  march  was  not  unobserved  by  the 
Federals.  It  was,  in  fact,  seriously  threatened  by  two 
divisions  of  the  3d  Corps,  under  Sickles.  But  Hooker 
believed  that  Lee  was  trying  to  escape  in  the  direction  of 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  175 

Gorclonsville,     At  4.10  p.m.  the  following  despatch  was 
telegraphed  to  Hooker's  chief  of  staff  at  Falmouth  : 

The  major-general  commanding  directs  that  General  Sedgwick 
cross  the  river  as  soon  as  indications  will  permit ;  capture  Fred- 
ericksburg with  everything  in  it,  and  vigorously  pursue  the  enemy. 
We  know  that  the  enemy  is  fleeing,  trying  to  save  his  trains.  Two 
of  Sickles's  divisions  arc  among  them. 

Hooker  is  greatly  discouraged  by  the  rout  of  the  11th 
Corps,  but  expects  to  retrieve  his  fortune  to-morrow. 

The  following  despatch,  telegraphed  at  9  p.m.  to  his 
chief  of  staff,  indicates  his  plan  of  action : 

The  major-general  commanding  directs  that  General  Sedgwick 
cross  the  Eappahannock  at  Fredericksburg  on  the  receipt  of  this 
order,  and  at  once  take  up  his  line  of  march  on  the  Chancellors- 
ville  road  until  he  connects  with  us,  and  he  will  attack  and  destroy 
an}^  force  he  may  fall  in  with  on  the  road.  He  will  leave  all  his 
trains  behind,  except  the  pack  train  of  small  ammunition,  and 
march  to  be  in  our  vicinity  at  daylight.  He  will  probably  fall 
upon  the  rear  of  the  forces  commanded  by  General  Lee,  and  be- 
tween us  we  will  use  him  up.  Send  word  to  General  Gibbon  to 
take  possession  of  Fredericksburg.  Be  sure  not  to  fail.  Deliver 
this  by  your  swiftest  messenger.  Send  word  that  it  is  delivered  to 
General  Sedgwick. 

This  despatch  is  received  by  Sedgwick  at  eleven  o'clock, 
and  finds  him  with  his  command  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Kappahannock,  opposite  Franklin's  crossing.  He  took 
this  position  in  obedience  to  an  order,  which  Hooker  seems 
to  have  lost  sight  of,  directing  Sedgwick  to  pursue  the 
enemy  in  the  direction  of  Bowling  Green.  To  recross  and 
cross  again  at  Fredericksburg,  where  no  bridges  have  been 
laid,  would  take  all  night.  Sedgwick  decides,  therefore,  to 
move  against  Fredericksburg  by  the  south  bank,  and  he 
puts  his  corps  in  motion  accordingly  at  midnight. 

At  6.30  A.M.,  General  Averell,  at  Rapidan  Station, 
receives  the  following  despatch,  dated 


176  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Chancellorsville,  ^[ay  1,  1863,  6.30  p.m. 
General, — I  am  directed  by  the  major-general  commanding  to 
inform  you  that  he  does  not  understand  what  you  are  doing  at 
Rapidan  Station.  If  this  finds  3'ou  at  that  place,  j-ou  will  imme- 
diately return  to  United  States  Ford,  and  remain  there  until  further 
orders,  and  report  in  person. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Wm.  L.  Candler, 
Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp. 

p,S. — If  this  reaches  3'Ou  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning,  you  will 
start  immediately. 

Pursuant  to  this  order,  Averell  marches  to  Elley's  Ford. 

Stoneman  assembles  his  force  at  Louisa  Court-House. 
Having  destroyed  the  Virginia  Central  Raih-oad  and 
telegraph,  burned  depots,  water-tanks,  etc.,  for  eighteen 
miles,  he  pushes  on  to  Thompson's  Cross-Roads,  where  he 
arrives  at  10  p.m.  (Map  3). 

?>d  May. — Hooker  has  taken  advantage  of  the  night  to 
restore  order  in  his  army.  That  portion  of  the  11th 
Corps  which  was  in  line  of  battle  has  been  sent  to  the 
rear. 

About  midnight  Lee  receives  from  Stuart,  who  has 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  Jackson's  corps,  the  report 
both  of  Jackson's  wound  and  of  his  success.  At  3  a.m. 
he  forwards  the  following  despatch  to  General  Stuart : 

General, — It  is  necessary  that  the  glorious  victory  thus  far 
achieved  be  prosecuted  with  the  utmost  vigor,  and  the  enemy  given 
no  time  to  rally.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  it  is  possible,  thej^  must  be 
pressed,  so  that  we  can  unite  the  two  wings  of  the  army. 

Endeavor,  therefore,  to  dispossess  them  of  Chancellorsville,  which 
will  permit  the  union  of  the  whole  army. 

I  shall  myself  proceed  to  join  you  as  soon  as  I  can  make  arrange- 
ments on  this  side,  but  let  nothing  delay  the  completion  of  the 
plan  of  driving  the  enemy  from  his  rear  and  from  his  positions. 

I  shall  give  orders  that  every  effort  be  made  on  this  side  at 
daylight  to  aid  in  the  junction. 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  177 

About  5  A.M.  the  Confederates  renew  tlie  attack.  The 
Federals  contest  the  field  until  ten  o'clock,  when  they 
yield  at  every  point,  and  rapidly  retreat  within  a  line  of 
intrench ments  about  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  Chancellorsville, 
covering  the  road  to  United  States  Ford.  The  defence  of 
their  old  position  was  feeble.  The  whole  of  the  1st  and 
three-quai-ters  of  the  oth  Corps  were  kept  out  of  action. 
These,  with  5000  reliable  men  of  the  lltli  Corps,  made  a 
fresh  army,  which,  if  used  against  Stuart's  tired  men, 
should  have  driven  them  from  the  field. 

Salem  Church. 

Sedgwick,  with  the  6th  Corps,  reaches  Fredericksburg  at 
3  A.M.  About  7  A.M.  he  is  joined  by  Gibbon  with  his  divi- 
sion, and  at  eleven  he  gets  possession  of  the  heights  behind 
Fredericksburg.  Here  he  halts  to  reform  and  to  get  up  a 
division  left  near  Franklin's  crossing.  It  is  consequently 
3  P.M.  before  he  makes  a  start  for  Chancellorsville.  In 
the  mean  time,  the  enemy,  re-enforced  from  Banks'  Ford 
and  Chancellorsville,  has  taken  position  at  Salem  Church 
to  oppose  him.  Sedgwick's  efforts  to  dislodge  him  are 
arrested  by  darkness. 

Averell  moves  his  command  to  United  States  Ford  and 
reports  in  person  to  General  Hooker. 

Stoneman  breaks  up  his  command  into  regiments  and 
sends  the  fragments  in  different  directions  to  burn  and 
destroy.  One  is  engaged  all  day  in  injuring  the  James 
and  Kanawha  Canal  at  Columbia,  and  in  attempting  to 
blow  up  the  aqueduct  over  the  Kivanna.  Another  passes 
within  two  miles  and  a  half  of  Richmond  and  creates 
great  consternation  there.  Another  strikes  the  Richmond, 
Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  Railroad  at  Ashland  and 
does  it  considerable  damage.  Two  regiments  go  down  the 
South  Anna,  burning  bridges  over  common  roads  and  rail- 
roads, and  destroy  the  station  at  Hanover  Junction. 

12 


178  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

4th  3Iay. — Leaving  three  divisions  of  Jackson's  corps  in 
front  of  Hooker,  Lee  concentrates  Anderson's,  McLaws's, 
and  Early's  divisions,  numbering  about  24,000  men,  against 
Sedgwick's  corps,  which  now  numbers  about  20,000.  Sedg- 
wick takes  up  a  position  five  or  six  miles  long,  covering 
Banks'  Ford,  and,  notwithstanding  the  feebleness  of  his 
line,  contests  the  field  until  nightfall,  when  he  retires 
across  the  river. 

The  Confederates  have  retaken  the  heights  back  of 
Fredericksburg,  leaving  Gibbon's  division  in  possession  of 
the  town. 

The  Federal  right  wing  does  some  desultory  fighting 
with  Jackson's  corps. 

Averell  is  relieved  from  command  and  ordered  to  report 
to  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army. 

Apprehending  the  approach  of  hostile  cavalry,  Stone- 
man  moves  back  to  Shannon's  Cross-Roads,  about  six  miles 
in  his  rear,  where  he  has  an  encounter  with  the  brigade  of 
W.  H.  F.  Lee,  set  free  by  the  recall  of  Averell's  command. 

bth  May. — Deeming  it  futile  to  attack  the  Confederate 
army  in  the  Wilderness,  Hooker  withdraws  his  right  wing 
across  the  Rappahannock,  and  orders  the  return  of  his 
army  to  its  old  camps  about  Falmouth. 

Stoneman,  who  has  heard  nothing  about  the  army  ex- 
cept vague  rumors  of  its  defeat  and  capture,  proceeds  to 
take  his  command  back  to  it. 

Comments. 

Foremost  among  the  notable  features  of  this  campaign 
are  the  flank  marches  of  Hooker's  right  wing  and  of 
Lee's  left,  under  Jackson.  Neither  march  was,  in  fact, 
secret  or  concealed.  That  they  were  both  successfully 
executed  was  due  mainly  to  the  circuitous  and  eccentric 
direction,  which  led  the  enemy  in  each  case  to  believe  that 
the  movement  was  directed  not  against  him,  but  against 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  179 

the  remote  railroad  centre  of  Gordonsville.  This  ruse 
caused  Stuart  to  post  liis  cavalry  so  that  the  Federal 
columns  cut  it  from  its  proper  field  of  operations — the 
Federal  front — and  prevented  Stuart  from  warning  his 
pickets  along  the  Kappahannock  below  Kelley's  Ford. 
These  were  consequently  taken  in  rear  and  captured  be- 
fore they  had  heard  of  the  crossing  of  the  river  by  the 
Federals.  His  couriers  sent  to  notify  the  troops  at  United 
States  Ford  were  intercepted.  At  Germanna  Ford  the 
Federal  column  found  a  party  of  Confederates  engaged  in 
rebuilding  the  bridge,  and  captured  it  almost  to  a  man. 

Stoneman's  cavalry,  after  crossing  the  Rappahannock, 
did  nothing  to  contribute  to  the  success  of  the  campaign  ex- 
cept to  keep  the  two  regiments  under  W.  H.  F.  Lee  from 
joining  the  Confederate  army  with  Stuart.  That  it  did 
no  more  was,  however,  the  fault  of  Hooker  rather  than  of 
Stoneman.  It  was  a  capital  mistake  of  Hooker's  to  detach 
the  cavalry  corps.  Sending  it  ahead  of  the  army  as  the 
latter  ascended  the  Rappahannock  served  the  important 
purpose,  already  pointed  out,  of  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to 
Hooker's  intentions.  So  far  its  employment  was  most 
judicious.  But  after  it  crossed  the  Rappahannock  it 
should  have  been  used  to  screen  and  protect  the  turning 
columns  and  to  keep  Stuart  from  joining  Lee.  Instead  of 
this,  it  was  ordered  off  to  push  into  the  enemy's  country, 
with  the  object,  j'l'i'ii'ii'ily,  of  obstructing  Lee's  retreat; 
and,  secondarily,  of  destroying  his  depots  and  his  lines  of 
communication  generally.  Stoneman  was  required  by 
Hooker's  order  to  divide  his  command  into  two  parts  to 
operate  separately  for  the  attainment  of  his  double  object. 
One  part  was  to  intercept  Lee  somewhere  near  Hanover 
Junction,  the  other  was  to  destroy  property  along  the 
Confederate  comnumications,  and  at  the  same  time  serve 
as  a  flanking  party  for  the  former  body.  Stoneman's 
whole  command,  which   did  not  number'  more  than  7500 


180  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

men,  was  totally  inadequate  to  the  purpose  of  barring  the 
way  of  an  army  numbering  from  50,000  to  60,000  men 
bent  on  reaching  its  base  ;  but,  if  kept  united,  it  was 
strong  enough  effectually  to  harass  its  columns,  and  per- 
haps to  retard  its  march.  But  it  lacked  the  element  of 
time.  Tlie  cavalry  crossed  the  Kappahannock  simultane- 
ously with  the  army,  and  the  enemy  might  at  any  moment 
betake  itself  by  forced  marches  to  the  rear.  The  cavalry 
could  therefore  hardly  be  expected  to  anticipate  such  a 
movement.  The  delay  caused  by  the  rising  of  the  river 
gave  to  the  cavalry  expedition,  in  advance,  the  character  of 
a  mere  raid,  and  made  the  operation  so  much  the  less 
advisable  or  justifiable. 

Stoneman  alone  was  responsible  for  splitting  up  his 
command  into  flying  columns  of  the  strength  of  a  regi- 
ment, as  he  did  at  Thompson's  Cross-Roads.  He  might 
have  been  better  employed  in  beating  the  road  to  Freder- 
icksburg for  the  retreating  Confederate  army. 

Averell  contented  himself  between  April  29  and  May 
3  with  marching  from  Kelley's  Ford,  through  Culpeper 
Court-House,  to  Rapidan  Station,  a  distance  of  twenty- 
eight  miles,  meeting  no  enemy  worthy  of  the  name,  and 
from  there  to  Elley's  Ford,  twenty-three  miles. 

Pleasonton,  with  his  single  brigade,  rendered  such  effi- 
cient service  as  largely  to  compensate  for  the  absence  of 
the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  corps. 

The  damage  done  by  the  Federal  cavalry  to  the  railroads 
was  easily  repaired,  and  had  no  influence  on  the  course  of 
operations.  Some  stores  were  destroyed  by  it,  but  these 
were  not  sufficient  to  affect  the  Confederate  commissariat. 

Nearly  all  the  transportation  of  Lee's  army  was  col- 
lected at  Guiney's  Station,  eighteen  miles  from  Chancel- 
lors ville,  with  little  or  no  guard,  and  might  have  been 
destroyed  by  one-third  of  Stoneman's  force.  The  absence 
of  this  cavalry  was,  or  should  have  been,  severely  felt  by 


COUNTER-OFFENSIVE   OPERATION.  181 

Hooker,  while  Lee's  plans  were  in  nowise  disarranged  by 
its  presence  in  his  rear. 

The  reverses  and  final  failure  of  the  campaign  may  be 
traced  to  Hooker's  fallacious  idea  of  consummating  offen-  ^k 
sive  strategy  with  defensive  tactics.  Had  he  been  imbued 
with  the  true  offensive  spirit,  he  would  not  on  the  30th  of 
April  have  allowed  his  whole  force  to  camp  in  the  vicinity 
of  Chancellorsville,  but  would  have  pushed  at  least  a 
portion  of  it  down  the  Rappahannock  and  gained  pos- 
session of  Banks'  Ford ;  and  in  the  morning  he  would 
have  advanced,  not  at  eleven  o'clock,  but  about  daylight, 
and  with  the  object,  not  of  taking  up  a  defensive  position,  \\ 
but  of  looking  up  the  enemy  and  attacking  him  wherever 
he  might  be  found.  Even  on  tlie  1st  of  May,  and  tardy 
as  he  was  in  starting,  he  might  have  achieved  a  success 
that  would  have  placed  him  among  the  great  commanders 
of  the  age,  but  he  was  too  apprehensive  of  defeat.  When 
he  ordered  a  retreat  (about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon),  his 
army  was  eager  to  push  on.  There  was  no  good  reason  to 
suppose  that,  had  he  let  it  have  its  way,  it  would  not  have 
continued  to  advance,  or  at  least  have  held  its  ground,  and 
eventually  cleared  the  south  bank  of  the  E-appahannock 
of  the  enemy. 

On  the  2d  and  again  on  the  4th  of  May,  Lee  made  a 
judicious  use  of  interior  lines.  On  the  2d  he  attacked  the  "^ 
larger  fraction  under  Hooker;  on  the  4th,  the  smaller  one 
under  Sedijwick.  He  would  on  the  2d  as  well  as  on  the 
4th  have  turned  first  upon  the  smaller,  which  was  in  each 
case  the  nearer  one,  but  for  the  strength  of  the  Federal 
position  of  Stafford  Heights,  which  made  it  seem  impossible 
to  inflict  a  crushing  blow  upon  a  force  having  that  position 
to  fall  back  on.  If,  moreover,  he  had  succeeded  in  crush- 
ing Sedgwick,  he  would  with  reduced  numbers  have  had 
to  attack  Hooker,  who,  with  the  larger  fraction,  threatened 
his  communications.     On  the  4th  of  May,  Hooker  had 


182  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

fallen  back  from  his  commanding  position,  dispirited  by 
the  events  of  the  last  two  days,  and  Sedgwick  was  away 
from  the  cover  of  Stafford  Heights,  and,  what  was  more 
important,  in  possession  of  the  Confederate  position  and 
of  Banks'  Ford,  by  which  Hooker  might  re-enforce  or 
join  him.  To  dislodge  Sedgwick  was  now  of  immediate 
and  paramount  importance. 

The  movement  by  which  Sedgwick  sought  to  join 
Hooker  exposed  Sedgwick's  corps  to  being  overpowered  and 
forced  up  against  the  impassable  Kappahannock  between 
Banks'  and  United  States  Fords.  Hooker  should,  there- 
fore, have  made  a  vigorous  effort  to  meet  Sedgwick  half 
way.  All  he  did  was  to  engage  about  half  of  his  force, 
and  that  defensively.  This  was  on  the  3d  of  May,  and 
resulted  in  his  falling  back.  On  the  4th  he  contented 
himself  with  continuing  to  occupy  his  lines  as  a  bridge- 
head. True,  if  he  had  moved  to  join  Sedgwick,  both  he 
and  Sedgwick  might  have  been  caught  between  the  fords 
and  driven  into  the  river.  But  if  Hooker,  with  the  mass 
of  the  army,  could  not  safely  undertake  to  join  Sedgwick 
wdien  Sedgwick  was  moving  to  join  him,  it  was  hardly  to 
be  expected  that  Sedgwick,  with  a  single  corps,  would  suc- 
ceed in  joining  Hooker.  If  Hooker  was  not  to  move, 
Sedgwick's  movement  should  have  been  directed  up  the 
north  bank  of  the  Kappahannock  and  over  United  States 
Ford,  instead  of  across  country  from  Fredericksburg. 

The  losses  in  this  campaign  aggregated  on  the  side  of 
the  Federals  about  17,000,  and  on  the  side  of  the  Con- 
federates about  13,000. 


XIII. 

OPERATING  BEHIND  AND  ABOUT  THE 
ENEMY'S  BASE. 

THE  enemy's  base  is  not  his  final  source  of  supplies. 
Behind  it  is  the  country  at  large  from  which  it  is  fed, 
and  which,  in  turn,  may  be  dependent  for  its  resources  on 
foreign  countries.  Operating  behind  or  about  the  enemy's 
base  will  consist  either  in  ijnpoverishing  the  sections  from 
which  it  is  replenished  or  in  cutting  them  off  from  com- 
munication with  it.  Both  modes  of  operation  are  illus- 
trated in  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea ;  for  at  that  time  the 
supplies  of  Lee's  army  were  largely  drawn  from  the 
eastern  Gulf  States,  and  those  supplies  which  the  Fed- 
erals did  not  seize  or  destroy  were  cut  off  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  raill^oads. 

Cutting  a  country  off  from  the  outside  world  consists 
(1)  in  a  more  or  less  perfect  investment  or  blockade  of  its 
frontier  or  coast  line,  or  (2)  in  intercepting  and  destroy- 
ing its  commerce  on  the  high  seas.  During  the  Civil 
War  tlie  whole  sea-coast  of  the  Confederacy,  extending 
from  the  outlet  of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Kio  Grande,  a  distance  of  about  3000  miles,  was  placed 
under  blockade.  Shortly  after  the  establishment  of  the 
coast  blockade  the  line  of  the  Mississippi  w^as  seized  and 
patrolled  by  our  gunboats,  and  thus  the  main  organized 
force  of  the  Confederacy,  wliich  was  east  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, was  cut  off,  not  only  from  Mexico  and  the  rest  of 
the  outside  world,  but  also  from  the  rich  grain  and  cattle 
country  of  Louisiana  and  Texas.  Our  armies  in  the  field 
debarred  the  South  from  direct  intercourse  with  the  North. 

183 


184  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

So,  with  our  sea  navy  on  the  east  and  south,  our  Missis- 
sippi fleet  on  the  west,  and  our  land  forces  on  the  north, 
the  better  part  of  the  Confederacy  was  practically  besieged. 
In  a  political  sense,  a  blockade  is  said  to  be  effective 
when  it  is  made  close  or  complete.  In  a  strategic  sense, 
however,  it  is  not  effective  until  the  enemy  feels  the  effect 
of  it.  Successful  blockading,  therefore,  depends  primarily 
upon  the  extent  to  which  the  enemy's  country  is  depend- 
ent upon  the  outside  world.  Should  Great  Britain  invest 
our  land  frontier  and  close  our  ports,  thus  besieging  our 
united  country  as  the  North  besieged  the  South  during 
the  war,  not  only  would  the  effect  be  immaterial  upon  us, 
but  it  would  be  most  serious,  not  to  say  disastrous,  upon 
England,  on  account  of  her  need  of  our  exports.  The 
probable  effect  of  a  blockade  of  the  English  coast  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  about  two-thirds  of  her  food 
supplies  are  imported. 

THE    BLOCKADE    OF    THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES. 

Among  the  many  remarkable  features  of  the  war  be- 
tween the  North  and  South,  the  blockade  system  was 
perhaps  the  most  extraordinary.  For  extent  and  effec- 
tiveness it  stands  without  a  parallel  in  history.  It  is  to 
be  questioned  if  there  was  ever  before  a  great  people  so  far 
from  self-sustaining  as  was  the  South  in  1861.  It  did  not 
feed  itself,  nor  clothe  itself,  nor  was  it  prepared  to  arm 
itself.  Its  whole  system  of  supply  was  based  upon  the 
exportation  and  exchange  of  cotton,  by  which  it  hoped 
to  realize  some  $300,000,000  yearly.  But  the  war  in- 
terfered with  this,  not  only  by  closing  the  Southern  ports, 
but  by  diverting  much  of  the  slave  labor,  and  practi- 
cally all  of  the  white  labor,  from  cotton  raising  to  pur- 
suits more  closely  connected  with  military  operations. 
Thus,  as  the  importance  of  exportation  increased,  the 
•material    as    well   as    the    facilities    therefor    decreased. 


OPERATING  BEHIND  AND  ABOUT  THE  ENEMY'S  BASE.    185 

Under  date  of  January  15,  1863,  the  Confederate  Secre- 
tary of  State  wrote  to  the  agent  of  his  government  at 
Paris  that  the  cotton  crops  for  the  three  years  of  1861, 
1862,  and  1863  would  not  exceed  one  full  crop  in  time  of 
peace. 

Had  the  South  depended  entirely  on  blockade-running 
for  those  supplies  which,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  she 
did  not  produce  herself,  the  Confederacy  must  have  col- 
lapsed in  the  first  or  second  year  of  the  war.  The  great 
secret  of  its  endurance  was  the  fact  that  it  managed  before 
the  blockade  was  completed  to  have  considerable  cotton 
lands  converted  into  cornfields,  and,  thanks  to  foreign 
contractors,  to  acquire  a  certain  strength  of  armament. 
Whether  the  South  could  have  thus  effectually  trans- 
formed her  agricultural  system,  and  founded  her  military 
system,  had  the  blockade  been  suddenly,  instead  of  gradu- 
ally, established,  may  well  be  doubted.  Her  endeavors 
and  achievements,  therefore,  should  teach  us  two  important 
lessons : 

1.  That  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  effective  a  blockade 
must  be  sudden.  This  points  to  the  advantage  of  main- 
taining a  navy  adapted  to  prompt  mobilization, — that  is, 
to  being  immediately  expanded  and  equipped  for  service 
on  the  outbreak  of  war. 

2.  That  the  most  effective  blockade  should  not  be  ex- 
pected to  prove  decisive  in  itself.  An  entire  country  can 
hardly  be  starved  like  a  city  into  surrendering.  It  is  a 
reasonable  question,  therefore,  whether  England  might 
not  stand  a  blockade,  assuming  that  she  should  ever  have 
occasion  to  do  so. 

In  1861  the  United  States  still  occupied  the  second 
place  among  commercial  nations.  Of  the  total  registered 
tonnage,  however,  less  than  one-tenth  belonged  to  the 
seceding  States,  and  this  rapidly  disappeared.  In  a  war- 
fare against  commerce,  therefore,  the  Confederacy  could 


186  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

strike  heavy  blows  without  fear  of  being  struck  in  return. 
It  was  accordingly  by  such  warfare  that  the  South  sought 
to  produce  upon  the  North  those  effects  which  it  had  itself 
to  experience  in  consequence  of  the  blockade.  It  resorted 
at  first  to  privateering. 

During  the  first  year,  of  the  war  the  privateers  met 
with  moderate  success.  A  considerable  number  of  small 
vessels  were  fitted  out, — old  slavers,  tugs,  fishing  schooners, 
revenue  cutters,  and  small  coasters  of  all  descriptions. 
Many  of  them  would  lie  securely  in  the  inlets  on  the  coast 
of  the  Carolinas,  and  issue  forth  when  they  sighted  a  stray 
merchantman  off  the  coast,  returning  to  cover  when  they 
had  made  their  capture.  Others  went  to  work  more 
boldly,  but  nearly  all  had  a  short  career.  The  practice  of 
privateering,  after  suffering  severely  from  interruptions  to 
which  it  was  subjected  by  the  sailing  vessels  of  the  Fed- 
eral navy,  died  out  under  the  influence  of  the  blockade. 
The  principal  incentive  to  privateering  is  gain,  but  there 
is  little  to  be  gained  where  prizes  cannot  be  sent  into  port. 
The  privateers  consequently  betook  themselves  to  the  more 
profitable  pursuit  of  carrying  contraband.  The  work 
which  they  abandoned  was  then  taken  in  hand  by  the 
Confederate  government,  and  it  was  carried  on  by  the 
navy  during  the  rest  of  the  war. 

THE    CRUISE    OF    THE  ALABAMA. 

The  most  successful  of  the  regularly  commissioned  com- 
merce destroyers  of  the  Confederacy  was  the  famous 
Alabama,  commanded  by  Captain  Semmes.  Commerce 
destroying  had  been  practised  on  a  considerable  scale  in 
earlier  wars,  but  the  introduction  of  fast  steamers  enabled 
Semmes  to  carry  his  operations  to  a  j^ohit  of  perfection 
that  had  never  before  been  attained.  He  entered  upon 
the  cruise  of  the  Alabama  with  a  well-considered  plan  of 
operations.     He  began  with  a  careful  study  of  the  ocean 


OPERATING  BEHIND  AND  ABOUT  THE  ENEMY'S  BASE.    187 

highways  of  commerce,  and  these  determined  the  locality 
of  his  successive  cruising  grounds.  It  is  upon  this  dis- 
covery of  strategic  points  that  his  patent  chiefly  rests. 
He  calculated  nicely  the  time  required  for  news  of  his 
presence  to  reach  the  United  States,  and  before  a  ship 
could  be  sent  after  him,  he  had  moved  to  a  new  scene  of 
operations.  The  period  which  he  generally  allowed  him- 
self in  any  quarter  was  about  two  months.  He  passed  his 
first  two  months  in  the  North  Atlantic.  His  next  field 
was  the  West  Indies.  On  each  of  these  stations  he  found 
a  large  number  of  unprotected  merchant  vessels.  After 
leaving  the  West  Indies,  he  posted  himself  near  the 
equator,  in  the  track  of  South  American  commerce.  The 
waters  over  which  this  commerce  passes  lie  within  a  belt 
not  more  than  one  hundred  miles  wide.  The  Alabama 
occupied  this  belt.  Next  she  passed  two  months  on  the 
coast  of  Brazil.  Thence  she  went  to  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  near  which  the  whole  commerce  of  the  Indian 
Ocean  must  pass.  At  the  Cape,  again,  she  remained  about 
two  months ;  but  American  shipmasters  had  by  this  time 
become  cautious,  and  they  gave  the  African  coast  a  wide 
berth.  From  the  Cape  Semmes  went  to  the  Strait  of 
Sunda,  the  gate-way  of  the  China  Sea.  Here  he  remained 
two  months,  and  was  again  successful.  During  all  this 
period  the  Alabama  was  kept  almost  constantly  moving. 
The  only  delays  were  for  repairs  and  coal.  The  latter 
was  furnished  at  first  by  coaling  vessels  sent  to  appointed 
rendezvous.  Later,  the  ship  depended  upon  prizes,  and 
upon  supplies  in  neutral  ports,  which  were  never  grudged. 
When  a  long  cruise  made  repairs  or  rest  a  necessity,  an 
anchorage  was  selected  which,  from  its  remoteness  and 
obscurity,  and  from  its  slight  dependence  upon  a  civilized 
power,  gave  an  opportunity  to  refit  at  leisure  and  in 
security.  When  more  extensive  repairs  were  required, 
Semmes  put  boldly  into  a  neutral  port,  and  his  ingenuity 


188  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

generally  supplied  the  authorities  with  the  points  that 
were  needed  to  justify  them  in  extending  to  him  every 
facility.* 

Notwithstanding  the  great  injury  inflicted  by  the  Ala- 
bama and  other  cruisers  upon  Northern  shipping,  com- 
merce destroying  j)roved  more  irritating  than  weakening. 
It  did  not  in  the  least  influence  or  retard  the  event  of  the 
war.f 

*  "The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers,"  by  Professor  James  Russell 
Soley,  U.S.N. 

f  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,"  JMahan,  p.  138. 


XIV. 

TACTICAL  STRATEGY. 

THE   FACTORS   OF    TACTICAL   POWER. 

THE  important  advantages  to  be  aimed  at  on  the  field  of 
battle  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

1.  General  preponderance. 

2.  Local  preponderance. 

3.  Individual  preponderance. 

Only  a  certain  number  of  men  can  fight  in  any  given 
space,  and  only  a  certain  space  can  be  regularly  occupied 
by  any  given  number  of  men.  If  a  position  be  too  long 
for  the  force  that  is  to  occupy  it,  the  line  of  battle  will  be 
weak  somewhere ;  if  too  short,  there  will  be  a  considerable 
force  out  of  action  ;  and  if,  in  this  case,  the  ground  in  front 
of  the  position  allows  the  enemy  to  deploy  a  larger  force, 
the  position  will  be  relatively  weak. 

Suppose  the  army  A  (Fig.  33)  to  be  formed  to  attack 
the  army  B,  that  a  b  and  a'  b'  are  impassable  obstacles,  and 
that  the  distance  between  these  obstacles  is  5000  yards. 
Taking  the  maximum  density  of  a  line  of  battle,  reserves 
included,  at  ten  men  to  the  running  yard,  the  largest 
number  of  men  that  either  army  can  deploy  is  50,000. 
Supposing  one  man  on  the  defensive  to  be  equivalent  to 
two  on  the  offensive,  the  largest  force  that  B  need  put  into 
line  is  25,000  men.  If  it  numbers  that  many,  A  cannot 
get  the  better  of  it  except  through  attrition.  But  if  B 
numbers  less  than  25,000  men,  and  A  more,  A  may 
realize  its  advantage  of  numbers  or  secure  a  general  pre- 
ponderance. 

Now  let  us  imagine  the  obstacle  a'  b'  to  be  turned  around 

189 


190  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

into  the  position  a"  b'.  We  have  extended  the  battle 
front  of  the  army  A  by  the  length  a'  a".  This  extension 
affords  room,  say,  for  15,000  more  men.  Assuming  it 
to  have  the  numbers,  A  may  deploy  up  to  65,000  men ; 
B  is  restricted  to  the  number  of  50,000.  A  may  thus  match 
B  along  its  whole  front,  and  at  the  same  time  overmatch 
it  on  the  flank  b'.  It  may  thus  realize  the  advantage  of  a 
local  preponderance.  A  simple  demonstration  along  a 
part  of  its  original  front  may  enable  it  to  secure  such 
preponderance  with  a  comparatively  small  number  of  men. 

Fig.  33, 


B 


ib' 


V" 


,^Ca 


M     \ 


\ 
\ 


\ 


This  advantage  is  realized  by  a  line  converging  its  fire 
upon  the  head  of  a  column.  Now  let  us,  in  imagination, 
revolve  the  obstacle  a"  b'  into  the  position  gC"  b'.  A's  battle 
front  is  again  extended,  this  time  by  the  space  a"  a'".  By 
the  occupation  of  this  space  A  not  only  adds  to  the  local 
preponderance,  it  also  secures  a  new  form  of  advantage. 
Any  force  A"  posted  in  a!'  a'"  is,  by  reason  of  its  position, 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY.  191 

more  effective,  man  for  man,  than  it  would  be  in  a'  a". 
The  reason  of  this  is  twofold.  In  the  first  place,  A"  fires 
directly  to  the  front,  while  B  in  return  fires  obliquely, 
at  a  considerable  angle ;  the  aim  of  A"  is  consequently 
appreciably  truer  than  B's.  In  the  second  place,  A"  fires 
down  or  athwart  B's  line,  while  B  fires,  relatively  speak- 
ing, perpendicularly  to  A".  Consequently,  a  shot  from  A" 
that  strikes  B,  will,  on  an  average,  do  moi'e  execution  than 
a  shot  from  B  that  strikes  A".  A",  then,  will  not  only  get 
in  more  shots  than  its  opponent,  but,  generally  speaking, 
each  of  its  shots  will  count  for  more  than  one  of  the  latter's. 
This  illustrates  the  advantage  of  individual  preponderance. 
Such  essentially  is  the  advantage  of  an  army  behind 
intrenchments  or  on  the  edge  of  a  wood  when  its  enemy 
is  in  the  open. 

By  overlapping  an  enemy,  or  reaching  around  his  flank, 
the  object  is  also  accomplished  of  approaching  his  com- 
munications, and  thus  threatening  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 
Manoeuvring  to  this  end  on  the  field  of  battle,  which  may 
be  regarded  as  a  form  of  strategic  tactics,  constitutes  turn- 
ing as  distinguished  from  flanking. 

From  this  discussion  it  should  appear  that,  next  to 
general  numerical  strength,  the  most  important  factors  of 
tactical  power  are  formation  or  disposition,  and  ground  or 
ten^ain.  Apart  from  manoeuvring  on  the  field  of  battle, 
the  advantage  of  formation  may  be  obtained  by  surprising 
the  enemy  in  camp  or  on  the  march,  or  when  he  is  cross- 
ing a  river,  or  emerging  from  a  defile ;  also  by  following 
up  his  routed  fragments.  The  advantage  of  ground  may 
be  secured  by  the  exercise  of  foresight  and  initiative  in 
determining  the  location  of  impending  battles.  A  general 
should  endeavor  always  to  have  in  his  mind  a  specially 
chosen  position  to  fight  in  for  each  direction  from  which 
the  enemy  may  be  sui)posed  to  appear.  Such  })Osition 
should,  as  we  have  seen,  correspond   in    length   to    the 


192  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

number  of  troops  that  are  to  occupy  it,  and  terminate  at 
each  extremity  in  an  obstacle. 

CONCENTRATION. 

Where  the  object  is  to  outnumber  the  enemy  on  the 
field  of  battle,  the  obvious  means  is  to  direct  masses 
against  isolated  fractions.  The  first  care  of  the  enemy, 
thus  threatened,  is  to  concentrate.  The  point  upon  which 
an  army  effects,  or  seeks  to  effect,  its  concentration  may 
be  designated  as  the  centre  of  concentration.  It  may  be 
assumed  to  be  the  point  at  which  the  fractions  can  unite 
in  the  shortest  time.  Where  there  are  only  two  fractions, 
the  theoretical  centre  of  concentration  is  obviously  the 
point  midway  between  them.  In  the  case  of  three  or 
more  fractions,  it  will  be  the  point  midway  between  those 
two  fractions  that  are  farthest  from  each  other,  or  else  the 
equidistant  or  central  point  with  respect  to  those  three 
fractions  which  are  farthest  from  a  common  centre. 

INTERIOR    AND    EXTERIOR    LINES. 

If  two  opposing  armies  are  so  situated  that  one  of  them 
can  reach  any  objective  that  they  may  have  in  common 
by  a  shorter  line  than  the  other,  the  former  army  is  said 
to  have  interior  and  the  latter  to  have  exterior  lines  of 
operation. 

Fig.  34. 

A 


In  Fig.  34,  the  army  B,  defending  the  curved  line  C  D, 
has  interior  lines. 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY. 


193 


In  Fig.  35,  the  army  B,  defending  the  line  o  o',  has 
interior  lines  with  respect  to  A ;  at  B'  it  wonld  have  in- 
terior lines  with  respect  to  an  army  at  B ;  and  at  B",  with 
respect  to  an  army  at  B'. 

Fig.  35.  Fig.  36. 


A« 

• 

# 

/         \ 

A 

A 

/                \ 

• 

• 

/     .01     \ 

B' 

B 

/    -                            ^^    \ 

• 

• 

.    ^    m -i-  . 

B" 

In  Fig.  36,  the  fixed  points  B'  and  B"  are  nearer  to  each 
other  than  A'  is  to  B"  or  A"  to  B'.  Hence  they  afford 
interior  lines  for  their  mutual  defence  against  forces  at  A' 
and  A". 

THE   USE    AND    VALUE    OF    EOAD    JUNCTIONS. 

Suppose  an  army  B  disposed  in  two  bodies,  B'  and  B", 
on  the  road  b  b'  (Fig.  37).  An  army  A  advancing  by 
another  road  to  a  point  A'  between  them  secures,  if  rapid 
enough  in  its  movements, 
an  ^opportunity  of  sepa- 
rately  attacking   first   one      ^- •— 

body  and   then  the  other. 

If  we  sujopose  the  road  b  b' 

to    form    an    angle    at   A' 

(Fig.    37),  the   advantage 

offered  by  the  point  A'  will 

be  the  same  in  kind,  and 

whether  or  not  the  same  in  degree  will  depend  upon  the 

size  of  the  angle,  together  with  the  nature  of  the  country 

13 


Fig.  37. 

A' 


194 


THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 


included  within  it.  If  that  country  be  perfectly  impassa- 
ble, it  matters  not  how  small  the  angle  be,  the  strategic 
value  of  the  i^oint  of  junction  will  be  the  same.  If  the 
country  between  the  branches  be  not  impassable,  a  reduc- 
tion of  the  angle  which  will  make  B'  and  B"  more  accessi- 
ble to  each  other  than  they  are  to  an  enemy  at  A'  will 
deprive  the  point  A'  of  its  peculiar  strategic  value. 

It  is  plain  that  the  mere  occupation  of  an  intermediate 
point  A'  (Fig.  37)  will  not  prevent  the  strategic  junction 
of  B'  and  B"  at  A' ;  and  if  B'  and  B"  manage  to  engage 
the  interposing  army  simultaneously,  the  advantage  of  the 
situation  is  on  the  side  of  the  opposing  fractions,  and  is 
measured  by  the  tactical  advantage  of  a  convergent  attack. 

The  point  of  junction  A'  (Fig.  38)  marks  the  position 
farthest  from  the  j^oint  A  and  nearest  to  the  points  B' 
and  B"  at  which  either  A,  on  the  one  hand,  or  B'  and  B", 
on  the  other,  can  be  directly  covered  without  a  division  of 
forces. 

Fig.  38.  Fig.  39. 


An  army  B  (Fig.  39)  operating  by  tactical  strategy 
against  the  armies  A'  A"  is  under  the  probable  disadvantage 
of  having  to  cross  a  river  at  least  once.  This  disadvan- 
tage may  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  the  construction  of 
a  double  bridge-head,  or  a  strong  work,  C,  astride  of  the 
river,  covering  a  number  of  bridges. 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY.  195 

Points  of  junction  of  valleys  owe  a  certain  amount  of 
their  strategic  importance  to  tlie  open  tactical  positions 
which  they  afford. 

STRATEGIC   INTERPOSITION. 

Let  us  assume  that  the  two  bodies  B'  and  B"  (Fig.  40) 
are  equally  distant  from  the  army  A ;  that,  as  they  start 
to  unite  at  the  point  midway  between  them,  the  army  A 
starts  to  interpose  itself  and  beat  them  in  detail,  and  that 
A's  first  objective  is  B".     A  must  reach  some  point  of  the 

Fig.  40.  ^ 

Be  o       r      o'  B 

•x \ — "—1 y* 

^  '  / 

'  / 


line  B'  B"  by  the  time  that  B"  can  reach  it,  and  such  a 
length  of  time  before  B'  as  A  will  consume  in  beating  B" ; 
that  time  may  be  reckoned  as  one  day.  Lay  off  B'  c  equal 
to  one  day's  march  ;  determine  on  the  line  B'  B"  tlie  point 
0,  equally  distant  from  c  and  A,  the  point  o',  equally  distant 
from  A  and  B",  and  the  point  r,  equally  distant  from  c  and 
B".  The  army  A  may  direct  its  march  from  its  initial 
position  upon  any  point  between  o  and  o',  but  if  it  strike 
a  point  between  o  and  r,  it  will  have  to  move  therefrom 
before  B'  gets  within  a  day's  march  of  it,  and  take  position 
between  r  and  o'.  The  engagement  must  take  place  within 
the  space  r  d. 

The  theory  of  this  operation  requires  that  the  distance 
B'  0  be  within  the  distance  B'  o\  and  this  requires  that  the 
angle  B'  A  B"  be  obtuse. 


196  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Important  as  it  is  that  the  enemy's  fractions  be  not  too 
near  together,  it  is  hardly  less  important  that  they  be  not 
too  far  apart.  If  they  are,  it  will  be  hard  to  force  either 
of  them  to  stand  and  fight  alone ;  and  if  this  is  accom- 
plished, the  other  fraction  may  in  the  mean  time  follow  its 
own  purpose  undisturbed.  If  enterprising  and  fortunate, 
the  latter  may  compensate  by  its  success  for  whatever 
misfortune  may  befall  the  fraction  attacked.  Before 
moving,  therefore,  upon  either  fraction,  one  should  con- 
sider the  situation  and  designs  of  the  other.  It  is  ordi- 
narily advisable  to  oppose  a  retarding  or  containing  force 
to  the  fraction  that  is  not  attacked ;  but  the  importance  of 
being  as  strong  as  possible  at  the  point  of  attack  prohibits 
the  use  of  a  containing  force  in  those  exceptional  cases  in 
which  the  fraction  that  is  not  attacked  can  neither  re- 
enforce  the  fraction  that  is  nor  operate  effectually  elsewhere. 

Hamley's  discussion  of  "  the  effect  of  interposing  an 
army  between  the  parts  of  an  enemy's  extended  front" 
concludes  with  the  following  remarks : 

"  To  sum  up  the  effects  of  a  successful  operation  of  this 
kind,  it  appears : 

*'  1.  That  either  part  of  the  separated  army  which 
stands  to  fight  may  find  itself  exposed  to  the  blows  of  the 
full  force  of  the  antagonist  minus  a  detachment  left  to 
contain  the  other  part,  as  is  seen  by  the  examples  of 
Millesimo,  Ceva,  and  Eckmiihl. 

"  2.  That  by  alternating  such  blows,  the  assailant  may 
continue  both  to  weaken  his  antagonist  and  to  interpose 
between  the  parts. 

"  3.  That  as  the  commander  of  a  separated  part  of  an 
army  will  be  playing  the  enemy's  game  if  he  stands  to 
fight,  his  best  course  will  be  to  retreat  for  reunion ;  and 
that  this  will  be  best  effected  by  taking  advantage  of  every 
position  to  retard  the  enemy  on  both  lines. 

"  4.  That  a  commander,  who  perceives  an  opportunity  for 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY.  197 

separating  the  enemy  and  overwhelming  a  portion  of  his 
force,  need  not  generally  be  solicitous  to  cover  his  own 
communications  during  the  operation,  since  the  enemy 
will  be  in  no  condition  to  assail  them. 

"  Lastly,  it  is  necessary  to  remark  that  the  force  which 
aims  at  separating  the  parts  of  an  enemy  should  be 
so  superior  to  either  part  singly  as  to  preserve  a  superiority 
after  detaching  a  force  in  pui'suit  of  tlie  portion  first  de- 
feated ;  and  that  if  the  attacking  force  does  not  fulfil  this 
condition,  it  will  have  no  right  to  expect  success." 

Von  der  Goltz  says  in  "  The  Nation  in  Arms,"  "  It 
may  be  laid  down  as  a  principle  that  if  the  detached 
groups  are  nearer  together  than  two  full  days'  marches, 
none  of  them  can  be  separately  defeated.  By  this  prin- 
ciple the  favorable  time  for  action  upon  interior  lines  is 
much  restricted.  If  the  advance  is  made  too  early,  there 
is  danger  that  it  will  be  merely  beating  the  air ;  if  it  be 
made  too  late,  we  are  caught  in  the  course  of  the  battle 
between  the  enemy's  divisions,  which  close  upon  us  on  all 
sides.  This  state  of  things  impedes  our  resolve  to  a  great 
extent.  When  the  enemy  employs  his  cavalry  proj^erly, 
it  will  rarely  be  possible  to  perceive  against  which  of  the 
approaching  opponents  we  must  first  turn.  But  clearness 
is  doubly  necessary  when  everything  urges  to  prompt 
action.  Only  generals  of  great  determination  can  make 
proper  use  of  interior  lines.  The  irresolute  man  vacillates. 
The  uncertainty  as  to  whether  he  has  chosen  the  right 
moment  and  the  right  opponent  will  nip  his  operations 
in  the  bud." 

As  already  indicated,  a  containing  force  need  not  be  as 
strong  as  the  force  to  be  contained.  If  the  latter  is  pas- 
sive or  inactive,  it  need  only  be  observed ;  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  threatens  to  advance,  the  containing  force  has  the 
advantage  of  being  on  the  defensive.  Where  a  hostile 
fraction  has  been   thoroughly  beaten,  it  is  no  longer  a 


198  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

question  of  containing  it,  but  of  pursuing  it.  "  A  beaten 
army,"  says  the  Archduke  Charles,  "  is  no  longer  in  the 
hands  of  its  general."  It  no  longer  responds  to  his  ap- 
peal. The  retreating  general  will  be  unable  for  some  time 
to  ascertain  what  amount  of  force  is  pursuing  him ;  for  all 
he  knows,  the  whole  of  the  army  that  has  just  beaten  him 
is  on  his  track ;  he  is  compelled,  perhaps,  to  pass  by  posi- 
tions which  he  might,  with  the  troops  in  hand,  hold 
against  the  real  pursuing  force,  but  which  he  cannot  ven- 
ture to  occupy  with  the  chance  of  being  attacked  by  the 
whole  weight  of  the  enemy.  And  if  at  last  he  does  rally 
his  corps  and  turn  on  the  pursuer,  the  latter  at  once  takes 
up  the  part  of  a  containing  force  and  falls  back  upon  the 
main  army,  which  in  the  mean  time  should  have  found 
time  to  effect  its  purpose. 

"  As  the  rear  guard  is  seldom  more  than  a  fifth  or  sixth 
of  the  total  force,  the  pursuing  force,  in  order  to  press 
confidently  on  the  enemy's  rear  guard,  attacking  boldly 
and  augmenting  the  disorder,  need  not  be  more  than 
a  third  of  the  beaten  army.  Thus,  two-thirds  of  the 
victorious  force  (supposing  it  to  have  been  equal  to  its 
adversary  at  first)  will  be  disposable  elsewhere. 

"  Let  us  assume,  then,  that  part  of  an  army  may  occupy 
a' superior  force  of  the  enemy  while  the  remainder  strikes 
a  blow  elsewhere ;  that  a  beaten  army  may  be  pursued  for 
a  time  by  an  inferior  force ;  and  that  the  course  taken  by 
parts  of  an  army  which  have  been  separately  defeated, 
will  be  to  retreat  in  order  to  recombine."* 

The  attack  and  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  fractions  should 
be  directed  with  a  view  to  deflecting  them  from  their 
centre  of  concentration.  It  would  be  a  flagrant  vio- 
lation of  this  principle  to  drive  one  fraction  towards  an- 
other.    With  a  view  to  increasing  the  difiiculties  in  the 

*  Hamley,  "  Operations  of  War." 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY.  199 

way  of  concerted  opposition,  every  effort  should  be  made 
to  cut  the  enemy's  telegraph  lines  and  railroads,  and  de- 
stroy or  obstruct  his  other  channels  of  correspondence 
and  lines  of  operation.  But  the  interposing  army  should 
not  content  itself  with  keeping  between  the  hostile  fractions 
and  baffling  their  attempts  to  unite.  It  should  centre  its 
attention  on  one  of  them,  and  follow  it  up  until  captured 
or  destroyed.  If  one  fraction  be  cut  from  its  base  while 
the  other  is  not,  the  offensive  army  should,  as  a  rule,  follow 
up  the  intercepted  fraction. 


XV. 


TACTICAL  STRATEaY-CoNTiNUED. 


THE   SELECTION    OF    AN    OBJECT. 

npHOSE  fractions  which  are  easily  accessible  (by  reason 
J-  either  of  proximity  or  of  excellence  of  communica- 
tion) should  be  attacked  before  those  that  are  difficult  of 
access.  This  favors  the  containing  of  those  fractions  that 
are  not  immediately  attacked. 

As  a  rule,  the  smaller  fractions  of  the  enemy's  army 
should  be  attacked  before  the  larger  ones,  other  things 
being  equal ;  for  the  defeat  of  a  certain  portion  of  an 
army  ordinarily  determines  the  remaining  portion  to  re- 
treat. In  case,  however,  that  no  advantage  that  may  be 
gained  over  the  small  fractions  can  give  any  advantage 
over  the  large  ones,  the  first  freshness  and  strength  of 
the  oflPensive  should  be  devoted  to  the  defeating  of  the 
large  fractions. 

Prompt  action  should  be  taken  against  any  hostile 
fraction  that  threatens  one's  own  communications.     The 

army  A  (Fig.  41) 
"^^^"  *^'  operating       offen- 

sively against  the 
army  B,  consisting 
of  the  fractions  B' 
and  B",  should 
commence  by  at- 
tacking B',  that 
fraction  being  in  position  to  threaten  A's  communica- 
tions should  A  march  upon  B". 

200 


TACTICAL   STRATEGY. 


201 


Suppose  (Fig.  42)  that  the  army  B  is  fractioned  as  B' 
and  B'"  and  based  upon  O,  and  that  the  army  A  is  equally 
distant  from  B'  and  B'".     The  army  A  will  seek  to  sepa- 


FiG.  42. 


A 


rate  each  fraction  of  the  army  B,  both  from  O  and  from 
the  other  fraction.  It  will,  if  practicable,  operate  first 
against  B',  deflecting  it,  say  in  the  direction  of  B".  It 
may  then  interpose  between  O  and  B'". 


A    FRACTIONAL   ARMY   AND    SEPARATE   ARMIES. 
PARISON    OF    MODES    OF    OPERATION. 


COM- 


In  operating  against  a  divided  enemy,  it  is  a  material 
consideration  whether  the  hostile  elements  are  fractions  of 
one  and  the  same  army  or  separate  armies.  The  fractions 
of  a  single  army  operate  ordinarily  from  a  common  base. 


202  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

A  fraction  that  is  deprived  of  its  proper  line  may  be  able, 
by  gaining  the  line  of  another,  to  place  itself  in  com- 
munication with  the  base,  and  continue  to  co-operate  with 
the  other  fraction.  A  separate  army  cannot  under  simi- 
lar circumstances  act  in  a  similar  manner.  It  is  tied  to 
its  own  separate  base.  The  lines  of  retreat  of  separate 
armies  commonly  diverge  towards  the  separate  bases.  The 
beaten  army  retreats  towards  its  base,  leaving  the  other 
one  to  take  care  of  itself 

The  distance  between  separate  armies,  enhanced,  perhaps, 
by  intervening  obstacles  and  difference  of  race  or  na- 
tionality, of  language  and  ultimate  aims,  may  make  their 
mutual  support  almost  impossible.  These  factors  are  com- 
mon causes  of  failure  of  coalitions.  It  is  true,  however, 
that  the  use  of  the  electric  telegraph,  of  balloons  and 
carrier-pigeons,  the  increased  intercourse  among  peoples 
and  races,  and  the  perfection  of  diplomacy  have  to  a  great 
extent  overcome  these  disadvantages,  and  the  joint  opera- 
tions of  separate  armies  will  therefore  more  commonly 
succeed  in  the  future  than  they  have  in  the  past.  A 
notable  instance  of  the  successful  co-operation  of  separate 
armies  is  the  campaign  of  Waterloo. 

A  single  army  opposed  to  two  separate  armies  will 
ordinarily  do  well  to  confront  each  opponent  with  a  retard- 
ing force,  to  be  considered  as  a  wing,  and  hold  its  mass  in 
reserve  to  re-enforce  either  wing  or  both.  If  the  separate 
armies  be  too  far  apart  for  this,  the  single  army  should 
retire,  drawing  them  after  it.  At  a  moment  when  the 
wings  of  the  single  army  are  near  enough  together  for 
concerted  action,  and  the  separate  armies  are  not,  the 
single  army  should  turn  upon  its  pursuers  and  overpower 
them  separately. 


XVI. 


TACTICS  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  STRATEGY. 

WHERE  an  army  cannot,  by  manoeuvring  alone,  place 
itself  in  a  desired  strategic  relationship  with  a  given 
point,  it  may  seek  to  do  so  by  force. 

Suppose  the  army  B  to  be  covering  the  point  O  (Fig. 
43).  The  ofifensive  army  A  may  find  it  impossible  to 
steal  a  march  on  B  that  will  place  it  nearer  to  O  than  B 

Fig-  43. 


A  ^ 


is ;  it  may  then  take  the  bull  by  the  horns,  with  the 
determination  of  forcing  its  way  to  the  objective.  Sup- 
pose that  it  advances  directly  upon  B  and  successfully 
attacks  it ;  if  B  now  retires  upon  O,  A  may  succeed,  by 
vigorously  following  it  up,  in  driving  it  through  and 
beyond  that  point,  and  may  then  occupy  it  itself.  It  was 
thus  in  the  main  that  the  Americans  in  1847  obtained 
possession  of  the  city  of  Mexico.  Or,  having  driven  the 
enemy  upon  the  objective,  the  offensive  may  cause  him  to 
abandon  it  by  threatening  him  with  an  investment,  as 
Sherman  did  the  Confederates  in  the  Atlanta  campaign ; 

203 


204  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

for,  generally  speaking,  an  investment  cannot  be  pre- 
vented except  by  the  defeat  of  the  would-be  investing 
army  or  by  a  change  of  position. 

Suppose  that  the  offensive  army  A  (Fig.  43),  instead  of 
advancing  directly  upon  B,  manoeuvres  towards  its  flank, 
and  by  a  successful  attack  drives  it  in  the  direction  B  o, 
oblique  to  the  direction  BO.  Draw  O  c  perpendicular 
to  Bo.  As  B  retires,  pursued  by  A,  it  will  continue 
nearer  to  O,  as  the  crow  flies,  than  the  army  A,  until  the 
two  armies  are  equally  distant  from  the  point  c,  as  in  the 
positions  A'  B'.  As  A  advances  beyond  the  position  A', 
it  places  itself  nearer  to  O  than  B,  and  if  the  retreat 
continues,  the  relative  proximity  of  A  to  the  point  O 
continually  increases. 

The  army  A  may,  as  soon  as  it  has  started  B  in  retreat, 
move  directly  upon  the  point  O.  It  may  thus  secure  the 
advantage  of  moving  on  one  side  of  a  triangle  while  B 
moves  on  the  other  two  sides.  It  will  have,  however,  to 
detach  a  sufficient  force  in  2:)ursuit  to  insure  itself  against 
a  return  movement  upon  its  communications,  and  to  see 
that  the  enemy  retreats  a  certain  distance  eccentrically, 
before  starting  for  the  point  O.  The  attainment  of  the 
latter  purj^ose  may  be  greatly  favored  by  a  mountain  or 
other  obstacle  intervening  between  the  enemy  and  the 
point  O. 

Should  the  army  A  (Fig.  43)  drive  B  along  the  line  B 
d,  perpendicular  to  B  O,  or  towards  any  point,  F,  on  the 
side  of  B  d,  opposite  O,  it  will  at  once  put  the  army  B  out 
of  strategic  relationship  with  O. 

These  modes  of  operation  reduce  to  a  minimum  the 
risk  to  be  incun-ed  by  the  offensive  on  account  of  its 
own  communications,  for  they  do  not  necessarily  involve 
manoeuvring  off  the  field  of  battle;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  peculiarly  preclude  the  utilization  of  the  tacti- 
cal defensive. 


XVII. 

STRATEGY  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  TACTICS. 

WHERE  the  objective  is  the  enemy's  army,  and  it  is 
too  strongly  posted  to  admit  of  attack,  a  movement 
against  its  communications,  or  some  point  of  material 
imi^ortance  to  it,  will  cause  it  to  abandon  its  position,  and 
probably  to  take  upon  itself  the  burden  of  the  tactical 
offensive.  The  most  common  use,  in  fact,  of  regular  and 
jDolitical  strategy  is  in  such  subordination  to  tactical  strat- 
egy. The  object  of  Hooker's  manoeuvres  in  the  Chancel- 
lorsville  campaign  was  not  so  much  to  cut  Lee  off  from 
Richmond  as  to  enable  himself  to  attack  Lee  in  the  act  of 
retreating.  The  primary  object  of  Sherman's  manoeuvres 
against  Johnston  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  was  to  draw  the 
Confederates  out  of  their  intrenched  positions  into  the 
open,  where  the  opposing  armies  might  fight  on  compara- 
tively equal  terms.  Grant's  campaign  from  the  Rapidan 
to  the  James  River  was  a  succession  of  manoeuvres  with 
the  same  object  in  view.  As  regards  the  attainment  of 
their  tactical  object,  the  three  campaigns  just  mentioned 
were  total  failures.  Hooker's  army,  instead  of  attacking 
Lee's,  was  attacked  itself  and  beaten  ;  and  neither  Sherman 
nor  Grant  managed  to  confront  their  enemy  that  he  was 
not  intrenched.  The  Confederate  positions  were  generally 
intrenched  beforehand,  and  those  of  the  Federals  as  soon 
as  they  were  taken  up.  Neither  army  could  attack  the 
enemy  in  the  open,  unless  it  were  on  the  march,  and  much 
of  the  marching  was  done  at  night,  when  the  darkness 
would  have  favored  the  defensive  over  the  offensive  per- 
haps as  much  as  field  intrenchments.     It  was  by  carrying 

205 


206  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

their  regular  strategy   to    its    legitimate   conclusion   that 
Grant  and  Sherman  finally  overcame  their  opponents. 

THE    SECOND    BULL    RUN    CAMPAIGN,    1862. 

The  Federal  and  Confederate  armies  confronted  each 
other  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Rappahannock  River  (Map 
7).  Each  numbered  about  55,000  men,  but  the  Federal 
army  was  being  re-enforced  from  Alexandria.  On  the  25th 
of  August,  Jackson  started  from  Jefiferson  with  nearly  one- 
half  of  the  Confederate  army,  crossed  the  Rappahannock 
entirely  beyond  Pope's  right,  and  marched  northward, 
partially  covered  by  the  Bull  Run  Mountains.  On  the 
26th  he  reached  Bristoe,  where  he  broke  the  railroad. 
Pushing  a  part  of  his  force  during  the  night  to  Manassas, 
he  there  captured  immense  stores  and  destroyed  one  of  the 
principal  depots  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  army.  Pope, 
on  the  27th,  turned  his  columns  away  from  the  Rappa- 
hannock and  faced  them  towards  Manassas.  Late  in  the 
afternoon  his  advance,  under  Hooker,  came  in  contact  with 
Ewell,  commanding  a  division  of  Jackson's  at  Bristoe. 
After  a  sharp  fight,  Ewell  fell  back  on  Jackson's  main 
body  at  Manassas.  Longstreet,  with  the  other  wing  of 
Lee's  army,  having  engaged  Pope's  attention  until  Jackson 
was  well  advanced  towards  Pope's  rear,  was  at  Salem  on 
his  way  to  join  Jackson. 

"  Now  came  a  test  of  Jackson,  than  which  few  greater 
have  ever  tried  the  genius  of  a  commander.  He  knew  at 
nightfall  on  the  27th  that  the  whole  of  Pope's  forces, 
more  than  three  times  as  numerous  as  his  own,  were 
heading  towards  Manassas,  and  on  the  morrow  must  crush 
him  if  he  remained  there.  A  large  jiart  of  these  forces 
were  within  reach  of  the  road  by  which  he  had  come.  He 
knew  that  at  Alexandria  and  Washington  were  large 
bodies  of  troops,  which,  like  a  nest  of  hornets,  would  be 
stirred   up  by  his  descent  upon   Manassas.     Alexandria 


STRATEGY  AS  A   FACTOR  IN  TACTICS.  207 

was  only  twenty-seven  miles  off, — a  good  day's  march,  as 
he  measured  day's  marches  when  in  earnest.  It  was  of 
course  possible  for  him  to  fly,  and,  contenting  himself  with 
the  damage  already  done,  rejoin  Lee  by  rapid  marching 
over  a  circuitous  route.  This  would,  however,  reduce  his 
expedition  to  a  raid  on  the  Federal  communications  and 
depots,  which  had  forced  Pope  from  the  Rappahannock, 
but  had  accomplished  little  else.  Lee  designed  much 
more  than  this.  He  designed,  if  possible,  to  give  battle 
to  Pope  while  suffering  from  the  confusion  and  demor- 
alization consequent  upon  an  enforced  retreat  and  the 
destruction  of  his  communications.  Jackson  fully  com- 
prehended the  situation.  It  was  necessary  for  him  not  to 
retire,  but  so  to  baffle  and  mislead  Poj^e  as  to  keep  him  on 
the  ground,  and  yet  at  bay,  until  Lee,  who  was  already  on 
the  way,  could  come  up  with  Longstreet's  corps. 

"  The  main  column  of  the  Federals  was  moving  on  the 
Warrenton  and  Centreville  turnpike.  Their  advance  on 
the  morrow  would  bring  them  directly  between  himself 
and  Lee,  and  Jackson  determined  to  place  his  command 
north  of  that  road,  in  such  a  position  that  if  forced  to 
retreat  he  could  approach  Longstreet.  He  selected  the 
vicinity  of  Groveton,  not  far  from  the  battle-field  of  July 
1,  1861.  Here  there  were  good  positions  for  defence,  and 
he  would  be  within  easy  reach  of  Lee,  when  once  the  latter 
had  passed  the  Bull  Pun  Mountains  at  Thoroughfare  or 
the  neighboring  gaps.  Soon  after  nightfall  on  the  27th, 
Jackson  began  to  move.  In  order  to  distract  and  mislead 
Pope,  he  directed  his  divisions  by  different  routes. 

"  Having  discovered  from  the  fight  at  Bristoe,  on  the 
evening  of  the  27th,  that  it  was  Jackson's  command  which 
held  Manassas,  and  seeing  thus  the  opportunity  afforded 
him  by  the  division  of  the  Confederate  army,  Pope  de- 
termined to  '  bag'  the  part  of  it  which  had  ventured  so  far 
from  support.     Orders  were  issued  for  the  concentration 


208  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

of  his  whole  army  upon  Manassas  on  the  28th.  He  does 
not  seem  to  have  doubted  that  he  could  reach  that  point 
and  crush  his  adversary  before  the  latter  could  get  away. 
He  felt  so  certain  of  this  as  to  take  no  precaution  to  pre- 
vent, or  even  delay,  the  arrival  of  Lee,  who  was  now 
approaching  Thoroughfare  Gap.  The  necessity  of  this 
precaution,  however,  was  perceived  by  McDowell,  who, 
with  the  left  wing  of  the  Federal  army,  was  moving  down 
the  Warrenton  and  Centreville  turnpike,  and  early  on  the 
28th  he  took  the  responsibility  of  detaching  Ricketts's 
division  and  sending  it  to  hold  the  gap  through  which 
Jackson  had  come  and  through  which  Lee  with  Long- 
street  was  to  be  expected.  Pope  reached  Manassas  about 
mid-day  on  the  28th,  with  Heintzelman's  and  Reno's  corps, 
and  did  not  learn  that  Jackson  was  gone  until  that  time."* 

Jackson  was  then  resting  after  his  march,  some  six  or 
seven  miles  off,  in  a  wood  between  Groveton  and  Sudley. 
In  the  afternoon  Pope  orders  a  concentration  of  his  army 
at  Centreville.  Jackson  takes  position  on  an  unfinished 
railroad  north  of  the  Warrenton  and  Centreville  turn- 
pike. In  this  position  he  can  easily  unite  with  Lee  on  his 
passing  Thoroughfare  Gap,  or,  failing  in  that  and  being 
hard  pressed,  he  can  retire  by  the  east  end  of  Bull  Run 
Mountain  and  unite  with  him  on  its  north  side. 

As  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps,  marching  along 
this  route  to  Centreville,  comes  fairly  in  front  of  the 
Confederate  position,  Jackson  opens  on  it  with  artillery. 
There  ensues  a  hot  and  sanguinary  contest,  which  results 
in  the  repulse  of  the  Federals. 

Meanwhile  Longstreet  forces  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
Ricketts  at  dark  falls  back  to  Gainesville.  Longstreet's 
advance,  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  camped  not  much 
farther  from   Jackson  than  Pope  himself  at  Centreville. 


*  William  Allan,  in  The  Magazine  of  American  History. 


STRATEGY  AS  A    FACTOR  IN  TACTICS.  209 

On  the  29th,  before  Pope  had  assembled  his  army  in  front 
of  Jackson,  Longstreet  had  come  up  on  Jackson's  right. 
The  Confederate  army  was  now  united  and  i-eady  for 
battle,  but  of  this  Pope  could  not  or  would  not  be  con- 
vinced. He  spent  the  day  in  vainly  trying  to  outflank 
and  dislodge  what  he  conceived  to  be  Jackson's  corps  by 
itself.  The  opposing  armies  numbered,  on  the  Federal 
side,  about  65,000 ;  on  the  Confederate,  about  52,000. 

On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  Pope  entertained  the  con- 
viction that  Jackson  had  been  worsted  the  day  before,  and 
still  did  not  clearly  realize  that  any  large  part  of  Long- 
street's  force  was  present.  About  mid-day,  having  his 
whole  army  in  hand,  he  ordered  it  "  forward  in  pursuit." 
Fitz-John  Porter  was  placed  at  the  Federal  centre  and 
ordered  to  lead.  Porter  knew  that  it  was  not  a  question 
of  pursuit,  but  of  driving  a  defiant  army  from  a  strong 
position ;  Lee,  in  fact,  was  more  than  willing  to  receive  an 
attack  before  delivering  his  own. 

Porter's  charge,  though  gallant  and  fierce,  was  repulsed; 
it  was  followed  by  a  general  advance  of  the  Confederates, 
which  drove  the  Federal  army,  with  heavy  loss  and  in 
utter  disorder,  from  the  field.  Night  alone  saved  Pope's 
army  from  overwhelming  disaster. 

THE    GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863. 

On  the  28th  of  June,  Lee's  army  numbered  about 
75,000,  officers  and  men.  It  was  disposed  as  follows  (Map 
8,  No.  1): 

Ewell's  corps :  Johnson's  and  Rodes's  divisions,  and 
corps  head-quarters  at  Carlisle ;  Early's  division  at  York. 

Longstreet's  corps  :  at  Chambersburg. 

Hill's  corps :  at  Fayetteville. 

The  cavalry,  under  Stuart,  was  at  Rockville,  cutting  in 
between  the  Federal  army  and  Washington,  to  join  Early 
at  York.      The  Federal  army,  under  JMeade,  aggregated 

14 


210  TEE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

about  97,000  men.  It  comprised  seven  army  corps,  a 
cavalry  corps,  and  artillery  reserve,  and  was  for  the  greater 
part  assembled  about  Frederick.  The  corps  and  divisions 
of  the  Federal  army  averaged  about  half  the  strength  of 
those  of  the  enemy. 

Lee's  line  of  communications  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Williamsport.  The  Federal  army  might  therefore  cut  the 
enemy  from  the  Potomac  and  at  the  same  time  cover  its 
own  line  of  retreat  to  Washington.  As  a  protection  to  his 
communications,  Lee  determined  to  threaten  Baltimore, 
and  thus,  as  he  thought,  cause  the  Union  army  to  march 
eastward.  In  pursuance  of  this  plan  he  ordered  a  concen- 
tration of  his  army  at  Cashtown. 

Meade,  uninformed  as  to  the  plan  of  the  enemy,  but 
thinking  him  to  be  aiming  northward  at  Harrisburg  and 
Columbia,  determined  to  march  upon  Harrisburg.  He 
would  thus  threaten  at  the  same  time  the  enemy's  march- 
ino;  columns  and  his  communications. 

On  the  29th  the  Confederates  began  their  concentration 
and  the  Federal  army  its  march  to  the  north.  By  the 
evening  of  the  30th  (Map  8,  No.  2)  Meade  was  apprised 
of  the  Confederate  retrograde  movement,  and  satisfied  that 
Lee  had  abandoned  all  designs  on  the  Susquehanna.  Not 
knowing,  however,  what  the  enemy  was  going  to  do, 
Meade  discontinued  his  advance,  and  ordered  his  right 
and  centre  to  concentrate  on  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  and 
his  left  wing  to  move  forward  to  Gettysburg,  as  a  mask. 
He  had  no  thought,  as  yet,  of  fighting  a  battle  at  Gettys- 
burg. 

In  the  mean  while,  Early's  and  Bodes's  divisions  had 
assembled  under  Ewell  at  Heidlersburg.  Stuart  was  in 
the  vicinity  of  Jefferson,  on  a  night  march  in  search  of 
Early.  The  rest  of  Lee's  army  lay  between  Cashtown 
and  Chambersburg.  Carlisle  was  occupied  by  local  militia 
from  Harrisburg. 


STRATEGY  AS  A   FACTOR  IN  TACTICS.  211 

On  the  1st  of  July  the  advance  of  the  two  armies  con- 
tested for  the  possession  of  Gettysburg.  The  action  closed 
with  the  repulse  of  the  Federals  and  their  occupation  of  a 
strong  defensive  position  on  the  south  side  of  Gettysburg, 
facing  north  and  west.  Towards  this  position  Meade's 
forces  converged  during  the  night. 

By  the  morning  of  the  2d  the  whole  Federal  army, 
except  Sedgwick's  corps,  which  arrived  in  the  afternoon, 
was  in  position. 

After  two  days  of  ineffectual  attempt  to  dislodge  it,  the 
Confederates,  on  the  4th,  drew  back  their  lines  into  defen- 
sive position  and  commenced  their  retreat.  Not  until 
satisfied,  on  the  5th,  that  the  enemy  had  actually  with- 
drawn did  Meade  take  measures  to  follow  him  up.  The 
loss  in  numbers  and  morale  inflicted  by  his  victory  upon 
the  principal  army  of  the  South  was,  in  his  estimation,  a 
sufficient  result  to  have  attained.  The  Confederates  lost 
25,000  men  out  of  70,000,  more  than  one-third  of  the 
entire  number  engaged.  The  Federals  lost  23,000  out  of 
80,000. 


XVIII. 

JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862. 

AN  excellent  illustration  of  the  methods  of  tactical 
strategy  is  the  series  of  operations  conducted  by 
Stonewall  Jackson  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1862, 
and  known  as  Jackson'' s  Valley  Campaign  (Map  9,  No.  1). 

The  Shenandoah  Valley  is  bounded  on  the  east  by  the 
Blue  Ridge  Mountains  and  on  the  west  b}'-  the  Little 
North  and  Great  North  Mountains  and  other  ridges. 
Near  Front  Royal  the  Shenandoah  River  divides  into  two 
branches,  or  forks,  called  the  North  Fork  and  South  Fork 
respectively.  A  mountain  chain  called  the  Massanutton 
rises  abruptly  between  these  two  branches.  It  is  impas- 
sable except  by  way  of  New  Market,  about  the  middle  of 
the  range. 

The  Federal  forces  are  distributed  as  follows : 

At  Franklin,  under  Schenck 3,000 

At  McDowell,  under  Milroy 3,000 

At  Harrisonburg,  under  Banks 19,000 

Total 25,000 

They  are,  nominally  at  least,  under  the  command  of 
General  Fremont,  who  is  awaiting  the  arrival  of  re-enforce- 
ments to  assume  the  offensive. 

General  Jackson  has  his  forces  disposed  as  follows : 

At  Swift  Run  Gap,  under  his  immediate  command  6,000 

About  a  day's  march  in  rear,  under  Ewell   ....  8,000 

At  West  View,  under  Edward  Johnson 3,000 

Total 17,000 

212 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  213 

Milroy  has  pushed  his  advance  over  the  Shenandoah 
Mountain  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  Lebanon  and  Har- 
risonburg turnpike.  This  road  affords  an  easy  and  direct 
means  for  Milroy  to  communicate  with  Banks,  and  Jack- 
son fears  a  movement  of  their  combined  forces  on  Staun- 
ton, which  may  result  in  separating  him  from  Edward 
Johnson  and  in  the  capture  of  Staunton.  He  determines 
to  strike  first  at  Milroy  and  then  at  Banks. 

oOth  April-llth  May. — Leaving  Ashby's  cavalry,  about 
700  men,  in  front  of  Banks,  Jackson  moves  with  the 
balance  of  his  6000  men  from  Swift  Run  Gap,  picks  up 
Edward  Johnson's  3000  at  West  View,  and  with  these 
9000,  all  but  700,  marches  upon  Milroy,  who,  in  the 
mean  while,  is  joined  by  Schenck  from  Franklin.  Ewell 
with  his  8000  men  moves  to  Conrad's  store,  in  order, 
together  with  the  cavalry,  to  keep  an  eye  on  Banks. 

In  the  battle  which  ensues  at  McDowell  on  the  8tli  of 
May  the  forces  actually  engaged  number  on  the  Federal 
side  about  2300,  on  the  Confederate  about  6000.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  the  Federals  are  defeated.  Jackson 
pursues  them  to  Franklin.  When  Banks  learned  on  the 
1st  of  May  that  Ewell  had  entered  the  valley,  and  that 
Jackson  was  moving,  fearing  an  attack  from  their  combined 
forces,  he  fell  back  to  New  Market. 

Vltli-X^th  May. — Having  received  re-enforcements,  Fre- 
mont moves  with  about  7000  men  to  the  support  of  his 
advance  at  Franklin.  Jackson  retires  to  Mount  Solon. 
About  11,000  men,  under  Shields,  are  detached  by  order 
of  the  President  from  Banks's  corps  out  of  the  field  of 
operations.  Banks,  with  the  remainder,  numbering  about 
8000  men,  falls  back  to  Strasburg. 

At  this  point,  going  northward,  the  Little  North  and 
Massanutton  Mountains  approach  each  other,  the  country 
is  broken  and  cut  up  with  ravines,  and  the  heights  around 
afford  good  defensive  positions.     Banks  throws  out  pickets 


214  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

a  few  miles  in  the  direction  of  Woodstock,  and  posts  about 
1000  men  at  Front  Royal  to  protect  the  railroad  and  the 
bridges  at  that  place,  which  leaves  him  7000  men  at  Stras- 
burg.  Jackson's  cavalry,  under  Ashby,  occupies  the  valley 
below  New  Market. 

19th-20th  3£ay. — Jackson  determines  to  concentrate  his 
whole  force  of  17,000  men  upon  Banks.  Ordering  one 
brigade,  constituting  the  bulk  of  Ewell's  division,  to  turn 
the  south  end  of  the  Massanutton  Mountains  and  join 
him  en  route,  he  sets  out  on  the  19th  with  the  force  in 
hand  at  Mount  Solon  for  New  Market,  where  he  arrives, 
re-enforced  with  this  brigade  of  Swell's  division,  on  the 
20th.  Ewell  with  his  other  brigade  marches  down  the 
valley  on  the  east  side  of  the  Massanutton  Mountains,  to 
the  entrance  of  the  New  Market  Gap. 

21st  3fay. — Leaving  Ashby's  cavalry  confronting  Banks, 
Jackson  crosses  the  Massanutton  Mountains  and  unites 
with  Ewell  at  White  House  Brido-e. 

22d  3Iay. — The  Confederates  move  down  the  valley. 
Ewell's  division,  which  is  in  advance,  bivouacs  ten  miles 
from  Front  Royal.  Pursuant  to  orders,  Ashby  joins  the 
main  body,  leaving  a  covering  force  in  front  of  Banks  to 
prevent  information  from  crossing  the  Confederate  lines 
towards  the  enemy. 

2Sd  May. — The  Confederates  overpower  the  Federal 
outpost  at  Front  Royal  and  drive  it  in  with  heavy  loss. 
Ewell's  division  camps  at  Cedar ville ;  the  other  division, 
under  Jackson,  at  Front  Royal. 

As  the  result  of  this  day's  operations  may  be  mentioned 
the  capture  of  about  700  j^risoners,  including  some  twenty 
officers,  a  section  of  rifled  artillery,  and  a  very  large  amount  of 
quartermaster's  stores  ;  and,  what  is  more  important  than  all 
that,  the  turning  of  the  Federal  position.  For  Banks's  main 
line  of  communication  is  the  turnpike  through  Winchester, 
and  Ewell  is  now  nearer  Newtown  on  that  road  than  Banks. 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY   CAMPAIGN,  1862.  215 

Banks,  however,  is  not  confined  to  one  line  of  com- 
munication. His  base  is  the  line  of  the  Potomac.  He 
may  reach  it  by  marching  westward  over  the  Little  North 
Mountains,  or  eastward  over  the  Blue  Bidge.  Apprehend- 
ing that  if  he  moves  westward  he  will  be  compelled  by  the 
roughness  of  the  country  to  abandon  his  baggage,  and  that 
if  he  moves  eastward  he  will  encounter  the  enemy  in  over- 
whelming force,  he  determines  to  race  with  Jackson  for 
Winchester. 

2Ath-2bth  May. — Not  knowing  which  course  the  enemy 
has  taken,  Jackson  aims  at  seizing  the  road  from  Strasburg 
to  Winchester  without  losing  his  command  of  the  road 
from  Strasburg  to  Front  Boyal  (Map  10).  His  main  body 
moves  upon  Middletown.  It  is  preceded  by  Ashby's  regi- 
ment of  cavalry,  supported  by  infantry  skirmishers,  and 
eight  guns.  Ashby  is  directed  to  keep  scouts  out  to  his 
left.  Two  regiments  of  cavalry,  under  Stewart, — not  the 
famous  "  Jeb"  (J.  E.  B.)  Stuart, — are  directed  upon  New- 
town. Ewell's  division  is  directed  towards  Winchester, 
under  orders,  however,  to  halt  near  Nineveh  and  there 
await  Jackson's  further  orders.  Stewart's  cavalry  strikes 
the  Federal  wagon  train  passing  through  Newtown,  and 
dashes  through  it  in  the  direction  of  Middletown,  throwing 
everything  into  confusion.  When  Jackson,  with  the  main 
column,  reaches  Middletown,  the  Federal  main  body  has 
passed  that  point,  and  the  rear  guard  is  just  beginning  to 
go  through.  Stewart,  at  Newtown,  cannot  check  the  prog- 
ress of  the  Federal  advance  guard  and  main  body,  under 
cover  of  which  the  Federal  train  accomplishes  the  march 
to  Winchester.  The  Federal  rear  guard,  headed  off  at 
Middletown,  saves  itself  by  taking  to  circuitous  roads  on 
its  left.  Owing  to  the  miscarriage  of  an  order  from  Jack- 
son, Ewell's  division  did  not  move  from  its  position  near 
Nineveh  until  too  late  to  accomplish  anything.  Thus, 
notwithstanding  Jackson's  advantage  at  the  start,  Banks 


216  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

beats  him  into  Winchester  and  there  prepares  to  resist  him. 
on  the  morrow. 

The  general  idea  of  Jackson's  combinations  was  for  the 
cavah'y  and  main  body  to  ascertain  the  direction  in  which 
the  enemy  had  gone,  and  then  for  all  his  forces  to  co- 
operate in  that  direction  to  head  the  enemy  off  and  capture 
or  destroy  him.  But  for  the  accidental  miscarriage  of  the 
order  to  Ewell,  this  idea  would,  no  doubt,  have  been 
carried  out. 

Continuing  the  pursuit  all  night,  Jackson  comes  up  in 
front  of  the  Federal  position  in  the  morning.  In  the 
battle  which  immediately  ensues  the  Federal  force  in  action 
numbers  oOOO,  the  Confederate  15,000.  Banks's  defeated 
army  is  driven  from  Winchester  and  followed  by  Jackson's 
cavalry  to  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  having  marched 
since  its  defeat  in  the  morning  a  distance  of  thirty-four 
miles.  It  crosses  the  river  in  the  night  and  the  following 
morning,  a  disorganized  mass. 

On  the  25th,  Fremont  sets  out  from  Franklin  for  Stras- 
burg  (Map  9). 

2&h-29th  May.— After  resting  the  26th  and  27th  at 
Winchester,  Jackson  pushes  on  to  Halltown  and  makes  a 
feint  of  crossing  the  Potomac.  Meanwhile  the  Federals 
are  closing  in  on  his  rear. 

30^/i  3Iay. — Jackson  returns  to  Winchester,  his  rear 
guard  halting  near  Halltown. 

On  the  Federal  side,  7000  men,  under  Banks,  are  at 
Williamsport;  7000,  under  Saxton,  at  Harper's  Ferry; 
15,000,  under  Fremont,  at  Wardens ville.  McDowell  is 
entering  the  valley  from  the  east  with  the  two  divisions  of 
Shields  and  Ord  and  two  cavalry  brigades.  Deduction 
being  made  for  detachments  to  guard  his  rear,  his  com- 
mand aggregates  about  21,000  men.  Shields's  division, 
numbering  about  10,000,  is  at  Front  Royal;  Ord's  division, 
numbering  about  9000,  is  at  or  about  Rectortown,  about  a 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  217 

day's  march  in  rear.  The  cavah*y,  numbering  about  2000, 
is  detached  to  front  and  flank.  The  Federals  in  the  theatre 
of  operations  thus  aggregate  50,000  men.  Jackson's  force 
numbers  about  15,000.  While  the  head  of  Jackson's 
column  is  still  eighteen  miles  from  Strasburg  and  the  rear 
forty  miles,  the  head  of  McDowell's  army  is  but  twelve, 
and  of  Fremont's  but  twenty,  from  the  same  point. 

olst  May. — Jackson  marches  without  molestation  to 
Strasburg.  His  rear  guard  halts  in  the  vicinity  of  New- 
town, having  marched  since  morning,  some  of  it  thirty- 
five  miles,  and  all  of  it  twenty-eight  miles.  Fremont 
advances  from  Wardensville,  intending,  according  to  his 
despatches  to  the  President,  to  enter  Strasburg,  but  he 
stops  about  half  way  to  that  place  at  Cedar  Creek. 

McDowell's  rear  division  closes  up  on  the  leading  one 
at  Front  Royal.  His  leading  division,  however,  makes  no 
attempt  to  impede  or  harass  Jackson's  retreat. 

Saxton  moves  out  from  Harper's  Ferry  and,  finding 
Jackson's  rear  guard  gone,  advances  as  far  as  Charlestown. 
There  he  goes  into  camp,  and  makes  no  further  effort  to 
follow. 

\st  June. — Fremont  makes  a  feeble  attempt  to  force  in 
Jackson's  outposts.  He  evidently  hesitates  to  bring  down 
the  whole  of  Jackson's  force  on  himself  while  uncertain 
that  McDowell  is  within  supporting  distance. 

McDowell's  leading  division,  under  Shields,  starts  off 
under  orders  for  Strasburg,  but,  misled  by  a  report  that 
Jackson  has  fallen  back  towards  the  Potomac,  he  changes 
his  line  of  march  for  Winchester.  Finding  out  his  mis- 
take, he  returns  to  the  vicinity  of  Front  Royal  and  pushes 
u})  the  valley  on  the  Luray  road,  east  of  the  Massanutton 
Mountains,  in  the  hope,  not  to  say  expectation,  of  heading 
Jackson  off  before  he  can  leave  the  valley. 

As  the  Confederates  withdraw  from  Strasburg,  a  brigade 
of  Fremont's  advance  follows  them  and  occupies  the  town. 


218  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

2d  June. — As  Shields  races  with  Jackson  up  the  valley, 
he  is  separated  from  his  contestant,  not  only  by  the  Mas- 
sanutton  Mountains,  but  also  by  the  South  Fork  of  the 
Shenandoah.  The  pass  througli  New  Market  can  be 
reached  from  the  Luray  road  only  by  crossing  one  of  two 
bridges,  the  White  House  and  the  Columbia,  nearly 
opposite  the  entrance  of  the  pass.  From  the  fact  that 
McDowell  had  not  appeared  near  Strasburg  as  late  as  the 
afternoon  of  June  1,  though  he  had  entered  Front  Royal 
on  the  30th  of  May,  Jackson  suspects  a  movement  up  the 
valley  to  head  him  off.  He  consequently  despatches  a 
detachment  of  cavalry  to  burn  the  White  House  and 
Columbia  bridges,  which  is  effected  without  opposition. 
Shields  is  now  cut  off,  not  only  from  Jackson's  line  of 
retreat,  but  also  from  Fremont,  who  is  pressing  forward 
on  the  west  side  of  the  Massanuttons. 

Jackson  bivouacs  at  Mount  Jackson,  Fremont  at  Wood- 
stock, Shields  en  route  for  Luray.  The  advance  of 
Shields's  division,  having  reached  the  White  House  and 
Columbia  bridges  and  reported  them  burned,  is  now  push- 
ing on  for  the  next  crossing  at  Conrad's  store. 

Sd-6th  June. — Jackson  continues  his  retreat,  and  on 
the  5th  reaches  Harrisonburg.  Here  he  changes  his  line 
of  march  and  moves  to  Port  Republic.  By  thus  covering 
the  road  through  Brown's  Gap,  he  secures  the  best  route 
across  the  Bkie  Ridge  to  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  in 
case  he  should  have  to  leave  the  valley,  while  the  configu- 
ration of  the  mountains  at  the  gap  gives  him  an  almost 
impregnable  position,  should  he  desire  to  hold  it.  His 
first  care  now  is  to  prevent  the  junction  of  Shields  with 
Fremont.  The  only  bridge  over  the  Shenandoah  north  of 
Port  Republic  by  which  this  junction  might  be  effected  is 
that  at  Conrad's  store.  A  detachment  of  cavalry  is  accord- 
ingly sent  to  destroy  it.  Shields's  advance  had  reached 
this  bridge  and  was  charged  with  guarding  it.     But  while 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  219 

it  is  absent  on  a  scout  after  some  stores  reported  to  be  in 
the  hands  of  a  small  Confederate  guard  a  few  miles  off, 
the  cavalry  sent  by  Jackson  arrives  and  burns  it.  Jackson 
now  holds  the  only  means  of  communication  between  his 
enemies, — the  bridge  at  Port  Republic.  But  no  farther  to 
his  rear  would  the  Shenandoah  serve  as  a  barrier  to  their 
junction,  for  south  of  Port  Republic  its  waters  are  easily 
fordable. 

Q>th  June. — Fremont  occupies  Harrisonburg.  Shields, 
with  his  main  body,  has  got  no  farther  than  the  ruined 
Columbia  bridge,  where  he  is  building  a  new  one. 

^th  June. — Jackson  determines  to  retreat  no  farther, 
but  to  fight  his  enemies  in  detail.  To  retire  towards 
Brown's  Gap  is  to  allow  them  to  unite.  To  concentrate  on 
the  east  side  of  the  river  against  Shields,  as  the  weaker, 
and  burn  the  bridge  to  keep  Fremont  back,  would  be  to 
run  the  risk  of  having  the  battle-field  commanded  from 
the  west  side  of  the  river  by  Fremont's  guns.  The 
destruction  of  the  bridge  might  thus  fail  to  neutralize 
Fremont,  and  would  certainly  prevent  Jackson  from 
returning,  in  case  of  success,  to  attack  him.  The  Con- 
federate commander,  therefore,  took  the  other  course  re- 
maining to  him,  of  closing  with  the  stronger  of  his  two 
opponents.  He  accordingly  put  his  army  in  position 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river :  one  division  at  Cross 
Keys,  half  way  to  Harrisonburg;  the  other  just  across 
the  river  on  a  height  above  the  bridge.  His  artillery 
is  at  hand  to  command  the  town  and  bridge  and  plain 
beyond. 

Shields  orders  Colonel  Tyler  forward  with  a  re-enforce- 
ment for  his  advance,  commanded  by  Colonel  Carroll. 
The  latter,  not  as  yet  re-enforced  by  Tyler,  takes  up  his 
march  under  orders  to  move  by  way  of  Port  Republic  to 
Waynesboro,  with  the  object  of  destroying  the  railroad, 
d^pot,  track,  bridge,  etc.,  at  that  place,  and,  having  started 


220  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Jackson  in  retreat,  to  assail  him  in  flank  and  rear.  He 
halts  within  six  miles  of  Port  Republic. 

Fremont  makes  a  reconnoissance  in  the  evening,  and, 
finding  the  Confederates  in  force  at  Cross  Keys,  gives 
orders  for  a  general  advance  in  the  morning. 

When  Jackson  started  up  the  valley  from  Winchester, 
on  the  31st  of  May,  his  force  numbered  about  15,000  men. 
It  has  since  been  reduced  by  straggling,  detachments,  etc., 
to  about  13,000.  Fremont's  command  numbered  at  that 
time  also  about  15,000  men.  It  has  since  been  re-enforced 
by  about  1000  men  of  McDowell's  corps.  Allowing  for 
garrisons  in  its  rear,  for  straggling,  etc.,  it  may  be  reckoned 
at  about  the  same  number  as  Jackson's,  13,000.  Shields's 
division  numbers  about  10,000.  The  aggregate  effective 
strength  of  the  Federal  forces  in  the  theatre  of  operations 
may  be  taken  at  about  48,000. 

Sth  June. — Carroll  makes  a  dash  through  Port  Republic 
at  Jackson's  trains,  and  comes  near  stampeding  them,  but 
is  driven  back.  Shortly  afterwards  Fremont  attacks  the 
division  at  Cross  Keys,  re-enforced  by  part  of  Jackson's 
other  division,  and  is  repulsed.  The  number  of  troops 
engaged  numbered,  on  the  Federal  side,  about  11,000;  on 
the  Confederate,  about  6000. 

During  this  engagement,  which  lasted  until  near  night, 
the  advance  force  of  General  Shields  continued  quiet  on 
the  east  side  of  the  river.  Colonel  Carroll  was  joined  by 
Colonel  Tyler  about  2  p.m.,  but  their  combined  force,  which 
numbered  about  3000  men,  was  deemed  by  Tyler,  who 
commanded  it,  too  small  for  an  aggressive  movement. 
Hence  no  diversion  in  favor  of  Fremont  was  made. 

Shields,  with  his  main  body  of  7000  men,  is  advancing 
from  Columbia  bridge  to  the  support  of  Tyler,  intelligence 
of  which  reached  Fremont  at  the  close  of  the  day.  Hith- 
erto Fremont  has  had  no  positive  knowledge  of  Shields's 
whereabouts,  beyond  the  fact  that  he  was  somewhere  near 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  221 

Luray.  He  now  contemplates  attacking  Jackson  on  the 
morrow,  in  co-operation  with  Shields. 

Jackson,  emboldened  by  tlie  inactivity  of  Shields's 
advance  and  his  easy  repulse  of  Fremont,  conceives  the 
design  of  attacking  his  two  oj^tponents  in  succession. 

Deducting  losses  in  battle,  the  strength  of  Jackson's 
army  is,  in  round  numbers,  12,700;  of  Fremont's,  12,300. 

Wh  June. — Leaving  the  bulk  of  his  forces  on  the  west 
side  of  the  river  to  oppose  Fremont,  Jackson  attacks  the 
3000  men  under  Tyler  on  the  east  side  with  about  1200 
men.  The  resistance  offered  by  Tyler  causes  him  to  in- 
crease this  force  to  about  7000.  His  force  opposed  to 
Fremont  is  thereby  reduced  to  such  an  extent  that  he  can 
no  longer  hope  to  hold  the  bridge ;  he  consequently  with- 
draws the  remainder  of  the  army  to  the  east  side,  burning 
the  bridge.  Fremont  arrives  on  the  heights  overlooking 
the  field  of  battle  only  in  time  to  witness  the  retreat  of 
Tyler,  and  is  prevented  by  the  river  from  giving  him  any 
assistance.  Shields,  pressing  on  through  the  night  to 
Tyler's  relief,  reaches  Conrad's  store  in  the  morning,  and 
a  few  miles  in  advance  of  that  point  meets  Tyler's  com- 
mand in  full  retreat. 

Thus  ends  the  campaign.  Shields  continues  to  retreat 
to  Luray  and  Front  Koyal.  Fremont  retires  down  the 
valley  by  the  way  that  he  came. 

To  recapitulate,  the  strength  of  the  opposing  armies 
corresponding  to  each  of  the  four  battles  was  as  shown  in 
the  following  table.  On  one  side  is  the  strategic  strength, 
expressed  by  the  number  of  men  in  the  theatre  of  opera- 
tions; on  the  other,  the  tactical  strength,  expressed  by  the 
number  of  men  actually  engaged  in  battle. 

MCDOWELL. 

Strategic.  Tactical. 

Federal 25,000  Federal 2,300 

Confederate   .    .    .     17,000  Confederate   .    .    .      6,000 


222  THE  PRINCIPLES    OF  STRATEGY. 

WINCHESTER. 

Strategic.  Tactical. 

Federal 21,000  Federal 3,000 

Confederate   .    .    .     17,000  Confederate   .    .    .     15,000 

CROSS    KEYS. 

Strategic.  Tactical. 

Federal 48,000  Federal 11,000 

Confederate   .    .    .     13,000  Confederate   .    .    .      6,000 

PORT    REPUBLIC. 

Strategic.  Tactical. 

Federal 47,000  Federal 3,000 

Confederate   .    .    .     12,500  Confederate   .    .    .      7,000 

While  the  Confederates  were  inferior  in  strategic  num- 
bers throughout,  they  outnumbered  the  enemy  in  eacli 
battle  except  that  of  Cross  Keys.  Here,  however,  they 
had  two  marked  advantages :  first,  of  fighting  on  the  de- 
fensive ;  and,  second,  of  having  a  force  exceeding  that 
actually  engaged  within  supporting  distance. 

It  would  be  hard  to  find  a  better  illustration  than  this 
campaign,  of  the  stratagem  of  compensating  for  lack  of 
numbers  by  rapidity  of  movement.  The  Confederate 
force,  which  at  no  time  exceeded  17,000  men,  was  gener- 
ally estimated  by  the  enemy  at  from  20,000  to  40,000. 
On  the  30th  of  May,  when  Jackson  was  making  his  way 
back  from  the  Potomac  to  Winchester,  President  Lincoln 
was  informed  by  Fremont  that  "  scouts  and  men  from 
Winchester  represent  Jackson's  force  variously  at  from 
30,000  to  60,000  men,"  from  twice  to  four  times  his  actual 
strength. 

Taken  in  its  entirety,  Jackson's  valley  campaign  was  a 
successful  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  Confederate  army 
on  the  peninsula  (Map  9,  No.  2).  Here  Lee,  with  about 
81,000  men,  was  protecting  the  Confederate  capital  against 
McClellan,  commanding  about  93,000.  In  consequence 
of  Jackson's  threatening  movements,  President  Lincoln 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  223 

withheld  from  McClellan  McDowell's  corps  of  40,000 
men,  to  serve  as  a  protection  to  the  Federal  capital,  and 
without  the  co-operation  of  this  corps  McClellan  could 
not  carry  out  his  plan.  As  early,  however,  as  June  8, 
before  the  cessation  of  operations  in  the  valley,  McDowell 
was  ordered  to  collect  his  forces,  with  a  view  to  co-oper- 
ating with  McClellan  against  Richmond.  Moving  sooner 
and  on  a  shorter  line,  Jackson  interposed  himself  between 
McDowell  and  McClellan,  and,  by  threatening  McClellan's 
line  of  communication,  caused  him  to  break  up  his  base 
at  the  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  move  across 
the  peninsula  to  Harrison's  Landing,  on  the  James  River. 
Here  he  was  farther  from  McDowell  than  ever.  Re-en- 
forcements could  no  longer  be  sent  to  him  except  by  water. 
As  he  would  not  advance  upon  Richmond  without  a  re- 
enforcement  of  35,000  men,  and  so  large  a  force,  it  was 
thought,  could  not  be  safely  removed  from  in  front  of 
Washington,  President  Lincoln  put  an  end  to  operations 
against  Richmond  by  withdrawing  the  Federal  army  from 
the  peninsula.  Meanwhile,  an  army  of  about  50,000  men 
had  been  organized  out  of  the  forces  covering  Washing- 
ton, and  placed  under  the  command  of  General  Pope. 
Against  this  army  Lee  moved  with  an  equal  force,  and  in 
the  second  Bull  Run  campaign  routed  it  before  McClellan, 
moving  around  by  water  to  Alexandria,  could  afford  it 
adequate  support. 


XIX. 

POLITICAL  STRATEGY. 

THE   GOVERNMENT   AS    A    MILITARY    OBJECTIVE. 

THERE  are  two  principal  forms  of  political  strategy. 
The  one  consists  in  impairing,  destroying,  or  block- 
ing the  machinery  of  the  enemy's  government ;  the  other 
in  coercing  his  government,  under  penalty  of  dissolution 
or  overthrow. 

The  former  does  not  materially  affect  the  armies  in  the 
field,  except  so  far  as  it  curtails  their  supplies  or  has  the 
effect  of  regular  strategy,  but  it  carries  the  war  home  to 
the  enemy's  people  by  interfering  more  or  less  with  the 
regulation  of  trade,  the  administration  of  justice,  and  other 
ministrations  for  the  general  welfare. 

The  second  form,  or  that  of  coercion,  may  cause  the 
enemy's  armies  to  be  recalled  from  the  field ;  but  this  is 
possible  only  where  the  civil  power  controls  the  miUtary. 
Under  a  military  despotism  it  is  impossible.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  military  des- 
potism. The  people,  or  the  regular  civil  government,  will 
always  command  more  or  less  military  influence  or  au- 
thority.    Grant  says  in  his  "  Memoirs," — 

"  The  South  was  a  military  camp,  controlled  absolutely 
by  the  government,  with  soldiers  to  back  it,  and  the  war 
could  have  been  protracted,  no  matter  to  what  extent  the 
discontent  reached,  up  to  the  point  of  open  mutiny  of  the 
soldiers  themselves." 

Yet  he  recognizes  it  as  an  advantage  to  the  North  that 
the  war  was  brought  home  to  the  Southern  people.     Com- 

224 


POLITICAL  STRATEGY.  225 

meriting  on  Slierman's  march  through  Georgia  and  the 
Carolinas,  he  says, — 

"  It  had  an  important  bearing  in  various  ways  upon  the 
great  object  we  had  in  view,  that  of  closing  the  war.  All 
the  States  east  of  the  Mississippi  River,  up  to  the  State  of 
Georgia,  had  felt  the  hardships  of  the  war.  Georgia  and 
South  Carolina,  and  almost  all  of  North  Carolina,  up  to 
this  time  had  been  exempt  from  invasion  by  the  Northern 
armies,  exce^Dt  upon  their  immediate  sea-coasts.  Their 
newspapers  had  given  such  an  account  of  Confederate 
success  that  the  people  who  remained  at  home  had  been 
convinced  that  the  Yankees  had  been  whipped  from  first 
to  last,  and  driven  from  pillar  to  jDOst,  and  that  now  they 
could  hardly  be  holding  out  for  any  other  purpose  than  to 
find  a  way  out  of  the  war  with  honor  to  themselves. 

*'  Even  during  this  march  of  Sherman's,  the  newspapers 
in  his  front  were  proclaiming  daily  that  his  army  was  noth- 
ing better  than  a  mob  of  men  who  were  frightened  out  of 
their  wits,  and  hastening,  panic-stricken,  to  try  to  get  under 
cover  of  our  navy  for  protection  against  the  Southern 
people.  As  the  army  was  seen  marching  on  triumphantly, 
however,  the  minds  of  the  people  became  disabused,  and 
they  saw  the  true  state  of  affairs.  In  turn  they  became 
disheartened,  and  would  have  been  glad  to  submit  without 
compromise." 

If  the  war  be  popular  with  the  enemy,  it  may  be  carried 
on  by  the  j^eople  or  by  a  provisional  government  after  the 
regular  government  is  overthrown.  The  actual  govern- 
ment may  therefore  be  unable  to  guarantee  a  peace. 
AVhether  it  may  do  so  or  not  will  depend  upon  the  sta- 
bility of  its  power. 

If,  however,  the  war  be  unpopular,  the  people  will  not 
carry  it  on  after  the  government  is  overturned.  In  that 
case  the  government  will  be  disposed  to  make  peace  at  the 
first  serious  apprehension  for  its  own  safety. 

15 


226  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

We  may  conclude  that  the  enemy's  government  should 
not  be  expected  to  prove  a  decisive  objective  unless  the 
enemy's  people  are  opposed  either  to  the  war  or  to  their 
form  of  government.  In  either  of  these  cases  the  spirit  of 
revolution  may  commit  the  people,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
army,  to  an  alliance  with  the  invader. 

The  government,  as  a  military  objective,  is  ordinarily 
aimed  at  through  the  capital,  and  the  importance  of  the 
capital  as  a  strategic  objective  depends  primarily  upon  its 
character  as  the  seat  of  government.  But  even  though 
previously  abandoned  by  the  government,  the  loss  of  the 
capital  would  be  more  or  less  felt  on  account  of  its  records 
and  archives,  its  public  buildings  and  works  of  art,  and 
its  historical  association  in  the  minds  of  the  people  and  of 
foreign  nations,  to  say  nothing  of  its  importance  as  a 
centre  of  communications  and  perliaps  of  trade  and  com- 
merce ;  for  the  seat  of  government  is  ordinarily  a  com- 
mercial as  well  as  a  political  centre.  Washington  is  a 
remarkable  exception  in  this  respect,  being  a  purely 
political  centre.  It  follows  that  the  older  and  more  cen- 
tralized the  government  the  greater  is  the  strategic  impor- 
tance of  the  capital. 

A  section  of  country  engaged  in  rebellion  or  revolu- 
tion has  practically  no  capital,  though  it  must  have  a  seat 
of  government.  There  is  good  reason  for  thinking  that, 
by  their  occupation  of  Philadelphia  in  the  Revolutionary 
War,  the  British  injured  their  own  cause  more  than  they 
did  that  of  the  Americans.  First,  the  operation  of  taking 
Philadelphia  prevented  the  commander  at  New  York  from 
co-operating  with  General  Burgoyne  in  his  expedition 
down  the  Hudson,  and  may  be  regarded  as  the  chief  cause 
of  the  failure  of  that  all-important  operation.  Second, 
Philadelphia  proved  the  Capua  of  the  British  army. 
Referring  to  the  deportment  of  its  garrison,  Green  says, 
in  his  "  History  of  the  English  People,"  "  Discipline  was 


POLITICAL   STRATEGY.  227 

totally  relaxed.  Gaining,  if  not  encouraged,  was  per- 
mitted to  a  most  ruinous  extent ;  and  the  gross  misconduct 
of  very  many  officers  disgusted  to  such  a  degree  the 
inhabitants  of  a  town  in  which  perhaps  more  than  any 
other  profligacy  was  offensive,  that  feelings  very  averse  to 
British  authority  were  engendered,  or  increased,  among  a 
people  originally  loyal.  These  bad  impressions  were  never 
removed  or  overcome." 

In  the  AVar  of  Secession,  Richmond,  though  in  certain 
respects  of  more  importance  to  the  South  than  Washington 
was  to  the  North,  was  politically  by  far  the  less  important 
capital  of  the  two. 

The  Confederate  flag  flying  from  the  dome  of  the  capitol 
at  Washington  would  have  been  the  signal  for  the  recogni- 
tion and  open  assistance  of  the  Confederacy  by  at  least 
two  of  the  five  great  powers  of  Europe,  and  would  have 
seriously  injured  the  prestige  of  the  Federal  administra- 
tion and  of  the  war  party  generally  at  the  North.  The 
occupation  of  Kichmond  by  a  Federal  army,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  have  secured  no  foreign  ally  for  the  North, 
and  would  have  had  no  more  eflect  upon  the  spirit  of 
resistance  in  the  South  than  the  occupation  of  Philadelphia 
by  the  British  had  upon  the  colonists. 

It  is  a  manifest  advantage  to  a  belligerent,  at  least  in  a 
defensive  war,  to  have  its  regular  and  political  strategic 
points  located  well  in  the  interior  of  the  country.  In  our 
Civil  War '  both  belligerents  were  unfortunate  in  the 
proximity  of  their  capitals  to  the  frontier.  General 
Barnard  says, — 

"That  the  preservation  of  the  national  cause  should 
have  been  identified  with  the  continuous  tenure  of  a  city 
situated,  as  is  Washington,  upon  the  very  boundary  of 
the  most  powerful  and  energetic  of  the  rebellious  States, 
and  surrounded  by  the  territory  of  another  State  only 
restrained   from    open    rebellion    by   the    heavy  jiressure 


228  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

of  armed  force,  was  one  of  the  chief  embarrassments  of 
the  government  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  A  point 
so  vital,  and  yet  so  vuhierable,  furnished  to  the  enemy 
ready  means  of  relieving  himself,  through  demonstrations 
more  or  less  serious,  from  dangerous  pressure ;  while  ex- 
cessive anxiety  for  its  safety  partially  paralyzed  most  of 
our  own  operations  on  this  theatre." 

Political  decentralization,  however  it  may  favor  stability 
and  permanence  of  government,  is  unfavorable  to  military 
power.  Centralization  is  a  characteristic  military  advan- 
tage of  absolute  over  liberal  forms  of  government. 

THE    PEOPLE   AS    A    MILITARY   OBJECTIVE. 

On  account  of  the  superiority  in  republics  of  the  civil 
over  the  military  power,  the  people  of  a  republic  are  a 
more  decisive  objective  than  those  of  a  despotism  or  abso- 
lute monarchy ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  republicans  ai-e, 
as  a  rule,  more  devoted  to  their  form  of  government,  if 
not  to  their  country,  than  the  subjects  of  a  despot  or  of 
an  absolute  monarch.  While,  therefore,  in  view  of  their 
sovereign  character,  republicans  are  the  more  decisive 
objective,  they  are  also,  generally  speaking,  the  less  vul- 
nerable. 

War  is"  brought  home  to  a  hostile  people  by  depriving 
them  of  their  civil  and  political  rights  and  privileges,  or 
of  the  comforts  and  conveniences,  and  perhaps  the  neces- 
saries, of  life;  by  injuring  their  business,  or  by  detracting 
in  any  other  way  from  their  individual  welfare. 

Political  strategy  is  often  an  incident  of  regular  strategy. 
The  same  fields  and  mills  which  feed  an  army  may  feed  a 
non-combatant  population.  Hence,  in  destroying  crops 
and  agricultural  implements  and  machinery,  though  the 
object  be  only  to  prevent  the  supplying  of  a  hostile  army, 
more  or  less  hardship  must  of  necessity  be  inflicted  upon 
the  people. 


POLITICAL   STRATEGY.  229 

Sheridan's  devastation  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  was 
directed  and  executed  with  a  single  view  to  the  destruction 
of  those  resources  which  could  be  turned  to  account  by  the 
Confederate  armies.  Nominally,  at  least,  it  was  purely 
regular  strategy  ;  but  by  what  name  it  was  called  mattered 
little.  The  people  could  not  but  feel  the  hardship  of  Sheri- 
dan's "  burning,"  as  the  operation  is  called  in  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley  to  this  day.  Sherman's  march  through 
Georgia,  on  the  other  hand,  though  primarily  a  change 
of  base,  was  conducted  with  a  view  to  bringing  the  war 
home  to  the  Southern  people. 

The  blockade  was  hardly  more  effective  upon  the  army 
of  the  South  than  it  was  upon  the  non-combatant  popula- 
tion. The  best  of  everything  that  the  country  afforded 
went  to  the  army.  The  blockade-runners,  to  be  sure,  made 
at  intervals  perilous  trips  from  Wilmington  and  Charleston 
to  Nassau  and  back,  carrying  out  cargoes  of  cotton  and 
bringing  in  supplies;  but  these  scanty  imports -^vere  only 
a  drop  in  the  great  empty  bucket  of  want,  and  the  South 
was  forced  to  rely  upon  its  own  products  and  its  own 
ingenuity  to  meet  the  demands  of  physical  and  social 
existence.  The  sudden  realization  of  this  duty  was  a 
greater  shock  to  the  inert  and  indolent  South  of  that  time 
than  even  that  of  arms.*  Her  manufacturing  establish- 
ments were  insufficient  to  meet  the  military  requirements 
of  the  hour.  For  the  people  in  their  domestic  needs  there 
was  nothing  left  but  a  recourse  to  the  rude  contrivances  of 
primitive  days,  which  were  not  yet  entirely  obsolete  in  the 
rural  districts.  To  these,  as  the  slender  stock  of  manu- 
factured articles  in  the  country  gave  out  and  the  European 
pow^ers  persisted  in  holding  aloof,  the  people  turned  with 
such  skill  and  material  as  they  were  possessed  of  to  provide 
the  necessaries  of  life.     Spinning-wheels  were  set  going; 

*  The  Century  Magazine. 


230  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  scattered  members  of  shapeless,  half-forgotten  old 
looms  were  dragged  to  light;  while  the  neighborhood 
blacksmith,  cobbler,  and  other  petty  craftsmen  found 
themselves  suddenly  springing  into  importance.  On  the 
ingenuity  of  each  family,  often  of  each  individual,  de- 
pended sooner  or  later  their  comfort,  almost  their  existence. 
The  most  serious  matter  of  all  was  the  great  dearth  of 
the  prime  staples  of  life  themselves  that  overtook  the  South 
almost  on  the  very  threshold  of  war.  The  Confederacy 
was  self-sustaining  in  bread-stuff  alone, — and  by  bread-stuff 
is  meant  Indian  corn  only,  wheateu  bread  being  regarded 
as  a  luxury  by  thousands  in  average  circumstances, — and 
the  inadequacy  of  transportation  prevented  a  proper  dis- 
tribution of  even  that.  There  was  only  one  considerable 
saline,  and  the  probability  of  a  total  failure  of  the  salt 
supply  from  its  exhaustion  or  capture  was  a  matter  of 
ever-deepening  anxiety.  The  meat  product  of  the  country 
was  largely  insufficient  at  first,  and  after  the  loss  of  so 
much  valuable  territory  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  the 
government,  by  dint  of  buying,  tithing,  and  impressing, 
was  barely  able  to  scrape  together,  week  by  week,  the 
stinted  rations  of  bacon  indispensable  to  keep  life  in  the 
soldiers.  Urgent  as  the  need  of  recruits  soon  became,  tlie 
authorities  perforce  adhered  to  the  arrangement  whereby 
the  overseers  of  plantations  were  exempt  from  military 
duty,  mainly  in  consideration  of  the  proprietors  giving 
bond  to  furnish  the  army  with  a  few  hundred  pounds  of 
bacon  or  beef  annually.  Private  individuals,  having  the 
advantage  of  only  one  of  the  resources  of  the  government, 
and  that  the  least  reliable, — that  of  purchase, — often  found 
it  impossible  to  procure  meat  at  all.  The  South  had  no 
fisheries. 

Coffee  had  been  almost  the  sole  table  beverage  of  the 
South,  and  no  privation  caused  more  actual  discomfort 
among  the  people  at  large  than  the  want  of  it.     There 


POLITICAL   STRATEGY.  231 

was  iiotliiug  for  which  they  strove  so  eagerly  and  un- 
ceasingly to  procure  a  substitute.  Few,  indeed,  were  the 
substances  which  did  not  first  and  last  find  their  way  into 
the  coffee-pot.  Wheat,  rye,  corn,  sweet  potatoes,  pea-nuts, 
dandelion  seed,  okra  seed,  persimmon  seed,  melon  seed, 
are  but  a  few  of  the  substitutes  which  had  their  turn  and 
their  day.  The  few  votaries  of  tea  consoled  themselves  as 
best  they  could  on  a  decoction  of  raspberry  leaves  or  sassa- 
fras root.  Some  genius  discovered  in  corn-fodder  the 
exact  flavor  of  black  tea. 

The  molasses  and  sugar  of  Louisiana  were  procurable 
in  degree  till  the  fall  of  Vicksburg ;  but  the  spirit  of 
independence  was  rife,  and  each  State  desired  and  deter- 
mined to  rely  as  much  as  possible  on  its  own  products. 
In  sorghum  molasses  the  people  found  a  substitute  for 
sugar  which  came,  perhaps,  nearer  to  success  than  any 
other  of  the  numberless  makeshifts  of  the  j)eriod. 

There  was  but  little  coal  oil  in  the  South  and  as  little 
sperm  oil,  and  the  tallow  of  the  country  went  in  large 
measure  to  the  armies  for  military  purposes.  A  favorite 
lamp  was  a  saucer  of  lard  with  a  dry  sycamore  ball  float- 
ing in  the  midst  of  it. 

For  the  support  of  the  government  and  of  the  armies 
the  tithing  system  had  been  established  as  early  as  April, 
1863:  This  exacted  a  tenth  of  all  farm  produce  not  abso- 
lutely too  perishable  for  transportation,  sweet  potatoes 
included.  When  tithes  and  taxes  combined  proved  in- 
adequate, as  they  soon  did,  recourse  was  had  to  the  last 
resource  of  impressment.  When  the  restrictions  by  which 
the  impressing  power  was  surrounded  bade  fair  to  render 
utterly  barren  this  last  resource,  the  Confederate  agents 
ignored  all  trammels  and  summarily  impressed  supplies 
wherever  they  could  be  found,  paying  for  them  at  schedule 
rates,  which  were  usually  about  one-fourth  the  market 
price.     Among  other  things  impressed  were  all  pleasure- 


232  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

horses,  to  be  used  in  cavalry  service,  and  all  fire-arms  of 
every  description,  except  a  gun  for  each  household/'' 

With  or  without  design,  and  despite  every  possible  pro- 
vision to  the  contrary,  war  sooner  or  later  becomes  a  bur- 
den and  a  trial  to  the  great  body  of  the  people  concerned 
in  it ;  and  the  mere  prolongation  of  war  in  any  form  will 
finally  break  the  spirit,  if  it  does  not  exhaust  the  re- 
sources, of  a  belligerent.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  theory  of 
what  is  called  the  Fabian  policy.  It  was  believed  by 
General  Johnston  to  be  a  proper  one  for  the  Confederate 
armies,  but  the  government  and  j^eople  of  the  South  dis- 
approved of  it.  General  Grant  says  in  his  "  Memoirs," 
that  anything  that  could  have  prolonged  the  war  a  year 
beyond  the  time  when  it  did  close  would  probably  have 
exhausted  the  North  to  such  an  extent  that  it  might  then 
have  abandoned  the  contest  and  agreed  to  a  separation. 

How  far  the  idea  of  dispiriting  a  people  may  be  advan- 
tageously carried  is  a  function  of  most  uncertain  factors. 
The  infiiction  of  suffering  on  a  people  who  can  stand  all 
that  can  be  inflicted  only  makes  the  military  problem 
more  difficult  by  embittering  them,  and  so  the  infliction 
of  inadequate  suffering  is  a  cruel  mistake.  The  popular 
support  given  to  our  government  in  the  War  of  1812  was 
largely  the  effect  of  a  system  of  devastation,  culminating 
in  the  desecration  of  the  capital,  to  which  the  British 
resorted  with  the  object  of  rendering  the  war  uni:)opular, 
and  of  making  it  hateful  to  the  people  by  bringing  its 
horrors  home  to  their  hearths  and  firesides.  Moreover,  a 
course  of  chastisement  which  might  bring  the  war  to  a 
successful  termination  may  be  prohibited  to  a  commander 
by  the  law  of  nations,  or  of  his  own  country,  or  by  his 

*  The  foregoing  particulars  relating  to  domestic  economy  in  the 
Confederacy  are  taken,  for  the  greater  part,  from  an  interesting 
magazine  article  on  the  subject  by  David  Dodge. 


POLITICAL  STRATEGY.  233 

own  scruples.  Tliis  is  a  matter  in  which  the  commander 
must  be  governed  to  a  large  extent  by  his  judgment  of 
the  temper  and  disposition  of  the  enemy's  people  and  his 
own,  and  of  mankind  in  general.  While  always  good 
military  policy,  it  is  especially  important  in  the  execution 
of  political  strategy  to  arouse  all  that  there  may  be  of 
disaffection  or  disloyalty  in  the  enemy's  country,  and 
make  of  such  element  as  active  an  auxiliary  as  possible. 
In  our  War  of  Independence  there  were  three  classes  of 
j^eople  which  were  particularly  unfriendly  to  the  American 
cause ;  these  were  the  loyalists,  or  Tories,  the  slaves,  and 
the  Indians.  All  three  classes  resided  principally  in  the 
South,  and  this  in  a  large  measure  accounts  for  the  fact 
that  it  was  principally  in  the  South  that  the  British 
resorted  to  political  strategy. 


XX. 

BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  GEORGIA,  THE 
CAROLINAS,  AND  VIRGINIA,  1776-1781. 

IN  tlie  early  part  of  the  year  1776  an  expedition  was 
directed  by  sea  against  North  Carolina.  Its  com- 
mander, Sir  Henry  Clinton,  was  given  to  expect  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Southern  colonies  would  join  the  king's 
army.  Should  they  not,  however,  he  was  to  gain  posses- 
sion of  a  suitable  naval  base  in  the  South  and  proceed  to 
annoy  the  rebels  by  sudden  and  unexpected  attacks  upon 
their  sea-coast.  He  was  ordered  to  destroy  any  towns  that 
refused  submission.  At  Wilmington,  North  Carolina, 
(Map  12),  he  issued  from  on  board  a  transport  a  formal 
proclamation  denouncing  persistent  rebels  and  offering 
pardon  to  penitents,  and  sent  Cornwallis  on  shore  with 
900  men,  who  laid  waste  Brunswick.  The  army  then  took 
sail  for  Charleston,  South  Carolina.  Here  it  was  baffled 
by  a  gallant  defence  under  Major  Moultrie,  whereupon  it 
sailed  for  New  York.  The  expedition,  as  a  whole,  had 
jDroved  a  signal  failure. 

"  In  the  month  of  June,  about  when  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
was  sailing  away,  as  just  stated,  to  return  to  New  York, 
the  Southern  colonies  were  assailed  by  an  enemy  in  their 
rear.  At  the  instigation  of  the  British,  over  2000  Chero- 
kee Indians,  assisted  by  a  few  Creeks  and  Tories,  had 
taken  to  the  war-path.  These  warriors  rushed  down  from 
their  upland  fastnesses  on  the  west,  the  different  bands 
marching  north-east,  east,  and  south-east.  From  South- 
western Virginia  to  North-western  Georgia  the  back- 
country  settlements  were  suddenly  wrapped  in  the  horrors 

234 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      235 

of  savage  warfare.  Horses  and  cattle  were  driven  off, 
houses  burned,  plantations  laid  waste,  while  the  women 
were  ravished,  and  women  and  children  massacred  indis- 
criminately with  the  men.  The  people  fled  from  their 
homes  and  crowded  into  stockade  forts.  They  were  greatly 
hampered  by  the  scarcity  of  guns  and  ammunition,  as  they 
had  parted  with  much  of  their  stores  to  equip  the  troops 
that  they  had  sent  to  the  coast. 

"  All  the  Southern  colonies  were  maddened  by  the  out- 
break and  prepared  for  immediate  revenge,  knowing  that 
if  they  were  quick  they  would  have  time  to  chastise  the 
savages  before  the  British  could  interfere.  The  conse- 
quence was  a  general  counter-attack  which,  about  the  end 
of  November,  caused  the  Indians  to  sue  for  peace."  '•" 

The  next  attempt  of  the  British  upon  the  South  was 
made  in  1778.  The  plan  for  this  year's  campaign  was 
prepared  by  Lord  Germain,  the  British  Secretary  of  War, 
with  o;reat  minuteness  of  detail.  Georo-ia  and  South  Caro- 
lina  (Map  12)  were  to  be  reduced  by  detachments  from 
the  Army  of  New  York,  and  to  be  held  by  the  employ- 
ment of  their  own  militia ;  the  upland  settlements  were  to 
be  separated  from  the  planters  of  the  low  country ;  the 
former  to  be  reduced  by  the  terror  of  savage  warfare,  the 
latter  by  the  fear  of  their  slaves ;  the  city  of  Charleston 
was  in  due  time  to  be  taken,  and  on  the  appearance  of  a 
small  corps  at  Cape  Fear,  "  large  numbers  of  the  inhabit- 
ants," it  was  thought,  "  would  flock  to  the  standard  of  the 
king,"  whose  government  would  thus  be  restored  in  North 
Carolina.  But  for  want  of  troops  the  summer  at  the  South 
passed  away  in  idleness. 

About  the  middle  of  1778,  the  war  having  then  lasted 
between  three  and  four  years,  the  British  became  convinced 
of  the  difficulty,  not  to  say  impossibility,  of  conquering  the 

*"The  Winning  of  the  West,"  Roosevelt,  vol.  i.  p.  11. 


236  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Northern  and  Middle  States.  The  people,  they  found, 
were  not  subdued  when  their  armies  were  beaten.  The 
country  could  only  be  conquered,  if  at  all,  by  political 
strategy.  Instead  of  proceeding  to  this  mode  of  conquest 
in  the  North,  our  enemies  made  the  mistake  of  transfer- 
ring the  war  to  the  South. 

In  the  autumn,  two  expeditions  of  regulars  and  vindic- 
tive refugees  (Tories)  were  sent  by  Brigadier-General 
Prevost  from  East  Florida  into  Georgia ;  the  one  was 
stopped  at  Sunbury,  the  other  at  the  Ogeechee.  The 
latter,  on  its  return,  burned  the  church  and  almost  every 
dwelling-house  in  Midway,  and  all  rice  and  other  cereals 
within  its  reach,  and  brought  off  with  it  negroes,  horses, 
cattle,  and  plate.* 

At  the  close  of  the  year  a  force  of  3000  men  despatched 
from  New  York,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Campbell,  got 
possession  of  Savannah,  the  capital  of  Georgia.  Early  in 
1779,  General  Prevost  advanced  again  into  Georgia  and 
occupied  Savannah,  reducing  Sunbury  on  the  way.  CarajD- 
bell  took  possession  of  Augusta,  and  the  province  of 
Georgia  appeared  to  be  restored  to  the  crown. 

The  organized  force  of  the  Americans  in  the  South, 
which  was  commanded  by  Lincoln,  took  post  at  Perrys- 
burg.  It  numbered  about  3000  men,  including  some  2000 
militia. 

Certain  Tory  emissaries,  who  were  sent  by  the  British  to 
encourage  a  rising  in  South  Carolina,  were  overtaken  by 
a  party  of  citizens  under  Colonel  Pickens,  and  routed. 
Being  tried  by  a  jury  of  their  fellow-citizens,  seventy  of 
them  were  convicted  of  treason  and  rebellion  against  the 
State  of  South  Carolina,  and  of  these  five  were  executed. 

Lincoln  resolved  to  lead  his  troops  against  Savannah 
by   way  of  Augusta,   leaving   only    1000   militia,  under 

*  Bancroft,  vol.  v.  p.  366. 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-17S1.       237 

Moultrie,  at  Perrysburg.  Prevost,  at  Savannah,  now  had 
the  choice  between  awaiting  an  attack  or  invading  the 
richest  part  of  Carolina,  and  he  chose  the  latter.  On  the 
28tli  of  April,  supported  by  Indians,  he  crossed  the  river 
with  3000  men  and  drove  Moultrie  before  him.  It  was 
represented  to  him  that  Charleston  was  defenceless.  After 
two  or  three  days  of  doubt,  the  hope  of  seizing  the  city 
lured  him  on,  and  upon  the  11th  of  May  he  appeared 
before  it.  He  came  two  days  too  late.  While  he  hesi- 
tated, the  men  of  Charleston  had  protected  the  neck  by 
sudden  but  well-planned  works,  and  re-enforcements,  in- 
cluding Moultrie  and  all  of  his  party  that  remained  true 
to  him,  had  come  into  the  place.  The  State  of  South 
Carolina  had  represented  to  Congress,  through  its  agent, 
that  it  was  weak  because  many  of  its  citizens  had  to 
remain  at  home  to  prevent  revolt  among  the  negroes  or 
their  desertion  to  the  enemy.  Congress  recommended  as 
a  remedy  that  the  two  southernmost  States,  Georgia  and 
South  Carolina,  should  arm  3000  of  the  most  vigorous  and 
enterj^rising  of  the  negroes,  under  command  of  white 
officers.  A  few  days  before  the  British  came  near  Charles- 
ton, young  Lawrence,  an  officer  of  the  army,  arrived, 
bringing  this  advice  of  Congress.  It  was  heard  in  anger 
and  rejected.  The  State  felt  itself  cast  off  and  alone. 
Georgia  had  fallen;  the  country  between  Savannah  and 
Charleston  was  overrun  ;  the  British  confiscated  all  negroes 
whom  they  could  seize ;  their  emissaries  were  urging  the 
rest  to  rise  against  their  owners  or  to  run  away.  Many 
began  to  regret  the  struggle  for  independence.  Moved  by 
their  dread  of  exposing  Charleston  to  being  taken  by 
storm,  and  sure,  at  least,  of  gaining  time  by  protracted 
parleys,  the  executive  government  sent  a  flag  to  ask  of  the 
invaders  their  terms  for  a  capitulation.  In  answer,  the 
British  general  offered  peace  to  those  inhabitants  who 
would  accept  protection ;  to  all  others,  the  condition  of 


238  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

prisoners  of  war.  The  Council  at  its  next  meeting  de- 
bated giving  up  the  town.  Irritated  by  the  advice  of 
Congress  to  liberate  and  arm  slaves,  it  "  proposed  a  neu- 
trality during  the  war,  the  question  whether  the  State 
shall  belong  to  Great  Britain  or  remain  one  of  the  United 
States  to  be  determined  by  the  treaty  of  peace  between  the 
two  powers."  The  British  general  declined  to  treat  with 
the  civil  government  of  South  Carolina,  but  made  answer 
that  the  garrison  must  surrender  as  prisoners  of  war. 
"Then  we  will  fight  it  out,"  said  Moultrie  to  the  governor 
and  his  Council,  and  accordingly  waved  the  flag  from  the 
gate  as  a  signal  that  the  conference  was  at  an  end. 

The  enemy  had  intercepted  a  letter  from  Lincoln,  who 
was  en  route  from  Savannah  to  Charleston,  in  which  he 
charged  Moultrie  "  not  to  give  up  the  city  nor  suffer  the 
city  to  despair,"  for  he  was  hastening  to  their  relief.  At 
daylight  the  next  morning  the  British  were  gone.  The 
Americans,  for  want  of  boats,  could  not  prevent  their 
embarkation,  or  their  establishing  a  post  at  Beaufort. 

This  invasion  of  South  Carolina  by  General  Prevost 
amounted  to  nothing  more  than  a  raid  through  the  richest 
plantations  of  the  State.  The  British  pillaged  almost 
every  house  in  a  wide  extent  of  country,  though  sparing 
in  some  measure  those  who  professed  loyalty  to  the  king. 
Objects  of  value  not  transportable  were  destroyed.  Porce- 
lain, mirrors,  windows,  were  dashed  in  pieces ;  gardens, 
carefully  planted  with  exotics,  laid  waste.  Domestic  ani- 
mals were  shot.  About  3000  fugitive  slaves  passed  with 
the  army  into  Georgia. 

With  the  aid  of  a  French  fleet,  Lincoln  had  laid  siege 
to  Savannah,  but  failed  to  take  it.  The  militia  of  South 
Carolina  returned  home;  the  Continental  regiments  in  the 
State  were  melting  away,  and  its  paper  money  became  so 
jiearly  worthless  that  a  bounty  of  $2500  for  twenty-one 
months'  service  had  no  attraction.     The  dwellers  near  the 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      239 

sea  between  Charleston  and  Savannah  knew  not  where  to 
find  protection.  Throughout  the  State  the  people  were 
disheartened  and  foreboded  its  desolation. 

The  property  of  the  greatest  part  of  the  inhabitants  of 
South  Carolina  was  confiscated.  Families  were  divided  ; 
patriots  outlawed  and  assassinated ;  houses  burned,  and 
women  and  children  driven  shelterless  into  the  forests ; 
districts  so  desolated  that  they  seemed  the  abode  onl}^  of 
orphans  and  widows. 

Within  three  months  after  the  capture  of  Savannah,  all 
the  property,  real  and  personal,  of  the  rebels  in  Georgia 
was  disposed  of.  Indians  were  encouraged  to  bring  in 
slaves  wherever  they  could  find  them.  All  families  in 
South  Carolina  were  subjected  to  the  visits  of  successive 
sets  of  banditti,  who  received  commissions  as  volunteers, 
with  no  pay  or  emolument  but  that  derived  from  rapine, 
and  who,  roaming  about  at  pleasure,  robbed  the  plantations 
alike  of  patriots  and  loyalists.  Negroes  were  the  spoil 
most  coveted ;  on  the  average,  they  were  valued  at  250 
silver  dollars  each. 

The  policy  prescribed  by  Germain  of  arming  the  slaves 
was  generally  supplanted  in  practice  by  that  of  confisca- 
tion. Arming  them  would  have  involved  freeing  them, 
and  this  the  British  generals  were  not  disposed  to  do. 
George  Bancroft  says, — 

"  The  permanence  of  the  power  of  the  British  in  the 
Southern  Atlantic  States  depended  on  their  treatment  of 
the  negro.  Now  that  they  held  Georgia  and  Beaufort  in 
South  Carolina,  they  might  have  gained  an  enduring- 
mastery  by  emancipating  and  arming  the  blacks.  But  the 
idea  that  slavery  was  a  sin  against  humanity  was  unknown 
to  Parliament  and  to  the  Ministry,  and  would  have  been 
hooted  at  by  the  army.  The  thought  of  universal  eman- 
cipation had  not  yet  conquered  the  convictions  of  the 
ruling  class  in   England,  nor  touched  the  life  and  con- 


240  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

science  of  the  nation.  The  English  of  that  day  rioted 
in  the  lucrative  slave-trade,  and  the  zeal  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  upholding  it  had  been  one  of  the  causes  that 
provoked  the  American  war.  So  the  advice  to  organize 
an  army  of  liberated  negroes,  though  persisted  in  by  the 
royal  governor  of  Virginia,  was  crushed  by  the  mad 
eagerness  of  the  British  officers  and  soldiers  in  America 
for  plunder." 

Early  in  the  spring  of  1779,  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  now  in 
command  in  America,  sent  a  detachment  of  2500  men  to 
Virginia.  They  landed  at  Portsmouth,  sacked  the  town, 
marched  to  Suffolk,  destroyed  a  magazine  of  provisions  in 
that  place,  burnt  the  village  and  several  detached  private 
houses,  and  seized  large  quantities  of  tobacco.  Many 
vessels  were  likewise  captured,  others  were  burnt  or  sunk, 
and  much  plunder  was  taken.  The  detachment  then 
returned  to  New  York. 

On  the  day  after  Christmas,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  himself, 
having  provided  for  the  security  of  New  York,  set  sail 
with  8500  officers  and  men  for  the  conquest  of  South 
Carolina.  On  the  12th  of  May,  1780,  he  received  the 
surrender  of  Charleston. 

This  terminated  all  resistance  to  the  British  army.  The 
attempt  was  now  made  to  force  the  men  of  Carolina  into 
the  British  service,  and  so  to  become  the  instruments  of 
their  own  subjugation.  On  the  3d  of  June,  Clinton,  by  a 
proclamation,  required  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  province 
— even  those  outside  of  Charleston,  "  who  were  now 
prisoners  on  parole" — to  take  an  active  part  in  securing 
the  royal  government. 

"  Should  they  neglect  to  return  to  their  allegiance,"  so 
ran  the  proclamation,  "  they  will  be  treated  as  rebels  to 
the  king."  He  never  reflected  that  many  who  accepted 
protection  did  so  in  the  expectation  of  living  in  a  state  of 
neutrality,  and  that  they  might  say,  "  If  we  must  fight,  let 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      241 

US  fight  on  the  side  of  our  friends,  of  our  countrymen,  of 
America."  On  the  day  of  his  proclamation  he  reported 
to  Germain,  "  The  inhabitants  from  every  quarter  declare 
their  allegiance  to  the  king  and  offer  their  service  in  arms. 
There  are  few  men  in  South  Carolina  who  are  not  either 
our  prisoners  or  in  arms  with  us." 

Two  days  thereafter  he  departed  for  New  York,  leaving 
the  command  of  the  British  forces  in  the  South  to  Lord 
Cornwallis.  The  new  commander  proposed  to  keep  pos- 
session of  all  that  had  been  gained,  and  to  advance  as  a 
conqueror  to  the  Chesapeake.  Clinton  had  left  with  him 
no  more  than  5000  effective  troops  in  South  Carolina  and 
less  than  2000  in  Georgia ;  but  to  these  were  to  be  added 
the  regiments  which  he  was  determined  to  organize  out  of 
the  Southern  people. 

As  fast  as  the  districts  submitted,  Cornwallis  enrolled 
all  the  inhabitants,  and  appointed  field  officers  with  civil 
as  well  as  military  power.  The  men  of  property  above 
forty  were  made  responsible  for  order,  but  were  not  to  be 
called  out  except  in  case  of  insurrection  or  of  actual 
invasion  ;  the  younger  men,  who  composed  the  second 
class,  were  held  liable  to  serve  six  months  in  each  year. 
Some  hundreds  of  commissions  were  issued  for  the  militia 
regiments.  Major  Patrick  Ferguson,  known  from  his 
services  in  New  Jersey,  and  greatly  valued,  was  deputed  to 
visit  each  district  in  South  Carolina,  to  procure  on  the 
spot  lists  of  its  militia,  and  to  see  that  the  orders  of  Corn- 
wallis were  carried  into  execution.  Any  Carolinian  there- 
after taken  in  arms  might  be  sentenced  to  death  for  deser- 
tion and  bearing  arms  against  his  country.  The  proposals 
of  those  who  offered  to  raise  provincial  corps  were  acce2:)ted  ; 
and  men  of  the  province  received  commissions,  gathered 
about  them  profligate  ruffians,  and  roamed  through  Caro- 
lina indulging  in  rapine,  and  ready  to  put  patriots  to  death 
as  outlaws.    The  prisoners  who  had  capitulated  at  Charles- 

16 


242  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

ton  were  the  subjects  of  perpetual  persecution  unless  they 
would  exchange  their  paroles  for  oaths  of  allegiance. 
Mechanics  and  shopkeepers  could  not  collect  their  dues 
except  after  promises  of  loyalty. 

Under  these  circumstances  organized  resistance  was  im- 
possible. The  only  hope  was  that  of  relief  from  without, 
and  this  the  British  dispositions  were  well  calculated  to 
prevent.  The  principal  geographic  strategic  points  on  the 
coast  were  Charleston,  Beaufort,  and  Savannah ;  in  the 
interior,  Augusta,  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  Savannah 
Kiver,  was  the  gate-way  of  Georgia.  The  communica- 
tions between  this  point  and  the  wild  mountains  of  North 
Carolina,  the  population  of  which  was,  as  a  whole,  in- 
tensely hostile  to  Great  Britain,  were  dominated  by  a  vil- 
lage known  as  Ninety-Six.  Eighty  miles  to  the  north-east 
of  Ninety-Six  lay  the  post  of  Camden,  in  which  centred 
all  the  principal  roads  by  which  South  Carolina  could  be 
reached  from  the  North.  All  these  points  were  held  in 
force  by  the  British.  Florida,  adjoining  Georgia  on  the 
south,  was  a  Tory  province.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  Georgia  was  the  weakest  of  all  the  colonies,  and  was 
in  constant  danger  of  an  uprising  of  the  black  slaves,  who 
outnumbered  the  whites. 

At  the  end  of  June,  Cornwallis  reported  that  he  had 
put  an  end  to  all  resistance  in  Georgia  and  in  South  Caro- 
lina, and  in  September,  after  the  harvest,  would  march 
into  North  Carolina  to  reduce  that  province. 

Houston,  the  delegate  in  Congress  from  Georgia,  wrote 
to  Jay,  "  Our  misfortunes  are,  under  God,  the  source  of 
our  safety.  Our  captive  soldiers  will,  as  usual,  be  poi- 
soned, starved,  and  insulted — will  be  scourged  into  the 
service  of  the  enemy ;  the  citizens  will  suffer  pillaging, 
violences,  and  conflagrations ;  a  fruitful  country  will  be 
desolated ;  but  the  loss  of  Charleston  will  promote  the 
general  cause.     The  enemy  have  overrun  a  considerable 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      243 

part  of  the  State  in  the  hour  of  its  nakechiess  and  debility; 
but  as  their  measures  seem,  as  usual,  to  be  dictated  by  in- 
fatuation, when  they  have  wrought  up  the  spirit  of  the 
people  to  fury  and  desperation,  they  will  be  expelled  from 
the  country." 

Up  to  this  time  the  South  had  rested  on  its  own  ex- 
ertions. Relying  now  on  the  internal  strength  of  New 
England  and  the  Central  States  for  their  protection, 
Washington  detached  from  his  army  of  less  than  10,500 
men  a  force  of  over  2000,  under  De  Kalb,  for  service  in 
the  South.  Gates  was  appointed  to  succeed  Lincoln.  At 
the  battle  of  Camden,  fought  on  the  16th  of  August, 
Gates's  forces  were  routed  and  dispersed.  There  was  now 
no  longer  an  American  army  worthy  of  the  name  in  the 
Department ;  but  in  the  South,  as  in  the  North,  the  people 
refused  to  be  subdued. 

Under  the  leadership  of  such  men  as  Marion  and  Sum- 
ter, the  militia  devoted  themselves  in  considerable  bodies 
to  the  work  of  harassing  the  invader.  Knowing  the  coun- 
try perfectly,  they  lurked  in  forests  and  swamps,  coming- 
out  from  time  to  time  to  make  a  dash  at  a  convoy  or  some 
exposed  post  or  camp  or  marching  column,  or  to  repress 
or  punish  some  hostile  movement  or  demonstration  on  the 
part  of  the  royalists. 

In  carrying  out  his  plan,  the  first  measure  of  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  the  institution  of  a  reign  of  terror.  Pro- 
fessing to  regard  South  Carolina  as  restored  to  the  domin- 
ion of  George  III.,  and  acting  on  the  principle  that 
severity  was  the  true  mode  to  hold  the  recovered  prov- 
inces, he  addressed  the  most  stringent  orders  to  the  com- 
manding officers  of  posts  to  imprison  all  who  would  not 
take  up  arms  for  the  king,  and  to  seize  and  destroy  their 
whole  property.  The  war  assumed  its  most  hideous  form 
where  these  orders  were  followed  by  subordinates  in  re- 
mote districts  away  from  supervision.     Officers  patrolled 


244  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  country,  burned  houses,  ravaged  estates,  and  put  to 
death  whom  they  woukl.  The  wives  and  daughters  of  the 
opulent  were  left  with  no  fit  clothing,  no  shelter  but  a 
hovel  too  mean  to  attract  the  destroyer.  Of  a  sudden,  the 
woodman  in  his  cabin  would  find  his  house  surrounded, 
and  he  himself  or  his  guest  might  be  shot  because  he  was 
not  in  arms  for  the  king.  There  was  no  question  of  proofs 
and  no  trial.  For  two  years  cold-blooded  assassinations, 
often  in  the  house  of  the  victim  and  in  the  presence  of  his 
wife  and  children,  were  per2:)etrated  by  men  holding  the 
king's  commission.  The  enemy  seemed  determined  to 
break  every  man's  spirit  or  to  take  his  life. 

Preparatory  to  his  northward  march,  Cornwallis  re- 
quested Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  detach  3000  men  to  establish 
a  post  on  the  Chesapeake.  In  the  second  week  of  Sep- 
tember, 1780,  when  the  heat  of  summer  had  abated,  the 
earlier  cereals  had  been  harvested,  and  the  maize  was 
nearly  ripe,  he  put  his  army  in  motion,  relying  on  the 
royalists  of  North  Carolina  to  recruit  it.  On  his  left, 
Major  Ferguson,  the  ablest  British  partisan,  was  sent  with 
two  hundred  of  the  best  troops  to  the  uplands  of  South 
Carolina,  where  he  enlisted  young  loyalists  who  had  fled 
to  that  mountainous  country  for  security,  and  fugitives  of 
the  worst  character,  who  sought  his  standard  for  the 
chances  of  plundering  with  impunity.  The  Cherokee 
Indians  had  been  encouraged  during  the  summer  in  rav- 
aging the  American  settlements  west  of  the  mountains. 

At  Waxhaw,  Cornwallis  halted  for  a  few  days,  and,  that 
he  might  eradicate  the  sj^irit  of  patriotism  from  South 
Carolina  before  he  passed  beyond  its  borders,  he  se- 
questered by  proclamation  all  estates  belonging  to  the 
friends  of  America.  To  patriots  no  alternative  was  left 
but  to  fight  against  their  country  or  to  encounter  exile 
and  poverty.  He  then  advanced  to  Charlotte,  in  North 
Carolina.     Housed  by  their  feeling  for  the  fugitives,  about 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      245 

1300  militia,  mostly  backwoodsmen  from  west  of  the 
Alleghany  Mountains,  formed  themselves  into  a  so-called 
"  Western  Army,"  and  took  the  field,  resolved  to  restore 
the  unfortunate  people  to  their  homes.  At  the  battle  of 
King's  Mountain  they  attacked  a  detachment  of  1125 
men,  under  Ferguson,  and  compelled  them  to  surrender. 
This  victory  changed  the  aspect  of  the  war.  The  royalists 
of  North  Carolina  no  longer  dared  rise.  The  appearance 
on  the  frontiers  of  a  numerous  enemy  from  settlements 
beyond  the  mountains,  whose  very  names  had  been  un- 
known to  the  British,  took  Cornwallis  by  surprise,  and 
their  success  was  fatal  to  his  intended  expedition.  He 
had  hoped  to  step  with  ease  from  one  Carolina  to  the 
other,  and  from  these  to  the  conquest  of  Virginia ;  and 
now  he  had  no  choice  but  to  retreat.  After  a  march 
through  unwholesome  woods,  on  short  rations  of  food  and 
forage,  and  with  a  harassing  enemy  hanging  on  his  flanks 
and  rear,  he  camped  at  Wynesborough,  South  Carolina. 
The  position  of  the  British  becoming  precarious,  Corn- 
wallis gave  orders  for  the  3000  men  sent  by  Clinton  to 
the  Chesapeake  to  embark  for  Cape  Fear  River,  in  North 
Carolina.  So  ended  his  first  attempt  to  penetrate  to  Vir- 
ginia. He  was  driven  back  by  the  spontaneous  risings  of 
the  Southern  and  South-western  people,  and  the  unwhole- 
some exhalations  of  autumn  swept  men  from  every  gar- 
rison in  the  low  country  faster  than  Great  Britain  could 
replace  them. 

While  the  attention  of  the  enemy  was  engaged  by 
Sumter  and  Marion,  General  Gates  proceeded  to  gather 
together  the  scattered  fragments  of  his  army  at  Hills- 
borough. On  the  retreat  of  Cornwallis  from  Charlotte, 
Gates  advanced  to  the  latter  place,  where  he  was  super- 
seded by  General  Greene.  Finding  the  country  around 
Charlotte  exhausted,  Greene  separated  his  army  into  two 
divisions.     One,  about   1000  strong,  under   Morgan,  was 


246  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

detached  towards  the  district  of  Ninety-Six,  with  orders 
to  assemble  the  militia  of  that  country.  With  the  other 
division,  numbering  about  1300,  Greene  posted  himself 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Pedee  River,  opposite  the  Cheraws. 
Cornwallis  was  still  encamped  at  Wynesborough.  General 
Leslie  had  recently  arrived  at  Wilmington  from  the  Chesa- 
peake, and  was  advancing  to  re-enforce  him  with  1500 
men.  This  would  give  Cornwallis  a  force  of  3500.  His 
plan  was  to  leave  Rawdon  at  the  central  post  of  Camden, 
to  keep  all  quiet  in  South  Carolina,  while  with  the  main 
army  he  would  throw  himself  between  Greene  and  Vir- 
ginia, cut  him  off  from  all  re-enforcements  and  supplies 
from  that  quarter,  and  thus  oblige  him  either  to  make 
battle  with  his  inferior  force  or  retreat  precipitately  from 
North  Carolina.  Apprehending  that  Morgan  might  be 
dangerous  to  him  if  left  in  his  rear,  he  detached  Tarleton 
asainst  him  with  about  1100  men.  At  the  battle  of  the 
Cowpens,  fought  between  Tarleton  and  Morgan  on  the 
17th  of  January,  1781,  Tarleton's  force  was  completely 
routed,  and  pursued  twenty-four  miles  by  Morgan's  cav- 
alry. Cornwallis  had  moved  to  Turkey  Creek,  twenty- 
five  miles  from  the  field  of  battle,  meaning  to  cut  off 
Morgan  from  a  junction  with  Greene,  in  case  Tarleton's 
expedition  failed.  But  Morgan,  who  had  from  the  first 
divined  the  policy  of  Cornwallis,  lost  no  time  in  moving 
so  as  to  frustrate  it.  Although  farther  from  the  fords 
than  Cornwallis,  he  crossed  the  South  Fork  of  the  Ca- 
tawba at  Ramsower's,  just  two  hours  before  his  pursuers 
came  to  it.  Impatient  of  encumbrances,  Cornwallis  now 
determined  to  give  up  his  communications  with  South 
Carolina.  He  accordingly  devoted  two  days  at  Ram- 
sower's  to  the  destruction  of  all  such  impedimenta  as  he 
thought  he  could  spare.  Greene,  meanwhile,  had  been 
moving  to  join  Morgan.  On  the  9th  of  February  the  two 
divisions  of  the  American  army  effected  their  junction  at 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      247 

Guilford  Court-House.  Cornwallis  was  then  encamped  at 
Salem,  about  twenty-five  miles  south-west  from  there. 

The  great  object  of  Greene  was  now  to  get  across  the 
river  Dan  and  throw  himself  into  Virginia,  where  he 
counted  on  procuring  re-enforcements  and  assistance.  The 
object  of  Cornwallis  was  to  get  between  him  and  Virginia 
and  force  him  to  a  combat  before  he  could  be  re-enforced, 
or  enclose  him  between  the  great  rivers  on  the  west,  the 
sea  on  the  east,  and  the  two  divisions  of  the  British  army, 
under  himself  and  Lord  Rawdon,  on  the  north  and  south. 
Cornwallis  had  been  informed  that  the  lower  j^art  of  the 
river  Dan  could  at  present  be  crossed  only  in  boats,  and 
that  the  country  would  not  afford  a  sufficient  number  for 
the  passage  of  Greene's  army ;  he  trusted,  therefore,  to 
cutting  it  off  from  Virginia  by  seizing  and  guarding  the 
upper  fords.  Greene,  however,  had  provided  against  this. 
Boats  had  been  secured  at  various  places  by  his  agents, 
and  could  be  collected  at  a  few  hours'  notice  at  the  lower 
ferries.  Instead,  therefore,  of  contending  with  Cornwallis 
for  the  upper  crossing,  he  shaped  his  course  for  the  very 
lowest  (Boyd's  Ferry),  just  above  the  confluence  of  the 
Dan  and  Staunton  Rivers,  wdiich  form  the  Roanoke,  and 
about  seventy  miles  from  Guilford  Court-House.  This 
gave  him  twenty-five  miles  the  start  of  Cornwallis  at  the 
outset,  which  advantage  was  increased  by  the  demonstra- 
tions of  a  detachment  left  behind  for  that  purpose. 

As  soon  as  Cornwallis  gained  reliable  information  he 
pushed  after  Greene  at  the  rate  of  thirty  miles  a  day,  in 
the  firm  conviction  that  he  was  driving  the  American 
army  into  a  trap,  and  would  give  it  a  signal  blow  before  it 
could  cross  the  Dan.  But  when,  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  he  reached  the  banks  of  the  river,  he  learned  that 
the  Americans  were  already  across,  rear  guard  and  all. 
Not  deeming  it  prudent  to  venture  into  Virginia,  he  took 
post  on   the  20th  at  Hillsborough,  the  capital  of  North 


248  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Carolina,  where  he  issued  a  proclamation  calling  on  the 
royalists  to  rise.  Many  hundreds  of  the  people  of  the 
neighborhood  rode  into  the  British  camp  to  talk  it  over. 
They  acknowledged  that  the  rebels  had  been  chased  out  of 
the  province,  but  apprehended  that  they  would  soon  return. 
On  these  people  the  proclamation  had  little  effect.  Others, 
under  the  impression  that  Cornwallis  was  in  peaceable 
possession  of  the  country,  responded  in  considerable  num- 
bers. Seven  independent  companies  were  formed  among 
them  in  one  day,  and  Tarleton  was  detached  across  the 
Haw  River  to  protect  them  and  lead  them  to  the  British 
camp.  In  order  to  check  the  enemy's  recruiting,  Greene 
returned  to  the  south  side  of  the  Dan,  re-enforced  by  600 
militia  of  Virginia.  Shortly  afterwards  a  detachment  of 
his  army  fell  upon  Tarleton's  royalists,  who  were  march- 
ing in  a  body  to  meet  him,  and  routed  them  with  "  dreadful 
carnage."  Tarleton  hurried  back  to  Hillsborough,  and  all 
royalists  who  were  on  their  way  to  join  the  king's  standard 
returned  home.  Cornwallis  describes  his  friends  as  timid, 
the  rebels  as  "  inveterate." 

With  a  view  to  bringing  on  a  battle,  the  British  general 
now  abandoned  Hillsborough  and  approached  the  enemy. 
Greene,  without  abandoning  North  Carolina,  manoeuvred 
so  as  to  avoid  a  battle.  The  American  commander  was 
determined  not  to  risk  one  until  adequately  re-enforced. 
Finally,  on  the  14tli  of  March,  with  his  force  increased  to 
4400  men,  including  some  2500  militia,  he  encamped 
ready  for  battle  at  Guilford  Court-House.  Cornwallis 
attacked  him  on  the  15th  with  about  2000  men.  Though 
he  drove  the  Americans  from  the  field  towards  the  close  of 
the  day,  his  army  was  so  badly  shattered  that  he  was 
forced  to  begin  a  prompt  retreat  to  the  sea-coast,  leaving 
his  wounded  in  the  hands  of  the  pursuing  enemy. 

As  he  hurried  away,  he  distributed,  by  proclamation, 
news  of  his  late  victory,  offers  of  pardon   to   repentant 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      249 

rebels,  and  promises  of  protection  to  the  loyal.  His  rapid 
retreat,  however,  taught  the  royalists  of  North  Carolina 
that  they  should  expect  no  protection  from  British  generals 
or  the  British  king. 

On  the  7th  of  April  he  brought  the  relics  of  his  army, 
numbering  about  1400  men,  to  Wilmington,  where  a  party 
sent  by  his  orders  from  Charleston  had  established  a  depot 
of  supplies. 

As  soon  as  Cornwallis  was  beyond  pursuit,  Greene  took 
advantage  of  his  interior  lines  of  operation  to  carry  the 
war  into  South  Carolina.  Though  often  checked  and 
sometimes  defeated,  he  succeeded  in  about  six  months  in 
recoverino-  the  three  Southern  States  so  far  that  the  British 
held  only  the  three  chief  seaports  of  Savannah,  Charleston, 
and  Wilmington. 

Virginia  furnished  to  the  army  that  fought  at  Guilford 
Court-House  1693  of  her  militia  and  778  of  her  Con- 
tinental troops.  Conceiving  that  Virginia,  as  well  as  the 
more  Southern  States,  was  dependent  upon  aid  from  the 
North,  Cornwallis  now  recommended  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
the  plan  of  separating  all  the  country  south  of  the  Chesa- 
peake from  that  to  the  north  of  it,  and,  assuming  that  the 
plan  would  be  adopted,  determined  to  change  his  base  to 
the  Chesapeake  and  advance  from  there  to  the  subjugation 
of  Virginia.  Having  neutralized  that  powerful  province, 
he  proposed  to  himself  to  try  the  conquest  of  the  Carolinas 
over  again.  There  was  at  this  time  in  Virginia  a  British 
force  of  about  3500  men,  under  command  of  General 
Phillips,  with  a  fortified  base  at  Portsmouth.  Having 
sent  word  to  the  latter  officer  of  his  coming,  and  designated 
Petersburg  as  the  point  of  junction  of  the  two  forces,  he 
took  up  his  march  thither  on  the  25th  of  April.  Meeting 
with  little  resistance  on  the  way,  he  ejected  the  intended 
junction  at  Petersburg  on  the  20th  of  May.  In  the  mean 
time,  about  2000  additional  troops  had  been  sent  by  Clinton 


250  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

to  Virginia.  Cornwallis  now  found  himself  at  the  head 
of  7000  effective  men,  and  in  undisputed  command  of  the 
water.  Opposed  to  him  was  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette, 
with  some  3000  men,  inchiding  2000  militia.  The  mar- 
quis was  encamped  at  Wilton,  with  the  object  of  covering 
Richmond.  About  700  men  of  the  Pennsylvania  line 
were  marching  to  join  him,  under  Wayne.  Steuben  was 
at  Point  of  Fork,  engaged  in  receiving  and  equipping 
recruits,  with  which  he  was  to  join  Greene  or  La  Fayette, 
as  circumstances  might  suggest.  The  principal  part  of  the 
Continental  stores  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  James 
River,  at  Prince  Edward,  Charlotte,  and  Halifax ;  those  of 
the  State  were  dispersed  everywhere,  a  great  part  of  them 
being  at  the  Point  of  Fork. 

On  the  !25th  of  May,  Cornwallis  proceeded  to  cross  the 
James  River.  In  order  to  screen  the  movement  from  La 
Fayette,  and  at  the  same  time  approach  his  base,  whence 
his  re-enforcements  were  joining  him,  he  directed  his  march 
upon  Westover.  The  passage  of  the  river  at  that  place 
afforded  an  easy  entrance  into  a  fertile  quarter  of  Virginia. 
On  the  26th  of  May,  while  his  army  was  crossing,  he 
wrote  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton, — 

"  I  shall  now  proceed  to  dislodge  La  Fayette  from  Rich- 
mond, and  with  my  light  troo2:)s  to  destroy  any  magazines 
and  stores  in  the  neighbourhood  which  may  have  been 
collected  either  for  his  use  or  for  General  Greene's  army. 
From  thence  I  propose  to  move  to  the  neck  [narrow  part 
of  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  York  and  James  Rivers] 
at  Williamsburg,  which  is  represented  as  healthy,  and 
where  some  subsistence  may  be  procured,  and  keep  my- 
self unengaged  from  operations  which  might  interfere 
with  your  plan  for  the  campaign,  until  I  have  the  satis- 
faction of  hearing  from  you.  I  hope  I  shall  then  have  an 
opportunity  to  receive  better  information  than  has  hitherto 
been  in  my  power  to  procure,  relative  to  a  proper  harbour 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      251 

aiul  place  of  arms.  At  present  I  am  inclined  to  think 
well  of  Yorktown.  The  objections  to  Portsmouth  are, 
that  it  cannot  be  made  strong  without  an  army  to  defend 
it,  that  it  is  remarkably  unhealthy,  and  can  give  no  pro- 
tection to  a  ship-of-the-line.  Wayne  has  not  yet  joined 
La  Fayette,  nor  can  I  positively  learn  where  he  is,  nor 
what  is  his  force.  Greene's  cavalry  are  said  to  be  coming 
this  way,  but  I  have  no  certain  accounts  of  it. 

"  I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  repeating,  that  if  offensive 
war  is  intended,  Virginia  appears  to  me  the  only  province 
in  which  it  can  be  carried  on,  and  in  which  there  is  a 
stake ;  but  to  reduce  the  province  and  keep  possession  of 
the  country  a  considerable  army  would  be  necessary,  for 
with  a  small  force  the  business  would  probably  terminate 
unfavourably,  though  the  beginning  might  be  successful. 
In  case  it  is  thought  expedient,  and  a  proper  army  for  the 
attempt  can  be  formed,  I  hope  your  Excellency  will  do 
me  the  justice  to  believe  that  I  neither  wish  nor  expect  to 
have  the  command  of  it,  leaving  you  at  New  York  on  the 
defensive.  Such  sentiments  are  so  far  from  my  heart, 
that  I  can  with  great  truth  assure  you  that  few  things 
could  give  me  greater  pleasure  than  being  relieved,  by 
your  j^resence,  from  a  situation  of  so  much  anxiety  and 
responsibility." 

From  the  foregoing  representations  the  following  note- 
worthy particulars  may  be  inferred  respecting  the  state  of 
mind  of  the  writer : 

1.  He  deemed  the  force  under  him  insufficient  to  accom- 
plish the  main  purpose  for  which  he  had  come  to  Virginia, 
that  of  subduing  the  people  and  holding  the  country. 

2.  He  had  no  plan  for  the  execution  of  which  he 
deemed  his  force  sufficient. 

3.  He  doubted  whether  his  force  would  be  adequately 
increased. 

4.  He  was  as  ready  to  renounce  responsibility  as  he  had 


252  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

been  to  assume  it.  The  fact  should  be  noted  here,  that 
his  march  from  Wihiiington  to  Virginia  was  made  without 
the  sanction  or  approval  of  Clinton. 

5.  He  meant  to  strike  La  Fayette  before  Wayne  should 
join  him. 

6.  He  expected  to  be  settled  at  Williamsburg  within 
the  period  of  a  week. 

With  the  apparent  purpose  of  drawing  La  Fayette  away 
from  Richmond,  and  at  the  same  time  interposing  between 
him  and  Wayne,  Cornwallis  advanced  northward  and  pro- 
ceeded past  Hanover  Court-House,  across  the  South  Anna, 
to  the  south  bank  of  the  North  Anna.  La  Fayette, 
having  removed  the  most  valuable  stores  from  Richmond, 
warily  kept  to  the  north  and  west  of  Cornwallis.  Per- 
ceiving that  he  could  not  prevent  the  junction  of  La 
Fayette  with  Wayne,  Cornwallis,  on  reaching  the  North 
Anna,  turned  upon  the  people  and  resources  of  the  coun- 
try, to  strike  them  a  blow  before  La  Fayette,  re-enforced 
by  Wayne,  could  interpose  his  protection.  He  sent  out 
two  detachments, — one,  under  Tarleton,  to  break  up  the 
Virginia  Assembly,  which  on  the  approach  of  Cornwallis 
had  fled  from  Richmond  to  Charlottesville;  another,  under 
Simcoe,  to  take  or  destroy  the  stores  guarded  by  Steuben 
at  Point  of  Fork.  The  main  body  of  the  army  took  post 
on  the  James  River,  with  head-quarters  at  Elk  Hill,  a 
plantation  belonging  to  Thomas  Jefferson. 

With  180  dragoons  and  40  mounted  infantry,  Tarleton 
rode  seventy  miles  in  twenty-four  hours,  destroying  public 
stores  on  the  way ;  but  the  Assembly,  having  received 
warning,  had  adjourned.  The  dragoons  overtook  seven  of 
the  Legislature.     Otherwise,  the  expedition  was  fruitless. 

Steuben,  at  Point  of  Fork,  had  meanwhile  raised  a  force 
of  about  500  men,  had  caused  most  of  the  stores  at  that 
point  to  be  removed,  and  had  placed  his  command,  with 
the   remaining   stores,  on    the  south   side  of  the   James 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      253 

River,  beyond  the  enemy's  reach.  But  Simcoe,  who  com- 
manded also  about  500  men,  infantry  and  cavalry,  con- 
trived to  make  his  opponent  believe  that  the  whole  British 
army  was  in  pursuit  of  him,  in  consequence  of  which 
Steuben  fled  southward,  abandoning  some  stores  which 
were  not  transportable. 

At  Elk  Hill  all  the  barns  and  fences  were  burned,  the 
growing  crops  destroyed,  the  fields  laid  absolutely  waste, 
the  throats  cut  of  all  the  horses  that  were  too  young  for 
service,  and  the  rest,  along  with  about  thirty  slaves,  carried 
off. 

On  the  7th  of  June,  after  the  expeditions  above  related 
of  Tarleton  and  Simcoe,  La  Fayette  effected  his  junction 
with  Wayne,  not  far  from  the  Raccoon  Ford,  on  the 
Rai^idan.  Having  disposed  of  Simcoe's  and  Tarleton's 
captures,  Cornwallis  had  Tarleton  fitted  out  for  an  expedi- 
tion, the  purpose  of  which  is  set  forth  in  the  following 
letter  of  instructions : 

Camp  at  Jefferson's, 

June  9,  1781. 
Dear  Tarleton, — You  will  proceed  with  the  detachment  of 
cavalry  and  mounted  infantry,  under  your  command,  before  day- 
break to-morrow  morning,  to  Old  Albemarle  Court-House,*  where 
you  will  destroy  any  stores  that  you  may  find.  If  you  then  hear 
of  no  other  stores  of  any  consequence  on  this  side  the  Fluvanna 
[.James  Eiver],  and  that  Baron  Steuben  should  be  still  on  the  other 
side,  you  will  cross  that  river,  and  make  it  your  principal  object  to 
strike  a  blow  at  Baron  Steuben.  As  the  corps  under  his  command 
consists  of  part  of  the  new  levies,  and  is  the  foundation  on  which 
the  body  of  eighteen  months'  men  lately  voted  by  the  province  in 
Virginia  will  be  found,  it  will  be  of  the  utmost  im2)ortance  to 
defeat  and  disperse  it;  I  shoiild,  therefore,  wish  you  to  take  every 
means  in  your  power  of  effecting  this  service,  if  you  should  see  a 
probability  of  success.  I  likewise  recommend  to  you  to  destroy 
all  the  eneraj^'s  stores  and  tobacco  between  James  River  and  the 
Dan  ;    and  if  there   should  be  a  quantity  of  provisions   or  corn 

*  Charlottesville.  Most  of  the  stores  removed  by  the  Americans 
from  Eichmond  were  deposited  here. 


254  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

collected  at  a  private  house,  I  would  have  you  destroy  it,  even 
although  there  should  be  no  proof  of  its  being  intended  for  the 
public  service,  leaving  enough  for  the  support  of  the  family ;  as 
there  is  the  greatest  reason  to  appi*ehend  that  such  provisions  will 
be  ultimately  appropriated  by  the  enemy  to  the  use  of  General 
Greene's  army,  which,  from  the  present  state  of  the  Carolinas, 
must  depend  on  this  province  for  its  supplies. 

I  shall  proceed  by  easy  marches  to  Richmond  ;  and  it  will 
probably  be  a  business  of  eight  or  nine  days  from  this  time  before 
I  can  get  up  my  boats  to  that  place  to  receive  you ;  so  you  may 
very  well  employ  that  time  on  your  expedition.  As  it  is  very 
probable  that  some  of  the  light  troops  of  General  Greene's  army 
may  be  on  their  march  to  this  country,  you  will  do  all  you  can  to 
procure  intelligence  of  their  route.  I  do  not  tell  you  of  what 
importance  it  will  be  to  intercept  them,  or  any  prisoners  of  ours 
from  South  Carolina. 

I  would  have  all  persons  of  consequence,  either  civil  or  military, 
brought  to  me  before  they  are  paroled.  Most  sincerely  wishing  you 
success,  and  placing  the  greatest  confidence  in  your  zeal  and  abili- 
ties, I  am,  with  great  truth  and  regard. 

Dear  Tarleton, 

Most  faithfully  yours, 

CORNWALLIS. 

The  purport  of  this  despatch  was  anticipated  by  the 
enemy.  Before  Tarleton  left  his  camp  to  act  upon  it, 
reports  reached  British  head-quarters  that  the  stores  had 
been  removed  from  Albemarle  Court-House  (Charlottes- 
ville), and  that  Baron  Steuben  had  made  a  circuitous 
move  in  order  to  join  La  Fayette.  The  expedition,  there- 
fore, was  countermanded,  and  the  royal  forces  commenced 
their  march  to  Richmond.  On  the  19th  of  June,  Steuben 
joined  La  Fayette  some  twenty-five  miles  north-west  of 
Richmond.  This  determined  Cornwallis  to  abandon  that 
place  and  retire  to  Williamsburg.  He  arrived  there  on 
the  25th  of  June,  a  month  after  his  first  move  upon  La 
Fayette,  without  in  the  mean  while  having  struck  him  a 
blow. 

"  lu  the  march  of  the  British  army  from  Elk  Hill  down 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE   SOUTH,   1776-1781.      255 

the  river  to  Williamsburg,  all  dwelling-houses  were  plun- 
dered. The  trusty  band  of  La  Fayette  hung  upon  its 
rear,  but  could  not  prevent  its  depredations.  The  Ameri- 
cans of  that  day  computed  that  Cornwallis,  in  his  mid- 
summer marchings  up  and  down  Virginia,  destroyed 
property  to  the  value  of  three  million  pounds  sterling 
($14,580,000).  He  nowhere  gained  a  foothold,  and  he 
obtained  no  supplies  except  through  the  terror  of  his  arms. 
His  long  travels  had  only  taught  him  that  the  bulk  of  the 
people  were  bent  on  independence."  * 

At  Williamsburg  he  received  from  his  chief  orders  to 
send  back  to  him  about  3000  men.  Clinton,  in  a  letter, 
expressed  the  fear  of  being  attacked  by  a  superior  force  in 
New  York ;  there  was,  he  said,  no  possibility  of  re-estab- 
lishing order  in  Virginia,  so  general  was  the  dissatisfaction 
with  Great  Britain.  He  directed  Cornwallis  to  take  some 
healthy  defensive  station  covering  a  harbor  suited  for  a 
base  of  operations  both  by  land  and  sea.  Pursuant  to 
these  instructions,  Cornwallis  crossed  the  James  River 
and  marched  to  Portsmouth,  embarked  the  troops  called 
for  by  Clinton,  and,  having  destroyed  the  defences  of 
Portsmouth,  assembled  his  army  at  Yorktown. 

Apj^rised  by  La  Fayette  of  the  situation  of  the  enemy, 
Washington  demonstrated  against  New  York  (Map  11), 
with  the  effect  of  retaining  Clinton  at  that  point,  and 
moved  with  the  better  ^^vt  of  his  army,  including  the 
French  auxiliaries  under  Pochambeau,  from  the  Hudson 
to  a  position  taken  up  by  La  Fayette  at  Williamsburg. 
In  the  mean  time,  a  French  fleet  had  closed  the  entrance 
to  the  Chesapeake  Bay.  On  the  28th  of  September  the 
united  American  army  advanced  from  Williamsburg  to 
the  front  of  Yorktown.  After  a  day  given  to  recon- 
noitring and  forming  a  plan  of  attack  and  approach,  the 

*  Bancroft. 


256  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

place  was  invested.  Then  followed  the  regular  operations 
of  a  siege,  which  were  prosecuted  with  unremitting  vigor. 
On  the  17th,  Cornwallis,  who  still  had  supplies  to  last  him 
a  week  or  more,  but  was  no  longer  able  to  hold  the  works 
or  to  escape  from  them,  proposed  to  surrender.  On  the 
19th  of  October,  1781,  his  whole  command,  consisting  of 
7247  soldiers  and  840  sailors,  was  taken  possession  of  by 
the  allied  forces  of  France  and  America.  These  consisted 
of  16,000  troops  and  thirty-six  men-of-war. 

Yorktown  was  so  rapidly  reduced  by  bombardment  that 
hunger  had  not  time  to  enter  it.  The  blockading  fleet 
could  effect  nothing  by  the  exclusion  of  provisions.  It 
rendered  two  essential  services,  however : 

1.  In  preventing  the  besieged  from  being  withdrawn  or 
re-enforced  by  sea. 

2.  In  covering  the  inland  water  communications  by 
which  the  besiegers  were  supplied. 

Having  reason,  in  the  course  of  the  siege,  to  aj^prehend 
that  the  fleet  would  quit  the  bay,  Washington  wrote  to  the 
French  admiral,  Count  de  Grasse, — 

"  The  consequences  of  this  will  be  not  only  the  disgrace 
of  abandoning  a  design  on  which  are  founded  the  fairest 
hopes  of  the  allied  forces,  after  a  prodigal  expense,  fatigue, 
and  exertions ;  but  the  probable  disbanding  of  the  whole 
army  ;  for  the  present  seat  of  war  being  such  as  absolutely 
precludes  the  use  of  wagons,  from  the  great  number  of 
large  rivers  which  intersect  the  country,  there  will  be  a 
total  want  of  provisions,  unless  this  inconvenience  is 
remedied  by  water  carriage.  This  j^rovince  has  been  so 
exhausted  by  the  ravages  of  the  enemy,  and  by  the  sup- 
port already  given  to  our  forces,  that  subsistence  must  be 
drawn  from  a  distance,  and  that  can  be  done  only  by  a 
fleet  superior  in  the  Bay." 

Among  the  more  important  teachings  of  this  campaign 
are  the  following : 


BRITISH  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTH,   1776-1781.      257 

1.  The  Value  of  Undisciplmed  Militia  as  a  Home- 
Guard. — The  fact  should  not  be  overlooked,  however, 
that  since  the  days  of  Marion  and  Sumter  the  advantage 
of  the  trained  over  the  untrained  soldier  has  increased 
manifold.  In  the  three  highly  important  attributes  of 
marksmanship,  physical  endurance,  and  knowledge  of  the 
country  the  Southern  partisan  of  the  Revolution  was  the 
superior  of  the  British  and  German  regular. 

2.  The  Importance  of  Unity  of  Command. — The  move- 
ments of  the  British  were  directed  from  London,  from 
New  York,  and  from  head-quarters  in  the  field.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  Germain,  Clinton,  or  Cornwallis 
could  any  one  of  them  have  made  better  work  of  the 
campaign  than  was  made  by  the  three  together. 

3.  The  Difficulty  of  Commanding  Armies  at  a  Dis- 
tance.— Germain  would  not  have  suj)ported  Cornwallis  in 
pushing  the  war  as  he  did  from  South  to  North,  had  he 
been  near  enough  to  know  what  such  progress  amounted 
to.  He  was  under  the  impression  that  Cornwallis  was 
conquering  the  country  as  he  went  along. 

On  the  4th  of  June,  1781,  when  La  Fayette  was  about 
to  unite  with  Wayne  in  Virginia,  when  the  whole  of 
North  Carolina  excepting  the  post  of  Wilmington  was  in 
possession  of  the  Americans,  and  when  Greene  was  gradu- 
ally forcing  Lord  Rawdon,  in  South  Carolina,  back  upon 
the  sea,  Germain  wrote  to  Clinton, — 

"  Lord  Cornwallis  has  indeed  done  everything  in  Caro- 
lina that  prudence,  vigor,  and  activity  could  effect  with 
his  force,  and  if  Major-General  Phillips  remains  and  co- 
operates with  him  in  Virginia,  I  have  not  the  least  doubt 
of  the  rebellion  being  extinguished  at  this  day  in  all  parts 
south  of  James  River,  and  impatiently  expect  to  receive 
accounts  from  his  Lordship  to  that  i)urpose." 

4.  The  Uncertainty  of  Friendships  and  Engagements 
between  an  Invading  Ar^my  and  any  Considerable  Portion 

17 


258  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

of  the  Population  of  the  Enemy. — An  invader  should 
expect  little  assistance  from  any  community  whose  particu- 
lar locality  he  is  not,  to  all  appearances,  able  to  retain 
possession  of,  at  least  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  British  should  not  have  attempted  to  conquer  the 
South ;  they  should  instead  have  renewed  the  effort  to 
possess  themselves  of  the  line  of  the  Hudson.  Had  they 
succeeded  in  that,  they  might  have  invested  New  England 
substantially  as  the  North  invested  the  South  in  our  late 
war, — with  an  army  on  the  north,  an  ocean  fleet  on  the 
east  and  south,  and  a  river  and  lake  fleet  on  the  west. 
There  would  have  been  much  to  do  after  that  before  New 
England  would  have  been  conquered, — more,  perhaps, 
than  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  British  forces  in  America 
to  do ;  but  this  plan,  on  the  whole,  would  seem  more 
practicable  than  any  that  was,  or  could  have  been,  devised 
for  the  conquest  of  the  Middle  or  Southern  States ;  and 
its  success  would  have  been  far  more  effective,  if,  indeed,  it 
would  not  have  decided  the  war.  For  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  the  other  colonies  would  have  had  the  heart  or 
the  means  to  hold  out  after  the  loss  of  New  England. 


XXI. 

AVAR  AND  STRATEGY  IN  GENERAL. 

The  Political  and  Military  Problem. 

WHEN  a  war  is  determined  on,  the  first  step  to  be 
taken  is  to  estimate  the  force  that  will  be  necessary 
for  its  prosecution.  This  involves  an  inquiry  into  the 
political  attitude,  the  geography,  and  the  military  strength 
of  the  several  powers  that  may  unite  as  hostile  parties  to 
it.  Such  inquiry  will  determine  against  which  of  the 
powers  the  main  force  shall  be  directed  and  which  of  them 
shall  be  simply  arrested  or  observed.  The  case  of  there 
being  only  one  hostile  power  to  consider  is  a  rare  ex- 
ception. 

The  3Iobilizatio7i. 
The  next  step  is  to  raise  or  mobilize  the  necessary  mili- 
tary force.  In  continental  Europe  this  is  systematically 
and  expeditiously  done  in  accordance  with  a  regular  or 
permanent  scheme.  In  our  country  it  would  be  accom- 
plished by  some  comparatively  slow,  improvised  method 
of  strengthening  the  regular  army,  or  of  calling  out  and 
enlisting  volunteers,  or  possibly  by  drafting.  At  any  rate, 
in  this  country,  as  in  Europe,  some  hastily  recruited  or 
standing  contingent  would  have  to  guard  the  exposed 
frontier  while  the  bulk  of  the  army  was  being  placed  on 
a  war  footing.  This  first  duty  at  the  front  would  j)robably 
devolve  on  the  militia. 

The  Strategic  Formation. 
The  elements  of  the  army  being  ready  in  their  home 
depots,  or  first  rendezvous,  the  next  step  is  to  array  them 

259 


260  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY. 

for  strategic  action, — that  is,  to  assemble  the  army  on  the 
frontier  in  a  disposition  suited  to  its  projected  move- 
ments. The  strategic  formation  of  the  army  must  thus 
correspond,  at  least  in  its  main  features,  to  the  general 
plan  of  operation ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  to  a 
certain  extent  conform  to  the  direction  and  the  grouping 
of  the  lines  of  communication,  especially  the  railroads  and 
navigable  rivers,  leading  to  the  frontier.  The  plan  of 
operation  and  the  prior  strategic  formation  must  thus  be 
worked  out  with  reference  to  each  other.  Our  plan,  more- 
over, must  be  such  as  to  counteract  that  of  the  enemy,  and 
hence  our  strategic  formation  is  determined  by  a  com- 
promise between  the  counteraction  of  the  enemy's  plan 
and  the  utilization  of  our  system  of  communications. 

For  their  conveyance  to  the  frontier,  the  troops  will  be 
distributed  among  the  available  railways  and  waterways 
so  as  to  secure  the  minimum  of  friction,  interference,  or 
accident.  The  terminal  stations  of  these  lines  will  indi- 
cate approximately  the  strategic  front.  The  positions,  too, 
of  these  stations  and  of  the  roads  upon  which  the  last 
short  marches  are  made  will  usually  determine  the  group- 
ing of  the  collective  forces  into  minor  armies.  Such  was 
the  case  with  the  Germans  in  1870. 

"  At  all  events,"  says  Von  der  Goltz,  "  merely  in  order 
to  make  one  army  stronger  and  another  weaker,  and  to 
add  these  corps  to  this  army  and  those  to  that,  no  un- 
necessary and  dilatory  movements  will  be  undertaken." 
These  remarks  refer  to  the  case  in  which  minor  armies  are 
formed  merely  to  facilitate  the  handling  of  a  number  of 
corps  as  a  single  whole.  They  do  not  apply  to  the  forma- 
tion of  separate  armies  destined  to  operate  each  in  its  own 
theatre  or  with  its  own  distinct  object.  The  armies  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  and  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia 
in  1870  (the  second  and  third)  were  not  separate  armies 
as  were  Meade's  and  Sheridan's  in  1864  (the  Army  of 


WAR  AND   STRATEGY  IN  GENERAL.  261 

the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah).  Minor 
armies,  as  distinguished  from  separate  armies,  were  fore- 
shadowed by  the  grand  divisions  of  the  Army  of  tlie 
Potomac  in  1862,  and  may  be  said  to  have  been  typified 
by  the  Armies  of  the  Cumberland,  the  Ohio,  and  the 
Tennessee  as  the  right,  left,  and  centre,  respectively,  of 
Sherman's  army  in  1864. 

Of  course  the  enemy's  plan  is  not  known.  But  if  in 
spirit  we  transport  ourselves  to  the  enemy's  side,  and  then 
enter  into  the  same  investigation  as  we  have  already  made 
in  our  own  case ;  if  we  weigh  carefully  the  positions  of 
the  railroads  in  the  enemy's  country,  the  necessity  of  pro- 
tecting the  threatened  provinces,  and  later  the  metropolis 
and  the  frontier  defences,  if  such  exist,  we  shall  be  able  to 
guess  with  tolerable  certainty  the  strategic  deployment 
that  the  enemy  must  make. 

"If  we  have  made  up  our  minds  as  to  the  enemy's 
strategic  front  (supposing  it  to  have  been  a  matter  of 
uncertainty),  we  shall  be  able  to  determine  in  what  dis- 
trict of  the  frontier  our  own  troops  ought  to  be  massed. 
Thither  the  railway  transports,  or  the  more  forward  sec- 
tions, will  next  be  directed,  branch  and  side  lines  being 
made  use  of.  Finally,  the  troops  will  be  pushed  into 
position  by  foot  marches.  In  this,  each  division  must  be 
allowed  room  enough  to  find  comfortable  quarters.  It 
must  also  be  taken  into  consideration  tliat,  in  case  defence 
be  thought  of,  a  concentration  of  troops  for  the  battle  must 
be  possible,  and  that  if  an  attack  is  to  be  made,  each  army 
corps  must  have  at  least  one  good  road  in  front,  leading 
from  its  quarters  straight  to  the  enemy.  Under  all  cir- 
cumstances the  cavalry  divisions  must  be  placed  in  the 
van,  else,  in  order  to  allow  them  to  begin  their  recon- 
noitring work,  they  would  have  to  be  brought  up  through 
the  other  troops.  This  would  be  productive  of  confusion, 
and  besides  would  deprive  them,  as  long  as  they  are  pass- 


262  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

ing,  of  the  means  of  finding  quarters,  all  the  villages  and 
towns  being  already  occupied.  They  will,  as  a  rule,  be 
sent  ahead  upon  the  railroads,  or  at  all  events  a  part  of 
them,  by  which  arrangement  they  will  arrive  at  the  very 
front."  * 

The  Design  of  Operatio7is. 

The  strategic  formation  being  completed,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief has  to  indicate  in  general  terms,  if  he 
has  not  already  done  so,  the  course  that  the  invasion  or 
the  defence,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  to  take. 

"  No  plan  of  operations  can  with  any  degree  of  safety 
extend  beyond  the  first  collision  with  the  enemy's  main 
army."f 

That  is  to  say,  no  plan  adopted  at  the  outset  should  be 
expected  to  prove  altogether  feasible  after  the  first  general 
engagement.  Unity  or  consistency  of  action  is  maintained 
by  a  general  idea,  or  a  set  of  such  ideas,  constituting  what 
Von  der  Goltz  terms  a  design  of  operations,  and  on  which 
all  plans  are  based. 

When  the  Germans  invaded  France,  in  1870,  their 
design  of  operations  was  the  single  idea  of  driving  the 
French  armies  northward  from  their  connection  with 
Paris.  This  being  accomplished,  they  formed  the  design 
of  taking  Paris. 

In  our  late  war  the  Federal  design  of  operations  con- 
sisted of  three  ideas :  to  isolate  the  Confederacy  commer- 
cially, to  cut  it  in  two,  and  to  strike  at  its  capital.  Its 
commercial  isolation  was  accomplished  by  the  blockade ; 
its  partition  was  then  effected  by  the  opening  up  of  the 
Mississippi  Piver.  At  this  time  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, whose  objective  from  the  beginning  had  been  Rich- 
mond, was  called  on  to  turn  back  the  tide  of  invasion  at 
Gettysburg,  and  was  farther  from  Richmond  than  it  had 

*  "  The  Nation  in  Arms,"  Von  der  Goltz.  f  Ibid. 


WAR  AND   STRATEGY  IN  GENERAL.  263 

been  at  any  time  during  the  war.  When  it  entered  on  its 
next  campaign,  in  which  the  other  Union  armies  more  or 
less  directly  participated,  its  design  was  to  strike  not  at  the 
capital,  but  at  the  main  army  of  the  Confederacy ;  its  ob- 
jective was  thenceforth  not  Richmond,  but  Lee's  army.  In 
the  mean  while  the  design  was  formed  in  the  North  of  again 
cutting  the  Confederacy  in  two ;  this  time  by  severing  its 
east  and  west  railroad  communications.  It  was  upon  the 
execution  of  this  design  in  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta 
campaigns  that  the  Western  armies  co-operated  with  the 
Eastern  in  the  grand  converging  movement  from  which 
resulted,  first,  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  and,  shortly 
afterwards,  the  surrender  of  Lee's  army. 

A  design  of  operations  should  be  based  upon  the  thor- 
ough knowledge  of  one's  enemy  and  of  his  circumstances 
and  condition.  Such  knowledge  is  acquired  only  by  a 
systematic  study  of  his  military  institutions;  of  the  po- 
litical, military,  and  statistical  geograj)hy,  and  of  the 
social,  political,  and  commercial  systems,  of  his  country ; 
and,  finally,  of  his  history,  with  special  regard  to  his  wars. 

As  a  rule,  the  primary  object  of  military  operations 
should  be  to  overpower,  and,  if  possible,  to  capture  or 
destroy,  the  hostile  army.  This  is  done  by  the  use  mainly 
of  tactical  strategy  (outnumbering  the  enemy  in  battle) 
and  subordinately  of  regular  strategy  (depriving  the  enemy 
of  supplies)  and  political  strategy  (embarrassing  the  en- 
emy's government  and  carrying  the  war  home  to  the 
people) . 

As  an  army  advances  into  an  enemy's  country  it  posts 
detachments  in  its  rear  and  on  its  flanks,  not  only  to  guard 
its  communications,  but  also  to  prevent  the  raising  of  re- 
enforcements  for  the  enemy,  to  obstruct  the  channels 
through  which  he  might  be  in  any  way  aided  or  abetted, 
to  seize  and  hold  his  depots  and  magazines,  and,  if  ]:>os- 
sible,  to   detach   the   population   from   its   allegiance  and 


264  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

organize  it  into  friendly  states,  or  to  induce  it  to  furnish 
auxiliary  corps,  either  of  partisans  or  of  regular  troops. 
The  formation  of  new  governments  in  the  enemy's  country 
is  greatly  favored  by  the  union  of  the  civil  with  the  mili- 
tary authority  in  the  person  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
Where  this  condition  does  not  obtain,  as  is  generally  the 
case  in  republican  armies,  a  civilian  commissioner  with 
the  necessary  powers  should  accompany  head-quarters. 
It  need  hardly  be  stated  that  the  form  of ,  government 
held  out  to  a  people  with  a  view  to  detaching  it  from  its 
allegiance  must  be  such  as  to  be  preferred  by  it  to  its  own, 
and  even  a  government  imposed  upon  a  hostile  peo23le  for 
the  purpose  merely  of  controlling  it  during  the  course  of 
operations  should  be  made  as  accej^table  to  it  as  possible. 
The  maintenance  of  a  military  despotism  in  the  rear  of  an 
invading  army  must  generally  prove  a  waste  of  power. 
All  great  conquerors  have  been  masters  of  the  politics  of 
strategy.  The  wonderful  successes  of  Napoleon  are  at- 
tributable in  no  small  measure  to  his  figuring  as  the  apos- 
tle of  republicanism,  or  of  representative  government. 
The  campaigns  of  Alexander  and  Hannibal  afford  perhaps 
the  most  signal  instances  in  the  history  of  the  strategist 
reckoning  with  diplomacy.  Both  commanders  counted 
for  success  upon  a  vast  augmentation  of  their  armies  in 
the  enemy's  country.  The  realization  of  this  idea  by 
Alexander  and  its  non-realization  by  Hannibal  may  be 
regarded  as  the  main  secrets  both  of  the  marvellous  suc- 
cess of  the  former  and  of  the  melancholy,  though  illus- 
trious, failure  of  the  latter. 

The  enemy's  army  disposed  of,  his  government  may  be 
expected  to  make  overtures  of  peace.  Should  this  expec- 
tation be  disappointed  or  no  agreement  be  arrived  at,  the 
victor  will  endeavor  to  coerce  the  hostile  government,  or 
to  awe  the  people  into  submission.  He  will  first  move 
upon  the  enemy's  capital.     If  he  reduce  it  and  peace  is 


WAR  AND   STRATEGY  IN  GENERAL.  265 

not  thereby  assured,  he  will  disperse  his  forces  as  an  army 
of  occupation,  and  will  proceed  to  possess  himself  of 
minor  political  centres  and  places  of  arms  and  other  stra- 
tegic points.  His  main  object  will  be  to  prevent  the 
formation  of  fresh  armies. 

Should  the  enemy's  army  at  the  outset  adopt  tlie  Fabian 
policy  of  avoiding  a  conflict,  one  would  be  playing  into 
its  hands  by  following  it  up.  In  such  a  case  the  fixed 
strategic  points  should  be  aimed  at.  If,  as  may  be  the 
case  in  a  sparsely-settled  or  imperfectly-civilized  country, 
there  are  no  fixed  strategic  points  or  none  of  decisive  or 
commanding  importance,  the  only  course  to  pursue  may 
be  that  of  carrying  the  war  home  to  the  people. 

The  Flan  of  Operations. 

The  army  being  assembled  on  the  frontier  with  its  design 
of  operations  determined  on,  the  final  step  is  to  fix  on  a  par- 
ticular plan  for  crossing  the  frontier  and  leading  up  to  the 
first  general  engagement.  "  From  the  first  moment,"  says 
Von  der  Goltz,  "  the  opposing  forces  will  confront  each 
other  a  short  distance  apart,  and  the  scope  for  manoeuvring 
will  be  very  small.  A  preliminary  operation,  formerly 
unknown,  will  in  the  future  consist  in  pushing  or  break- 
ing througli  the  frontier  line.  This  must  be  attempted 
by  the  assailant  in  the  place  where  he  knows  that  the 
enemy's  main  force  is  not  in  immediate  proximity,  for  its 
presence  on  the  spot  would  materially  impede  the  clear- 
ing away  of  the  defences.  In  this  case,  therefore,  the 
enemy's  main  army  will  be  sought  in  a  roundabout  way. 
Reconnoissances  pushed  across  the  border  and  extending 
to  right  and  left,  and  the  rapid  massing  of  troops  on 
points  where  a  breaking  through  is  either  determined  on 
or  apprehended,  as  the  case  may  be,  will  form  the  prelude 
to  ensuing  bloody  battles.  Subsequent  steps  will  be  taken 
as  they  are  determined  by  circumstances." 


266  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

In  illustration  of  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  an  account 
will  be  given  of  the  main  operations  by  which,  in  our 
Civil  War,  the  Federal  armies  gained  possession  of  the 
line  of  the  Mississippi  River.  They  will  be  treated  under 
the  heads  of  "  The  Shiloh  Campaign"  and  "  The  Vicks- 
burg  Campaign." 


XXII. 

THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN,  1862. 

WE  are  supposed  to  be  in  point  of  time  at  the  end  of 
the  year  1861.  Our  Civil  War  has  been  going  on 
tentatively,  so  to  speak,  for  over  six  months,  but  strategi- 
cally it  has  not  yet  commenced. 

General  McClellan  has  gained  a  minor  success  in  West 
Virginia,  and  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  all  the 
armies  in  the  field.  He  has  recently  completed  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  is  now  preparing 
to  respond  to  the  popular  demand  for  its  advance  against 
Kichmond.  The  battle  of  Bull  Run  has  been  fought, 
with  the  purely  moral  result  of  momentarily  depressing 
the  North  and  encouraging  the  South.  The  blockade  has 
hardly  begun  to  take  effect.  The  Monitor  and  the  Merri- 
mac  are  yet  to  meet  in  their  momentous  and  significant 
conflict.  The  strategic  object  has  been  formed  at  the  North 
of  opening  up  the  Mississippi  Kiver  and  thus  cutting  the 
Confederacy  in  two,  but  nothing  has  been  done  towards 
the  attainment  of  that  object.  The  fight  for  Missouri  is  at 
its  height,  but  is  being  fought  more  for  the  moral  than  for 
the  material  advantage  of  winning  it.  Grant's  Belmont 
expedition  has  proved  a  fiasco.  The  mouth  of  the  Missis- 
sippi is  blockaded,  but  Farragut's  brilliant  course  on  its 
majestic  waters  has  not  commenced. 

In  the  great  zone  of  operations  marked  out  by  the 
Alleghany  Mountains  as  an  eastern  boundary  and  the 
Mississippi  Kiver  as  a  western,  the  opposing  forces  in  the 
first  grand  or  decisive  campaign  of  the  war  now  confront 
each  other  along  the  natural  military  frontier  formed  by 

267 


268  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

tlie  Ohio  River.  A  Confederate  army,  numbering  about 
50,000  men,  occupies  an  east  and  west  line  designed  to 
cover  the  avenues  of  invasion  of  the  South  and  to  serve  as 
a  base  of  operations  for  an  invasion  of  the  North.  The 
principal  points  of  this  line  are  the  following  (Map  13)  : 
Columbus  on  the  Mississippi  River,  Fort  Henry  on  the 
Tennessee,  FortDonelson  on  the  Cumberland,  and  Bowling 
Green  on  the  Big  Barren.  They  are  all  strongly  fortified. 
An  intrenched  post  is  established  at  Mill  Springs,  on  the 
head-waters  of  the  Cumberland,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
barring  the  approach  which  that  river  ajffords  to  the  rear 
of  the  Confederate  line  and  of  covering  Cumberland  Gap 
and  Jacksboro,  through  which  access  is  gained  to  deposits 
of  salt,  coal,  iron,  and  lead,  which  are  of  vital  im^wrtance, 
and  to  the  railroad  tliat  connects  the  Western  armies  with 
the  Confederate  capital  and  with  the  armies  in  the  East. 
The  force  at  Mill  Springs  is  supplied  partly  from  Knox- 
ville  and  partly  from  Nashville.  Clarksville  is  intrenched 
and  garrisoned  as  a  sub-post  of  Fort  Donelson. 

The  Federals  occupy  the  line  of  the  Ohio  River  and  a 
section  of  country  to  the  south  of  it  with  the  following  forces: 

Grant's  army  at  Cairo,  Paducah,  and  Smithland, 

head-quarters  at  Cairo 15,000 

Buell's  army  confronting  the  positions  of  Bowl- 
ing Green  and  Mill  Springs,  with  centime  at 
Elizabethtown,  head-quarters  at  Louisville  .  .    60,000 
Total 75,000 

The  Federal  armies,  however,  are  on  the  increase,  and 
their  total  strength  averages  during  the  campaign  about 
100,000  men. 

The  Federals  have  a  fleet  of  gunboats,  mortar-boats,  and 
transports,  to  which  are  afterwards  added  a  number  of 
improvised  rams.  The  Confederates  have  in  the  Upper 
Mississippi  a  few  gunboats,  which  are  incapable  of  coping 
with  those  of  the  Federals,  and  here  and  there  a  floating 


THE  SHILOE  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  269 

battery.  This  uaval  force  is  increased  in  the  course  of 
the  campaign,  but  it  is  never  made  a  fair  match  for  the 
enemy's.  Except  on  the  Mississippi,  the  Confederates 
have  no  naval  force  worthy  of  the  name. 

Grant's  army  is  under  the  control  of  General  Halleck, 
whose  head-quarters  are  at  St.  Louis.  Buell  is  indepen- 
dent of  Halleck.  Both  Buell  and  Halleck  report  to 
General  McClellan  at  AVashington.  The  Confederate 
forces  are  under  the  command  of  General  Albert  Sydney 
Johnston,  whose  head-quarters  are  at  Bowling  Green. 

31s^  December,  1861-ls^  February,  1862. — Demonstra- 
tions made  by  the  Confederates  at  Mill  Springs  give 
General  Buell  reason  to  apprehend  an  incursion  from  that 
quarter.  To  prevent  it,  he  detaches  a  force  under  General 
Thomas  from  Lebanon.  Starting  on  the  last  day  of 
December,  Thomas  marches  southward,  threatening  to 
occup3'  the  border  of  the  Cumberland  below  Mill  Springs, 
and  on  the  19th  of  January  meets  the  enemy  and  utterly 
defeats  him  at  a  point  called  Logan's  Cross-Roads,  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Cumberland,  about  nine  miles  from  Mill 
Springs.  The  Confederates  retreat  in  disorder,  partly 
down  the  Cumberland  Kiver  and  partly  towards  the 
Cumberland  Mountains,  Lack  of  transportation,  together 
with  the  bad  condition  of  the  roads,  prevents  General 
Thomas  from  following  up  his  victory  in  either  direction. 
A  blow  is  now  to  be  struck  by  Grant's  army  at  the  centre 
of  the  Confederate  line. 

1d—lQ>th  February. — On  the  2d  of  February,  General 
U.  S.  Grant  starts  up  the  Tennessee  River  with  a  force  of 
17,000  men,  on  transports,  convoyed  by  seven  gunboats 
under  Commodore  Foote,  to  gain  possession  of  Fort 
Henry.  On  the  5th  the  troops  are  landed  about  three 
miles  below  the  fort.  An  attack  by  land  and  water  is  to 
take  place  the  following  day  at  noon  ;  but,  being  delayed 
by   the   difficulties   of  the  road.  Grant  arrives   with  the 


270  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

troops  only  in  time  to  take  possession  of  the  works,  which 
in  the  mean  time  have  been  reduced  by  the  fleet  alone. 
With  the  exception  of  the  commander,  his  staff,  and  about 
ninety  men,  who  are  cajitured  with  the  fort,  the  garrison 
of  Fort  Henry,  which  numbered  about  2800  men,  escapes 
to  Fort  Donelson. 

The  course  of  the  Tennessee  is  now  open  up  to  East- 
port.  Between  this  point  and  the  vicinity  of  Florence  it 
is  obstructed  by  shallows  called  Muscle  Shoals.  A  fleet  of 
wooden  gunboats  promptly  pushes  up  to  this  obstruction, 
displaying  the  Federal  flag,  and  does  not  encounter  the 
least  opposition.  Nevertheless,  the  line  of  the  Tennessee, 
w^hich  is  the  natural  path  of  invasion  for  the  Federals, 
cannot  yet  be  regarded  as  secure.  At  the  sites  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland 
Rivers  are  only  eleven,  and  the  forts  only  seven,  miles 
apart.  A  Confederate  force  at  Fort  Donelson  might  at  any 
time  march  over  to  the  Tennessee  and  again  close  that  river 
to  the  Federals.  The  Tennessee  River  cannot  be  relied 
on  as  a  line  of  operation  until  Fort  Donelson  is  reduced. 
With  this  point  in  their  possession,  the  Federals  may  not 
only  securely  utilize  the  line  of  the  Tennessee,  they  may 
also  push  up  the  Cumberland  and  turn  the  position  of 
Bowling  Green  as  effectually  as  they  might  have  done 
coming  down.  Accordingly  the  investment  of  Fort 
Donelson,  which  is  accomplished  on  the  12th  of  February, 
is  followed  on  the  14th  by  the  evacuation  of  Bowling 
Green. 

On  the  6tli  of  February,  Buell,  of  his  own  accord, 
orders  a  division  *  from  the  mouth  of  Green  River  to  join 
Grant  by  water.  This  force  of  course  does  not  reach  its 
destination  until  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  but  it  is  now 
acting  an  important  part  in  front  of  Fort  Donelson. 

*  Crufl's  brigade  and  eight  new  regiments. 


THE   SHILOII  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  271 

On  the  loth,  Buell,  again  on  his  own  responsibility, 
orders  a  division '''  to  move  by  water  to  the  aid  of  Grant, 
and,  with  the  object  of  co-operating  with  Grant,  he  directs 
the  mass  of  his  army  upon  Bowling  Green.  Buell's 
advance  reaches  Bowling  Green  on  the  14tli,  just  in  time 
to  see  the  last  Confederate  troops  depart. 

Fort  Donelson  surrenders  to  Grant  on  the  16th.  Of 
the  garrison,  which  may  be  estimated  at  20,000,  about 
5000  have  escaped  and  about  13,000  are  captured.  The 
rest  may  be  set  down  as  killed  or  missing.  Grant's  land 
force  has  been  increased  during  the  investment  to  27,000 
men. 

About  the  middle  of  February,  General  Beauregard 
assumes  command,  under  Johnston,  of  the  Confederate 
forces  on  the  Mississippi  River. 

nth  February -bth  Ajiri/.  —  From  Bowling  Green, 
Johnston  falls  back  on  Nashville,  the  capital  of  the  State 
of  Tennessee  and  the  most  important  depot  of  supplies 
west  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains.  He  hopes  to  make  a 
defence  on  the  Cumberland  Biver.  But,  as  already  indi- 
cated, the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  opens  up  to  the  Federals 
both  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee  Bivers,  and  thus 
exposes  the  line  of  the  Cumberland  to  attack  in  front, 
flank,  and  rear.  It  has  also  exposed  Columbus  on  the 
Mississippi  to  being  taken  in  reverse.  As  a  consequence, 
both  Nashville  and  Columbus  have  to  be  abandoned. 
The  evacuation  of  Nashville  commences  on  the  17th  of 
February  and  is  completed  by  the  departure  of  the  Con- 
federate rear  guard  on  the  night  of  February  23.  On  the 
following  morning  Buell's  advance  appears  on  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  river. 

The  division  ordered  by  Buell,  on  the  13th  of  February, 
to  re-enforce  Grant  by  water  did  not  reach  Fort  Donelson 

*  Xelson's. 


272  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

in  time  to  assist  in  the  reduction  of  that  ^^lace.  It  accord- 
ingly i^roceeded  by  water  to  Nashville,  where  it  arrives  on 
the  25th,  the  day  after  Buell's  advance.  On  the  20th  of 
February,  Buell  orders  another  division*  to  re-enforce 
Grant.  This  is  done  without  orders,  but  on  a  request  of 
Halleck's  dated  the  15th,  the  day  before  the  fall  of  Fort 
Donelson.  Buell  has  now  three  divisions  of  his  army 
with  Grant  or  en  route  to  join  him,  and  three  under  his 
own  command. 

On  the  20th,  the  date  of  Buell's  last-mentioned  order, 
a  naval  force  under  Foote  takes  possession  of  Clarksville, 
and  prepares  to  take  4000  of  Grant's  soldiers  on  board 
for  the  purpose  of  occupying  Nashville,  which  has  been 
abandoned  by  the  Confederate  main  body  ;  but  this  under- 
taking is  forbidden  by  General  Halleck. 

The  evacuation  of  Columbus  commences  on  February 
27  and  is  completed  on  March  2. 

From  Nashville  Johnston  retires  to  Murfreesboro. 
Here  he  covers  the  removal  towards  Chattanooga  of  the 
stores  that  he  has  been  able  to  remove  from  Nashville, 
and  collects  a  number  of  fugitives  from  Donelson,  and 
detached  bodies  of  troops,  including  the  force  that  had  re- 
treated down  the  Cumberland  from  Mill  Springs.  These 
re-enforcements  raise  his  immediate  command  to  17,000 
men. 

He  intends  to  continue  his  retreat  to  Stevenson,  and  to 
operate  from  that  point  as  a  base  against  Buell,  leaving 
Beauregard,  with  the  forces  on  the  Mississippi,  to  oppose 
Grant ;  or  else  he  is  feigning  such  a  plan  and  actually 
intending  to  unite  his  force  with  Beauregard's. 

Beauregard  realizes  that  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  and 
Nashville  renders  all  the  defences  of  the  Mississippi  above 
Memphis  powerless.     It  is  therefore  near  this  city  that  he 

*  Thomas's. 


THE   SHILOir  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  273 

prepares  his  system  of  works  for  checking  the  Federal 
fleets.  But  to  retard  their  progress  and  gain  time  to 
finish  these  woi-ks,  he  fortifies  New  Madrid  and  Island 
No.  10.  Estimating  at  their  proper  value  these  means 
of  passive  resistance,  he  believes  that  the  true  defence  for 
the  MississijDpi  is  a  field  army  capable  of  making  head- 
way against  Grant's.  Accordingly,  on  the  abandonment 
of  Columbus,  a  portion  of  the  garrison  is  sent  down  the 
river  to  man  the  works  of  New  Madrid  and  Island  No. 
10 ;  the  rest  is  established  as  a  nucleus  for  a  field  army  at 
Corinth.  To  appreciate  the  strategic  value  of  this  point, 
one  must  consider  the  general  features  of  the  j'ailroad 
system  of  the  Confederacy.  It  comprises  but  two  lines 
connecting  the  Mississippi  valley  with  the  Atlantic  coast. 
The  northern  one  (Map  13)  joins  Memphis  to  Richmond ; 
the  southern  (Map  14)  joins  Vicksburg  to  Charleston. 
These  lines  are  crossed  west  of  the  Alleghanies  by  three 
north-and-south  lines,  which  tap  the  Memphis-Richmond 
line  going  south  at  the  following  points:  (1)  Chattanooga 
and  Cleveland,  (2)  Corinth,  (3)  Grand  Junction  and  Mem- 
phis. It  is  apparent  that  Corinth  is  the  natural  base  of 
operations  for  a  defence  of  this  railroad  system  against  an 
attack  directed  up  the  Tennessee  River. 

After  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson,  Halleck  adopts 
Memphis  as  his  decisive  objective.  Unaware  that  Beaure- 
gard is  forming  a  field  army,  Halleck  proposes  that  the 
subordinate  positions  above  and  below  Memphis,  and  the 
railroads  radiating  from  that  point,  be  disposed  of  by  his 
lieutenants  as  a  j)reliminary  to  his  taking  the  field  himself 
and  moving  on  the  main  objective.  On  the  18th  of  Feb- 
ruary he  assigns  to  General  Pope  the  task  of  rechicing 
the  forts  on  the  Mississii)pi.  On  the  3d  of  March,  Pope's 
command  appears  before  tlie  position  of  New  Madrid  and 
Island  No.  10,  which  received  its  garrison  from  Columbus 

only  the  day  before.     Regarding  the  operations  against 

18 


274  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  railroads,  Halleck  forwards  to  Grant,  on  the  1st  of 
March,  the  following  order : 

"  Transports  will  be  sent  to  you  as  soon  as  possible  to 
move  your  column  up  the  Tennessee  Kiver.  The  main 
object  of  this  expedition  will  be  to  destroy  the  railroad 
bridge  over  Bear  Creek,  near  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and 
also  the  connections  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt. 
It  is  thought  best  that  these  objects  should  be  attempted 
in  the  order  named.  Strong  detachments  of  cavalry  and 
light  artillery,  supported  by  infantry,  may,  by  rapid  move- 
ments, reach  these  points  from  the  river  without  very 
serious  opposition.  Avoid  any  general  engagement  with 
strong  forces.  It  will  be  better  to  retreat  than  to  risk  a 
general  battle.  This  should  be  strongly  impressed  upon 
the  officers  sent  with  the  expedition  from  the  river.  Gen- 
eral C.  F.  Smith,  or  some  very  discreet  officer,  should  be 
selected  for  such  commands.  Having  accom23lished  these 
objects,  or  such  of  them  as  may  be  practicable,  you  will 
return  to  Danville  and  move  on  Paris." 

AVhile  the  preparations  for  this  expedition  are  being 
made.  General  Grant,  through  a  misunderstanding  of  his 
conduct  by  General  Halleck,  is  virtually  placed  in  arrest, 
and  the  command  of  the  expedition  given  to  General 
C.  F.  Smith.  But  being  returned  to  duty.  Grant  joins 
the  expedition,  and  assumes  command,  on  the  17th  of 
March,  at  Savannah.  In  the  mean  time,  the  first  step  in 
General  Halleck's  plan,  the  destruction  of  the  railroad 
near  Eastport,  has  been  attempted  and  failed,  and  events, 
have  occurred  which  dictate  to  Halleck  a  material  change 
in  his  plan. 

On  the  6th  he  telegraphs  to  Buell, — 

"  News  down  the  Tennessee  that  Beauregard  has  20,000 
men  at  Corinth,  and  is  rapidly  fortifying  it.  Smith  will 
probably  not  be  strong  enough  to  attack  it.  It  is  a  great 
misfortune  to  lose  that  point.     I  shall  re-enforce  Smith  as 


THE  SIIILOH  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  275 

rapidly  as  possible.  If  you  can  sentl  a  division  by  water 
around  into  the  Tennessee,  it  would  require  only  a  small 
amount  of  transportation  to  do  it." 

And  on  the  10th, — 

"My  forces  are  moving  up  the  Tennessee  River  as 
rapidly  as  we  can  obtain  transportation.  Florence  was 
the  point  originally  designated,  but,  on  account  of  the 
enemy's  forces  at  Corinth  and  Humboldt,  it  is  deemed 
best  to  land  at  Savannah  and  establish  a  depot."  .  .  . 

Under  date  of  March  11,  the  President  issues  an  order 
placing  Buell  under  the  orders  of  Halleck. 

On  the  strength  of  it,  Halleck  despatches  to  Buell,  on 
the  16th,  the  following  order : 

"  Move  your  forces  by  land  to  the  Tennessee  as  rapidly 
as  possible.  Our  troops  have  destroyed  the  railroad  at 
Purdy,  but  find  the  enemy  in  strong  force  at  Eastport 
and  Corinth,  reported  60,000.  Grant's  army  is  concen- 
trating on  Savannah.  You  must  direct  your  march  on 
that  point,  so  that  the  enemy  cannot  get  between  us."  ,  .  . 

Buell  does  not  receive  this  order  until  the  18tli,  but, 
pursuant  to  a  previous  agreement  with  Halleck,  he  has 
anticipated  and  partly  executed  it.  His  progress  is  checked 
on  the  17th  of  March  at  Columbia,  where  the  necessity  of 
constructing  a  bridge  delays  him  until  the  29th.  Grant's 
army  is  advanced  by  the  20th  of  March  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  nine  miles  from  Savannah  and  twenty-three 
from  Corinth,  with  outposts  at  Shiloli. 

While  Buell  is  moving  to  join  Grant,  Johnston  is 
moving  to  join  Beauregard.  Leaving  Murfreesboro  on  the 
28th  of  February,  Johnston  marches  through  Shelbyville 
and  Decatur  upon  Corinth.  He  arrives  with  his  staff  on 
the  22d  of  March ;  the  mass  of  his  army  is  assembled 
at  or  about  Corinth  by  the  25tli.  Buell  does  not  reach 
Savannah  until  the  oth  of  A[)ril.  In  the  mean  time 
Johnston  forms  or  adopts  the  plan   of  attacking  Grant 


276  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

before  Buell  joins  him,  but  he  puts  off  the  operation  to 
await  the  arrival  of  an  army  of  17,000  men  under  Van 
Dorn,  coming  from  across  the  Mississippi.  Learning, 
however,  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  April,  that  Buell  has 
passed  Columbia,  Johnston  orders  his  army  to  move  on 
the  following  day.  It  is  his  intention  to  get  near  enough 
to  the  Federal  outposts  by  the  evening  of  the  4th  to  be 
able  to  fight  the  battle  on  the  5th  ;  but,  owing  to  various 
mishaps  incidental  to  the  handling  of  an  improvised  army, 
his  advance  does  not  get  into  position  until  3  p.m.  on  the 
5th,  too  late  to  open  a  battle  on  that  day  ;  but  it  remains 
in  position,  within  two  miles  of  the  Federal  outposts, 
during  the  night. 

6th-Sth  April. — Soon  after  three  o'clock  in  the  morning 
the  Confederates  are  astir,  and  about  two  hours  later  they 
move  in  full  force  into  action.  The  Federals  are  taken 
completely  by  surprise.  Their  outposts  are  at  once  driven 
in,  by  noon  their  first  line  is  overcome,  and  by  evening 
they  have  lost  all  their  positions  and  their  camps,  even 
those  occupied  by  the  second  line.  Two  divisions  are 
completely  disorganized.  The  other  three,  greatly  re- 
duced, are  crowded  back  upon  Pittsburg  Landing.  A 
brigade  only  of  Buell's  leading  division  is  able  to  reach 
the  field  in  time  to  assist  at  the  last  moment  in  averting 
the  destruction  of  Grant's  army.  The  Confederates  are 
now  under  the  command  of  Beauregard,  Johnston  having 
been  mortally  wounded  about  half-past  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon. 

On  the  following  day  the  Federals,  re-enforced  by  the 
bulk  of  Buell's  army,  assume  the  offensive.  By  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  they  have  recovered  all  lost  ground 
and  forced  the  enemy  to  retreat.  In  this  battle — the 
greatest  which  up  to  this  time  has  been  fought  in  the 
western  hemisphere — the  forces  engaged  on  the  first  day 
numbered  on  each  side  about  40,000  men.    The  re-enforce- 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  277 

raents  received  by  the  Federals  for  the  second  day  aggre- 
gated about  22,000.  The  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing  is  on  the  Federal  side  about  13,000  and  on  the 
Confederate  about  11,000. 

While  Grant  was  fighting  for  the  field  of  Shiloli,  Pope 
was  manoeuvring  for  the  position  of  New  Madrid  and 
Island  No.  10.  He  obtains  possession  of  it  on  the  8th  of 
April.  The  way  is  now  open  for  Grant  to  Corinth  and 
for  Pope  to  Fort  Pillow. 

Wi  April-Wi  June. — On  the  11th  of  April,  General 
Halleck  arrives  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  assumes  per- 
sonal command  of  the  Federal  forces,  making  Grant 
second  in  command.  General  Pope,  summoned  from  the 
operations  just  begun  before  Fort  Pillow,  arrives  with  his 
army  on  the  21st.  By  various  re-enforcements  the  Federal 
army  is  made  to  number  100,000  effective  men.  Beau- 
regard's army,  increased  by  Van  Dorn's,  which  joined  on 
the  13tli,  and  by  other  re-enforcements,  numbers  50,000 
effectives. 

About  the  end  of  April,  Halleck  initiates  a  cautious 
movement  against  Corinth.  Beauregard  contests  his 
advance  with  great  pertinacity,  but  never  in  such  strength 
as  to  precipitate  a  general  battle.  Not  until  the  oOth  of 
May  do  the  Federals  gain  possession  of  their  objective. 
The  Confederate  army  has  meanwhile  withdrawn  and 
retired  southward.  Fort  Pillow  is  abandoned  June  1. 
On  the  6tli  the  Federals  destroy  the  Confederate  fleet  in 
front  of  Memphis,  and  two  regiments  which  Pope  left 
behind  him  take  possession  of  the  city.  The  Mississippi 
Kiver  is  now  open  to  Vicksburg  (Map  14). 

Throughout  this  cam])aign  the  great  pre[)onderance  of 
the  Federals,  notably  on  the  water,  made  it  hopeless  for 
the  Confederates  to  contend  against  them  except  by  a 
masterly  concentration.  AVhen  the  Federals  developed 
the    plan    of   forcing    the    Confederate   centre,    Johnston 


278  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

might  have  thrown  34,000  men  against  the  17,000  with 
which  Grant  was  moving  up  the  Tennessee,  and  yet  have 
had  7000  or  8000  at  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus  to 
conceal  the  situation  while  he  crushed  Grant  and  prepared 
to  turn  on  Buell.  Such  a  movement  was  advocated  by 
General  Beauregard.*  Be-enforcements  were  indeed  sent 
to  Fort  Donelson,  but  not  in  time  or  in  sufficient  numbers 
to  warrant  its  commander  in  assuming  the  offensive. 

The  garrison  of  Fort  Donelson  should  not  have  allowed 
itself  to  be  invested.  Johnston's  policy  was  that  of 
retarding  by  demonstrating,  of  making  a  bold  front  as 
long  as  the  enemy  could  be  deceived,  and  then  retiring 
with  everything  worth  moving  and  capable  of  being 
moved.  These  tactics,  which  were  soon  to  be  so  success- 
fully practised  by  Beauregard  in  his  retreat  from  Shiloli, 
by  Magruder  in  his  defence  of  the  Peninsula,  and  later 
by  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  his  retreat  to  Atlanta,  proved 
a  signal  failure  as  practised  or  attempted  on  the  Cumber- 
land Biver. 

While  Grant's  army  was  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  Beau- 
regard's at  Corinth,  and  Johnston's  en  route  to  Corinth, 
which  was  the  situation  from  the  20tli  to  the  25th 
of  March,  the  Federals  might  have  thrown  a  force  of 
thirty-odd  thousand  men  between  the  two  Confederate 
armies.  But  Grant  was  counting  upon  re-enforcements 
that  would  give  him  a  greater  preponderance  over  these 
armies  united  than  he  now  possessed  over  them  separately. 
He  was  hardly  warranted,  therefore,  in  undertaking  alone 
to  beat  the  enemy  in  detail.  He  might  perhaps,  by  inter- 
posing himself  between  the  hostile  fractions,  have  retarded 
their  junction  until  his  re-enforcements  joined  him ;  but 
considering  the  imperfection   of  his  army,  which  was  so 

*  Thomas  Jordan,  Beauregard's  adjutant-general,  in  the  United 
Service  for  March,  1885. 


THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN,  1862.  279 

glaringly  exhibited  on  the  first  clay  of  Sliiloh,  the  discre- 
tion of  engaging  it  in  this  most  delicate  operation  should 
be  seriously  questioned. 

The  rawness  of  Grant's  army  excuses  in  a  measure  the 
inefficiency  of  its  outposts  at  Shiloh ;  but  by  so  doing 
it  condemns  the  strategy  which  placed  it,  with  its  back  to 
a  river,  only  about  twenty  miles  from  an  enemy  superior 
to  it  in  numbers.  The  Federal  army  should  have  remained 
on  the  east  side  of  the  river  until  it  was  capable  of  taking 
care  of  itself  on  the  west  side. 

Owing  partly  to  the  caution  and  method  of  General 
Halleck  and  partly  to  multiplicity  of  command  and 
responsibility,  none  of  the  great  successes  of  this  cam- 
paign— Fort  Donelson,  Shiloh,  or  Corinth — was  improved 
as  it  might  have  been.  The  following  extracts  from 
Grant's  "  Memoirs"  are  interesting  in  this  connection  : 

"  My  opinion  was,  and  still  is,  that  immediately  after 
the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  the  way  was  opened  to  the 
national  forces  all  over  the  South-west  without  much 
resistance.  If  one  general  who  would  have  taken  the 
responsibility  had  been  in  command  of  all  the  troops  west 
of  the  AUeghanies,  he  could  have  marched  to  Chattanooga, 
Corinth,  Memphis,  and  Vicksburg  with  the  troops  we  then 
had,  and  as  volunteering  was  going  on  rapidly  over  the 
North,  there  would  soon  have  been  force  enough  at  all 
these  centres  to  operate  offensively  against  any  body  of  the 
enemy  that  might  be  found  near  them."  .  .  . 

"  Corinth  was  a  valuable  strategic  point  for  the  enemy 
to  hold,  and  consequently  a  valuable  one  for  us  to  possess 
ourselves  of.  We  ought  to  have  seized  it  immediately 
after  the  fall  of  Donelson  and  Nashville,  when  it  could 
have  been  taken  without  a  battle ;  but,  failing  then,  it 
should  have  been  taken,  without  delay,  on  the  concentra- 
tion of  troops  at  Pittsburg  Landing  after  the  battle  of 
Shiloh.     In   fact,  the  arrival  of  Pope  should   not  have 


280  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

been  awaited.  There  was  no  time  from  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  up  to  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  when  the  enemy 
would  not  have  left  if  pushed."  .  .  . 

" .  .  .  It  is  a  question  whether  the  morale  of  the  Con- 
federate troojis  engaged  at  Corinth  was  not  improved  by 
the  impunity  with  which  they  were  permitted  to.  remove 
all  public  property  and  then  withdraw  themselves.  On 
our  side  I  know  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee — and  I  presume  the  same  is  true  of  those  of 
other  commands — were  disappointed  at  the  result.  They 
could  not  see  how  the  mere  occupation  of  places  was  to 
close  the  war,  while  large  and  effective  rebel  armies 
remained.  They  believed  that  a  well-directed  attack 
would  at  least  have  partially  destroyed  the  army  defending 
Corinth.  For  myself,  I  am  satisfied  that  Corinth  could 
have  been  captured  in  a  two  days'  campaign  commenced 
promptly  on  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements  after  the  battle 
of  Shiloh."  .  .  . 

"  After  the  capture  of  Corinth  a  movable  force  of  80,000 
men,  besides  enough  to  hold  all  the  territory  acquired, 
could  have  been  set  in  motion  for  the  accomplishment  of 
any  great  campaign  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion." 

Instead  of  this,  about  40,000  men  were  sent  in  pursuit, 
who  followed  the  enemy  only  thirty  miles  and  then  re- 
turned to  Corinth. 

On  the  3d  of  June,  Halleck  ordered  a  dispersion  of  his 
army  which  reduced  the  Federals  to  the  defensive.  It 
was  not  until  December  that  they  were  in  a  condition  to 
resume  the  work  of  opening  up  the  Mississippi  River.  In 
the  course  of  the  winter  and  spring  a  number  of  expedi- 
tions were  directed  against  the  next  obstruction  of  this 
grand  waterway  before  the  remarkable  operation  was  un- 
dertaken which  was  destined  to  remove  it. 


LEGEND   FOR   MAPS  15-21. 

FEDERAL.  CONFEDERATE, 

m   DIVISION.  C^    DIVISION. 

m   BRIGADE   OR   SMALLER   FORCE.  Ql    BRIGADE  OR  SMALLER   FORCE. 

^GENERAL   HEADQUARTERS.  fe^  GENERAL   HEADQUARTERS. 

The  Maps  sho-w  the  dispositions  at  Midnight« 


EXAMPLES   OF   NOTATION. 

^        -i  ~  3''''  DIVISION,  15th  CORPS. 
<^       -|-  -  Slh   DIVISION,  2nd   DISTRICT. 

^^  Tt 3rd  and  7th  DIVISIONS,   17th  CORPS 

QB  145 

^^  ~2~—  '''■  ^••i  a"d  5th  DIVISIONS.  2nd  DISTRICT. 

■  ST7~  ^""^   BRIGADE,  6th  DIVISION,  17th  CORPS. 

t^  i-j-  '*'  »"''   2nd   BRIGADES    5th  DIVISION,  2nd   DISTRICT. 

S9  13   —  13th   CORPS. 


281 


XXIII. 

THE  VICKSBURG  CAMPAIGN,  1863. 

TWO  widely-separated  Federal  armies,  the  one  in  the 
northern,  the  other  in  the  southern,  part  of  the 
theatre  of  war,  are  preparing  to  co-operate.  The  northern 
army  is  that  of  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee,  com- 
manded by  General  Grant ;  the  southern,  that  of  the 
Department  of  the  Gulf,  commanded  by  General  Banks. 

On  the  31st  of  March,  1863,  the  forces  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Tennessee  aggregated  105,150  men.  Allow- 
ing for  garrisons  to  control  the  disloyal  population  and 
protect  the  country  against  incursions  of  the  enemy.  Grant 
estimates  that  he  has  available  for  field  service,  in  an 
emergency,  from  60,000  to  70,000  men.  A  field  force  of 
about  50,000  is  assembled  on  the  west  side  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  for  the  greater  part  between  Helena  and 
Milliken's  Bend  (Map  14).     It  is  organized  and  composed 

as  follows : 

Army  head-quarters,  540. 

13th  Army  Corps  (McClernand). 

Head-quarters      339 

9th  Division 4,219 

10th  Division 4,654 

12th  Division 4,425 

14th  Division 4,662 

Total  13th  Corps 18,299 

loth  Army  Corps  {Sherman). 

Head-quarters 6 

1st  Division 6,128 

2d  Division 5,846 

Total  15th  Corps 11,980 

283 


284  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

17th  Army  Corps  (McPherso?i). 

Head-quarters 80 

3d  Division 6,873 

6th  Division 5,465 

7th  Division 5,850 

Total  17th  Corps 18,268 

Grand  total 49,087 

In  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  are  about  30,000  Fed- 
eral troops,  of  which  about  17,000  are  available  for  field 
service.  Banks's  field  army  is  assembled  at  Baton  Kouge. 
A  powerful  fleet  of  river  gunboats,  under  the  command  of 
Admiral  Porter,  assures  to  the  Federals  the  control  of  the 
water. 

The  enemy's  forces  are  those  of  the  Department  of 
Mississippi  and  Eastern  Louisiana,  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral J.  C.  Pemberton.  This  command  is  organized  and 
distributed  as  follows : 

Ist  District  (Euggles)  1,961  at  Columbus. 

2d  District  (Stevenson)  : 

1st  Division 10,476  at  Vicksburg. 

2d  Division 5,058  at  Vicksburg. 

3d  Division 5,965  at  Haines  Bluff. 

4th  Division 4,554  at  Grand  Gulf. 

Total  2d  District  26,053 

3d  District  (Gardner)     .  16,287  at  Port  Hudson. 
4th  District  (Adams)    .    .  431  at  Jackson  and  Grenada. 

5th  District  (Chalmers)   .  860  at  Panola. 

Loring's  command    .    .    .  5,188  at  Fort  Pemberton. 

Grand  total  50,780 

The  department  commanded  by  General  Pembei'ton, 
and  the  two  adjoining  departments,  that  of  General  Brax- 
ton Bragg,  on  the  east,  and  of  General  E.  Kirby  Smith, 
on  the  west,  are  united  under  the  command  of  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who,  however,  is  not  authorized  to 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  285 

transfer  troops  from  one  department  to  another.  The 
Confederate  forces  in  Louisiana  consist  of  about  4500  men, 
under  General  Kichard  Taylor.  Their  principal  point  of 
defence  is  Alexandria,  but  their  outposts  extend  down  as 
far  as  the  railroad  from  New  Orleans  to  Brashear.  Just 
below  Alexandria  they  have  an  earthwork  called  Fort  de 
Kussy,  intended  to  block  the  passage  up  Ked  Kiver. 

The  Confederates  have  relinquished  their  hold  on  the 
Mississippi  Kiver  from  Port  Hudson  down  and  from  Vicks- 
burg  up ;  but  through  their  possession  of  the  intervening 
section  they  seek  to  accomplish  three  imjjortant  objects : 

1.  To  protect  the  western  frontier  of  the  State  of  Mis- 
sissippi, 

2.  To  obstruct  the  Mississippi  River  as  a  military  and 
commercial  highway. 

3.  To  keep  open  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River,  through 
which  extensive  supplies  are  drawn  by  the  Confederacy 
from  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  Texas. 

The  Federal  gunboats  have  shown  their  ability  to  run 
past  the  Confederate  batteries,  and  for  the  last  two  weeks 
a  couple  of  vessels,  which  ran  past  Port  Hudson,  liave 
held  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River  under  blockade.  The 
chief  value,  therefore,  of  the  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson 
defences  consists  now  in  their  efficacy  as  a  frontier  defence 
and  as  an  obstruction  to  the  river  traffic.  The  great  width 
of  the  Mississippi,  together  witli  the  Federal  command  of 
the  water,  restricts  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  Confederate 
masses  to  the  east  side  of  the  river. 

Grant's  objective  is  Vicksburg,  and  his  idea  is  to  pass 
across  the  front  of  that  position,  turn  it  from  below,  and 
advance  against  it  from  the  rear.  His  advance  corps,  the 
13th,  is  directed  to  move  upon  New  Carthage  (Map  15), 
the  first  point  below  Vicksburg  which  in  the  present  high 
stage  of  the  water  can  be  reached  by  land.  From  there 
the  army  is  to  proceed  by  water. 


286  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

The  winter  of  1862  and  1863  had  been  unprecedented 
for  liigh  water  in  the  Mississippi,  and  consequently  the 
roads  through  the  lowlands  to  the  west  of  it  are  exceed- 
ingly bad.  Instead,  therefore,  of  following  the  troops,  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  supplies  are  sent  down  the 
river. 

11th  April. — The  first  transports  to  run  the  batteries 
(three  in  number)  have  arrived  at  New  Carthage,  which  is 
now  occupied  by  the  13th  Corps.  Grant  is  on  the  spot  to 
assure  himself  of  their  safe  arrival,  and,  having  done  so, 
returns  to  Milliken's  Bend  to  attend  to  the  despatching  of 
further  supplies  and  his  other  corps.  The  progress  of  the 
13th  Corps  has  been  reported  to  Pemberton  through 
General  Bowen,  in  command  at  Grand  Gulf.  Bowen  has 
had  a  brigade  in  observation  on  the  west  side  of  the  river 
from  the  early  part  of  April  until  the  night  of  this  day, 
when  it  was  withdrawn  to  the  east  side.  A  brigade  of 
about  2000  men  is  ordered  from  Edwards  Depot,  in  rear 
of  Vicksburg,  and  about  800  men  are  ordered  from  Jack- 
son, to  re-enforce  Bowen.  Stevenson,  commanding  at 
Vicksburg,  telegraphs  to  Pemberton,  "  Every  movement 
of  the  enemy  indicates  that  they  are  about  to  execute  some 
plan.  Until  it  is  developed,  I  request  that  troops  may  be 
kept  in  reserve,  not  farther  than  Jackson,  to  re-enforce 
this  position  if  attacked  on  three  sides.  Reports  from 
scouts  and  citizens  on  the  upper  river  that  troops  are 
moving  down,  none  going  up."  Pemberton  telegraphs 
to  Johnston,  "...  Enemy  has  now  nine  boats  between 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson.  He  has  land  forces  at  New 
Carthage  from  Grant's  army,  and  can  re-enforce  them  to 
any  extent.     He  can  use  his  nine  boats  to  cross  his  troops 

to  this  side." 

Grierson's  Bald. 

At  daylight  on  the  17th,  General  Benjamin  H.  Grierson 
started  from  La  Grange,  Tennessee  (Map  14),  in  command 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  287 

of  three  regiments  of  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  artillery, 
numbering,  all  told,  1700  men,  with  the  object  of  crippling 
and  disconcerting  the  enemy.  Let  us  turn  aside  for  a 
time  from  Grant's  army  and  follow  this  handful  of  cavalry. 

On  the  18th,  Grierson  crossed  tlie  Tallahatchie  at  three 
points  and  camped  about  four  miles  south  of  that  river. 

l^th  April. — Having  demonstrated  towards  the  east  and 
west,  he  turns  his  whole  force  towards  the  south,  and 
marches  to  Pontotoc,  arriving  there  at  5  p.m. 

20th  April. — At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  he 
detaches  175  of  the  least  effective  portion  of  the  command, 
with  one  gun  and  all  the  prisoners,  led  horses,  and  cap- 
tured property,  to  proceed  back  to  La  Grange,  and  leave 
the  impression  that  the  whole  command  has  returned. 
The  commander  of  this  detachment  is  ordered  to  send  a 
single  scout  to  cut  the  telegraph  wire  south  of  Oxford. 

At  5  A.M.  the  main  command,  under  Grierson,  marches 
upon  Houston.  About  4  p.m.  it  passes  around  that  place, 
and  at  dark  goes  into  camp  between  Houston  and  Stark- 
ville. 

21st  April. — At  six  in  the  morning  the  command  is 
again  on  the  march.  At  eight  o'clock,  having  reached  a 
branch  road  leading  to  Columbus,  Grierson  detaches 
Colonel  Hatch  with  one  regiment  and  one  gun,  under 
orders  to  raid  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  then 
return  by  the  most  practicable  route  to  La  Grange. 

This  detachment  and  the  one  previously  made  are 
intended  principally  as  diversions  to  withdraw  the  enemy's 
attention  from  the  main  object  of  the  expedition. 

With  the  remaining  portion  of  the  command,  about 
950  strong,  Grierson  continues  on  his  southward  course. 
Marching  until  midnight,  he  camps  about  ten  miles  south 
of  Louisville. 

2Zd-2Ath  April. — By  marching  all  day  and  all  night 
he  reaches  the  railroad  at  Newton  early  in  the  morning  of 


288  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  24th.  Having  damaged  as  much  as  possible  the  track 
and  telegraph,  and  destroyed  the  government  property  in 
the  vicinity,  he  moves  about  four  miles  south  of  the  rail- 
road. Learning  from  captured  mail  and  reports  from  his 
scouts  that  large  forces  have  been  sent  out  to  intercept  his 
return,  he  decides  to  move  on  southward  a  certain  distance, 
in  order  to  secure  the  necessary  rest  and  food  for  his  men 
and  horses,  and  then  either  to  return  to  La  Grange  through 
Alabama  or  to  make  for  Baton  Kouge,  as  may  seem  best. 
He  camps  this  evening  about  two  miles  west  of  Montrose. 

2bth-2Q>th  April. — Looking  especially  to  the  resting  and 
recruiting  of  his  command,  he  takes  up  the  march  about 
eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  25th,  and  makes  about 
seventeen  miles.  From  his  night  camp  he  sends  a  single 
scout,  disguised  as  a  citizen,  to  proceed  northward  to  the 
railroad  there  to  cut  the  telegraph  and,  if  possible,  fire  a 
bridge  or  trestle-work.  This  man  sets  out  about  midnight. 
When  within  seven  miles  of  the  railroad  he  conies  upon  a 
regiment  of  Confederate  cavalry  looking  for  Grierson. 
Having  misdirected  it  and  seen  it  well  on  the  wrong  road, 
he  returns  to  Grierson  with  the  report  of  his  experience. 

Learning  from  various  sources  that  Jackson  and  several 
stations  to  the  east  have  been  re-enforced  by  infantry  and 
artillery,  and  that  a  fight  was  momentarily  expected  at 
Grand  Gulf,  Grierson  decides  to  strike  the  railroad  to  the 
west  of  him  at  Hazlehurst,  and,  after  destroying  as  much 
of  it  as  possible,  to  endeavor  to  get  upon  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  and  co-operate  with  the  Federal  army,  should  it 
succeed  in  the  passage  of  the  MississijDpi. 

2Qth-21th  April. — At  Hazlehurst  he  finds  and  destroys 
about  500  loaded  shells  and  a  large  quantity  of  commissary 
and  quartermaster  stores.  About  four  miles  from  there  he 
captures  a  sixty-four-pounder  gun  and  a  heavy  wagon-load 
of  ammunition  and  machinery  for  mounting  the  gun,  on 
the  road  to  Port  Gibson.     The  gun  is  spiked  and  the  car- 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  289 

riages  and  ammunition  are  destroyed.     He  camps  on  the 
27tli  about  seven  miles  from  Hazleluirst. 

28th-29th  April. — Taking  up  the  march  at  six  in  the 
morning,  lie  moves  to  Union  Church,  where  he  has  a  brush 
with  a  force  of  Confederate  cavalry,  and  camps  for  the 
night.  From  this  point  he  makes  a  strong  demonstration 
to  create  the  impression  that  he  is  going  towards  Port 
Gibson  or  Natchez,  and  quietly  moves  off  towards  Brook- 
haven.  Here  he  captures  about  200  prisoners  and  a  great 
quantity  of  military  stores. 

30th  April. — Following  the  railroad  for  a  number  of 
miles,  he  destroys  every  bridge,  water-tank,  etc.,  that  he 
comes  upon.  Hearing  nothing  of  Grant's  army  at  Grand 
Gulf,  he  concludes  on  this  day  to  make  for  Baton  Rouge. 
Accordingly,  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  he  changes 
his  course  from  south  to  south-west,  and,  having  proceeded 
about  fifteen  miles,  halts  to  rest  until  daylight. 

lst-2d  May. — He  threatens  Magnolia  and  Osyka,  where 
forces  are  concentrating  to  meet  him,  but,  instead  of 
attacking  there,  strikes  through  woods,  lanes,  and  by-roads 
into  the  road  from  Clinton  to  Hazlehurst,  and  proceeds 
through  Clinton  upon  Baton  Bouge.  He  has  two  serious 
but  successful  encounters  with  Confederate  cavalry,  and 
makes  a  narrow  escape  from  being  headed  off  b}^  a  force  of 
infantry  and  artillery  sent  out  from  Port  Hudson.  Within 
four  miles  of  Baton  Bouge  he  is  met  by  a  detachment  of 
two  companies  of  cavalry  from  the  garrison,  with  which 
his  trusty  command  enters  that  place  about  three  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  May  2.  During  the  last  twenty-eight 
hours  it  has  marched  seventy-six  miles  without  food  or 
rest  for  men  or  horses. 

In  the  course  of  the  expedition,  which  lasted  less  than 
sixteen  days,  it  marched  over  GOO  miles.  It  thus  averaged 
over  thirty-seven  and  one-half  miles  a  day.  It  killed  and 
wounded  about  a  hundred  of  the  enemy;  captured  and 

19 


290  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

paroled  over  500,  many  of  them  officers;  destroyed  between 
fifty  and  sixty  miles  of  railroad  and  telegraph ;  captured 
and  destroyed  over  3000  stands  of  arms,  and  other  army 
stores  and  government  property  to  an  immense  amount. 
It  also  captured  1000  horses  and  mules.  Its  only  loss 
was  ten  men  killed  and  wounded  and  nine  missing,  sup- 
posed to  have  straggled. 

Crossing  the  Mississippi. 

To  return  to  the  main  operations,  Grant  is  now  fairly 
launched  on  his  grand  manoeuvre.  On  the  20th  of  April 
(Map  15)  the  bulk  of  his  field  army  was  assembled  between 
Milliken's  Bend  and  New  Carthage,  under  orders  to  close 
up  on  the  13th  Corps  at  New  Carthage. 

On  this  day  (April  20)  Pemberton  telegraphed  to 
Johnston,  "...  I  have  virtually  no  cavalry  from  Grand 
•Gulf  to  Yazoo  City,  while  the  enemy  is  threatening  to 
cross  river  between  Vicksburg  and  Grand  Gulf,  having 
twelve  vessels  below  Vicksburg."  .  .  .  And  to  Stevenson, 
commanding  at  Vicksburg,  "  You  should  place  at  least 
5000  men  in  easy  supporting  distance  of  Warrenton." 

The  latter  had  reference,  no  doubt,  to  a  possible  attempt 
at  effecting  a  landing,  which  would  have  placed  Grant  at 
once  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Big  Black.  There 
are  batteries  at  Warrenton  designed  both  to  prevent  a 
landing  and  to  keep  gunboats  ascending  the  river  from 
getting  within  range  of  Vicksburg.  Grand  Gulf  is  forti- 
fied with  the  special  object  of  closing  the  mouth  of  the 
Big  Black.  The  works  there  were  begun  in  the  month  of 
March,  at  a  time  when  Grant  was  trying  to  cut  a  canal 
from  a  point  on  the  Mississippi  above  Vicksburg  to  a 
point  below,  which  would  have  given  him  water  transpor- 
tation from  his  base  at  Milliken's  Bend  all  the  way  to  the 
rear  of  Vicksburg. 

On  the  night  of  the  22d  a  number  of  Federal  trans- 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  291 

ports  and  barges  ran  the  batteries  of  Vicksburg,  but  it  was 
soon  afterwards  found  impracticable  to  secure  a  sufficient 
number  of  transports  to  embark  the  whole  army.  The 
general  movement  was  consequently  directed  upon  Hard' 
Times,  a  distance  of  seventy  miles  by  huid  from  Milliken's 
Bend  and  three  miles  by  water  from  Grand  Gulf.  The 
13th  Corps  arrived  at  Hard  Times  on  the  28th.  Grant's 
plan  was  to  seize  Grand  Gulf;  tlien  detach  a  corps  of 
about  20,000  men  to  co-operate  with  Banks  in  the  re- 
duction of  Port  Hudson ;  then,  with  Grand  Gulf  as  an 
advance  base  and  New  Orleans  as  his  main  base,  and  with 
his  army  increased  by  a  large  part  of  Banks's  force,  to 
advance  up  the  Big  Black  River,  which  is  navigable  for 
sixty  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  threaten  both  Jackson, 
the  capital  of  Mississippi,  and  Vicksburg.  This,  he 
thought,  would  compel  Pemberton  to  come  out  and  attack 
him.  Having  defeated  the  enemy  in  a  pitched  battle,  he 
purposed  following  up  his  advantage  with  a  view  to  cut- 
ting him  off  from  Jackson  or  Vicksburg,  or  both  places. 
On  this  day  (April  28)  General  Pemberton  telegraphed 
to  General  Johnston, — 

"The  enemy  is  at  Hard  Times  in  large  force  with 
barges  and  transports,  indicating  a  purpose  to  attack 
Grand  Gulf  with  a  -view  to  Vicksburg." 

And  to  the  commanding  officer  at  Vicksburg, — 
"Hold  5000  men  in  readiness  to  move  to  Grand  Gulf, 
and,  on   requisition  of  General  Bowen    [commanding  at 
Grand  Gulf],  move  them." 

He  was  answered  from  Vicksburg  (April  28), — 
"  The  men  will  be  ready  to  move  promptly.  To  cross 
the  Mississippi  both  gunboats  and  transj^orts  must  pass 
the  batteries  at  Grand  Gulf.  An  army  large  enough  to 
defend  itself  on  this  side  would  consume  much  time  in  cross- 
ing. As  it  is  not  known  what  force  has  been  withdrawn 
from  this  front,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  force  oppo- 


292  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

site  Grand  Gulf  is  there  to  lay  waste  the  country  on  that 
side,  and  is  a  feint  to  withdraw  troops  from  a  main  attack 
here.  I  venture  to  express  the  hope  that  the  troops  will 
'not  be  removed  far  until  further  developments  below  ren- 
der it  certain  that  they  will  cross  in  force." 

On  the  13th  of  March,  Banks  had  written  to  Grant 
from  Baton  Rouge,  giving  the  strength  and  location  of  his 
field  forces,  and  requesting  Grant's  views  as  to  the  most 
efficient  mode  of  co-operation.  The  despatch  was  received 
March  20.     In  reply.  Grant  wrote  on  the  23d, — 

"The  continuous  high  water  and  the  nature  of  the 
country,  almost  precluding  the  possibility  of  landing  a 
force  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  anywhere  above 
Vicksburg,  has  induced  the  hope  that  you  would  be  able 
to  take  Port  Hudson  and  move  up  to  Black  Biver.'''  By 
the  use  of  your  transports  I  could  send  you  all  the  forces 
you  would  require.  .  .  .  The  best  aid  you  can  give,  if  you 
cannot  pass  Port  Hudson,  will  be  to  hold  as  many  of  the 
enemy  as  possible." 

On  the  date  of  this  despatch  Grant  wrote  to  Admiral 
Farragut,  commanding  on  the  Lower  Mississippi,  that,  if 
he  found  it  practicable,  he  would  despatch  20,000  men  to 
Banks  by  way  of  the  Bayou  Macon  and  Black  River. 
Both  of  these  despatches  were  received  by  Banks  on  the 
21st  of  April. 

In  the  mean  time  Banks  had  moved  from  Baton  Rouge. 
Deeming  Port  Hudson  too  strong  for  him  to  assault,  or 
besiege,  or  pass  by,  he  resolved  to  operate  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Mississippi  River,  On  account  of  the  impas- 
sability  of  the  country  adjoining  the  river  on  the  west,  he 
had  to  take  his  army  to  New  Orleans  and  move  it  thence 
to  Brashear,  where  it  assembled  on  the  10th  of  April. 
On  this  day  he  was  visited  by  the  private  secretary  of 


*  A  tributary  of  the  Eed  Eiver  (Map  14). 


THE    VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  186S.  293 

Admiral  Farragut  and  apprised  verbally  of  the  substance 
of  Grant's  despatches.  The  secretai-y,  who  did  not  bring 
the  despatches  with  him,  on  account  of  his  having  to  pass  the 
batteries  of  Port  Hudson,  gave  Banks  to  understand  that 
he  could  count  on  the  arrival  of  20,000  Federal  troops  on 
the  Red  River  by  the  1st  of  May.  Banks,  in  reply,  wrote 
to  Grant  the  same  day  that  he  hoped  to  move  without 
delay  upon  Iberia  to  destroy  the  salt  works  there,  and 
then  upon  Opelousas.  "This,"  he  said,  "  is  the  limit  pro- 
posed. We  do  not  intend  to  hold  any  ])ortion  of  this 
country,  as  it  weakens  our  force,  but  will  at  once  return 
to  Baton  Rouge  to  co-operate  with  you  against  Port  Hud- 
son.    I  can  be  there  easily  by  May  10." 

Overcoming  the  resistance  offered  by  General  Taylor, 
he  worked  his  way  up  by  the  20tli  of  April  to  Opelousas. 
Here  he  received  Grant's  despatches  themselves,  from 
which  he  learned  that  at  the  time  of  tlieir  writing  Grant 
was  still  undetermined  whether  the  re-enforcements  in 
question  could  be  forwarded  or  not.  Two  days  later  he 
wrote  to  Grant  for  positive  information  as  to  his  views 
and  intentions  respecting  co-operation.  On  the  28th  of 
April  he  was  still  at  Opelousas,  waiting  for  an  answer. 

29/A  April. — On  the  morning  of  this  day  Porter's  fleet 
of  gunboats  engaged  the  batteries  of  Grand  Gulf,  and 
about  10,000  men  of  McClernand's  corps,  embarked  on 
transports,  were  moved  out  into  the  river.  Grant's  pur- 
pose was  for  the  navy  to  silence  the  enemy's  batteries,  and 
the  troops  then  to  carry  them  by  storm.  Grant  himself 
was  on  a  tug  in  the  middle  of  the  stream,  where  he  could 
watch  the  artillery  duel  and  send  in  the  troops  whenever 
the  favorable  moment  should  arrive.  The  cannonade 
opened  about  8  a.m.,  and  was  kept  up  without  intermission 
until  about  1  p.m.  It  then  plainly  a})peared  that  the  land 
batteries  were  not  to  be  silenced  by  the  fleet.  Grant  con- 
sequently determined  to  seek  a  crossing  lower  down  the 


294  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

river.  The  troops  were  accordingly  landed  at  Hard  Times 
and  moved  overland  to  De  Schroon  ;  the  gunboats  and 
transports  then  ran  the  batteries  of  Grand  Gulf  and  tied 
up  near  by. 

At  Grand  Gulf  the  edge  of  the  solid  ground — a  line  of 
steep  slopes  and  bluffs — recedes  from  the  river,  and  only 
approaches  it  again  at  Kodney,  about  nine  or  ten  miles 
below.  From  the  village  of  Bruinsburg,  about  nine  miles 
from  Grand  Gulf,  a  good  road  leads  along  a  dry  and  some- 
what elevated  piece  of  land  across  the  marginal  lowlands 
and  high  ground  to  Port  Gibson.  Grant  decided  to  land 
his  troops  at  Bruinsburg,  and,  advancing  thence  through 
Port  Gibson,  to  take  Grand  Gulf  in  rear.  Port  Gibson 
is  separated  from  Grand  Gulf  by  the  Bayou  Pierre,  and 
Grand  Gulf  from  Vicksburg  by  the  Big  Black  Biver. 
The  first  bridge  on  the  Bayou  Pierre  above  its  mouth  is 
the  railroad  crossing  north-west  of  Port  Gibson.  Imme- 
diately above  this  point  is  the  confluence  of  the  North  and 
South  Forks.  The  first  crossing  on  the  North  Fork  above 
the  confluence  is  Grindstone  Ford,  where  there  is  also  a 
suspension  bridge,  and  the  first  on  the  South  Fork  is  a 
bridge  on  the  outskirts  of  Port  Gibson.  The  first  bridge 
on  the  Big  Black,  above  its  mouth,  is  at  Hankinson's 
Ferry,  the  second  at  Hall's  Ferry,  the  third  at  the  railroad 
in  rear  of  Vicksburg.  Each  is  a  sort  of  pontoon  bridge, 
formed  of  floats  or  barges  fastened  together.  The  one  at 
the  railroad  is  designated  as  the  Big  Black  Bridge.  A 
detachment  of  about  350  men  has  been  posted  to  guard 
it.  The  shortest  line  of  communication  between  Vicks- 
burg and  Grand  Gulf  crosses  the  Big  Black  at  Hankin- 
son's Ferry. 

At  the  suggestion  of  General  Grant,  the  2d  Division  of 
the  5th  Corps,  under  Sherman's  immediate  command, 
moved  up  the  Yazoo  Eiver  to  make  a  demonstration 
against  Haines  Bluff*.     It  is  lying  for  the  night  at  the 


THE    VICKSRURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  295 

moutli  of  the  Chickasaw  Bayou.  An  order  from  Grant 
is  now  on  its  way  to  Sherman,  directing  him  to  move 
down  to  Perkins  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  leaving  the  other  division  to  guard  the  com- 
munications and  hasten  up  supplies  and  ordnance  stores. 

Pemberton  telegraphed  to  the  commander  at  Vicks- 
burg, — 

"  If  General  Bowen  is  attacked,  send  on  the  column  I 
directed  as  soon  as  possible.  I  will  send  more  troops  to 
Vicksburg." 

And  later,  having  presumably  heard  of  the  attack  on 
Grand  Gulf, — 

"  Hurry  forward  re-enforcements  to  Bowen  to-night. 
Endeavor  to  send  him  ammunition  for  heavy  guns.  Troops 
on  the  way  from  here  to  replace  those  sent  away." 

The  only  troops  nearer  Port  Hudson  than  Grand  Gulf 
are  about  800  men  with  six  pieces  of  artillery,  who  are 
picketing  the  road  to  Natchez  (Map  14).  Baldwin's 
brigade  (..V)  is  e/z.  route  from  Vicksburg,  and  Tracy's  {l^) 
from  Warrenton,  for  Grand  Gulf.  Each  numbers  about 
1700  men. 

Stevenson,  commanding  at  Vicksburg,  telegraphed  to 
Pemberton, — 

"  Eight  boats,  loaded  with  troops  from  our  front,  are 
now  moving  up  Yazoo.  The  display  made  in  moving 
them  showed  a  desire  to  attract  our  attention." 

And  later, — 

"  Re-enforcements  are  going  rapidly  to  Bowen.  He 
was  successful  in  driving  back  their  boats  to-day.  The 
transports  are  at  mouth  of  Chickasaw  Bayou  to-night ; 
have  not  yet  landed.     We  are  all  ready  for  them." 

It  appears  that  he  now  apprehends  an  advance  up  the 
Chickasaw,  with  a  view  to  Vicksburg. 

30^A  April. — The  work  of  ferrying  the  Federal  troops 
across  the  river  did  not  commence  until  daylight,  and  for 


296  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

lack  of  transports  proceeded  but  slowly.  By  eleven 
o'clock,  however,  McClernand,  who  held  the  advance,  had 
three  of  his  divisions,  and  by  noon  his  four  divisions,  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  river. 

"  There  were  no  Confederates  in  sight,  and  it  was  most 
important  to  get  possession  of  the  bluffs,  which  are  here 
about  three  miles  back  from  the  river,  as  quickly  as  possi- 
ble. But,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  rations  had  not 
been  issued  to  McClernand's  men  before  landing;  their 
wagons  had  been  left  away  back  at  Perkins's  two  days 
before,  and  it  was  known  that  the  first  advance  beyond  the 
river  w^ould  necessarily  be  made  without  them.  Neverthe- 
less, the  usual  three  days'  rations  in  haversacks  had  not 
been  issued,  and  a  delay  of  four  hours  occurred  on  the 
bank  just  after  landing,  in  order  to  distribute  them.  This 
delay  at  such  a  critical  period  might  have  been  disas- 
trous, but  fortunately  it  was  not  so,  and  at  four  o'clock 
McClernand  took  up  his  line  of  march,  Carr's  division  in 
the  lead.  At  sunset  he  reached  the  bluffs,  and,  finding  no 
enemy,  puslied  on  during  the  night  towards  Port  Gibson."  * 

At  midniglit  the  head  of  his  column  is  about  an  hour's 
march  from  the  enemy.  In  the  mean  time  two  brigades 
{^^  have  crossed  the  river.  Early  this  morning  Sherman 
proceeded  up  the  Yazoo  to  within  easy  range  of  Haines 
Bluff,  whence  the  gunboats  fired  on  the  j^osition  for  several 
hours.  Towards  evening  the  troops  were  disembarked,  as 
if  in  preparation  for  an  assault;  and,  having  kept  up 
appearances  until  night,  were  re-embarked. 

On  account  of  the  slowness  with  which  supplies  are 
arriving  at  the  front,  over  the  roads  from  Milliken's  Bend, 
Grant  directs  his  chief  quartermaster  to  prepare  two  tugs 
to  run  the  batteries  of  Vicksburg  and  Grand  Gulf,  each 
with  two  barges  in  tow.     The  barges  are  to  be  loaded  to 

*  Greene,  "  Mississippi  Campaign." 


THE   VICKSBURO    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  297 

nearly  their  full  capacity  with  rations,  and  then  filled  up 
with  oats  and  hay,  so  as  to  cover  the  rations  and  afford 
shelter  for  the  tugs. 

Pending  the  arrival  of  a  train  or  transport,  his  army 
may,  if  necessary,  subsist  off  the  country  ;  but  for  ammuni- 
tion it  must  depend  on  itself  A  sufficient  supply  being  at 
hand,  it  is  only  necessary  to  improvise  the  means  of  trans- 
porting it.  This  is  done  by  impressing  the  vehicles  of 
the  neighborhood. 

Stevenson,  in  command  at  Vicksburg,  telegraphs  to 
Pemberton  that  the  enemy  has  been  shelling  the  position 
of  Snyder's  Mill,  a  dependency  of  Haines  Bluff,  at  long 
range  most  of  the  day ;  and  that  Forney,  conunanding  at 
Haines  Bkiff,  thinks  that  five  regiments  have  landed  below 
Snyder's  Mill.  The  Confederate  force  at  Port  Gibson  has 
been  increased  by  Tracy's  brigade  (f^).  Baldwin's  brigade 
has  just  reached  Grindstone  Ford.  The  Confederates 
actually  in  position  to  defend  Port  Gibson  thus  number 
about  2500 ;  but  Bowen  has  at  hand — at  Grand  Gulf, 
Port  Gibson,  and  Grindstone  Ford — about  8000  men. 
The  Federals  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  number  about 
22,000.  A  force  of  1550  men,  comprising  two  regiments 
and  a  battery  of  Tilghman's  brigade  (^),  and  under 
Tilghman's  command,  is  posted  at  the  Big  Black  Bridge. 
The  remainder  of  this  brigade  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Jack- 
son. During  the  past  month  Pemberton  has  withdrawn 
from  Port  Hudson  about  4300  men.  He  has  now  between 
Meridian  (east  of  Jackson)  and  the  Mississippi  River — ex- 
clusive of  11,700  men  left  at  Port  Hudson — about  39,000 
men.  The  least,  it  seems,  that  Banks  might  be  doing 
to  assist  Grant  is  to  prevent  as  far  as  possible  this  re- 
enforcing  of  the  Vicksburg  army  from  Port  Hudson. 
Banks  is  still  at  Opelousas  waiting  to  hear  from  Grant. 

1st  May. — While  repeating  his  demonstration   of  the 
day  before  against  Haines  Bluff,  Sherman  received  Grant's 


298  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

order  to  hasten  towards  Grand  Gulf.  He  has  since 
returned  to  Young's  Point. 

About  one  o'clock  in  the  mornins;  McClernand's  advance 
came  upon  the  enemy  in  position.  After  an  engagement 
of  about  two  hours,  the  troops  on  both  sides  lay  down  on 
their  arms  to  wait  for  daylight.  About  six  o'clock  firing 
was  renewed  and  the  battle  regularly  commenced.  At 
this  time  General  Bowen,  who  commanded  the  Confeder- 
ates, had  but  the  2500  men  who  were  in  position  the  night 
before.  During  the  day  he  was  re-enforced  by  Baldwin's 
brigade  (^,)  and  by  some  infantry  and  artillery  from 
Grand  Gulf.  But  of  his  8000  men  he  does  not  brinsj 
more  than  5e500  into  action.  This  is  partly  due  to  his 
retaining  something  of  a  garrison  at  Grand  Gulf,  and 
partly  to  the  straggling  in  Baldwin's  and  Tracy's  brigades. 

"  The  country  in  this  part  of  Mississippi  stands  on  edge, 
as  it  were,  the  roads  running  along  the  ridges,  except 
where  they  occasionally  pass  from  one  ridge  to  another. 
Where  there  are  no  clearings,  the  sides  of  the  hills  are 
covered  with  a  very  heavy  growth  of  timber  and  with 
undergrowth,  and  the  ravines  are  filled  with  vines  and 
canebrakes  almost  impenetrable.  This  makes  it  easy  for 
an  inferior  force  to  delay,  if  not  to  defeat,  a  far  superior 
one."  * 

With  his  5500  men  Bowen  holds  Grant  with  some 
20,000  in  check  until  near  sundown.  He  then  retires 
with  the  bulk  of  his  command  across  the  Bayou  Pierre  at 
the  railroad,  burning  the  bridge.  Baldwin  withdraws  his 
brigade  {l^  across  the  South  Fork,  also  burning  the  bridge. 
He  has  just  crossed  the  North  Fork  at  Grindstone  Ford 
on  his  way  to  rejoin  Bowen.  The  latter  informed  Pem- 
berton  at  5.30  p.m.  that  he  was  falling  back  across  the 
Bayou  Pierre,  and  that  he  would  endeavor  to  hold  that 

*  Grant,  in  The  Century  Magazine. 


THE    VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  299 

position  until  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements  wliicli  are 
moving  towards  him.  These  consist  of  tAvo  regiments  (15, 
16)  and  a  battery  of  Tilghman's  brigade  from  Edwards 
Depot,  and  Reynolds's  brigade  {*.,)  from  Warrenton. 
The  former  detachment  is  commanded  by  Tilghman,  under 
Loring,  avIio  has  been  ordered  to  proceed  to  Port  Gibson 
or  Grand  Gulf  and  direct  operations  there.  Gregg's 
brigade  {}j)  is  ordered  from  Port  Hudson  to  Jackson. 
Pemberton  telegraphs  to  President  Davis, — 

"...  Enemy  can  cross  all  his  army  from  Hard  Times 
to  Bruinsburg  below  Bayou  Pierre.  Large  re-enforce- 
ments should  be  sent  me  from  other  departments.  Enemy's 
movement  threatens  Jackson,  and,  if  successful,  cuts  off 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  from  the  east.  Am  hurrying 
all  re-enforcements  I  possibly  can  to  Bowen.  Enemy's 
success  in  passing  our  batteries  has  completely  changed 
character  of  defence." 

And  to  Bowen, — 

"...  It  is  very  important,  as  you  know,  to  retain  your 
present  position  if  possible.  Your  telegraph  communica- 
tion will  be  cut  off,  and  enemy  will  have  road  open  to  the 
east." 

"...  It  is  of  vast  importance  to  drive  enemy  back  and 
save  our  communications  with  Grand  Gulf  and  Port 
Gibson." 

2d  May. — As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  follow  the 
road,  the  Federal  army  pushed  on  to  Port  Gibson.  The 
troops  were  set  to  work  at  once  to  construct  a  bridge  across 
the  South  Fork  of  Bayou  Pierre.  When  it  was  finished, 
McPherson's  two  divisions  ("),  with  the  exception  of  one 
brigade  left  at  the  railroad  bridge,  crossed  over  and  marched 
to  Grindstone  Ford.  Here  again  the  bridge  was  found 
burned.  One  regiment  is  detailed  for  fatigue  duty  during 
the  night  to  repair  it.  Bowen  has  assembled  his  army  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Bayou  Pierre,  between  the  railroad 


300  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

crossing  and  Grand  Gulf.  He  has  been  re-enforced  by 
Reynolds's  brigade  and  joined  by  Loring.  The  latter  has 
sent  Tilghman  with  his  two  regiments  and  battery  to 
Grindstone  Ford,  and  directed  Bowen  to  put  his  army  in 
motion  to  cross  the  Big  Black.  This  direction  was  given 
in  ignorance,  it  seems,  of  the  strength  and  proximity  of 
re-enforcements,  to  be  hereafter  mentioned,  that  are  march- 
ing to  join  him.  The  continuation  of  the  retreat  was 
scarcely  decided  upon,  however,  when  it  was  approved  by 
the  following  despatch  from  Pemberton  to  Bowen : 

"...  I  am  informed  that  you  have  fallen  back  to 
Grand  Gulf.  If  this  is  so,  carry  out  my  instructions,  just 
sent  in  cipher." 

These  instructions  read, — 

"  You  must  endeavor  to  cross  Big  Black,  abandoning 
Grand  Gulf,  and  destroying  guns,  ammunition,  and  stores." 

At  the  time  this  despatch  was  written  the  latest  com- 
munication that  Pemberton  had  from  Bowen  was  the  5.30 
P.M.  despatch  of  the  day  before,  in  which  Bowen  reported 
his  retreat  across  the  Bayou  Pierre. 

Pemberton  has  telegraphed  to  Governor  Pettus,  of  Mis- 
sissippi,— 

"  It  would  be  well  to  remove  the  State  archives  from 
Jackson.  The  enemy  has  or  is  crossing  nearly  his  whole 
force.  It  is  likely  he  will  move  on  Jackson.  A  heavy 
raid  is  reported  from  Tennessee.*  I  am  moving  all  my 
forces  to  relieve  Bowen." 

To  General  Buford,  at  Meridian  (Map  14), — 

"Bring  all  your  force  Q.,)  immediately  to  Vicksburg. 
Use  all  possible  haste." 

And  to  General  Featherston,  at  Grenada, — 

"Bring  your  command  [l.)  immediately  to  this  place. 
Quartermaster  is  directed  to  furnish  transj^ortation." 

*  Grierson's. 


THE     VICKSBVRG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  301 

He  orders  General  Adams,  commanding  at  Jackson,  to 
withdraw  all  the  guards  on  the  Great  Northern  Railroad, 
to  arm  600  exchanged  prisoners  that  he  has  at  Jackson, 
and  to  send  all  these  men  at  once  to  Vicksburg. 

He  gives  orders  also  to  have  all  the  ordnance,  ammu- 
nition, and  provisions  thrown  into  Vicksburg  that  pos- 
sibly can  be.  He  receives  the  following  despatches  from 
Johnston  : 

TuLLAHOMA,  May  1,  1863. 
If  Gi'ant's  army  lands  on  this  side  of  the  river,  the  safety  of 
Mississippi  depends  on  beating  it.     For  that  object  you  should  unite 
your  whole  force. 

TuLLAHOMA,  May  2,  1863. 
.  .  .  If  Grant  crosses,  unite  all  your  troops  to  beat  him.    Success 
will  give  back  what  was  abandoned  to  win  it. 

The  brigades  of  Barton  (,\,),  Taylor  d-:,),  and  Lee  {-^  are 
marching  to  re-enforce  Loring,  and  all  troops  arriving  at 
Vicksburg  are  ordered  to  be  sent  on  to  Grand  Gulf  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

Zd  May, — At  daylight,  McPherson's  corps  (17)  crossed 
the  bridge,  which  it  had  repaired  during  the  night,  and 
pushed  on,  driving  the  enemy's  rear  guard  before  it,  for 
Han kinson's  Ferry.  It  arrived  at  dusk,  just  as  the  last 
of  the  enemy  were  crossing,  and  in  time  to  save  the  bridge 
from  destruction,  though  not  to  prevent  its  being  consider- 
ably damaged. 

Taking  with  him  an  escort  of  about  twenty  cavalry, 
Grant  rode  over  to  Grand  Gulf.  Here  he  receives  Banks's 
despatch,  dated  Brashear,  April  10,  from  which  he  learns 
that  Banks  cannot  be  at  Port  Hudson  before  the  10th  of 
May.  This  determines  him  to  move  independently  of 
Banks,  and  to  abandon  the  idea  of  a  base  at  New  Orleans ; 
but  the  length  of  time  it  would  take  to  perfect  arrange- 
ments for  supplying  his  army  from  Milliken's  Bend  pre- 


302  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

eludes  his  depending  upon  that  base.  He  consequently 
decides  to  operate  independently  of  a  base  altogether."  * 
He  writes  to  Sherman  to  collect  a  train  of  120  wagons  at 
Milliken's  Bend  and  Perkins  and  load  them  at  Grand 
Gulf  with  rations.  "  The  enemy,"  he  says,  "  is  badly 
beaten,  greatly  demoralized,  and  exhausted  of  ammuni- 
tion. The  road  to  Vicksburg  is  open.  All  we  want  now 
are  men,  ammunition,  and  hard  bread.  We  can  subsist 
our  horses  on  the  country  and  obtain  considerable  suj^plies 
for  our  troops." 

He  orders  a  road  to  be  constructed  from  Young's  Point 
to  a  landing  just  below  Warrenton,  from  which  point  his 
supplies  may  be  safely  forwarded  by  water.  "  Every- 
thing," he  says,  "  depends  upon  the  promptitude  with 
which  our  supplies  are  forwarded."  It  is  now  of  para- 
mount importance  to  advance  before  the  enemy  can  gather 
additional  strength.  An  order  is  despatched  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  16th  Corps,  at  Memphis  (Map  14),  to 
send  four  regiments  to  Milliken's  Bend  to  relieve  Blair's 
division  (^). 

During  the  night  one  of  Grant's  tugs,  with  a  barge  on 
each  side  of  it,  attempted  to  run  the  Confederate  batteries. 
The  tug  was  sunk  and  the  two  barges  were  set  on  fire.  The 
barges  were  secured,  but  the  supplies  were  greatly  dam- 
aged, partly  by  fire  and  partly  by  water  used  in  putting 
it  out. 

Lorinir  crosses  his  entire  command  to  the  north  side  of 
the  Big  Black.  Lee's  brigade  (.,-:,)  joined  in  time  to  assist 
in  covering  the  retreat;  Barton's  and  Taylor's  brigades 
(J  2)  were  j^icked  up  at  Hankinson's  Ferry.  Loring  has 
presumably  been  joined,  moreover,  by  two  or  three  addi- 

*  Grant  was  more  or  less  influenced  in  making  this  decision  by  a 
consideration  of  the  strength  and  security  to  be  gained  by  having 
no  communications  to  guard.  See  his  article  on  this  campaign  in 
"The  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War." 


THE    VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  303 

tional  regiments  of  Tilghman's  brigade.  He  has  now  in 
hand,  a  few  miles  north  of  the  Big  Black,  the  whole  of 
Stevenson's  and  Bowen's  divisions  (v),  two  brigades  of 
Smith's  division  (V^),  and  the  bulk  of  Tilghman's  brigade 
of  Loring's  own  division  (^A,).  These  forces  must  aggre- 
gate about  15,000  men.  Had  they  been  assembled  a  day 
or  two  earlier  on  the  south  side  of  the  Big  Black,  or,  still 
better,  of  the  Bayou  Pierre,  they  might  have  decided  the 
campaign  against  Grant. 

Pemberton  cannot  undertake  to  cover  both  Jackson  and 
Vicksburg,  except  by  assuming  the  offensive.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  is  not  strong  enough,  with  the  forces  in 
hand,  to  assume  the  offensive.  The  first  thing  for  him  to 
do,  therefore,  is  to  concentrate  his  army.  He  telegraphs 
to  President  Davis, — 

"  .  .  .  I  shall  concentrate  all  my  troops  this  side  of 
Big  Black.  The  question  of  subsistence  and  j^roximity  to 
base,  and  the  necessity  of  supporting  Vicksburg,  have 
determined  this."  .  .  . 

To  General  Stevenson, — 

" .  .  .  As  soon  as  possible,  I  desire  to  concentrate  the 
army,  with  a  view  to  operations  against  the  enemy."  .  .  . 

And  to  Governor  Pettus,  of  Mississippi, — 

"...  I  must  concentrate  my  whole  army  to  beat 
Grant's."  .  .  . 

He  is  in  considerable  anxiety  lest  a  movement  which 
he  understands  the  enemy  is  making  upon  the  Vicksburg 
and  Jackson  Kailroad  should  cut  off  part  of  his  forces 
from  him,  and  ap2:»reliends  that  the  enemy  intends  cross- 
ing the  Big  Black  at  the  bridge  in  rear  of  Vicksburg. 
He  telegraj^hs  to  the  commanding  officer  at  Edwards 
Depot, — 

"  Notify  commanders  of  troops  at  Edwards  that  the 
enemy  are  in  a  direct  line  of  march  to  that  point,  on  the 
same  side  of  the  Big  Black  River,  and  tliat  he  must  be  on 


304  TEE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

the  alert,  and  keep  his  pickets  three  or  four  miles  out  in 
advance. 

"  Stop  all  troops  en  route  here,  at  Edwards  Depot,  by 
my  order,  till  further  orders." 

And  j^resumably  later,  to  General  Buford, — 

"  You  will  stop  at  Jackson,  and  remain  there  with  your 
troops  until  further  orders.  Enemy  reported  approaching 
Edwards  Depot." 

Pemberton  is  jeopardizing  the  concentration  and  re- 
enforcement  of  his  army  for  the  sake  of  continuing  in 
communication  with  Vicksburg.  He  apprehends  that 
he  cannot  abandon  it  without  its  being  occupied  by  Grant, 
and  realizes  that  Grant  once  inside  of  Vicksburg,  with  the 
Mississippi  River  and  Porter's  fleet  at  his  back,  the  largest 
army  that  the  Confederacy  can  afford  to  give  him  will  not 
enable  him  to  get  Grant  out  again.  On  the  other  hand, 
Johnston  intimated  in  his  despatches  of  the  1st  and  2d* 
that  Pemberton  should  be  able  to  operate  outside  of  Vicks- 
burg without  letting  Grant  in,  and  that  his  trying  to  keep 
Grant  out  without  coming  out  himself  would  result  in 
Grant's  getting  in.  Pemberton  orders  Wirt  Adams  to 
operate  with  cavalry  from  Raymond  towards  Port  Gibson, 
and  keep  head-quarters  advised  of  the  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

A.thr-bth  May. — McClernand's  and  McPherson's  com- 
mands (13,  17)  are  kept  substantially  as  they  were  on  the 
night  of  the  3d,  awaiting  supplies  to  give  them  three  days' 
rations  in  haversacks.  In  the  mean  time  they  had  to 
subsist  ojQP  the  country.  Beef,  mutton,  poultry,  and  forage 
are  found  in  abundance.  Quite  a  quantity  of  bacon  and 
molasses  is  also  secured,  but  bread  and  coffee  are  compara- 
tively scarce.  Grant  writes  on  the  5th  to  the  commanding 
officer  at  Grand  Gulf, — 

*  See  p.  301. 


THE  VICKSBUJIO'    CAMPAIGN,  18G3.  305 

"  We  will  risk  no  more  rations  to  run  the  Vicksburg 
batteries.  The  river  falling  will  enable  us  to  contract  our 
lines  so  as  to  give  but  eight  miles  of  land  transportation 
to  bring  them  from  Young's  Point  to  below  Warrenton 
batteries."  .  .  . 

Some  active  employment  is  given  to  the  troops  in  the 
form  of  reconnoissances  and  demonstrations  pushed  across 
and  up  and  down  the  Big  Black.  On  the  5tli,  Osterhaus's 
division  (l^)  is  pushed  beyond  Rocky  Springs,  with  out- 
posts near  Cayuga.  Hurlbut,  at  Mem2:)his,  is  ordered  to 
send  forward  Lauman's  division  dg),  and  Sherman  to  have 
Blair's  division  [l^]  come  forward,  both  to  join  the  army 
in  the  field.  Steele's  and  Tuttle's  divisions  C^)  are  between 
Perkins  and  Grand  Gulf  on  their  way  to  the  front. 

Blair  is  to  leave  one  brigade  at  Milliken's  Bend,  to 
remain  there  until  relieved  by  the  four  regiments  ordered 
down  from  Memphis.  The  forces  at  Milliken's  Bend  and 
McArthur's  division  (y,  below,  are  charged  with  guard- 
ing the  communications. 

On  the  5th,  General  Banks,  whom  we  left  on  the  30th 
of  April  at  Opelousas,  put  his  army  in  motion  for  Alex- 
andria. He  received  the  same  day  the  following  despatch 
from  General  Grant,  dated  April  14 : 

"  I  am  concentrating  my  forces  at  Grand  Gulf.  Will 
send  an  army  corps  to  Bayou  Sara  [Map  14]  by  the  25th 
of  April  to  co-operate  with  you  on  Port  Hudson.  Can 
you  aid  me  and  send  troops,  after  the  reduction  of  Port 
Hudson,  to  assist  at  Vicksburg?" 

By  General  Pemberton's  order,  Bowen's  and  Loring's 
divisions  (V)  moved  on  the  4th  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Big 
Black  Bridge.  Stevenson  disposed  his  division  {\)  on  the 
line  of  Warrenton  and  Baldwin's  Ferry.  Moore's  brigade 
(3',)  is  at  Warrenton.  With  this  brigade  and  his  own 
division,  Stevenson  is  guarding  the  approaches  to  Vicks- 
burg from  the  South. 

20 


306  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

On  the  5tli,  Pemberton  writes  to  Loring, — 

"The  enemy,  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  are  reported 
advancing  upon  Edwards  Depot.  Take  your  position  at 
the  bridge  or  at  Edwards  Depot,  whichever  you  deem 
best.     You  must  hold  the  bridge."  .  .  . 

Pursuant  to  this  despatch,  Loring  moves  the  two  brigades 
that  he  has  with  him  (^)  to  Edwards  Depot.  Here  he  is 
joined  by  his  other  brigade,  Buford's  {—),  which  has 
arrived  from  Jackson. 

General  Pemberton  receives  the  following  despatch  from 
General  Beauregard,  in  command  at  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  dated  the  5tli  instant : 

"  In  obedience  to  instructions  from  the  War  Department, 
I  have  sent  you  two  brigades  of  my  troops  (about  5000 
men),  having  selected  the  best  that  can  be  spared,  under 
two  of  my  ablest  generals,  S.  R.  Gist  and  W.  H.  T. 
AValker ;  also  two  excellent  batteries."  .  .  . 

Qth-lth  May. — McClernand  pushes  his  outposts  beyond 
Cayuga,  and  brings  up  Smith's  division  (j")  to  Rocky 
Springs.  Sherman  reaches  Grand  Gulf  with  Steele's  and 
Tuttle's  divisions  (\f).  Blair  starts  out  with  two  brigades 
(,^)  from  Milliken's  Bend. 

On  the  6th,  Banks  replied  to  Grant's  inquiry  received 
on  the  0th, — 

"  By  the  25th  [of  May],  probably,  by  the  1st  [of  June], 
certainly,  we  will  be  there." 

On  the  7tli  he  occupied  Alexandria.  The  Confederates 
retired  up  the  Bed  Biver. 

Apprehending  that  the  enemy's  movements  up  the  Big 
Black  are  but  demonstrations  to  cover  a  real  advance 
across  the  lower  ferries  upon  Warrenton,  Pemberton  moves 
Loring's  whole  division  from  Edwards  Depot  to  a  j^oint 
on  the  Baldwin  Ferry  and  Mount  Alban  Boad  in  support 
of  Stevenson.  Bowen's  weaker  division  he  posts  at  the 
Big  Black  Bridge,  one  brigade  on  either  side  of  the  river, 


THK  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  307 

to  guard  against  raids  and  a  surprise  by  the  enemy's  main 
force.  This  is  on  the  6th.  On  the  7th  he  telegraphs  to 
Bo  wen, — 

"  Information  received  makes  it  probable  that  enemy 
will  move  on  Big  Black  Bridge,  and,  when  their  advance 
is  certain,  give  information  to  General  Loring,  who  is 
directed  to  re-enforce  you." 

Wirt  Adams's  cavalry,  a  regiment  of  six  companies, 
enters  Port  Gibson  on  the  7th,  and  captures  some  men, 
horses,  and  ambulances. 

Looking  up  the  Enemy. 

8th-dth  May  (Map  16). — Three  days'  rations  having 
been  forwarded  from  Grand  Gulf  and  issued,  Grant's  army 
resumes  its  general  movement.  McPherson's  corps  (17) 
moves  through  Kocky  Springs  to  within  seven  miles  of 
Utica.     Tuttle's  division  Q.^  moves  to  Rocky  Springs. 

The  6th  Missouri  Cavalry,  temporarily  attached  to 
McPherson's  corps  (17),  is  at  Utica,  having  had  some 
skirmishing  with  the  enemy.  McPherson  writes  to  its 
commander.  Colonel  Clark  Wright, — 

"...  Beconnoitre  the  enemy  cautiously,  and,  if  possi- 
ble, find  out  his  strength  and  intentions.  Keep  me  fully 
advised  of  any  important  movements.  Find  out,  if  pos- 
sible, whether  troops  have  been  running  up  North  from 
Port  Hudson,"  .  .  . 

Grant  is  aiming  at  the  interval  between  Edwards  Station 
and  Raymond.  McClernand's  corps  (13)  is  to  march 
through  Cayuga  and  thence  by  the  left-hand  road  in  the 
direction  of  Montgomery  Bridge  and  Edwards  Depot; 
McPherson's  (17),  through  Utica  in  the  direction  of  Ray- 
mond;  and  Sherman's  (15),  through  Cayuga  and  Auburn 
in  the  direction  of  Bolton.  Grant  expects  that  by  the 
time  his  corps,  which  are  to  keep  abreast  of  one  another, 
arrive  on  a  line  with  Auburn,  he  will  know  where  the 


308  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

enemy  is  preparing  to  offer  battle,  and  intends  then  to 
make  new  combinations  accordingly. 

He  writes  to  Sherman, — 

".  .  .  If  Blair  were  up  now,  I  believe  we  could  be  in 
Vicksburg  in  seven  days.  .  .  .  Bring  Blair's  two  brigades 
up  as  soon  as  possible." 

Pemberton's  dispositions  remain  substantially  as  on  the 
7th.  Of  his  five  divisions,  three  are  guarding  the  line  of 
the  Big  Black:  Stevenson  (})  on  the  right,  Bowen  (!)  on 
the  left,  Loring  (,)  in  the  centre.  Smith's  and  Forney's 
divisions  (^)  are  guarding  the  water  front  from  Haines 
Bluff  down  to  Warrenton. 

He  writes  General  E.  Kirby  Smith,  commanding  the 
trans-Mississi23pi  department, — 

"  My  force  is  insufficient  for  offensive  operations.  I 
must  stand  on  the  defensive,  at  all  events,  until  re-enforce- 
ments reach  me.  You  can  contribute  materially  to  the 
defence  of  Vicksburg  and  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi Biver  by  a  movement  upon  the  line  of  communica- 
tions of  the  enemy  on  the  western  side  of  the  river." 

And  sends  the  following  despatch  to  General  Johnston : 

"One  brigade  [^^J,  about  5000  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery,  at  Port  Hudson.  Two  [II]  en  route  to  this 
place." 

lOth-llth  3Iay. — Owing,  it  seems,  to  a  mistake  made 
by  Grant  in  designating  the  road  which  he  intended 
McClernand  to  take,  McClernand's  corps  has  followed 
the  road  from  Cayuga  to  Auburn.  Sherman's  corps  is 
at  Auburn ;  McPherson's  beyond  Utica,  on  the  road  to 
Raymond.  The  -bridge  at  Hankinson's  Ferry  has  been 
destroyed  by  Grant's  order.  By  McPherson's  order,  the 
6th  Missouri  Cavalry  makes  a  dash  at  the  New  Orleans 
and  Jackson  Railroad,  breaking  it  and  cutting  the  tele- 
graph wire  at  Crystal  Springs. 

Blair,  with  two  brigades  (;^),  is  at  Grand  Gulf.     His 


THE  VICKSRORG    CAMPAIGN,  18(U.  309 

other  brigade  (./i^)  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Young's  Point, 
having  completed  the  road  across  the  Bend.  McArthur, 
with  two  brigades  Q^-),  is  near  Hard  Times,  en  route  to 
Grand  Gulf. 

A  regiment  of  infantry  (,^5)  is  detached  by  Sherman 
towards  Hall's  Ferry,  as  a  guard.  Making  a  mistake  in 
the  road,  it  goes  to  Baldwin's* Ferry,  where  it  encounters 
the  enemy's  pickets  and  drives  them  across  the  river. 
Hall's  Ferry  has  consequently  been  left  unguarded.  De- 
fensive works  have  been  thrown  up  at  Hankinson's  Ferry, 
to  be  manned  from  Grand  Gulf.  They  are  occupied  at 
present  by  a  simple  picket.  On  the  11th  a  supply  train  of 
200  wagons  started  from  Grand  Gulf  to  the  front,  under 
the  escort  of  two  regiments. 

On  the  10th,  Grant  received  Banks's  despatch  of  the 
6th,  relative  to  a  movement  upon  Bayou  Sara.  On  the 
same  day,  but  apparently  before  receiving  this  despatch, 
he  wrote  to  Banks  of  the  necessity  that  he  was  under  of 
advancing  into  the  enemy's  country  without  stopping  to 
assist  in  the  reduction  of  Port  Hudson,  and  urgently  re- 
questing Banks  to  join  him,  or  to  send  to  him  all  the 
force  that  he  could  spare. 

Pemberton's  available  strength  has  been  increased  by 
Waul's  cavalry  from  Panola,  some  600  Mississippi  State 
troops  from  Columbus,  Richardson's  and  Steele's  cavalry, 
and  a  regiment  or  two  of  infantry,  all  from  Port  Hudson, 
and  probably  other  detachments.  Waul's  cavalry  and 
the  Mississippi  State  troops,  also  Moore's  brigade  (,',)  at 
Warrenton,  have  been  j^laced  under  Stevenson's  command. 
The  bulk  of  the  cavalry  is  at  Edwards  Depot,  under  the 
command  of  Wirt  Adams.  The  latter  has  orders  to  en- 
deavor to  cut  the  enemy's  comnumications,  covering  both 
Edwards  Depot  and  Raymontl,  and  to  keep  the  command- 
ing officers  there  informed  of  all  movements.  Gregg's 
brigade  (0^3)  from  Port  Hudson  has  reached  Jackson  and 


310  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

been  moved  thence  to  Raymond.  Gregg  is  unable  to 
procure  any  information  in  regard  to  the  strength  of  the 
enemy.  Walker's  brigade  from  Charleston,  South  Caro- 
lina, is  arriving  at  Jackson. 

Pemberton  receives  reports  from  his  outposts,  pointing 
some  to  Jackson  and  some  to  Vicksburg  as  the  enemy's 
objective.  He  is  particularly  impressed,  it  seems,  at  first, 
by  the  following  despatch  from  Tilghman  : 

"  Captain  Graham,  on  picket  at  the  ferry  [Baldwin's], 
reports  the  enemy  in  pretty  strong  force  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river,  extending  from  above  the  .ferry  to 
Down's,  one  and  a  half  miles  below.  They  occupy  the 
breastworks  on  the  opposite  side." 

He  sends  the  following  despatch  to  General  Gregg,  at 
Raymond  : 

"  From  information  from  General  Tilghman,  of  the 
enemy  being  in  force  opposite  the  ferry  at  Baldwin's,  it  is 
very  probable  that  the  movement  towards  Jackson  is  in 
reality  on  Big  Black  Bridge,  in  which  case  you  must  be 
prepared  to  attack  them  in  rear  and  on  flank." 

But  later  in  the  day,  under  the  influence,  no  doubt,  of 
subsequent  reports,  he  adds, — 

"...  If  the  enemy  advances  on  you  too  strongly,  fall 
back  on  Jackson.  All  the  South  Carolina  troops  will  be 
ordered  to  Raymond,  to  support  you  or  cover  your  retreat, 
as  the  case  may  be."  .  .  . 

And  to  his  chief  of  subsistence, — 

"  If  the  enemy  moves  on  Jackson,  I  will  advance  to 
meet  them,  and  must  have  subsistence  provided  at  Jack- 
son." 

He  is  necessarily  in  the  dark  as  to  where  Grant  will 
strike,  for  Grant  does  not  know  that  himself.  It  is 
Grant's  purpose  to  regulate  his  movements  by  those  of 
Pemberton,  and  Pemberton 's  to  regulate  his  by  those  of 
Grant. 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  311 

12th  May  (Map  17). — McClernand's  and  Sherman's 
corps  move  forward  to  Fourteen-mile  Creek,  and  occupy 
both  bunks.  One  regiment  of  Smith's  division  d.fo.ia)  is  on 
picket  at  Baldwin's  Ferry,  having  relieved  the  regiment 
previously  sent  there  (txis)'  A  battalion  of  the  4th  Iowa 
Cavalry  (loth  Corps)  is  on  similar  duty  at  Hall's  Ferry. 
McPherson's  corps  (17)  marches  upon  Raymond,  Logan's 
division  (,^,)  in  advance.  Soon  after  starting,  the  enemy's 
videttes  showed  themselves,  and,  after  marching  some 
three  miles,  two  regiments  had  to  deploy  and  advance  in 
line  of  battle  to  cover  the  head  of  the  column.  About 
two  miles  from  Raymond  the  enemy  was  found  strongly 
posted.  Before  much  additional  force  could  be  brought 
up,  Logan's  division  had  forced  the  enemy  to  retreat,  and 
by  5  o'clock  p.m.  Raymond  was  occupied.  From  reports 
of  skirmishing  on  the  part  of  Sherman's  and  McCler- 
nand's corps  on  the  north  side  of  Fourteen-mile  Creek, 
and  of  the  engagement  of  McPherson's  corps  at  Ray- 
mond, Grant  suspects  that  Pemberton's  forces  are  divided 
between  Jackson  and  the  neighborhood  of  Vicksburg. 
Judging  that  the  smaller  fraction  is  at  Jackson,  he  deter- 
mines to  follow  up  the  advantage  gained  by  McPherson  at 
Raymond. 

The  four  regiments  ordered  down  from  the  16th  Corps 
are  at  Milliken's  Bend.  McArthur's  division  (^)  has 
reached  Grand  Gulf,  and  Blair's  {{^  is  on  its  way  to  the 
front,  in  charge  of  the  train  which  started  yesterday,  to- 
gether with  its  own  train,  both  loaded  with  supplies. 

Banks,  whom  we  left  at  Alexandria,  receives  Grant's 
despatch  of  the  10th,  requesting  re-enforcements,  and 
replies  to  it, — 

"...  I  regret  to  say  that  it  is  impossible  for  me  to 
join  you  at  Vicksburg  in  time  or  with  force  to  be  of  ser- 
vice to  you  in  an  immediate  attack.  I  have  neither  water 
nor  land  transportation  to  make  the  movement  by  water. 


312  THF.   PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

or  by  the  river,  or  by  land.  The  utmost  that  I  can  do  is 
to  cross,  for  the  purpose  of  operating  with  you  against 
Port  Hudson."  ... 

By  Pemberton's  order,  based  on  his  apprehension  of  an 
advance  on  Vicksburg,  Loring  has  moved  Featherston's 
and  Buford's  brigades  g!)  to  Big  Black  Bridge,  and  Ste- 
venson his  whole  division  (2)  and  Vaughn  his  brigade  (2^) 
to  within  supporting  distance  of  Loring  and  Bowen,  at 
the  bridge.  Tilghman's,  Moore's,  and  Baldwin's  brigades 
(5^.4^)  ai'^  left  to  observe  the  ferries.  Gregg's  brigade 
(^),  numbering  about  3000  men,  constituted  the  force  that 
McPherson's  corps  had  to  contend  with  at  Raymond.  It 
is  now  camped  about  five  miles  from  the  battle-field,  to- 
gether with  about  1000  South  Carolinians  of  Walker's 
brigade,  brought  up  from  Jackson. 

The  following  communication  is  telegraphed  to  Pem- 
berton  by  Governor  Pettus,  at  Jackson : 

"Courier  just  from  Baymond ;  talked  with  General 
Gregg  on  the  battle-field.  Our  troops  falling  back  before 
greatly  superior  numbers."  .  .  . 

Pemberton  does  not  yet  know  where  Grant's  main  body 
is,  much  less  whither  it  is  tending.  He  sends  the  follow- 
ing despatch  to  President  Davis  and  General  Johnston : 

"  The  enemy  is  apparently  moving  in  heavy  force  to- 
wards Edwards  Depot,  Southern  Bailroad.*  With  my 
limited  force,  I  will  do  all  I  can  to  meet  him.  That  will 
be  the  field  of  battle  if  I  can  carry  forward  sufficient 
force,  leaving  troops  enough  to  secure  the  safety  of  this 
place.  Re-enforcements  are  arriving  very  slowly ;  only 
1500  have  come  as  yet.  I  urgently  ask  that  more  be  sent ; 
also  that  3000  cavalry  be  at  once  sent  to  023erate  on  this 
line.  I  urge  this  as  a  positive  necessity.  The  enemy 
largely  outnumbers  me,  and  I  am  obliged  to  hold  back 

*  Marked  on  map,  Vicksburg  and  Jackson  R.R. 


THE   VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  313 

large  forces  at  the  ferries  on  Big  Black,  lest  he  cross  and 
take  this  place.  I  am  also  compelled  to  keep  a  consider- 
able force  on  either  flank  of  Vicksburg,  out  of  supporting 
distance  of  Edwards,  to  prevent  his  approach  in  those 
directions." 

Strihing  to  Right. 

ISth  3Iay. — McPherson's  corps  (17)  moved  to  Clinton, 
his  advance  guard  doing  considerable  skirmishing.  It  is 
ordered  to  move  at  early  dawn  upon  Jackson.  Of  Sher- 
man's corps,  Steele's  division  {--)  moved  about  four  miles 
beyond  Raymond,  in  the  direction  of  Jackson,  with  out- 
post at  Mississippi  Springs  ;  Tuttle's  division  ( ,^)  moved  to 
Baymond.  Sherman  is  ordered  to  proceed  by  the  direct 
road  (through  Mississippi  Springs)  upon  Jackson.  Under 
cover  of  Hovey's  division  (J|),  which  is  thrown  forward 
for  that  purpose  in  the  direction  of  Edwards  Depot, 
Osterhaus's  and  Carr's  divisions  f',^)  crossed  to  the  north 
side  of  Fourteen-mile  Creek,  then  to  the  east  side  of 
Baker's  Creek,  and  marched  thence  by  the  road  north  of 
Fourteen-mile  Creek  to  Baymond,  followed  by  Hovey's 
division,  covering  their  rear.  Smith's  division  (]^),  after 
destroying  the  Montgomery  Bridge,  moved  back  to  Au- 
burn to  await  the  arrival  of  the  two  trains  coming  from 
Grand  Gulf  McCIernand  is  ordered  to  move  one  division 
to  Clinton,  charging  it  with  destroying  the  railroad  as  far 
as  possible  towards  Edwards  Depot ;  another  division 
three  or  four  miles  beyond  Mississippi  Springs ;  and  an- 
other to  Baymond,  ready  to  support  the  former  two.  It 
is  then  to  conduct  the  trains  and  Blair's  division  (,V)  to 
the  army. 

Blair's  third  brigade  is  en  route  to  join  the  division, 
having  been  relieved  at  Young's  Point  by  two  brigades 
(^)  from  Memphis ;  Bansom's  brigade  (^'i,)  is  moving  up 
from  Grand  Gulf     Peraberton  moves  Loring  and  Bowen, 


314  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

each  with  two  brigades  (5'; '),  and  Stevenson  with  his  four 
brigades  (2),  to  Edwards  Depdt;  Vaughn's  brigade  (2^)  is 
posted  at  the  bridge.  One  company  of  Bowen's  division 
is  left  to  watch  the  crossing  at  Bridgeport.  Moore's 
brigade  (3^)  retires  from  Warrenton  to  a  strong  position 
near  Vicksburg.  This  brigade  is  guarding  the  approaches 
from  Warrenton  and  Hankinson's  Ferry;  Baldwin's  (^y, 
those  from  Hall's  Ferry;  and  Tilghman's  (^,),  those  from 
Baldwin's  Ferry. 

Forney,  in  command  of  all  the  forces  at  the  rear,  is 
directed  to  arrange  to  concentrate  all  his  troops  within  the 
defences  of  Vicksburg,  "  and  that,  without  the  loss  of  any 
artillery." 

The  following  desj^atch  is  delivered  to  General  Loring : 

"The  lieutenant-general  commanding  directs  that  you 
make  a  reconnoissance  of  such  a  character  as  you  may 
deem  proper,  to  find  out  where  the  main  force  of  the 
enemy  is,  and  in  what  direction  moving.  If  on  Jackson, 
he  thinks  his  [Pemberton's]  move  will  be  to  fall  on  their 
rear  and  cut  their  communication,  but  he  must  have 
accurate  information  from  you  that  he  can  rely  on  before 
making  this  move,  which  would  leave  Vicksburg,  by  way 
of  Big  Black  Bridge  and  the  ferries,  in  so  critical  a  posi- 
tion. It  is  necessary  that  the  lieutenant-general  should 
be  informed  not  only  what  force  has  moved  on,  but  the 
strength  of  that  which  is  left,  and  where." 

In  answer  to  this  despatch,  Loring  reports  at  8  p.m, — 

"  From  every  source,  both  black  and  white,  I  learn  that 
the  enemy  are  marching  on  Jackson.  I  think  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  this." 

General  Johnston  has  arrived  at  Jackson,  under  the 
following  order  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  the  9th 
of  May  : 

"  Proceed  at  once  to  Mississippi  and  take  chief  com- 
mand of  the  forces  there,  giving  to  those  in  the  field,  as 


77//;   VIC KS BURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  315 

far  as  practicable,  the  encouragement  and  benefit  of  your 
personal  direction." 

He  receives  Pemberton's  despatch  of  the  12th,  asking 
for  re-enforcements,  and  finds  at  hand  the  brigades  of 
Gregg  and  Walker,  estimated  at  6000  men.  He  hears 
from  General  Gregg  that  Maxey's  brigade  is  expected  to 
arrive  from  Port  Hudson  to-morrow ;  and  from  his  own 
knowledge  expects  that  Gist's  brigade,  on  its  way  from 
the  East,  will  also  commence  arriving  to-morrow.  He 
estimates  that  these  two  brigades  will  swell  his  force  to 
about  11,000  men. 

His  plan  of  action  being  determined  upon,  he  desjoatches 
by  courier — the  telegraph  line  being  cut — the  following 
communication  for  General  Pemberton.  It  has  not  yet 
been  received : 

Jackson,  May  13,  1863,  8.40  p.m. 

Lieutenant-General  Pemberton, — I  have  lately  arrived,  and 
learn  that  Major-General  Sherman  is  between  us,  with  foiu-  divisions, 
at  Clinton.  It  is  important  to  re-establish  communications,  that 
you  may  be  re-enforced.  If  practicable,  come  up  on  his  rear  at 
once.  To  beat  such  a  detachment  would  be  of  immense  value. 
The  troops  here  could  co-operate.  All  the  strength  you  can  quickly 
assemble  should  be  brought.     Time  is  all-important. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  E.  Johnston. 

The  primary  object  of  these  instructions  is  not  to  defeat 
the  Federal  corps  at  Clinton,  but  to  unite  Pemberton's 
army  with  Johnston's  at  some  point  whence  the  united 
army  can  maintain  communication  with  the  East.  John- 
ston's idea  is  to  cut  loose  from  Vicksburg,  if  necessary,  in 
order  to  effect  such  a  junction.  Pemberton's,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  to  forego  such  junction,  if  necessary,  for  the  present, 
in  order  to  retain  communication  with  Vicksburg.  John- 
ston's directions  respecting  the  corps  at  Clinton  are  evi- 
dently  based  upon  the   mistaken   idea  tliat  the  Federal 


316  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

corps  at  Clinton  is  isolated,  or  so  distant  from  the  main 
body  that  it  may  be  defeated  before  the  latter  can  reach  it. 

lAth  May  (Map  18). — About  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  Sherman's  and  McClernand's  corps  (15,  17) 
expel  the  Confederates  from  Jackson.  Grant  learns  that 
the  enemy  retreated  northward  under  the  command  of 
General  Johnston,  and  comes  into  possession  of  a  copy  of 
Johnston's  despatch  of  yesterday,  directing  Pemberton  to 
•come  up  in  rear  of  the  corps  at  Clinton.  He  concludes 
that  it  is  now  Johnston's  plan  to  unite  with  Pemberton 
north  of  the  railroad,  cross  the  Upper  Big  Black,  and, 
pushing  down  the  peninsula  between  the  Big  Black  and 
Yazoo  Bivers,  to  beat  him  into  Vicksburg.  Hardly  hoping 
to  prevent  the  junction  of  Pemberton  and  Johnston,  Grant 
■determines  to  push  straight  for  Vicksburg,  with  a  view  to 
seizing  it  while  their  junction  is  being  effected,  or  before 
their  joint  army  can  take  position  to  oppose  him.  He 
accordingly  orders  the  concentration  of  McClernand's  and 
McPherson's  cor^^s  (13,  17)  and  Blair's  division  dV)  at 
Bolton,  directing  Blair  to  take  the  trains  with  him.  Sher- 
man is  to  remain  at  Jackson  with  his  two  divisions  (jj),  to 
■destroy  bridges,  railroads,  and  military  resources  generally. 
The  commander  of  the  6th  Missouri  Cavalry,  at  Clinton, 
is  ordered  by  McPherson  thoroughly  to  explore  all  the  roads 
north  and  west  of  Clinton,  towards  Bolton.  McPherson 
■evidently  apprehends  an  attempt  on  the  j)art  of  Johnston 
to  unite  with  Pemberton  by  one  of  these  roads. 

Ewing's  brigade  (,y  is  proceeding  down  the  Mississippi 
on  transports.  Banks  commences  to  move  his  army  from 
Alexandria  in  the  direction  of  Port  Hudson. 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Pemberton  proceeds  from 
Bovina  to  join  his  army  at  Edwards  Depot,  with  the 
intention  of  awaiting  there  the  attack  of  the  enemy. 
This,  he  thinks,  must  take  place  in  forty-eight  hours,  or 
the  enemy  must  fall  back  for  supplies  to  his  base  on  the 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  317 

Mississippi  Kiver.  In  case  of  a  Confederate  defeat,  lie 
intends  to  retreat  across  the  Big  Black,  and  hold  that  line 
as  an  obstruction  to  the  investment  of  Vicksburg.  But 
between  nine  and  ten  o'clock,  while  still  en  route  to 
Edwards  Depot,  he  receives  Johnston's  despatch  of  yester- 
day, directing  him  to  move  against  the  Federal  corps  at 
Clinton.     He  writes  immediately  in  reply, — 

"...  I  move  at  once  with  all  available  force,  about 
16,000,  from  Edwards  Depot,  leaving  Vaughn's  brigade, 
about  1500,  at  Big  Black  Bridge. 

"  Tilghman's  brigade,  1500,  now  at  Baldwin's  Ferry,  I 
have  ordered  to  bring  up  the  rear  of  my  column.  He  will 
be,  however,  from  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  behind  it.  .  .  . 
I  do  not  think  you  fully  comprehend  the  position  that 
Vicksburg  will  be  left  in,  but  I  comply  at  once  with  your 
order." 

Not  having  contemplated  a  forward  movement,  he  is 
not  prepared  to  act  up  to  his  first  impulse  to  "  move  at 
once."  He  issues  instructions,  however,  to  effect  the  neces- 
sary preparation,  and  goes  on  to  Edwards  Depot,  reflecting, 
no  doubt,  en  route.,  on  the  hazardous  nature,  as  it  seems  to 
him,  of  the  movement  to  which  he  is  committed.  On 
arriving  about  noon  at  Edwards  De[)6t,  he  learns  from 
prisoners  just  captured  that  Smith's  division  (~)  is  at  or 
near  Dillon.  Confirmed  by  this  information  in  his  dis- 
approval of  the  contemplated  movement,  and  deeming  this 
a  case  in  which  a  subordinate  commander  has  discretionary 
authority  to  disobey  the  order  of  his  superior,  he  calls  a 
council  of  war  of  the  general  officers  present  and  lays  the 
whole  matter  before  them.  A  majority  of  the  council 
declare  themselves  for  the  movement  indicated  by  John- 
ston ;  the  others,  for  a  movement  upon  Grant's  communi- 
cations. Pemberton  himself  is  opposed  to  any  move- 
ment which  would  separate  him  farther  from  Vicksburg. 
Feeling,  however,  that,  under  the  circumstances,  he  must 


318  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

do  something,  and  believing  the  only  possibility  of  success 
to  be  in  the  plan  of  cutting  the  enemy's  communications, 
he  adopts  this  plan.  Accordingly,  about  5.40  p.m.  he 
addresses  the  following  despatch  to  General  Johnston.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  his  previous  desjDatch  repre- 
sented that  he  was  about  to  move  upon  Clinton,  with  the 
object  of  attacking  a  detached  corps : 

"  I  shall  move  as  early  to-morrow  morning  as  prac- 
ticable, with  a  column  of  17,000  men,  to  Dillon's.  .  .  . 
The  object  is  to  cut  enemy's  comnuinications  and  to  force 
him  to  attack  me,  as  I  do  not  consider  my  force  sufficient 
to  justify  an  attack  on  enemy  in  position,  or  to  attempt  to 
cut  my  way  to  Jackson."  .  .  . 

The  movement  which  he  has  thus  abandoned  required 
him,  indeed,  to  attack  an  enemy  in  position,  but  he  was 
to  do  so  in  co-operation  with  tlie  troops  at  Jackson.  He 
was  not  called  on  to  cut  his  way  to  Jackson.  He  has 
adopted  a  movement  which  he  disapproves  of  himself, 
which  was  opposed  by  his  council  of  war,  and  which  is 
contrary  to  the  orders  of  his  commanding  general. 

Modifying  the  plan  set  forth  in  his  despatch  so  as  to 
make  his  movement  threaten  Raymond  as  well  as  Dillon, 
Pemberton  issues  an  order  for  his  army  to  move  to-morrow 
in  the  direction  of  Raymond.  While  Grant  has  prac- 
tically no  line  of  communication,  he  has  a  wagon  train  at 
Raymond,  the  loss  of  which  would  be  a  very  serious 
matter  to  him. 

Johnston,  with  the  garrison  of  Jackson,  consisting  of 
Gregg's  and  Walker's  brigades,  retires  along  the  railroad 
about  six  miles  in  the  direction  of  Canton,  this  being  the 
only  road  by  which  he  may  unite  with  Pemberton.  Gist's 
brigade  is  at  Forest  Station,  about  fifty  miles  east  of  Jack- 
son ;  Maxey's  is  at  Brookhaven,  on  the  New  Orleans  and 
Jackson  Railroad.     Johnston  writes  to  Pemberton, — 

"The  body  of  troops   mentioned   in   my  note  of  last 


THE  VWKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  319 

night  compelled  Brigadier-General  Gregg  and  his  com- 
mand to  evacuate  Jackson  about  noon  to-day.  The  neces- 
sity of  taking  the  Canton  road  at  right  angles  to  that 
upon  which  the  enemy  approached  prevented  an  obstinate 
defence.  A  body  of  troops,  reported  this  morning  to  have 
reached  Raymond  last  night,  advanced  at  the  same  time 
from  that  direction.  Prisoners  say  that  it  was  McPher- 
son's  corps  (four  divisions)  which  marched  from  Clinton. 
I  have  no  certain  information  of  the  other  ;  both  skirmished 
very  cautiously.  Telegrams  were  despatched  when  the 
enemy  was  near,  directing  General  Gist  to  assemble  the 
approaching  troops  at  a  point  forty  or  fifty  miles  from 
Jackson,  and  General  Maxey  to  return  to  his  wagons  and 
provide  for  the  security  of  his  brigade,  for  instance,  by 
joining  General  Gist.  That  body  of  troops  will  be  able, 
I  hope,  to  prevent  the  enemy  in  Jackson  from  drawing 
provisions  from  the  East,  and  this  one  may.  be  able  to 
keep  him  from  the  country  towards  Panola.*  Can  he 
supply  himself  from  the  Mississippi  ?  Can  you  not  cut 
him  off  from  it,  and,  above  all,  should  he  be  compelled  to 
fall  back  for  want  of  supplies,  beat  him  ?  As  soon  as  the 
re-enforcements  are  all  up,  they  must  be  united  to  the  rest 
of  the  army.  I  am  anxious  to  see  a  force  assembled  that 
may  be  able  to  inflict  a  heavy  blow  upon  the  enemy. 
Would  it  not  be  better  to  place  the  forces  to  support 
Vicksburg  between  General  Loringf  and  that  place,  and 
merely  observe  the  ferries,  so  that  you  might  unite,  if 
opportunity  to  fight  presented  itself?  General  Gregg- 
will  move  towards  Canton  to-morrow.  If  prisoners  tell 
the  truth,  the  forces  at  Jackson  must  be  half  of  Grant's 
army.  It  W'Ould  decide  the  campaign  to  beat  it,  which 
can  be  done  only  by  concentrating,  especially  when  the 

*  On  the  Great  Northern  Kailroad,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  north  of  Jackson  (Map  14). 
f  Commanding  at  Edwards  Station. 


320  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

remainder  of  the  Eastern  troops  arrive ;  tliey  are  to  be 
12,000  or  13,000." 

From  this  despatch  it  appears  that  Johnston  believes  or 
surmises : 

1.  Tliat  the  force  by  which  he  was  driven  from  Jackson 
consisted  of  four  divisions  from  Clinton  and  a  "  body  of 
troops"  from  Raymond. 

2.  That  this  force  constitutes  about  half  of  Grant's  army. 

3.  That  this  half  is  widely  separated  from  the  other. 

4.  That  Pemberton's  movable  force  should  be  consider- 
ably increased  by  transferring  troops  to  it  from  the  lines 
of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Big  Black. 

5.  That  a  prompt  junction  of  Johnston's  present  com- 
mand with  the  available  forces  under  Pemberton  would 
warrant  attacking  a  separate  fraction  of  Grant's  army. 

6.  That  the  joint  army  thus  constituted,  increased  by 
the  expected  re-enforcements  from  the  East,  would  make 
about  an  even  match  in  the  field  for  Grant's  united  army. 

7.  That  Pemberton  might,  with  his  present  available 
force,  inflict  a  blow  on  the  Federal  force  at  Jackson  by 
cutting  it  ofiP  from  supplies  and  falling  on  it  while  in 
retreat. 

8.  That  Grant  depends  for  his  supplies  upon  regular 
communication  with  his  base. 

This  despatch  of  Johnston's  is  still  on  its  way,  and 
Pemberton  does  not  know  of  the  Federal  occupation  of 
Jackson. 

The  Confederate  forces  operating  against  Grant  are  now 
fractioned  and  disposed  as  follows : 

Maxey,  at  Brookhaven 3,000 

Gist,  at  Forest  Station 2,000 

Johnston,  north  of  Jackson 6,000 

Pemberton,  at  Edwards  Depot 16,000 

Forney,  about  Vicksburg 12,000 

Total 39,000 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  321 

The  above  figures  represent  effective  strength. 

Grant's  total  present  for  duty,  east  of  the  Mississippi, 
numbers  46,500.  Deducting  one-fifth,  we  have  for  Grant's 
effective  strength  37,200. 

Striking  to  Left. 

Ibth  May  (Map  19). — Sherman  has  thoroughly  accom- 
plished his  work  at  Jackson.  The  railroads  are  destroyed, 
as  he  estimates,  four  miles  east,  three  south,  three  north, 
and  ten  west.  The  arsenal  buildings,  government  foundry, 
gun-carriage  establishment,  and  a  valuable  cotton-factory 
are  also  destroyed. 

The  concentration  of  Grant's  forces  has  progressed  so 
far  that  the  divisions  of  two  corps  are  within  easy  supj^ort- 
ing  distance  of  one  another.  Two  regiments  (^9^  ^J^)  are 
detailed  to  garrison  Raymond.  Swing's  brigade  {—)  has 
landed  at  Grand  Gulf  and  moved  out  thence  in  the  di- 
rection of  Raymond.  At  4.45  p.m.  Grant  sends  the 
following  despatch  to  McClernand  : 

"  Move  your  command  early  to-morrow  morning  to- 
wards Edwards  Depot,  marching  so  as  to  feel  the  enemy's 
force  if  you  encounter  him,  and  without  bringing  on  a 
general  engagement,  unless  you  feel  entirely  able  to  con- 
tend with  him.  Communicate  this  order  to  Major-General 
Blair,  who  will  move  with  you." 

Though  Pemberton  intended  to  move  at  eight  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  he  does  not  get  started  until  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Finding  the  ford  on  the  direct 
Edwards  Depot  and  Raymond  Road  impassable,  he  crosses 
Baker's  Creek  at  the  bridge  on  the  Edwards  Depot  and 
Clinton  Road.  His  army  marches  in  a  single  column  : 
Loring  in  advance,  Bowen  next,  Stevenson  last.  After 
proceeding  about  a  mile  and  a  half  on  the  Clinton  Road, 
the  head  of  his  column  is  turned  to  the  right.  About 
dark,  Loring's  division,  (y)  goes  into  bivouac  on  the  Ed- 

21 


322  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

wards  Depot  and  Raymond  Road,  Tilgliman's  brigade 
thrown  forward.  Bowen  ( *)  bivouacs,  about  ten  o'clock,  on 
Loring's  left.  At  midnight  Stevenson  is  still  on  the 
march,  about  three  hours  from  his  place  of  bivouac,  which 
is  on  the  left  of  Bowen.  Loring  has  reported  to  Pember- 
ton  that  the  enemy  is  close  in  Loring's  front.  Grant,  on 
the  other  hand,  does  not  know  that  Pemberton  has  an 
army  east  of  the  Big  Black. 

Johnston  has  moved  to  Calhoun.  He  does  not  mean 
that  Pemberton  shall  operate  against  Grant's  communi- 
cations unless  he  is  satisfied  that  the  operation  will  suc- 
ceed and  result  in  Pemberton's  army  being  united  to 
Johnston's.  Furthermore,  he  means  to  co-operate  with 
Pemberton.  Having  received  Pemberton's  despatch  of 
5.40  P.M.,  yesterday,  apprising  him  of  the  projected  move- 
ment upon  Grant's  communications,  he  writes  to  Pember- 
ton at  8.30  A.M., — 

"...  Our  being  compelled  to  leave  Jackson  makes 
your  plan  impracticable.  The  only  mode  by  which  we 
can  unite  is  by  your  moving  directly  to  Clinton,  informing 
me,  that  we  may  move  to  that  point  with  about  6000.  I 
have  no  means  of  estimating  the  enemy's  force  at  Jackson. 
The  princii)al  officers  here  differ  very  widely.  I  fear  he 
will  fortify  if  time  is  left  him.  Let  me  hear  from  you 
immediately.  General  Maxey  was  ordered  back  to  Brook- 
haven.  You  probably  have  time  to  make  him  join  you. 
Do  so  before  he  has  time  to  move  away." 

16/A  3Iay. — About  half-past  six  o'clock  in  the  morning 
Pemberton  receives  Johnston's  despatch  of  8.30  a.m.  yes- 
terday, directing  him  for  the  second  time  to  move  in 
the  direction  of  Clinton.*  The  Confederate  pickets  are 
skirmishing  with  the  advance  of  the  divisions  covering 
the   Federal   train   at  Raymond.      Pemberton   orders   a 

*  For  first  despatch,  see  p.  315. 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  323 

retrograde  movement,  by  reversing  the  column  as  it  stood, 
for  the  purpose  of  returning  towards  Edwards  Depot  and 
proceeding  thence  towards  CHnton  by  a  route  north  of  the 
railroad.  He  hastily  writes  the  following  despatch  to 
General  Johnston  : 

"Your  letter,  written  on  the  road  to  Canton,  was  received 
this  morning  at  6.30.  It  found  this  army  on  the  middle 
road  to  Raymond.  The  order  of  countermarch  has  been 
issued.  Owing  to  the  destruction  of  a  bridge  on  Baker's 
Creek,  which  runs  for  some  distance  parallel  with  the 
railroad,  and  south  of  it,  our  march  will  be  on  the  road 
leading  from  Edwards  Depot  in  the  direction  of  Browns- 
ville. This  road  runs  nearly  parallel  with  the  railroad. 
In  going  to  Clinton  we  shall  leave  Bolton  Depot  four 
miles  to  the  right.  I  am  thus  particular,  so  that  you  may 
be  able  to  make  a  junction  with  this  army." 

Just  as  the  reversing  of  the  army  commenced,  the 
enemy  opened  with  artillery  on  the  late  head,  now  become 
the  rear  of  the  Confederate  column.  Not  knowing  whether 
this  was  an  attack  in  force  or  simply  an  armed  reconnois- 
sance,  and  being  now  anxious  to  obey  Johnston's  instruc- 
tions, Pemberton  directed  the  continuance  of  the  retreat. 
But  the  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  soon  made  it  imprac- 
ticable, and  the  army  was  accordingly  formed  for  battle, 
Loring  (■)  on  the  right,  Bowen  (*)  in  the  centre,  and 
Stevenson  {\)  on  the  left.  About  10  a.m.  commenced  the 
battle  of  Champion  Hills.  The  main  effort  of  the  enemy 
was  directed  against  the  left  wing  under  Stevenson,  and 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Federal  right  was 
driving  it  from  the  field.  This  movement  threatened  the 
bridge  on  which  the  Confederates  had  crossed  in  the 
morning ;  but  during  the  day  the  creek  had  been  bridged 
at  the  ford,  and  its  waters  had  so  fallen  that  the  ford  itself 
was  now  practicable.  Bowen's  and  Stevenson's  divisions 
retreated  by  the  ford  across  Baker's  Creek.     Loring,  after 


324  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

covering  this  movement,  withdrew  in  search  of  a  safe 
crossing,  the  ford  being  threatened  by  the  enemy's  artillery. 
He  is  apparently  not  disposed  to  risk  much  to  maintain 
his  connection  with  Pemberton.  Midnight  finds  him 
following  a  civilian  guide  down  the  south  side  of  Baker's 
Creek,  and  Pemberton  attending  to  the  crossing  of  his 
army  at  Big  Black  Bridge.  Stevenson  (|)  is  within  an 
hour's  march  of  Big  Black  Bridge,  under  orders  to  pro- 
ceed to  Mount  Alban  ;  Bowen  ( *)  is  in  rear  of  Stevenson, 
directed  to  occupy  a  line  of  intrenchments  on  the  east  side 
of  Big  Black,  taking  position  to  the  right  and  left  of 
Vaughn's  brigade  (i^),  already  there,  Pemberton's  only 
purpose  in  keeping  hold  of  these  works  is  to  enable  Loring 
to  cross  the  Big  Black. 

At  the  battle  of  Champion  Hills  the  fighting  of  the 
Federals  was  done  mainly  by  the  three  divisions  on  the 
right, — Hovey's  (~),  Logan's  (~),  and  Crocker's  ( ,V)  ;  that 
of  the  Confederates  mainly  by  the  two  divisions  of  Bowen 
and  Stevenson  on  the  left.  Loring,  with  one  division, 
neutralized  during  the  greater  part  of  the  battle  the  four 
divisions  ('-^'  j")  under  McClernand.  Had  these  been 
used  with  the  same  vigor  as  the  divisions  on  the  Federal 
right,  Pemberton's  whole  army  would  probably  have  been 
driven  into  the  creek  or  taken  prisoner. 

About  half-past  five  in  the  evening  Pemberton  received 
on  the  field  of  battle,  from  which  his  army  was  then 
retreating,  Johnston's  despatch  of  the  14th,  apprising 
him  of  the  Confederate  evacuation  of  Jackson  and  sug- 
gesting a  movement  against  the  communications  of  the 
force  which  he  had  represented  as  being  at  Jackson. 

In  his  camp  at  Canton,  Johnston  receives  Pemberton's 
first  reply  to  Johnston's  order  to  move  upon  Clinton,  in 
which  Pemberton  represented  himself  as  about  to  comply 
with  it ;  ■■='  and  later,  his  reply  to  Johnston's  second  order 

*  See  p.  317. 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  325 

to  the  same  effect,  promising  also  immediate  compliance, 
and  defining  the  route  that  he  would  take.'''  In  reply  to 
the  latter,  Johnston  writes, — 

"  I  have  just  received  a  despatch  from  Captain  Yerger, 
informing  me  that  a  detachment  of  his  squadron  went  into 
Jackson  this  morning  just  as  the  enemy  was  leaving  it. 
They  (the  Federals)  took  the  Clinton  road.  It  is  a  matter 
of  great  anxiety  to  add  this  little  force  to  your  army,  but 
the  enemy  being  exactly  between  us,  and  consultation  by 
correspondence  so  slow,  it  is  difficult  to  arrange  a  meeting. 
I  will  take  the  route  you  suggest,  however,  if  I  understand 
it.  We  have  small  means  of  transportation,  however. 
Send  forward  a  little  cavalry  to  communicate  with  me 
orally.  Is  the  force  between  us  too  strong  for  you  to  fight, 
if  it  interposes  itself?" 

Grant's  advance  has  pursued  the  enemy  to  within  three 
miles  of  the  Big  Black.  Sherman's  corps  (15)  has  come 
up  from  Jackson,  and  is  ordered  to  march  upon  Bridge- 
port, there  to  be  joined  by  Blair.  The  army  is  prepared 
to  resume  the  j)ursuit  with  all  strength  and  vigor  in  the 
morning.  Hansom's  brigade  (l^{)  has  joined  the  advance ; 
Swing's  (..f^)  has  reached  Raymond.  Lauman's  two  bri- 
gades {^f^  have  moved  down  the  Mississippi  to  below 
Warrenton. 

Cornering  the  Enemy. 

11th  May  (Map  20).— At  daylight  the  Federals  resume 
the  pursuit.  They  find  the  enemy,  about  4000  strong, 
intrenched  on  the  east  side  of  the  Big  Black  Bridge.  The 
position  is  promptly  invested,  and  after  some  artillery  and 
infantry  firing,  a  charge  by  a  single  brigade  suffices  to 
carry  it.  The  enemy  retreats,  disordered  and  demoralized, 
across  the  river,  burning  the  two  bridges.  By  this  time 
Sherman  has  come  up  at  Bridgeport,  where  he  finds  Blair 

*  See  p.  323. 


326  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

with  his  division  (fs)  and  the  pontoon  train.  The  army 
now  settles  down  to  bridging  the  Big  Black, — the  13th 
Corps  at  the  railroad,  the  15th  Corps  at  Bridgeport,  the 
17th  Corps  between  the  two.  At  2  p.m.  Sherman  writes 
to  Grant, — 

"...  I  now  have  a  regiment  across,  and  the  pontoons 
ought  to  be  done  in  a  couple  of  hours.  I  expect  to  be  on 
high  lands  *  back  of  Vicksburg  by  night.  One  of  Tuttle's 
brigades  is  broken  down  by  the  march ;  will  be  left  at  this 
bridge.  You  may  count  on  my  being  across  in  three  hours. 
Shall  I  push  into  the  city,  or  secure  a  point  on  the  ridge?" 

Grant  writes  in  reply, — 

"...  If  the  information  you  gain  after  crossing  war- 
rants you  in  believing  you  can  go  immediately  into  the 
city,  do  so.  If  there  is  any  doubt  in  this  matter,  throw 
out  troops  to  the  left,  after  advancing  on  a  line  with  the 
railroad  bridge,  to  open  comnuinications  with  the  troo})S 
here.  We  will  then  move  in  three  columns,  if  roads  can 
be  found  to  move  on,  and  eitlier  have  Vicksburg  or  Haines 
Bluff  to-morrow  night.  The  enemy  have  been  so  terribly 
beaten  yesterday  and  to-day,  that  I  cannot  believe  that  a 
stand  will  be  made,  unless  the  troops  are  relying  on 
Johnston's  arriving  with  large  re-enforcements,  nor  that 
Johnston  would  attempt  to  re-enforce  with  anything  at  his 
command,  if  he  was  at  all  aware  of  the  present  condition 
of  things." 

At  midnight,  Sherman's  leading  division  is  in  camp 
two  miles  west  of  Bridgeport,  and  his  rearmost  division 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Big  Black.  Ewing's,  Holmes's, 
and  McGuinnis's  brigades  (^  ^  i^)  are  left  at  Cham- 
pion Hills,  to  attend  to  burying  the  dead.  Hovey's  divi- 
sion (Is)  t  is  at  Edwards  Station. 

*  Walnut  Hills. 

t  This  division  comprises  but  two  brigades,  and  one  of  these  is,  as 
stated  above,  at  Champion  Hills. 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  327 

Pemberton  lias  retired  within  tlie  defences  of  Vieks- 
burg.  He  wrote  to  Johnston  from  Bovina  in  tlie  morn- 
ing, reporting  his  being  compelled  to  withdraw,  with  heavy 
loss,  to  Big  Black  Bridge,  and  expressing  apprehension 
that  he  would  be  compelled  to  fall  back  again.  He  repre- 
sented that  in  that  event  his  position  at  Snyder's  Mill 
(Haines  Blnff)  would  be  untenable,  and  said, — 

"  I  have  about  sixty  days'  provision  at  Vicksburg  and 
Snyder's.     I  respectfully  await  your  instructions." 

Later  in  the  day  he  sent  off  another  despatch,  reporting 
his  withdrawal  into  the  position  of  Vicksburg. 

Pursuant  to  Pemberton's  order,  the  garrison  of  Haines 
Bluff  (xj),  with  the  exception  of  two  companies  left  to 
destroy  stores,  is  on  the  march  to  Vicksburg.  No  reliable 
information  has  reached  Pemberton  in  regard  to  Loring. 
Having  failed  to  find  a  crossing  on  the  Big  Black,  Loring 
has  marched  to  Crystal  Springs,  with  the  object  of  joining 
Johnston.  His  division  aggregates  about  6000  effective 
officers  and  men. 

Pursuant  to  his  determination  of  yesterday,  and  con- 
fident that  Pemberton  was  marching  to  meet  him,  John- 
ston marched  to-day  through  Livingston  in  the  direction 
of  Brownsville.  In  his  camp  between  these  two  places  he 
received  Pemberton's  despatch  of  this  morning,  reporting 
his  defeat  at  Champion  Hills,  and  asking  for  instructions. 
Johnston  replied, — 

"...  If  Haines  Bluff  is  untenable,  Vicksburg  is  of 
no  value,  and  cannot  be  held.  If,  therefore,  you  are  in- 
vested in  Vicksburg,  you  nuist  ultimately  surrender. 
Under  such  circumstances,  instead  of  losing  both  troops 
and  place,  we  must,  if  possible,  save  the  troops.  If  it  is 
not  too  late,  evacuate  Vicksburg  and  its  dependencies  and 
march  to  the  northeast." 

This  despatch  is  not  yet  received.  On  account  of  the 
repeated  passage  of  the  Confederate  batteries  by  Federal 


328  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

gunboats  and  transports,  Johnston  attaches  little  value  to 
Vicksburg  as  an  obstruction  to  navigation  ;  and  on  account 
of  the  forcing  of  the  chain  of  frontier  posts  by  the  victory 
of  Port  Gibson,  together  with  the  apprehended  unten- 
ability  of  Haines  Bluff,  he  values  it  still  less  as  a  mere 
defensive  position.  He  is  apparently  overlooking  the  fact 
that  Vicksburg  still  closes  the  Mississippi  River  to  com- 
merce and  travel  and  to  military  transports.  But  while 
he  may  somewhat  undervalue  the  position  of  Vicksburg, 
he  would  certainly  overvalue  it  should  he  attach  a  greater 
importance  to  its  temporary  retention  than  to  the  safety 
of  Pemberton's  army ;  and  he  evidently  does  not  believe 
that  Pemberton's  army,  if  invested,  can  be  relieved. 

18^A  3Iay. — Starting  at  break  of  day,  Sherman  ad- 
vances along  the  Bridgeport  and  Vicksburg  Road.  Mc- 
Pherson,  after  crossing,  turns  into  the  same  road  and 
follows  Sherman.  McClernand  advances  along  the  line 
of  the  railroad  to  Mount  Alban,  and  inclining  there  to 
the  left,  proceeds  to  the  Vicksburg  and  Hall's  Ferry 
Road. 

Sherman  has  now  Blair's  division  (~)  at  the  front,  his 
pickets  within  a  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  works, 
Tuttle's  {l^)  in  support,  and  Steele's  dV)  on  the  Walnut 
Hills,  commanding  the  approaches  from  the  Yazoo.  About 
midnight  Blair  is  joined  by  Ewing,  who,  with  his  brigade 
(^),  has  marched  from  Grand  Gulf  by  way  of  Raymond, 
a  distance  of  eighty-five  miles,  in  three  days.  By  Sher- 
man's order  the  4th  Iowa  Cavalry  (15th  Corps)  is  on  the 
way  to  Haines  Bluff  to  take  possession  of  that  place. 
McPherson's  and  McClernand's  corps  (13,  17)  are  in 
bivouac  on  the  line  of  march. 

Two  brigades  {-—  ^y  are  left  on  the  Big  Black  to 
guard  the  bridge  and  the  trains.  The  two  brigades  of 
Lauman's  division  (,^)  have  descended  the  Mississippi  to 
Grand  Gulf. 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  329 

About  noon  tlie  sound  of  firing  in  rear  of  Vicksburg 
assures  Admiral  Porter  of  Grant's  approach,  and  per- 
ceiving in  the  afternoon  that  Sherman  has  come  in  above 
the  city,  the  admiral  despatches  a  naval  force  up  the 
Yazoo.  It  is  about  noon,  too,  when  Pemberton  is  in- 
formed of  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  Just  at  this  mo- 
ment he  receives  Johnston's  despatch  of  yesterday,  direct- 
ing him  to  evacuate  Vicksburg  in  order  to  save  the  army. 
Pemberton  realizes  that  the  evacuation  of  Vicksburg 
means  the  loss  of  the  stores  and  munitions  of  war  collected 
for  its  defence,  the  fall  of  Port  Hudson,  the  surrender  of 
the  Mississippi  Piver,  and  the  severance  of  the  Con- 
federacy. He  judges,  moreover,  that  the  operation  is  at 
present  neither  practicable  nor  necessary.  He  knows  that, 
with  proper  economy  of  subsistence  and  ordnance  stores, 
he  can  stand  a  siege,  and  has  a  firm  reliance  on  the  desire 
of  the  President  and  of  General  Johnston  to.  do  all  in 
such  a  case  that  can  be  done  to  raise  the  siege,  and  believes 
that  their  efforts  will  be  successful.  He  believes,  in  short, 
that,  if  invested,  he  will  be  relieved.  He  again  summons 
his  general  ofiicers  to  a  council  of  war,  and,  having  laid 
Johnston's  communication  before  them,  requests  them  to 
express  their  opinions  as  to  the  one  point  of  t\\Q  j^racti- 
cability  of  evacuating  Vicksburg.  Having  received  their 
opinions,  he  writes  to  General  Johnston  a  report  of  his 
action,  in  which  he  says, — 

"  The  opinion  was  unanimously  expressed  that  it  was 
impossible  to  withdraw  the  army  from  this  position  with 
such  morale  and  material  as  to  be  of  further  service  to 
the  Confederacy.  While  the  council  of  war  was  assem- 
bled, the  guns  of  the  enemy  opened  on  the  works,  and  it 
was  at  the  same  time  reported  that  they  were  crossing  the 
Yazoo  River  at  Brandon's  Ferry  above  Snyder's  Mill.  I 
have  decided  to  hold  Vicksburg  as  long  as  is  possible, 
with  the  firm  hope  that  the  government  may  yet  be  able 


330  THE  PRINCIPLES    OF  STRATEGY. 

to  assist  me  in  keeping  this  obstruction  to  the  enemy's  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River.  I  still  conceive  it  to 
be  the  most  important  point  in  the  Confederacy." 

Johnston  has  moved  to  near  Vernon  with  a  view  to 
joining  Pemberton  in  case  of  the  evacuation  of  Vicksburg. 
He  has  not  yet  received  the  above  despatch. 

Loring  makes  an  easy  march  from  Crystal  Springs  in 
the  direction  of  Jackson.  About  four  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon the  4th  Iowa  Cavalry  takes  possession  of  Haines 
Bluff  and  delivers  it  over  to  the  gunboat  De  Kalb.  The 
two  Confederate  companies  left  to  destroy  the  guns  and 
stores  have  fled  without  accomplishing  their  purpose. 

lS)th  31ay. — The  Federal  army  has  closed  in  upon 
Vicksburg, — Sherman  on  the  right,  McPherson  in  the 
centre,  McClernand  on  the  left.  For  want  of  numbers, 
however,  it  cannot  complete  the  investment.  Between  its 
left  and  the  river  it  leaves  a  gap  of  about  three  miles. 
With  the  aid  of  his  pickets,  McClernand  can  prevent  this 
gap's  being  used  for  the  introduction  of  supplies  or  re- 
enforcements  into  the  city  ;  and  any  attempt  of  Pember- 
ton to  escape  by  it  should  result  in  his  being  driven  into 
the  pocket  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Big  Black. 
But  it  may  be  used  to  considerable  advantage  in  the  trans- 
mission of  intelligence  between  Pemberton  and  Johnston. 

Relying  upon  the  demoralization  of  the  enemy,  Grant 
causes  an  assault  to  take  place  while  as  yet  only  Sher- 
man's corps  is  in  position  to  act  with  vigor.  It  results 
in  the  repulse  of  Sherman  and  in  the  occupation  of 
more  advanced  positions  by  McPliei'son  and  McClernand. 
McGuinnis's  and  Holmes's  brigades  (^  ^)  have  moved 
forward  from  Champion  Hills.  Hovey's  division  (^)  is  on 
guard  at  the  Big  Black.  Pugh's  brigade  {^^d  from  Mem- 
phis has  arrived  at  Young's  Point.  Hall's  and  Johnston's 
brigades  {l^^^  ^)  are  embarking  at  Grand  Gulf  to  repair  to 
the  front. 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  331 

Johnston  has  moved  back  in  the  direction  of  Canton. 
Before  leaving  his  old  camp  he  receives  Pemberton's 
despatch  of  yesterday,  expressing  his  determination  to 
hold  Vicksburg.     Johnston  replies, — 

"  Can  you  not  get  rid  of  your  teams  ?  It  would  be 
better  to  kill  them  than  to  feed  them.  I  am  trying  to 
gather  a  force  which  may  attempt  to  relieve  you.  Hold 
out.     I  have  just  heard  from  Loring  at  Crystal  Springs." 

Loring  has  made  another  easy  march  towards  Jackson. 
Johnston  sends  ortlers  by  telegraph  and  by  courier  to 
Gardner  to  evacuate  Port  Hudson  and  move  his  troops  to 
Jackson. 

20fJi-21st  3Iay  (Map  21).— These  two  days  are  devoted 
in  the  Federal  army  to  the  perfecting  of  its  new  line  of 
supply.  Most  of  the  troops  have  been  marching  and 
fighting  for  twenty  days  on  about  five  days'  regular  rations, 
eked  out  with  the  resources  of  the  country.  Though  they 
have  not  suffered  from  insufficient  food,  the  want  of  bread 
has  been  seriously  felt.  On  the  21st  the  new  arrange- 
ments for  supplying  the  army  are  completed  and  the  men 
once  more  in  receipt  of  the  full  ration.  The  line  of  supply 
runs  from  the  Mississippi  up  the  Yazoo  to  the  Chickasaw 
Bayou,  and  thence  overland  to  the  army. 

As  a  ^preparation  for  another  assault,  ordered  for  to- 
morrow, the  whole  line  of  investment,  including  Admiral 
Porter's  mortar  fleet,  is  keeping  up  a  steady  fire  on  the 
city. 

Lauman's  division  (,V),  minus  the  3d  brigade,  left  at 
Grand  Gulf,  is  at  Haines  Bluff'.  General  James  Grant 
Wilson,  commanding  a  detachment  of  cavalry  of  this 
division,  is  ordered  to  keep  his  command  well  to  the  east 
and  north,  and  observe  closely  every  movement  of  the 
enemy,  "  who  are  reported  to  be  assembling  an  army  in 
the  vicinity  of  Brownsville."     His  instructions  read, — 

"  Should  vou  ascertain  to  a  certainty  that  the  enemy  are 


332  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

concentrating  there,  commence  with  your  cavalry  the  de- 
struction of  all  corn  between  the  Black  and  Yazoo  Rivers 
as  far  as  you  can  possibly  reach.  Drive  in  also  all  stock 
upon  which  an  army  might  feed  in  the  same  event. 

"  Report  to  these  head-quarters  promptly  all  you  may 
observe  concerning  the  movement  of  the  enemy." 

Hall's  brigade  (~.)  proceeded  on  the  20th  from  Grand 
Gulf  to  Young's  Point.  Early  on  the  21st  it  moved  to 
Haines  Bluff,  but  it  remained  there  only  a  few  hours. 
Pursuant  to  orders  from  the  division  commander,  it  re- 
turned to  Young's  Point,  marched  to  the  lower  landing, 
was  transported  to  Warrenton,  and  marched  four  miles  in 
the  direction  of  the  army.  Warrenton  is  garrisoned  by  a 
regiment  of  the  13th  Corps.  On  the  20th,  Pemberton 
wrote  to  Johnston, — 

"  The  enemy  assaulted  our  intrenched  lines  yesterday  at 
two  points,  centre  and  left,  and  was  repulsed  with  heavy 
loss.  Our  loss  small.  I  cannot  estimate  the  enemy's  force 
now  engaged  round  Vicksburg  at  less  than  60,000  men. 
It  is  probably  more.  At  this  hour  (8.30  a.m.)  he  is  briskly 
cannonading  with  long-range  guns.  That  we  may  save 
ammunition,  his  fire  is  rarely  returned.  At  present  our 
main  necessity  is  musket  caps.  Can  you  send  them  to  me 
by  hands  of  couriers  ?  An  army  will  be  necessary  to 
relieve  Vicksburg,  and  that  quickly.  Will  it  not  be  sent? 
Please  let  me  hear  from  you  if  possible." 

On  the  21st,  Pembei-ton  directs  that  the  horses  and 
mules  in  Vicksburg  be  driven  beyond  the  lines. 

Johnston  has  moved  to  Canton.  He  was  joined  on  the 
20th  by  Gist's  brigade,  and  on  the  21st  by  Ector's  and 
McNair's  from  Tennessee.  The  two  latter  number  together 
about  8000  men.  Loring  has  now  reached  Jackson,  and 
Maxey  is  moving  up  from  Brookhaven  to  the  same  j^oint. 

The  several  Confederate  commands  now  foot  up  about 
as  follows : 


THE  VICKSBURG   CAMPAIGN,  1863.  333 

Johnston,  at  Canton 16,000 

Loring,  at  Jackson (i,000 

Maxey,  between  Jackson  and  Brook  haven  .    .  8,000 

Pemberton,  at  Yicksburg 18,500 

Total 43,500 

Since  the  14th  instant,  Grant  has  increased  Iiis  force 
east  of  the  Mississippi  by  Swing's  brigade  (,,4)  and  Lau- 
man's  division  (,6 ),  aggregating  together  in  fresentfor  duty 
about  8100.  He  has  lost  in  battle  about  3000,  which 
leaves  him  a  net  gain  in  'present  for  duty  of  about  5100. 
Deducting  one-fifth,  we  have  for  his  effective  gain  4080. 
This,  added  to  his  effective  strength  of  May  14  (37,200), 
gives  him  an  effective  strength  of  41,280. 

22d-24ith  May. — On  the  22d  the  investing  army  makes 
a  general  assault.  Gi'ant  watches  it  from  a  commanding 
position,  whence  he  can  overlook  all  of  McPherson's  corps 
and  part  of  Sherman's  and  McClernand's.  Each  corps 
has  many  more  men  than  can  be  used  on  such  ground  as 
intervenes  between  it  and  the  enemy.  Such  excess  of 
numbers  can  avail  only  in  case  of  breaking  through  the 
enemy's  line,  or  of  having  to  repel  a  sortie.  The  assault 
is  gallant  in  the  extreme  on  the  part  of  all  the  troops,  but 
the  enemy's  position  proves  too  strong  to  be  taken  in  that 
way.  At  every  2:)oint  he  is  able  to  show  all  the  force 
necessary  to  man  the  woi'ks.  The  assault  fails,  with  a  loss 
on  the  Federal  side  of  3199  officers  and  men,  but  without 
weakening  the  confidence  of  the  troops  in  their  ability 
ultimately  to  succeed.  Since  the  assault,  Lauman's  division 
(^)  has  come  down  from  Haines  Bluff  and  taken  position 
on  Sherman's  left,  and  Garrard's  brigade  [^\i)  has  relieved 
Slack's  (^)  on  the  Big  Black.  The  Federal  army  has 
settled  down  to  a  regular  siege. 

On  the  night  of  the  23d,  Banks's  advance  crosses  the 
Mississippi,  and  on  the  24th  moves  to  the  rear  of  Port 
Hudson. 


334  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

Johnston's  army  has  been  increased  by  the  arrival  of 
Maxey's  brigade  and  other  re-enforcements  to  12,000  men, 
or,  inckiding  Loring's  division,  to  18,000. 

2Dth  May-A^th  June. — On  the  25th  of  May,  Johnston 
wrote  to  Pemberton, — 

"...  Bragg  is  sending  a  division  ;  when  it  comes  I 
will  move  to  you.  Which  do  you  think  the  best  route? 
How  and  where  is  the  enemy  encamped?  What  is  your 
force?" 

To  this  Pemberton  replied  on  the  29th, — 

"...  I  have  18,000  men  to  man  the  lines  and  river 
front ;  no  reserves.  I  do  not  think  you  should  move  with 
less  than  30,000  or  35,000,  and  then,  if  possible,  towards 
Snyder's  Mill,  giving  me  notice  of  the  time  of  your 
approach."  .  .  . 

This  despatch,  it  seems,  was  never  received.  Appre- 
hending evidently  that  Pemberton,  in  his  high  apprecia- 
tion of  the  importance  of  Vicksburg,  purposed  remaining 
in  his  lines  and  leaving  it  to  Johnston  alone  to  drive  away 
Grant's  army,  Johnston  wrote  to  Pemberton,  also  on  the 
29th,— 

"...  I  am  too  weak  to  save  Vicksburg.  Can  do  no 
more  than  attempt  to  save  you  and  your  garrison.  It  will 
be  impossible  to  extricate  you  unless  you  co-operate,  and 
we  make  mutually  supporting  movements." 

To  this  Pemberton  replied,  under  date  of  June  3, — 

"...  We  can  get  no  information  from  outside  as  to 
your  position  or  strength,  and  very  little  in  regard  to  the 
enemy." 

This  despatch  was  received  by  Johnston,  but  on  what 
day  does  not  appear.  Johnston  has  not  taken  it  upon 
himself  to  direct  what  Pemberton  shall  do,  and  has  not 
heard,  nor  expressly  inquired,  what  Pemberton  purposes, 
or  would  propose,  to  do.  Pemberton,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  not  determined  on  any  movement  for  himself,  and  can 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  335 

only  conjecture  as  to  the  plans  and  purposes  of  Johnston. 
The  two  commanders,  therefore,  are  no  nearer  to  an  under- 
standing as  to  how  they  shall  co-operate  than  they  were 
before  their  corres[)ondence  on  the  subject  commenced. 

Johnston's  army  is  composed  of  four  divisions,  which 
aggregate  in  pixsent  for  duty  as  follows : 

Loring 10,385 

Walker 10,366 

Brecken  ridge 8,194 

Jackson  (cavalry) .  2,512 

Total 31,457 

Adding  18,000  for  Pemberton,  we  have  a  grand  total  of 
49,457. 

Grant  was  re-enforced  on  the  od  of  June  by  a  pro- 
visional division  of  the  l(3th  Corps,  under  General 
Kimball.  This  command  has  been  despatched  up  the 
Yazoo  Kiver  to  Mechanicsburg,  between  Haines  Bluff  and 
Yazoo  City,  to  observe  Johnston.  The  Federal  forces  east 
of  the  Mississippi  now  aggregate  in  present  for  duty 
56,757. 

On  the  26tli  of  May,  Banks  invested  Pjort  Hudson. 

bth-oOih  June. — On  the  7th  of  June,  Pemberton  wrote  to 
Johnston, — 

"...  The  enemy  is  so  vigilant  that  it  is  impossible  to 
obtain  reliable  information.  When  may  I  expect  you  to 
move,  and  in  what  direction  ?  My  subsistence  may  be 
put  down  for  about  twenty  days." 

On  the  same  day  Johnston  wrote  to  Pemberton, — 

"  We  are  nearly  ready  to  move,  but  don't  know  the  best 
route.  Co-operation  is  absolutely  necessary.  Tell  us  how 
to  effect  it,  and  by  what  route  to  approach." 

Neither  of  these  two  despatches,  it  seems,  was  delivered. 
On  the  14th  of  June,  Johnston  writes, — 

"...  My   communication   with   the   rear  can   best  be 


336  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

preserved  by  operating  north  of  railroad.  Inform  me  as 
soon  as  possible  what  point  will  suit  you  best  [for  me  to 
move  on].  .  .  . 

"  General  Taylor,  with  8000  men,  will  endeavor  to  open 
communication  with  you  from  Richmond  [Louisiana]." 

To  this  Pemberton  replied  on  the  21st, — 

"...  If  it  is  absolutely  impossible,  in  your  opinion,  to 
raise  the  siege  with  our  combined  forces,  and  that  nothing 
more  can  be  done  than  to  extricate  the  garrison,  I  suggest 
that,  giving  me  full  information  in  time  to  act,  you  move 
by  the  north  of  the  railroad,  drive  in  the  enemy's  pickets 
at  night,  and  at  daylight  next  morning  engage  him  heavily 
with  skirmishers,  occupying  him  during  the  entire  day, 
and  that  on  that  night  I  move  by  the  Warrenton  Road  by 
Hankinson's  Ferry,  to  which  point  you  should  previously 
send  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  with  two  field  batteries,  to  build 
a  bridge  there,  and  hold  that  ferry  ;  also  Hall's  and  Bald- 
win's to  cover  my  crossing  at  Hankinson's.  I  shall  not  be 
able  to  move  with  my  artillery  or  wagons."  .  .  . 

While  this  correspondence  is  going  on,  Johnston  is 
engaged  in  gathering  together  the  necessary  supplies  and 
transportation  for  his  army.  The  country  in  which  he  is 
to  operate  is  broken,  wooded,  and  thinly  settled,  with  few 
streams.  "  It  still  has  many  cattle,  but  the  corn  is  pretty 
thoroughly  cleared  out.  He  cannot  move  through  it  with- 
out bringing  all  his  supplies  with  him.  Finally,  however, 
on  the  29th  of  June,  everything  is  ready  for  him  to  do  so, 
and  he  accordingly  takes  up  his  line  of  march  for  Big 
Black.  His  army  aggregates  at  this  time  31,226  present 
for  duty. 

On  the  7th  of  June  the  Federal  troops  at  Milliken's 
Bend,  numbering  some  1000  men,  about  half  of  whom 
were  raw  colored  troops,  were  attacked  by  about  2000  men 
of  the  trans-Mississippi  department.  The  object  of  this 
movement  was  to  throw  supplies  and  troops  into  Vicks- 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  337 

burg.  The  Federal  troops  Avere  at  first  driven  out  of  their 
works,  but,  having  rallied  under  cover  of  a  gunboat,  re- 
turned and  defeated  their  assailants.  An  unsuccessful 
attempt  was  made  at  the  same  time  against  Young's  Point. 
The  next  day  (June  8)  Mower's  brigade  (,■;-,)  w^as  ordered 
to  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi  as  a  re-enforcement  to 
the  garrisons  tliere. 

On  the  8th  of  June  the  Federal  army  was  re-enforced 
by  Sooy  Smith's  division  of  the  IGtli  Corps,  which  was 
sent  to  Haines  Bluff  as  an  additional  protection  against 
Johnston,  and  on  the  lltli  by  Herron's  division  from  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri,  which  was  placed  on  Lau- 
man's  left.  This  completed  the  line  of  investment.  On 
the  14th,  General  Parke  arrived  with  two  divisions  of 
Burnside's  corps,  and  was  despatched  the  next  day  to 
Haines  Bluff.  At  the  end  of  June,  Grant's  army  east  of 
the  Mississippi  aggregated  about  70,000,  Johnston's  and 
Pemberton's  armies,  together,  about  50,000,  present  for 
duty. 

lst-4th  July. — On  the  1st  of  July,  Pemberton  was 
satisfied  that  the  time  had  come  when  it  was  necessary 
either  to  cut  his  way  out  or  to  capitulate.  In  order  to  act 
advisedly,  he  addressed  to  his  division  commanders  a 
written  inquiry  as  to  the  fitness  of  their  men  for  march- 
ing, and  from  their  re^^lies,  received  on  the  2d,  he  con- 
cluded that  the  only  justifiable  course  was  to  capitulate. 
Accordingly,  on  the  3d  of  July,  he  proposed  an  armistice 
for  the  arrangement  of  terms.  Grant  replied  that  he 
would  consent  to  no  terms  except  unconditional  surrender; 
but  upon  further  consideration  he  offered  Pemberton  the 
condition  that  the  garrison  be  [)aroled.  On  these  terms 
the  capitulation  was  effected  the  following  day,  July  4, 
1863. 

Meanwhile,  Johnston  had  been  moving  towards  Pem- 
berton.    On  the  1st  of  July  he  camped  between  Browns- 


338  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

ville  and  the  Big  Black.  Keconnoissauces,  which  occupied 
the  2d  and  od,  convinced  him  that  the  attack  north  of  the 
railroad  was  impracticable.  Such  was  unquestionably  the 
fact,  for  at  that  time  Sherman  had  been  detached  from  the 
blockading  force  and  placed  in  command  of  a  large  force 
on  the  outside.  This  consisted  of  Parke's  corps  (9)  ; 
Kimball's  and  Lauman's  divisions  of  the  16th  Corps, 
under  Washburn ;  Tuttle's  division  of  the  15tli ;  Mc- 
Arthur's,  of  the  17th ;  and  Osterhaus's,  of  the  13th 
Corps.  This  force  numbered  neaidy  30,000  men,  and 
another  division  of  McPherson's  corps  was  in  readiness 
to  move  at  once  on  Sherman's  order.  These  troops  were 
posted  from  Haines  Bluff  on  the  left  to  Big  Black  Bridge 
on  the  right ;  they  had  fortified  and  barricaded  every  road 
between  these  points,  and  were  ready  to  hold  them  against 
double  their  numbers.* 

Having  found  no  opening  north  of  the  railroad,  John- 
ston determined  to  make  the  examination  necessary  for 
an  attempt  to  the  south  of  it,  thinking  from  his  actual 
knowledge  that  the  chance  of  succeeding  was  much  better 
there,  though  the  consequences  of  defeat  might  be  more 
disastrous.  On  the  night  of  the  3d  a  messenger  Avas  sent 
to  Pemberton,  with  information  that  an  attempt  to  create 
a  diversion  would  be  made  to  enable  him  to  cut  his  way 
out,  and  that  Johnston  hoped  to  attack  the  enemy  about 
the  7th.  But  on  the  5th,  Johnston  learned  of  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg,  and  thereupon  fell  back  to  Jackson.  He  was 
none  too  quick,  for  before  sunset  of  the  day  on  which  the 
garrison  laid  down  its  arms  Sherman  with  nearly  50,000 
men  was  on  his  heels  in  pursuit.  He  occupied  Jackson  on 
the  7th,  and  Sherman  appeared  before  the  place  on  the  9th. 
On  the  12th,  Johnston  heard  in  Jackson  of  the  surren- 
der of  Port  Hudson  ;  and  on  the  16tli,  apprehending  the 

*  Greene,  "Mississippi  Campaign." 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1863.  339 

re-enforcement  of  Sherman's  army  and  the  besieging  of 
Jackson,  evacuated  that  place. 

The  total  number  of  men  that  surrendered  at  Vicksburg, 
including  115  civilian  employes,  was  29,376.  Of  these, 
709  refused  to  take  the  parole  and  were  sent  North. 
Pemberton's  combatant  force  iwesent  for  duty  numbered 
at  the  time  of  the  surrender  less  than  18,000  men. 

The  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  sustained 
during  the  campaign  aggregated,  on  the  Federal  side, 
4379 ;  on  the  Confederate,  about  10,000.  The  force  that 
surrendered  at  Port  Hudson  numbered  about  5500  officers 
and  men. 

Comments. 

Regular  strategy  is  illustrated  in  this  campaign  by  the 
investment  of  Pemberton's  army ;  tactical  strategy,  by  the 
successive  overpowering  of  Johnston's  force  at  Jackson 
and  Pemberton's  at  Champion  Hills;  and  political  strategy, 
by  the  capture  of  Jackson,  the  capital  of  Mississippi. 

General  Pemberton  erred  in  assuming  the  authority  to 
sit  in  judgment,  as  he  did,  on  the  orders  issued  him  by 
General  Johnston.  The  latter  was  in  the  field  as  Pember- 
ton's duly  constituted  superior,  and  was  in  quite  as  good  a 
position  as  Pemberton,  if  not  in  a  better  one,  for  the  gen- 
eral supervision  and  direction  of  operations. 

It  may  seem  that  Johnston  might  in  person  have  joined 
the  Vicksburg  army,  and  should  have  directed  operations 
from  Pemberton's  head-quarters.  Had  he  done  so,  the 
Vicksburg  army  would  in  all  probability  have  been  saved. 
But  Johnston,  as  we  have  seen,  reached  Jackson  the  very 
day  that  railroad  communication  with  Vicksburg  was 
interrupted  (May  13),  and  he  was  prevented  by  a  dis- 
abling wound  from  undertaking  the  journey  there  on 
horseback. 

The  key-point  of  the  campaign  was  Port  Gibson.  For 
after  Grant  had   established  himself  upon  solid  ground 


340  THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

east  of  the  Mississippi  he  was  capable  of  holding  his  own 
against  even  a  united  attack  by  the  scattered  forces  directed 
against  him.  There  was  no  longer  any  sure  way  of 
checking  him  except  that  of  destroying  or  carrying  off 
the  resources  of  the  country  in  provisions,  and  this  des- 
perate measure  does  not  apjiear  to  have  been  anywhere 
resorted  to. 

That  Grant's  crossing  of  the  Mississippi  was  practically 
unopposed  was  due  to  an  apprehension  entertained  by 
Pemberton  that  the  JDreparatory  movement  of  Federal 
troops  from  Milliken's  Bend  to  Hard  Times  was  only  a 
feint,  and  that  the  real  movement  was  to  be  made  east  of 
the  Mississippi  from  Tennessee.  This  delusion  of  Pem- 
berton's  was  largely  the  effect  of  Grierson's  raid  through 
the  State  of  Mississippi  and  Sherman's  demonstration 
against  Haines  Bluff. 

Successful  though  it  was,  Grant's  passage  of  the  Missis- 
sippi was  not  a  faultless  operation.  It  is  plain  enough 
now  that  the  reduction  of  Grand  Gulf  should  not  have 
been  attempted.  The  necessity  of  issuing  rations  to 
McClernand's  troops  while  they  were  practically  in  the 
act  of  crossing  has  already  been  commented  on.  The 
subsequent  halting  of  the  army  for  nearly  a  week  about 
Hankinson's  Ferry  to  await  the  arrival  of  re-enforcements 
and  supplies  might  perhaps  have  been  anticipated  and 
obviated,  at  least  in  a  measure. 

Both  of  the  opposing  armies  operated  under  the  dis- 
advantage of  being  short  of  cavalry,  and  consequently  in 
the  dark  most  of  the  time  as  to  each  other's  movements 
and  intentions.  Until  about  the  middle  of  June,  the  only 
regiment  of  cavalry  in  Grant's  army  was  the  4th  Iowa ; 
the  rest  of  his  cavalry  consisted  of  Wright's  battalion  of 
the  6th  Missouri,  numbering  about  150  men,  and  a  num- 
ber of  separate  companies  acting  as  escorts  to  generals. 

The  reader  would  miss  one  of  the  most  important  lessons 


THE  VICKSBURG    CAMPAIGN,  1S63.  341 

of  this  campaign  should  he  fail  to  perceive  the  great  ad- 
vantage possessed  by  the  Federals  in  their  fleet.  In  order 
fully  to  appreciate  it,  let  him  suppose  the  water  to  be  com- 
manded, or  even  seriously  threatened,  by  the  Confederates, 
and  then  imagine  the  Federal  army  marching  by  a  single 
road  from  Milliken's  Bend  across  the  front  of  Vicksburg 
to  Hard  Times  and  De  Schroon  ;  stealing  a  passage  across 
the  river ;  smuggling  supplies  and  re-enforcements  over 
after  the  army,  as  opportunity  might  present  itself;  being 
doomed  to  almost  certain  interception  and  capture  in  case 
of  retreat;  depending  upon  the  resources  of  the  country 
for  carrying  on  a  siege ;  and  having,  with  an  army  of 
about  75,000  men  (counting  the  forces  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi), to  invest  Vicksburg  on  both  sides  of  the  river, 
closing  it  above  and  below  by  land  batteries,  and  at  the 
same  time  showing  a  respectable  front  to  Johnston  on  the 
one  side  and  E.  Kirby  Smith  on  the  other.  Except  as  a 
joint  operation  of  land  and  naval  forces,  a  campaign  below 
and  in  rear  of  Vicksburg  was  not  to  be  thought  of. 


INDEX. 


Active  defensive,  discussed,  20,  66,  67,  84,  119,  153. 

Adams,  John,  district  commander,  284  et  seq. ;  commanding  at  Jackson,  301. 

Adams,  Wirt,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  307. 

Adirondacks,  the,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Administration,  31,  110,  132. 

Advance  base,  116,  117. 

Advance  guard,  26,  27,  37. 

Alabama,  cruise  of,  186. 

Albany,  military  importance  of,  48,  50 ;  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Alexander,  campaigns  of,  264. 

Alexandria,  Louisiana,  a  river  obstruction,  285. 

Allan,  on  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  207. 

Allatoona,  Sherman's  turning  of,  96;  an  intermediate  base,  119. 

Alleghany  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Alps,  the,  as  an  obstacle,  60. 

Amsterdam,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  New  York,  51. 

Anderson,  division  commander  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161,  170,  171, 
173,  178. 

Apaches,  methods  of,  23,  31. 

Appalachian  range,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Appomattox,  campaign  of,  referred  to,  158 — described,  130. 

Appomattox  Court-House,  military  importance  of,  47  ;  surrender  at,  131. 

Arkansas  Post,  a  river  obstruction,  80. 

Armies,  grouping  of,  42;  co-operation  of,  201;  formation  of  separate,  260, 
261. 

Army,  definition  of,  17;  on  the  march,  21,  38,  39;  Napoleon's,  in  Egypt,  22; 
British,  in  the  Soudan,  23  ;  length  of,  in  column,  30  ;  order  of  march  of 
McClellan's,  in  1862,  33  ;  organization  of,  17,  39,  40,  260  ;  combat  front 
of,  41;  supplying  an,  110,  125,  133,  139  et  seq.;  of  the  Potomac,  124, 
129,  161,  206,  209,  210,  260;  of  the  James,  124,  129;  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, 124,  161,  206,  209;  Federal,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  92,  118,  261  ; 
Confederate,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  92 ;  British,  in  Trenton  campaign, 
159;  American,  i'i.  /  Sherman's,  on  his  march  through  Georgia,  144; 
British,  in  the  South,  236,  240-250;  American,  ib. ;  British,  in  Ameri- 
can war  of  1812,  107;  Federal,  in  Sheridan's  Valley  campaign,  130; 
Confederate,  ib. ;  Federal,  in  Grant's  Overland  campaign,  124,  129; 
Confederate,  in  Grant's  Overland  campaign,  124,  129,  130;  Federal,  in 
Appomatox  campaign,  131 ;  Confederate,  ib.  ;  British,  in  Saratoga  cam- 

343 


344  INDEX. 

paign,  136, 138;  Americau,  in  Saratoga  campaign,  138;  Confederate,  in 
Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212,  221 ;  Federal,  ih.;  Federal,  in  Shiloli 
campaign,  268,  269,  276;  Confederate,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  268,  272, 
276,  277;  Federal,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  283,  284,  321,  333,  337; 
Confederate,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  283,  284,  297,  309,  320,  333,  337 ; 
Banks's,  in  Department  of  the  Gulf,  284,  297. 
Axis  of  operations,  defined,  36. 

B. 

Baggage,  light  and  heavy,  defined,  28 ;  on  the  march,  28,  36  ;  General  Hull's 
loss  of,  31. 

Baldwin,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  295  et  seq. 

Banks,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212  et  seq.  ;  in  Vicksburg  campaign, 
279  d  seq. 

Banks'  Ford,  on  the  Rappahannock,  164. 

Bantry  Bay  expedition,  55. 

Barksdale,  at  Fredericksburg,  70. 

Barton,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  302. 

Base,  of  supplies,  110,  112;  of  retreat,  ib. ;  of  operations,  112  ;  intermediate, 
or  contingent,  116,  117;  change  of,  120,  121,  152,  223. 

Baton  Rouge,  a  strategic  point,  284. 

Bayou,  Macon,  292;  Pierre,  294  ;  Chickasaw,  295;  Sara,  305. 

Beaufort,  a  strategic  point,  242. 

Beauregard,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  271  et  seq.;  to  Pemberton,  306. 

Belmont,  expedition  to,  267. 

Bennington,  expedition  to,  137. 

Big  Black  River,  a  line  of  operation,  291  ;  Grant's  passage  of,  325,  326. 

Bitter  Root  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Black  River,  a  line  of  communication,  292. 

Blair,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  302  et  seq. 

Blockade,  nature  and  effect  of,  183 ;  of  Confederate  States,  182-185,  229,  266; 
running,  229. 

Blue  Ridge,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Blume,  on  mountain  warfare,  60. 

Bowen,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  286  et  seq. 

Bowling  Green,  a  strategic  point,  268. 

Bragg,  department  commander,  284. 

Brashear,  Banks's  army  at,  292. 

Breckenridge,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  335. 

Bridge,  trestle,  constructed  by  Army  of  the  Rappahannock,  63  ;  pontoon,  laid 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  ib.;  constructed  by  Buell's  army  at  Columbia,  275. 

Bridge-head,  definition  of,  05 ;  use  of,  ib. 

Bridges,  discussion  of,  61,  62,  63 ;  over  the  Potomac,  63 ;  destroyed,  by 
Sheridan,  127;  in  Saratoga  campaign,  137;  in  Jackson's  Valley  cam- 
paign, 218;  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  299,  323;  built  or  rebuilt  in 
Saratoga  campaign,  137;  in  War  of  Secession,  46. 

British,  order  of  march  in  the  Soudan,  23;  rear  guard,  30;  shipping,  54; 


INDEX.  345 

fleet  in  the  channel,  55  ;  fleet  off  Toulon,  56  ;  stratagem  at  Abu  Klea, 
59 ;  railroads,  76 ;  conduct  of  war  in  America,  105,  226,  233 ;  campaign 
of  Saratoga,  referred  to,  106,  119,  226— described,  136  ;  Trenton  cam- 
paign, 159;  campaign  in  the  South,  referred  to,  107 — described,  234; 
dependence  upon  commerce,  184;  base  in  America,  161  ;  discipline  in 
Philadelphia,  226,  227. 

Buell,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  268  et  seq. 

Buford,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  300,  304,  306. 

Bull  Run,  result  of  first  campaign,  267 ;  second  campaign,  referred  to,  71, 
111,  223— described,  206. 

Burgoyne,  his  Saratoga  campaign,  referred  to,  106,  119,  226 — described,  136. 

Burnside,  corps  commander,  124. 

Butler,  army  commander,  124,  127. 

C. 

Cairo,  a  strategic  point,  48,  51,  268. 

Camden,  battle  of,  242. 

Camp,  intrenched,  65. 

Campaign,  Second  Bull  Run,  referred  to,  71,  111,  223 — described,  206; 
Atlanta,  referred  to  113,  117,  118,   152,  154,  204,  263— described,  92 ; 
Grant's  Overland,  referred  to,  205,  263 — described,  124;  Appomattox, 
referred  to,  158 — described,  130  ;  Saratoga,  referred  to,  106,  119,  226 — 
described,  136  ;  Geronimo,  150;  Trenton,  159;  Chancellorsville,  referred 
to,  45,  70,  126,  205— described,  161 ;  Gettysburg,  referred  to,  158,  262— 
described,  209  ;  Jackson's  Valley,  212  ;  Sheridan's  Valley,  130, 147,  229 
Sherman's,  through  Georgia,  referred  to,  121,  224,  225 — described,  144 
British,  in  the  South,  referred  to,  107— described,  234;  Shiloh,  267 
Vicksburg,  referred  to,  70,  82,  123,  154,  157— described,  283. 

Campbell,  expedition  under,  236. 

Canada,  its  line  of  defence  against  United  States,  52,  61 ;  line  of  defence  of 
United  States  against,  61. 

Capital,  the,  as  a  strategic  objective,  226,  274. 

Carr,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  313. 

Carroll,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  219,  220. 

Cascade  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Cavalry,  its  place  in  column,  32;  its  use,  in  mountains,  60 — on  the  military 
frontier,  261,  262,  265. 

Celerity  on  the  march,  33,  36. 

Cerro  Gordo,  Scott's  turning  of,  46. 

Chalmers,  district  commander  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284. 

Champion  Hills,  battle  of,  321  et  seq. 

Chancellorsville,  campaign  of,  referred  to,  45,  70,  126,  205 — described,  161. 

Charleston,  Moultrie's  defence  of,  234,  237  ;  as  a  strategic  point,  229,  242. 

Charlottesville,  seat  of  government  of  Virginia,  252,  253. 

Chattahoochee  River,  Sherman's  i>a3sage  of,  97. 

Chattanooga,  an  intrenched  camp,  92,  111,  119;  campaign  of,  referred  to, 
263  ;  a  railroad  centre,  273. 


346  INDEX. 

Chicago,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Chiricahua  Indians,  in  Geronimo  campaign,  150. 

Cincinnati,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Cities,  military  beginnings  of,  51. 

Civil  War,  smallness  of  armies  in,  43;  strategy  of,  262;  railroads  built  or 

rebuilt  in,  46 ;  bridges,  ib. ;  blockade  in,  183-185,  229,  266 ;  duration  of, 

224,  225,  232  ;  campaigns  of,  see  Campaign. 
Clarke,  on  containing  power  of  modern  weapons,  35;  on  lines  of  communi- 
cation, 113. 
Clarksville,  sub-post  of  Fort  Donelson,  268. 
Cleveland,  Tennessee,  a  railroad  centre,  273. 
Clinton,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  107,  234  et  seq. 
Cold  Harbor,  operations  about,  128. 

Columbus,  Kentucky,  a  strategic  point,  268;  evacuation  of,  271,  272. 
Columbus,  Mississippi,  garrison  of,  284. 
Column  of  route,  30,  32. 
Combat  front,  39. 
Command,  efficiency  of,  131,  257. 
Commerce  destroying,  186,  187,  188. 
Communications,  discussed,  71;  protection  of,  43,  114,  118,  263;  objects  of 

striking  at,  153;  change  of,  120,  121,  152,  223. 
Corate  de  Paris,  on  use  of  rivers  and  railroads,  78. 
Concentration,  theory  of,  192  et  seq. 
Confederacy,  blockade   of,   183-185,  229,  266;    government  of,   224,  225; 

armies  of,  see  Army ;    campaigns  of,  see  Campaign ;   railroads  of,  see 

Railroad. 
Contingent  base,  116,  117. 
Cordilleras,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 
Corduroy  roads,  62. 

Corinth,  a  strategic  point,  273 ;  operations  against,  277. 
Cornwallis,  in  Trenton  campaign,  159;  in  the  South,  107,  241. 
Cotton,  Confederate,  184,  185. 
Couch,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161  et  seq. 
Counter-offensive,  20,  67,  153. 
Country,  living  off  the,  140. 
Cowpens,  battle  of  the,  246. 
Creasy,  on  spirit  of  New  England,  106. 
Cromwell,  spirit  of,  in  New  England,  106. 
Crossings,  on  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan,  163,  164;  on  the  Big  Black 

River  and  Bayou  Pierre,  294. 
Cross  Keys,  battle  of,  220. 
Cruft,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  270. 
Cruise  of  the  Alabama,  186. 
Cumberland,  Army  of  the,  261. 
Cumberland  Gap,  a  strategic  point,  268. 
Cumberland  River,  a  line  of  operation,  268. 
Custer's  regiment,  order  of  march  of,  24. 


INDEX.  347 

D. 
Dalton,  Sherman's  turning  of,  93. 
Danube,  Napoleon's  passage  of,  69. 
Darius,  bis  invasion  of  Scytbia,  144. 
Darkness,  a  screen,  66. 
Davis,  Pemberton  to,  299,  303,  312. 
Dearborn,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Chicago,  51. 
Decisive  point,  defined,  18. 
Deep  lines  of  operation,  119. 

Defensive,  defined,  19;  strength  of,  19,  QQ;  in  mountains,  60. 
Defensive  line,  defined  and  illustrated,  52,  66. 
Defensive,  mixed,  20. 

De  Kalb,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  243. 
Department,  of  the  Gulf,  279 ;  of  the  Tennessee,  ib. 
Deploying  interval,  35. 

Depots,  use  and  location  of,  65,  110,  116,  117,  123. 
Derrecagaix,  on  minor  armies,  39,  43. 
De  Schroon,  a  strategic  objective,  294. 
Deserts,  as  obstacles,  58 ;  strategic  points  of,  59. 
Design,  or  plan,  of  operation,  262,  265. 
Detroit,  military  beginning  of,  51. 
Devastation  of  Shenandoah  Valley,  147,  229. 
Directrix  of  operations,  defined,  36  ;  change  of,  120,  121,  152,  223. 
Discipline  of  British  in  Philadelphia,  226,  227. 
Division,  38;  grand,  261. 

Domestic  economy  in  the  Confederacy,  229  et  seq. 
Donelson,  Fort,  a  river  obstruction,  268  ;  capture  of,  269  et  seq. 
Dowdall's  Tavern,  action  of,  173. 


Early,  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  130 ;  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  209, 

212. 
Eastport,  near  Muscle  Shoals,  270. 
East  River,  Washington's  retreat  across,  66. 
Ector,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  332. 
Edwards  D6p6t,  a  strategic  point,  299  et  seq. 
Efficiency  of  command  and  administration,  31. 
Egypt,  Napoleon's  campaign  in,  referred  to,  22,  56. 
Elements  of  strategy,  81 ;  of  tactical  power,  189. 
Elizabethtown,  a  strategic  point,  268. 

Emory,  his  movement  from  Fort  Monroe  to  Washington,  74. 
Essential  elements  of  strategy,  81. 

Etape,  meaning  of,  118  ;  force  necessary  to  guard  length  of,  114,  118. 
Etowah  River,  Sherman's  passage  of,  94,  95,  96. 
Ewell,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  206  ;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  209, 

210  ;  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212  et  seq. 


348  INDEX. 

Ewing,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  316  et  seq. 

Explosives,  on  raids,  31.  ^ 

Exterior  lines,  192. 

Ezra  Church,  action  of,  100. 

F. 

Fabian  policy,  232,  265. 

Featherston,  Pemberton  to,  300. 

Ferguson,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  241. 

Fighting  power,  distinguished  from  military,  17. 

Fighting  train,  defined,  28 ;  place  of,  in  column,  ib. 

Fire-arms,  improvements  in,  19,  69. 

First  Bull  Run  campaign,  result  of,  267. 

Fixed  strategic  points,  49,  265. 

Flank  opposition,  discussed,  133,  134,  157,  158. 

Flank,  weakness  of,  1.89,  190. 

Flankers,  defined,  30. 

Florence,  near  Muscle  Shoals,  270. 

Forage,  allowance  of,  59 ;  carried  in  train,  125. 

Force  combined  with  stratagem,  70. 

Forcing,  of  rivers,  69;  of  mountains,  70. 

Fords,  on  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan,  163,  164 ;  on  the  Bayou  Pierre, 
294,  299 ;  on  Baker's  Creek,  321,  323,  324. 

Forests,  as  obstacles,  60. 

Formation  of  an  army  on  the  march,  in  a  plain  country,  21 — in  a  road  coun- 
try, 26,  39. 

Forney,  commanding  at  Haines  BluflT,  297. 

Fort,  defined,  65  ;  Amsterdam,  Dearborn,  Frederica,  Orange,  Pitt,  Pontchar- 
train,  Snelling,  St.  John,  St.  Louis,  Washington — military  beginning  of 
a  city,  51 ;  Henry,  a  river  obstruction,  80,  268 ;  Stanwix,  commanding 
Mohawk  Valley,  106;  Fisher,  commanding  harbor  of  Wilmington,  130; 
Donelson,  a  river  obstruction,  268 — capture  of,  269  et  seq.  ;  Pillow,  a 
river  obstruction,  277 — capture  of,  ih. ;  Pemberton,  garrison  of,  284. 

Fortification,  kinds  of,  64. 

Fortress,  definition  and  purpose  of,  65. 

France,  shipping  of,  54. 

Frederica,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Savannah,  51. 

Freeman's  Farm,  battle  of,  137,  138 ;  second  battle  of,  138. 

Fremont,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212. 

French  army,  rear  guard  in,  30 ;  voyage  of,  from  Toulon  to  Alexandria,  56 
— to  Bantry  Bay,  55. 

French  shipping,  54. 

Front  Royal,  action  at,  214. 


Gardiner's  Bay,  strategic  importance  of,  48. 
Gardner,  district  commander,  284  et  seq. 


INDEX.  349 

Garrard,  K.,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  96  et  seq. 

Garrard,  T.  T.,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  333. 

Gates,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  243  et  seq. 

Geographical  strategic  point,  defined  and  illustrated,  48. 

Georgia,  Sherman's  march  through,  referred  to,  121,  224,  225 — described, 
144  ;  exempt  from  invasion  by  Federal  armies,  225  ;  expedition  sent  by 
Prevost  into,  236  ;  Campbell's  expedition  to,  236. 

Germain,  his  plan  of  campaign  for  1778,  235. 

German,  rear  guard,  30  ;  method  of  march  in  1870,  34  ;  depots  in  1870,  117; 
estimate  of  necessary  force  on  communications,  114 ;  design  of  opera- 
tions in  1870,  262. 

Geronimo  campaign,  150. 

Gettysburg,  strategic  importance  of,  47  ;  forced  march  of  6th  Corps  to,  72 ; 
campaign  of,  referred  to,  158,  262 — described,  209. 

Gist,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  306. 

Goltz,  Von  der,  on  the  deployment  of  an  army  corps,  32 ;  on  the  movement  of 
an  army  corps,  73  ;  on  retreats,  90;  on  the  use  of  interior  lines,  197  ;  on 
the  formation  of  minor  armies,  260 ;  on  the  plan  of  operations,  262 ;  on 
preliminary  strategic  operations,  265. 

Government,  as  a  strategic  objective,  224,  226,  264;  absolute,  compared  with 
liberal,  228 ;  of  the  Confederate  States,  224,  225. 

Grain,  allowance  of,  59. 

Grand  divisions,  261. 

Grand  Gulf,  strategic  value  of,  290  ;  operations  against,  291  et  seq. 

Grand  Junction,  a  railroad' centre,  273. 

Grant,  his  overland  campaign,  referred  to,  205,  263 — described,  124;  on  the 
endurance  of  the  South,  224,  225,  232;  his  Vicksburg  campaign,  re- 
ferred to,  70,  82,  123,  154,  157 — described,  283;  his  Appomattox  cam- 
paign, referred  to,  158 — described,  130  ;  his  Belmont  expedition,  267 ; 
his  Shiloh  campaign,  268  et  seq. ;  on  the  strategy  of  the  Shiloh  cam- 
paign, 279,  280 ;  on  the  character  of  the  country  below  Vicksburg,  298. 

Great  Britain,  shipping  of,  54. 

Great  Lakes,  a  line  of  defence,  61. 

Greek  commissariat,  143. 

Green  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Greene,  his  strictures  on  Grant's  movement  to  Port  Gibson,  296. 

Greene,  General,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  245, 

Gregg,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  299. 

Grenada  and  Jackson,  garrison  of,  284. 

Gricrson,  his  raid  in  Mississippi,  286  et  seq.,  300,  340. 

Grindstone  Ford,  on  Bayou  Pierre,  294,  299. 

Grouchy,  after  Ligny,  46. 

Guard,  advance,  functions  of,  26 ;  formation  of,  27. 

Guilford  Court-House,  battle  of,  248. 

Gulf,  Department  of  the,  279. 

Gunboats  on  rivers,  68,  183,  268,  340,  341. 


350  INDEX. 


H. 


Haines  Bluff,  demonstration  at,  82,  294,  295,  296,  340 ;  evacuation  of,  327, 

328,  330. 
Hall,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  330. 
Halleck,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  269  et  seq. 
Hall's  Ferry,  on  Big  Black  River,  294. 
Hamley,  on  the  nature   of  the    ordinary  theatre  of  war,  44;  on   the  use 

of  obstacles,  67 ;  on  the  interception  of  an  army,  155 ;  on  the  use  of 

interior  lines,  196,  197;  on  retreats,  198. 
Hankinsou's  Ferry,  on  Big  Black  River,  294 ;  capture  of,  301. 
Hannibal,  campaigns  of,  264. 
Harper's  Ferry,  bridging  of  Potomac  at,  63. 
Hatch,  in  Grierson's  raid  in  Mississippi,  287. 

Haupt,  on  moving  troops  by  rail,  75;  on  protecting  communications,  115. 
Hay,  allowance  of,  59. 
Helena,  a  strategic  point,  279. 

Henry,  Fort,  a  river  obstruction,  80,  268  ;  capture  of,  269,  270. 
Hill,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  209. 
Holmes,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  326. 
Hood,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  96,  98  et  seq.,  114. 
Hooker,  his   Chancellorsville   campaign,   referred   to,   45,   70,    126,  205 — 

described  161 ;  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  206. 
Horse,  water  drunk  by,  58. 

Houston  to  Jay,  on  misfortunes  of  Georgia,  242. 
Hovey,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  330. 
Howard,  succeeds  McPherson,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  99;  commands  11th 

Corps  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161. 
Howe,  in  Saratoga  campaign,  108. 

Hudson  River,  a  strategic  line,  50,  106 ;  obstruction  of,  at  West  Point,  80. 
Hull,  his  loss  of  baggage  in  1812,  31. 
Humboldt,  a  strategic  point,  275. 

Hunt,  commands  artillery  reserve  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161, 
Hurlbut,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305. 

I. 

Iberia,  a  strategic  point,  293. 

Ice,  a  means  of  communication,  64. 

Impedimenta,  movement  of,  28. 

Indians,  methods  of,  23,  31,  103, 139, 149 ;  employment  of,  106, 108, 137,  233, 
235,  244. 

Infantry,  place  of,  in  column,  32. 

Initiative,  defined,  20. 

Inland  seas  and  lakes,  as  obstacles,  61. 

Interior  lines,  defined  and  discussed,  192  et  seq. ;  Lee's  use  of,  in  Chancellors- 
ville campaign,  181  ;  Jackson's  use  of,  in  Valley  campaign,  212  et  seq. 
— in  Peninsular  campaign,  222,  223. 


INDEX.  351 


Intermediate  base,  116,  117. 

Interposition,  strategic,  195. 

Interval  between  columns,  34. 

Intrenched  camps,  65. 

Inundations,  as  obstacles,  64. 

Invasion,  guarding  coast  against,  57,  58. 

Ireland,  attempt  of  French  to  invade,  55. 

Iron-clad  gunboat,  use  of,  on  rivers,  68. 

Island  No.  10,  a  river  obstruction,  80,  273 ;  capture  of,  277. 


J- 

Jacksboro,  a  strategic  point,  268. 

Jackson,  capital  of  Mississippi,  291,  299,  300 ;  garrison  of,  284,  333 ;  capture 
of,  313  et  seq. 

Jackson  and  Grenada,  garrison  of,  284. 

Jackson,  T.  J.,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  71,  206 ;  in  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  161,  173  et  seq. ;  in  his  Valley  campaign,  212. 

James,  Armj^  of  the,  124,  129. 

James  and  Kanawha  River  Canal,  in  Lee's  system  of  communication,  125 ; 
injured  by  Stoneman's  cavalry,  177. 

James  River,  Grant's  passage  of  the,  128, 129. 

Jay,  Houston  to,  on  misfortunes  of  Georgia,  242. 

Johnson,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  209  ;  in  Jackson's  Valley  camimign,  212 
et  seq. 

Johnston,  A.  S.,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  269. 

Johnston  J.  E.,  in  Atlanta  campaign  92;  relieved  from  command  in  Atlanta 
campaign,  98;  on  the  tenability  of  Atlanta,  102;  surrenders  at  Raleigh, 
147;  twice  orders  Pemberton  to  attack  Grant,  301,  304;  arrives  at 
Jackson,  Mississippi,  314,  339 ;  orders  Pemberton  to  unite  with  him, 
315,  318,  319,  320,  322;  orders  evacuation  of  Vicksburg,  327 ;  attempts 
to  relieve  Vicksburg,  331,  332,  334-338  ;  orders  evacuation  of  Port 
Hudson,  331. 

Jonesboro,  Sherman's  movement  on,  101,  102. 

Jordan,  on  Shiloh  campaign,  277,  278. 

Junctions  of  roads  and  rivers,  80,  193. 


K. 

Kelley's  Ford,  on  the  Rappahannock,  164. 
Kennesaw  Mountain,  Sherman's  turning  of,  96,  97. 
Key-point,  defined,  18  ;  discussed,  48. 
Kilpatrick,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  93  ct  seq. 
King,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  208. 
King's  Mountain,  battle  of,  245. 
Knoxville,  an  intrenched  camp.  111  ;  a  depot,  268. 


352  INDEX. 


La  Fayette,  in  Yorktown  campaign,  250  et  seq. 

La  Grange,  Grierson  starts  from,  286. 

Lakes,  as  obstacles,  6L 

Lauman,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305. 

Lawton,  his  pursuit  of  Geronimo,  150. 

Lee,  E.  E.,  his  campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James,  referred  to,  205, 
263 — described,  124;  liis  Chancellorsville  campaign,  referred  to,  45,  70, 
126,  205 — described,  161 ;  his  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  referred  to, 
71,  111,  213 — described,  206  ;  his  Gettysburg  campaign,  referred  to,  158, 
262 — described,  209;  his  Peninsular  campaign,  referred  to,  222, 

Lee,  S.  D.,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  302. 

Lee,  W-  H.  F.,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  169  et  seq. 

Legend  for  maps  15-21,  281. 

Leslie,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  246. 

Ligny,  marches  after,  46. 

Lincoln,  General,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  236  et  seq. 

Lincoln,  President,  terminates  Peninsular  campaign,  223  ;  places  Buell  under 
Halleck,  275. 

Line,  of  operation,  36,  119,  120,  121,  152,  223;  of  supply,  110,  121;  of 
retreat.  111,  121;  of  communication,  44,  71,  113,  120,  121;  deep,  119; 
of  battle,  density  of,  32,  119— attack  of,  189,  190,  19l ;  of  defence,  52. 

Lines,  of  communication,  number  of,  119,  122;  interior  and  exterior,  192. 

Lippitt,  on  containing  j^ovver  of  well-disciplined  troops,  33 ;  on  use  of  river 
gunboats,  69. 

Logan's  Cross-Roads,  battle  of,  269. 

Longstreet,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  207  et  seq. ;  in  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, 209. 

Loring,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284  et  seq. 

Losses,  in  Grant's  overland  campaign,  129,  131 ;  in  Saratoga  campaign, 
138  ;  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  182  ;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  211 ; 
at  Fort  Henry,  270  ;  at  Fort  Donelson,  271  ;  at  Shiloh,  277 ;  in  Grier- 
son's  raid,  290;  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  339. 

Louisiana,  a  source  of  supply,  183. 

Louisville,  Sherman's  main  base,  77,  117,  118  ;  Buell's  head-quarters,  268. 

Lower  St.  Lawrence  River,  a  defence  of  Canada,  52, 

M, 

Macon,  Bayou,  a  line  of  communication,  292. 

Magruder,  his  retreat  on  the  Peninsula,  referred  to,  278. 

Mahan,  on  efiectiveness  of  commerce  destroying,  188, 

Main  body,  use  of,  21, 

ManoBuvre,  strategic  point  of,  48,  49 ;  discussed  67,  70,  84,  119,  153. 

Manoeuvring,  aids  to,  67,  68,  70  ;  in  general,  84;  in  regular  strategy  without. 

communications,  133 — with  communications,  121,   122,   123,   153;    in 

tactical  strategy,  195. 


INDEX.  353 

March,  an  army  ou  the,  21,  39. 

March  front,  39,  41. 

Marching,  rate  of,  46,  72,  289. 

Marengo,  campaign  of,  cited,  157. 

Marion,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  243. 

Marshes,  as  obstacles,  Gl. 

Maude,  on  disembarkation  of  troops,  56,  57 ;  on  movement  of  troops  by 
rail,  76. 

Maxey,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  315  et  seq. 

McClellan,  his  order  of  march  in  1862,  33  ;  his  movement  by  water,  74 ;  his 
change  of  base,  121,  152,  223;  his  forcing  of  South  Mountain,  70; 
during  Shiloh  campaign,  269. 

McClernaud,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  283  ef  seq. 

McCook,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  93  et  seq. 

McDowell,  trestle  bridge  constructed  by,  63  ;  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign, 
216  et  seq.  ;  in  Peninsular  campaign,  223. 

McDowell,  battle  of,  213. 

McGuiunis,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  326. 

McNair,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  332. 

McPherson,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  92  et  seq. ;  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284 
et  seq. 

Meade,  corps  commander,  161 ;  his  Gettysburg  campaign,  referred  to,  158, 
262— described,  209. 

Mecca,  strategic  importance  of,  48. 

Memphis,  a  railroad  centre,  273. 

Merrimac,  battle  of  Monitor  with,  referred  to,  267. 

Metz,  campaign  of,  cited,  157. 

Mexico,  Scott's  order  of  march  in,  34 ;  Cerro  Gordo  in  campaign  in,  46  ; 
landing  on  coast  of,  57  ;  capture  of  city  of,  202. 

Midway,  burnt  by  British,  236. 

Miles,  his  campaign  against  Gerouimo,  150. 

Military  bridges,  62. 

Military  despotism,  in  Confederacy,  224,  225  ;  in  enemy's  country,  264. 

Military  power,  defined,  17, 

Militia,  in  Saratoga  campaign,  137 ;  in  Trenton  campaign,  159 ;  in  British 
campaign  in  the  South,  235,  241,  243-246,  248,  249,  257  ;  in  future  wars 
of  United  States,  259. 

Mill  Springs,  campaign  of,  269. 

Milliken's  Bend,  a  strategic  point,  279 ;  attacked,  336. 

Milroy,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212  et  seq. 

Minor  army,  formation  of,  39. 

Mississippi,  Grant's  campaign  in,  referred  to,  70,  82, 123, 154, 157 — described, 
283  ;  Grierson's  raid  in,  286  et  seq.,  300,  340. 

Mississippi  River,  a  line  of  defence,  52,  285,  327,  328  ;  a  line  of  communi- 
cation, 267,  285,  327,  328,  330;  Grant's  passage  of,  70,  290,  340;  pa- 
trolled by  gunboats,  183,  268,  284. 

Mist,  a  screen,  66. 

23 


354  INDEX. 

Mixed  defensive,  defined,  20. 

Mobilization,  discussed,  259. 

Mohawk  Valley,  a  strategic  objective,  106. 

Monitor,  its  battle  with  Merrimac,  referred  to,  267. 

Moore,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305  et  seq. 

Morgaii,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  245  et  seq. 

Moscow,  a  political  strategic  point,  48  ;  campaign,  referred  to,  119. 

Mount  Vernon,  a  political  strategic  point,  48. 

Mountain  Indians,  in  a  plain  country,  23. 

Mountains,  as  obstacles,  52,  60  ;  as  screens,  66. 

Mower,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  337. 

Murfreesboro,  a  strategic  point,  272. 

Muscle  Shoals,  an  obstruction  of  Tennessee  River,  270. 

N. 

Napoleon,  his  army  in  Egypt,  22 ;  his  march  after  Ligny,  46  ;  his  voyage 
from  Toulon  to  Alexandria,  56 ;  on  the  mobility  of  an  army,  60 ;  his 
passage  of  the  Danube,  69  ;  on  rivers  as  obstacles,  70  ;  his  Moscow  cam- 
paign, referred  to,  119  ;  his  political  strategy,  264. 

Nashville,  an  intrenched  camp,  111 ;  a  depot,  118,  119,  268,  271 ;  evacuation 
of,  271. 

Nassau,  a  resort  of  blockade-runners,  229. 

Nelson,  Admiral,  his  fleet  off  Toulon,  56. 

Nelson,  General,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  271. 

Neutral  territory,  an  obstacle,  53, 

New  Carthage,  a  strategic  objective,  285. 

New  England,  in  Revolutionary  War,  105,  106,  258. 

New  Hope  Church,  Sherman's  turning  of,  96. 

New  Madrid,  a  river  obstruction,  80,  273 ;  capture  of,  277. 

New  Orleans,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

New  York,  strategic  importance  of,  47,  48,  50  ;  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Newspapers  during  Sherman's  march  through  Georgia,  225. 

Ninety-Six,  a  strategic  point,  242. 

North  Anna,  Grant's  movement  to,  127. 

North  Carolina,  exempt  from  invasion  by  Federals,  225. 

Notation  on  maps  15-21,  explained,  281. 

O. 

Objective  (objective  point),  18. 

Oblique  opposition,  133,  134,  157,  158. 

Obstacles,  discussed,  52,  66,  67. 

Obstruction,  of  rivers  and  railroads,  78. 

Ocean,  an  obstacle,  54. 

Offensive,  defined,  19 ;  strength  of,  ib. ;  strategic,  involves  tactical,  156. 

Offensive-defensive,  defined  and  discussed,  20,  67,  153. 

Offensive  manoeuvring,  aids  to,  67,  68,  70 ;  in  general,  84 ;  in  regular  strategy, 


INDEX.  355 

without  comnuiiiications,  133 — with  communications,  121,  122,  123, 153; 
in  tactical  strategy,  195. 

Ohio,  Army  of  the,  261. 

Ohio  River,  a  military  frontier,  118,  267,  268. 

Old  Albemarle  Court-House  (Charlottesville),  seat  of  government  of  Vir- 
ginia, 252,  253. 

Opelousas,  a  strategic  objective,  293. 

Opening  out  on  the  march,  30. 

Operation,  line  of,  36;  base  of,  112;  plan  or  design  of,  262,  265  ;  change  of 
base  of,  120,  121,  152,  223. 

Operations,  in  general,  84,  259;  independent  of  a  base,  132;  of  regular 
strategy,  without  communications,  132 — with  communications,  121,  122, 
123,  153;  of  tactical  strategy,  195;  of  political  strategy,  224. 

Orange,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Albany,  51. 

Ord,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  216. 

Order  of  march,  in  a  plain  country,  21 ;  in  a  road  country,  26 ;  of  Napo- 
leon's army  in  Egypt,  22;  of  British  in  Soudan,  23;  of  7th  U.S. 
Cavalry  on  the  plains,  24;  of  Germans  in  1870,  34;  of  McClellan  in 
1862,  33;  of  Sheridan  in  1864,  34;  of  Scott  in  Mexico,  ib. 

Organization  of  armies,  17,  39,  260. 

Osterhaus,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305. 

Outposts  at  Shiloh,  276,  279. 

Overland  campaign,  referred  to,  205,  263 — described,  124. 

P. 

Paducah,  a  strategic  point,  268. 

Panola,  garrison  of,  284. 

Paris,  Comte  de,  on  use  of  rivers  and  railroads,  78. 

Paris,  siege  of,  77. 

Paris,  Tennessee,  a  strategic  objective,  274. 

Passive  defensive,  defined,  66. 

Patrick,  commands  provost  guard,  161. 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  Sherman's  passage  of,  98. 

Pemberton,  Fort,  garrison  of,  284. 

Pemberton,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284  et  seq. 

Pendleton,  commands  artillery  reserve,  161. 

Peninsula,  Lee  and  McClellan  on  the,  222. 

Peninsular  veterans  in  America,  107. 

People,  as  military  objective,  228,  257,  258,  263. 

Perkins,  an  objective  point,  295. 

Persian  commissariat,  143,  144. 

Pettus,  governor  of  Mississippi,  300,  303. 

Philadelphia,  seat  of  government,  108,  226;  a  British  Capua,  226. 

Phillips,  in  British  campaign  in  Virginia,  249. 

Pickens,  his  capture  of  Tory  emissaries,  236. 

Pine  Mountain,  Sherman's  turning  of,  96. 

Pitt,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Pittsburg,  51. 


356  INDEX. 

Pittsburg,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  battle  of,  275,  276. 

Pivot  of  operation,  defined,  123. 

Plan  or  design  of  operation,  262,  265, 

Plattsburg  Barracks,  British  attempt  upon,  107. 

Pleasonton,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  168  et  seq. 

Point,  tactical,  17,  18 — strategic,  ib. — decisive,  18 — objective,  ib. ;  different 

kinds  of  strategic,  47. 
Poisoning  of  springs,  59. 
Political  and  militarj"  problem,  259. 
Political  decentralization,  228. 
Political  strategic  point,  47.  ^ 

Political  strategy,  discussed,  224,  263,  264 ;  incidental  to  regular  strategy,  228. 
Pontchartraiu,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Detroit,  51. 
Pontoon  bridges,  63. 
Pope,  his  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  71,  206 ;    in  Shiloh  campaign,  273 

et  seq. 
Popular  war,  225. 

Port  Gibson,  operations  against,  294  et  seq.,  307,  339. 
Port  Hudson,  garrison  of,  284,  297,  308,  339 ;  surrender  of,  331,  338,  339. 
Port  Eepublic,  battle  of,  221. 

Porter,  Admiral,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284  et  seq. 
Porter,  General,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  209. 
Portland,  Maine,  a  strategic  point,  49. 
Portsmouth,  Virginia,  a  strategic  point,  249,  251. 
Potomac,  Army  of  the,  124,  161,  206,  209,  210;  objective  of  Army  of  the,  262, 

263. 
Potomac  River,  bridging  of  the,  63  ;  gunboats  on  the,  69;  Schofield's  pas- 
sage of  the,  75. 
Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  military  beginning  of  San  Francisco,  51. 
Prevost,  expedition  sent  out  by,  236. 

Prisoners,  in  Grant's  overland  campaign,  127,  128,  131 ;  in  Saratoga  cam- 
paign, 138;  in  Yorktown  campaign,  256  ;  at  Fort  Henry,  270;  at  Fort 
Donelson,  271  ;  in  Grierson's  raid,  289,  290. 
Problem,  the  political  and  military,  259. 
Puebla,  Scott's  march  from,  34. 
Pugh,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  330, 
Pursuits,  discussion  of,  89,  103,  139,  149. 

Q. 

Quartering  trooj^s  on  people,  142. 

R. 

Race,  strategic,  81. 

Raid,  Stoneman's,  below  Atlanta,  99,  100  ;  Kilpatrick's,  below  Atlanta,  100  ; 
Stoneman's,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  165  et  seq.,  179,  180 ;  Grier- 
son's, in  Vicksburg  campaign,  286  et  seq.,  300,  340. 


INDEX.  357 

Eaiding,  in  general,  31,  114,  143  ;  Indian,  103,  139,  149. 

Eailroad,  in  Georgia,  93 ;  in  Virginia,  125 ;  in  Confederacy,  140,  182,  273 ; 
transportation  by,  73  et  seq. ;  built  or  rebuilt  in  War  of  Secession,  46; 
destruction  of,  78,113,  115;  destroyed,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  98-101, 
113,  114— in  Grant's  overland  camjiaign,  127-130— in  Sherman's  march 
through  Georgia,  144 — in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  173,  176,  177, 
180 — in  Second  Bull  Run  cami)aign,  206 — in  Peninsular  campaign,  223 
— in  Grierson's  raid,  290 — in  Vicksburg  campaign,  308,  321. 

Ransom,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  313. 

Rapidan  River,  Grant's  passage  of,  126  ;  Hooker's  passage  of,  161  et  seq.  ; 
fords  on,  164. 

Rate  of  travel,  by  road,  71 ;  by  water,  72  ;  by  rail,  73. 

Ration,  weight  of,  58. 

Rations,  destroyed  by  Sheridan,  127;  carried  by  soldier,  125,  133,  166.  See 
Supplies. 

Rawdon,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  246  et  seq. 

Raymond,  battle  of,  311. 

Rear  guard,  functions  of,  30,  198. 

Rebellion,  War  of,  smallness  of  Federal  armies  in,  43  ;  bridges  and  railroads 
built  in,  46;  blockade  in,  182-185,  229,  266;  duration  of,  224,  225,  232; 
strategy  of,  262;  campaigns  of,  see  Campaign;  armies  in,  see  Army. 

Red  River,  a  line  of  supply,  285. 

Regimental  train,  defined,  28  ;  its  place  in  column,  lb. 

Regular  strategic  point,  47. 

Regular  strategy,  105,  110. 

Republic  compared  with  absolute  government,  228. 

Requisitioning,  142. 

Resaca,  Sherman's  turning  of,  94. 

Reserve  train,  defined,  28 ;  its  place  in  column,  ib. 

Retreat,  order  of  march  in,  30;  Washington's,  from  Long  Island,  QQ; 
change  of  line  of,  121;  cutting  line  of,  133;  Johnston's,  to  Atlanta, 
92,  278 ;  Banks's,  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  216 ;  Greene's,  in  the  South, 
246  etseq.;  Beauregard's  from  Shiloh,  277,  278;  Magruder's,  on  Penin- 
sula, referred  to,  278. 

Retreats,  discussed,  89,  102. 

Revolutionary  War,  people  during,  233;  strategy  of,  105,  108,  258;  cam- 
paigns of,  see  Saratoga,  Trenton,  South. 

Reynolds,  A.  W.,  in  Vicksburg  camj)aign,  299. 

Reynolds,  J.  F.,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161. 

Richmond,  strategic  character  of,  50,  51,  227;  a  strategic  objective,  126 
et  seq.,  250,  262,  263;  evacuated  by  Lee,  131— by  La  Fayette,  252; 
campaign,  referred  to,  205,  263 — described,  124. 

Ricketts,  in  Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  208. 

Rivers,  as  obstacles,  62,  69,  70;  as  communications,  76,  77;  obstruction  of, 
78,  80. 

Roads,  common,  46;  corduroy,  62;  travel  on,  71. 

Rocky  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 


358  INDEX. 

Rodes,  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  209,  210. 
Roman  commissariat,  143. 
Rome,  Georgia,  a  strategic  point,  94. 
Rousseau,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  99. 
Ruggles,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284. 
Russian  army,  rear  guard  in,  30. 


Salem  Church,  action  of,  177. 

San  Francisco,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

San  Francisco,  Presidio  of,  military  beginning  of  city,  51. 

Saratoga,  a  strategic  point,  47  ;  campaign  of,  referred  to,  106,  119,  226 — 
described,  136. 

Savannah,  Georgia,  military  beginning  of,  51 ;  a  strategic  point,  147,  242. 

Savannah,  Tennessee,  a  strategic  point,  274,  275. 

Saxton,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  216. 

Schenck,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  212,  213. 

Schofield,  his  movement  from  Nashville  to  Wilmington,  74;  in  Atlanta 
campaign,  92  et  seq.,  120. 

Schuyler,  in  Saratoga  campaign,  136. 

Scott,  his  order  of  march  from  Puebla,  34  ;  his  manoeuvre  at  Cerro  Gordo,  46. 

Screens,  use  of,  65. 

Seas,  inland,  as  obstacles,  61. 

Secession,  War  of,  smallness  of  Federal  armies  in,  43  ;  bridges  and  railroads 
built  in,  46;  blockade  in,  182-185,  229,  266;  duration  of,  224,  225,  232; 
strategy  of,  262  ;  camj^aigns  of,  see  Campaign  ;  armies  in,  see  Army. 

Second  Bull  Run  campaign,  referred  to,  71,  111,  223 — described,  206. 

Security,  of  an  army,  20,  43,  60;  of  communications,  43,  114. 

Sedgwick,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161,  175  et  seq. 

Semmes,  his  cruise  in  the  Alabama,  186. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  an  avenue  of  operation,  116,  212;  devastation  of,  147, 
229  ;  Sheridan's  campaign  in,  130, 147,  229  ;  Jackson's  campaign  in,  212. 

Sheridan,  his  order  of  march  in  1864,  34;  on  wars  with  foreign  powers,  55; 
his  Yellow  Tavern  expedition,  127 ;  his  Trevilian  Station  expedition, 
128 ;  his  Valley  campaign,  130,  147,  229;  in  Appomattox  campaign,  130. 

Sherman,  his  Atlanta  campaign,  referred  to,  113, 118, 152, 154,  204 — described, 
92  ;  his  destruction  of  railroads,  98,  100, 101,  102, 113, 114,  144,  321  ;  his 
march  through  Georgia,  referred  to,  121,  224,  225 — described,  144;  on 
distance  w-agons  can  advance  from  base,  116,  117;  his  march  from 
Savannah  to  Raleigh,  147  ;  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  279  et  seq. 

Shiloh,  campaign  of,  267  et  seq. ;  battle  of,  275  et  seq. 

Sickles,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161  et  seq. 

Siege  of  Paris,  impossible  without  railroads,  77. 

Sierra  Nevada,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Simcoe,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  252  et  seq. 

Size,  of  armies,  39 ;  of  army  corps,  ib. ;  of  divisions,  ib. 


INDEX.  359 

Slack,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  333. 

Slaves,  in  Eevolutionary  War,  233,  235-239,  253. 

Slocum,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161  et  seq. 

Smith,  C.  F.,  in  Shiloh  campaign,  274. 

Smith,  E.  K.,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284. 

Smith,  M.  L.,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  303. 

Smith,  Sooy,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  337. 

Snelling,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  St.  Paul,  51. 

Snyder's  Mill,  a  dependency  of  Haines  Bluff,  297. 

Soldier,  lighting  power  of,  17  ;  water  drunk  by,  58  ;  ration  of,  58 ;  weight 

carried  by,  132 ;  rations  carried  by,  125,  133,  106. 
Soudan,  order  of  march  in,  23  ;  filling  wells  at  Abu  Klea  in,  59. 
South,  British  campaign  in,  referred  to,  107 — described,  234;  strategic  points 

in,  242. 
South  Carolina,  exempt  from  Federal  invasion,  225;  British  enroll  militia 

in,  241. 
South  Mountain,  forced  by  McClellan,  70. 
Spottsylvania,  Grant's  movement  to,  126. 
Springfield,  Massachusetts,  a  strategic  point,  47. 
Squares,  Napoleon's,  in  Egypt,  22. 
Steele,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305. 
Steuben,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  250  et  seq. 
Stevenson,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  284. 
Stewart,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  215. 
St.  John,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  New  Orleans,  51. 
St.  Lawrence  River,  a  line  of  defence,  52,  61. 
St.  Leger,  in  Saratoga  campaign,  106. 

St.  Louis,  military  beginning  of,  51  ;  an  intrenched  camp.  111. 
Stoneman,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  94  et  seq. ;  in  Chancellorsville  campaign, 

161,  164  et  seq.,  179,  180. 
Stony  Point,  capture  of,  cited,  66. 
St.  Paul,  military  beginning  of,  51. 

Stratagem,  in  strategy,  82,  84 ;  combination  of  force  with,  70. 
Strategic  chess-board,  described,  44. 
Strategic  formation,  39  et  seq.,  259. 
Strategic  interposition,  discussed,  195  et  seq. 
Strategic  objective,  18,  200,  264,  265. 
Strategic  obstacle,  52,  66. 

Strategic  point,  defined,  17,  18;  discussed,  47,  49,  224,  228. 
Strategic  points  in  United  States,  47-52. 
Strategic  screens,  65. 
Strategy,  defined,  17  ;  its  conflict  with  tactics,  18;  regular,  105,  110;  tactical, 

105,  108,  189,  195 ;  political,  223 ;  as  a  factor  in  tactics,  205 ;  tactics  as 

a  factor  in,  203. 
Striking  distance,  37,  38. 
Stuart,  in  Chancellorsville  campaign,  161,  165  et  seq.;  in  Yellow  Tavern 

expedition,  127;  in  Gettysburg  campaign,  209,  210. 


360  INDEX. 

Sumter,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  243. 

Supplies,  destroyed,  by  Sherman,  145 — by  Sheridan,  127,  148 — by  Stone- 
man,  179,  180— by  Grierson,  290. 

Supply,  line  of,  110;  base  of,  110,  112;  cutting  a  line  of,  152;  methods  of, 
110,  132,  139  et  seq. ;  change  of  base  of,  120,  121,  152,  223. 

Supply  train,  28. 

Support,  mutual,  on  the  march,  32. 

Swamp,  a  strategic  obstacle,  61. 

T. 

Tabernacle  Church,  action  of,  172. 

Tactical  arms,  on  the  march,  32. 

Tactical  objective,  18. 

Tactical  point,  17,  18. 

Tactical  power,  elements  of,  189. 

Tactical  strategic  point,  47. 

Tactical  strategy,  105,  108,  189,  195. 

Tactics,  defined,  17  ;  its  conflict  with  strategy,  18 ;  a  factor  in  strategy,  203. 

Tarleton,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  246. 

Taylor,  Richard,  in  Louisiana,  285. 

Taylor,  T.  H.,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  302. 

Telegraph,  its  use  on  exterior  lines,  202 ;  destroyed,  by  Sheridan,  127 — by 
Stoneman,  176 — by  Grierson,  290;  cut  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  308. 

Tennessee,  Department  of  the,  279. 

Tennessee  River,  a  line  of  operation,  268. 

Texas,  a  source  of  supply,  183. 

Theatre  of  war,  discussed,  44. 

Thomas,  in  Atlanta  campaign,  92  et  seq. 

Ticonderoga,  a  strategic  point,  106,  138. 

Tilghman,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  299  et  seq. 

Tories,  mostly  in  the  South,  233;  in  Saratoga  campaign,  106,  137;  in  cam- 
paign in  the  South,  236,  239,  242,  244,  245,  248,  249. 

Tracy,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  295. 

Train,  on  the  march,  28 ;  attack  of,  31 ;  security  of,  30,  31,  132,  144. 

Transition  station,  117,  119. 

Transportation  of  troops,  by  marches,  71 ;  by  water,  55,  72;  by  rail,  73;  to 
the  frontier,  260. 

Transports,  capacity  of,  54  ;  movement  of,  55  ;  unloading  of,  56. 

Trenton  campaign,  159. 

Trestle  bridge,  63. 

Troops,  their  transportation  by  marches,  71 — by  water,  55,  72 — by  rail,  73 — 
to  the  frontier,  260;  their  subsistence,  110,  132,  139  et  seq. 

Tucker,  Mr.,  his  movement  of  McClellan's  army  to  Fort  Monroe,  74. 

Turning,  distinguished  from  flanking,  191  ;  of  a  position  on  a  river,  123. 

Tuttle,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  305. 

Tyler,  in  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  219. 


INDEX.  361 

U. 
Ulm,  campaign  of,  cited,  157. 
United  States,  strategic  points  in,  47-52,  ill;  smallness  of  armies  of,  43; 

its  commerce  in  1861,  185. 
United  States  P'ord,  on  the  Rappahannock,  164. 
Unity  of  command,  257. 
Unpopular  war,  225. 

Upper  St.  Lawrence,  a  line  of  defence,  61. 
Ute  Indians,  methods  of,  23. 

V. 

Valley  campaign,  Jackson's,  212;  Sheridan's,  130,  147,  229. 

Van  Dorn,  in  Shiloli  campaign,  277. 

Vane,  spirit  of,  106. 

Vaughn,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  317. 

Vicksburg,  campaign  of,  referred  to,  70,  82,  1 23,  154,  157 — described,  283. 

Vicksburg,  garrison  of,  284,  320,  333,  339 ;  investment  of,  327  et  seq. ;  assault 
of,  330-333  ;  surrender  of,  337,  339. 

Virginia,  campaigns  in,  see  Yorktown,  Peninsula,  Bull  Run,  Second  Bull 
Run,  Chancellorsville,  Overland,  Appomattox,  Valley ;  railroads  in, 
125,  126. 

Von  der  Goltz,  on  deployment  of  an  army  corps,  32  ;  on  movement  of  an 
army  corps,  73 ;  on  retreats,  90 ;  on  use  of  interior  lines,  197 ;  on  for- 
mation of  minor  armies,  260;  on  plan,  or  design,  of  oi^erations,  262;  on 
preliminary  operations  of  war,  265. 


W. 

Walker,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  306. 

War,  defined,  17;  of  American  Revolution,  105,  108;  of  1812,  107,  108, 
232;  of  Secession,  see  Secession;  of  1870,  262;  popular,  or  unpopular, 
225  ;  in  general,  259 ;  preliminary  operations  of,  265. 

Warrenton,  a  strategic  point,  290. 

Washington,  seat  of  government,  226,  227;  defence  of,  69,  111,  223. 

Washington,  Fort,  military  beginning  of  Cincinnati,  51. 

Washington,  General,  his  retreat  from  Long  Island,  66  ;  his  Trenton  cam- 
paign, 159;  his  Yorktown  campaign,  107,249;  detaches  De  Kalb  to 
command  in  the  South,  243. 

Water,  for  horse  and  man,  58. 

Waterloo,  squares  at,  23 ;  campaign  of,  referred  to,  46,  202. 

Watervliet  Arsenal,  a  strategic  point,  50. 

Wayne,  his  capture  of  Stony  Point,  cited,  66  ;  in  Yorktown  campaign,  250. 

West  Point,  a  river  obstruction,  80. 

Western  Army,  in  British  campaign  in  the  South,  245. 

White  Mountains,  a  line  of  defence,  52. 

Wilderness,  nature  of,  163;  operations  in,  126,  170  d  seq. 


362  INDEX. 

Williamsburg,  a  strategic  point,  250,  254,  255. 

Wilmington  harbor,  used,  by  Confederates,  126,  229— by  British,  234,  249. 

Wilson,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  331. 

Winchester,  Jackson's  victory  at,  217. 

Wolseley,  on  capacity  of  English  railroads,  73. 

Woods,  as  screens  and  obstacles,  66. 

Wright,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  307. 


Yazoo  River,  a  line  of  operation,  294. 
Yellow  Tavern  expedition,  126,  127. 
Yerger,  in  Vicksburg  campaign,  325. 
Yorktown  campaign,  107,  249. 
Young's  Point,  Sherman  at,  298. 


MAP  1. 


MAP    OF   THr 
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